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The Eastern Question and the Fallacy of Modernity 
On the Premodern Origins of the Modern Inter-State Order in Southeastern Europe 
 
 
 
The ‘eastern question’ of the 19th century is conventionally understood as the 
power-vacuum created by the decay of the geostrategically important Ottoman 
Empire in the context of a highly competitive and expansionary European inter-state 
system. Conventional approaches to International Relations argue that the eastern 
question was solved by creating multiple, legitimate, sovereign national states in lieu 
of Ottoman rule as the outcome of an expanding European modernity, replacing the 
outdated, illegitimate and despotic rule of Oriental princes. However, this assumption 
entails a tension between the supposedly universal scope of European modernity and 
its fractured, multi-national form of transmission. 
 
This contradiction, implicit in International Relations theory, is the subject of 
this thesis. Examining this problem in the light of the eastern question, this thesis 
offers a historical sociological reconstruction of the social transformations that 
produced the supposedly ‘modern’ geopolitical ‘order’ in Southeastern Europe. The 
critical re-reading and positive reconstruction of the Ottoman trajectory from the end 
of territorial expansion in 1683 to the Greek secession in 1821, problematizes in how 
far territorial fragmentation of political rule can be understood as the ‘logical’ result 
of the expansion of ‘modern’ social and political relations.  
 
It is argued that, instead of understanding these developments as a teleological 
and predetermined process of Westernization, the key for understanding the 
emergence of the post-Ottoman state system lies in deciphering the dialectic between 
a ‘domestic’ social struggle among pre-capitalist classes and an intensifying pan-
European geopolitical dynamic. Hence, rather than understanding the process of 
nation-formation as the inevitable result of the expansion of ‘modern’ international 
relations, it is necessary to emphasize the specificity of the Ottoman, like any other 
transformation. This in turn helps illuminating the unnatural and malleable nature of 
‘modern’ territorial inter-national ‘orders’. Rather than implementing a just, natural or 
finite domestic and geopolitical order, ‘national’ fragmentations result from specific, 
materially conditioned social struggles.  
 
This raises generic problems with static and ahistorical understandings of 
social and geopolitical relations. It is suggested that a theoretically open historical 
materialist sociology of International Relations can provide a remedy. In 
consequence, it is argued that the ‘eastern question’, far from being solved by the 
formation of national states, still remains open to this day. 
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1 A World after whose Image?  
Modernizing International Relations and Ottoman Decline 
 
‘By the beginning of the twentieth century Europe had added to its repertoire of 
Schimpfwörter, or disparagements, a new one which turned out to be more 
persistent than others with centuries old traditions. “Balkanization” not only had 
come to denote the parcelization of large and viable political units but also had 
become a synonym for a reversion to the tribal, the backward, the primitive, the 
barbarian.’ 
        Todorova (1997) 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
On February 17, 2008 Kosovo declared its independence from the Republic of Serbia. 
Many Western states recognized the new state soon thereafter. Arguably, these 
developments, while upholding a Kosovan ‘right to self-determination’, challenged 
established principles of international order - most notably the principle of 
sovereignty understood as the right to non-intervention in Serbian internal affairs. 
Beyond evoking the old dilemma of international relations between ‘justice’ and 
‘order’, some serious international implications were to follow. Russia defended its 
own intervention in Southern Ossetia in August 2008 with reference to the Kosovan 
precedent which had, according to the Russian rationale, established a ‘right to 
secession’ in conjunction with a protective Great Power enforcing it through military 
intervention. Conservative international lawyers had pointed at the dangers of 
legalizing secessions since the 1999 NATO intervention in the Kosovan case, as they 
constituted an open attack on one of the core principles of international order: state 
sovereignty and the inviolability of internationally recognized territorial borders. This 
was also reflected in the refusal of states within the West, like Spain, to acknowledge 
Kosovan independence. The Basque nationalist movement should not be encouraged 
by this precedent. Kosovo, however, by no means set any precedent, at least not in 
regards to the phenomenon of ‘national’ secession as such, which is just as old as the 
very principle of its antithesis, i.e. ‘national’ state sovereignty. More generally, this 
conflict between two mutually negating as well as reaffirming ‘national’ principles of 
self-determination and state sovereignty continues to constitute a foundational 
paradox of ‘modern’ international relations.1 
                                                 
1
 Throughout this thesis the terms modern and premodern will be used in a thin heuristic sense, as 
pertaining to chronology and in a thicker, more substantive sense as a problematization of the 
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The clash of these two universal principles of modern IR has frequently led to 
a differentiation of outcomes. They could be described as plurality at best, mostly 
disorder and socio-political instability, culminating in genocidal war at worst. The 
fact that many of these struggles were, like the above, fought on the Balkan Peninsula 
led to the articulation and widespread reception of the term ‘Balkanization’ in the 
Social Science literature and political lexicon, associated with these problematic 
social phenomena (Der Derian 1991; Todorova 1994; Todorova 1997; Bjelic and 
Savic 2002). Paradoxically this process of multiple state formations which has 
entered our conceptual vocabulary as a metaphor for instability and the unmaking of 
geopolitical order represents simultaneously the very realization of a modern inter-
national order. For it is precisely the emergence of a variety of sovereign states 
through a series of national secessions in southeastern Europe that, according to 
widely held assumptions, is understood to signify the transformation from an 
Oriental-Ottoman ‘backward’ and oppressive regime of exploitation and domination 
to modern, secular and enlightened forms of sovereignty. Abou-El-Haj expresses this 
assumption by noting that “in order to become truly modern, it [the Ottoman Empire] 
was perceived to having to transform necessarily into a nation-state, or rather a 
variety of nation-states” (Abou-El-Haj 2005: 62).  
International Relations theory, meanwhile, has departed a long way from the 
positivist realist assumptions on the transhistorically fixed ontological distinction of 
social relations within political communities from those without that constituted, 
ultimately, a reified notion of ‘the international’, predicated on a sharp inside/outside 
distinction (Waltz 1959, 1979, 2001). Critical theory, especially constructivist 
(Ruggie 1993), poststructuralist (Walker 1993) as well as historical materialist 
(Rosenberg 1994) critiques of Realism, have convincingly argued that what Realism 
assumes as timeless givens, in fact constitutes a historically peculiar, specifically 
modern form of sovereignty and international order. Having established this common 
concern with Realism, what is usually less problematized in these critical approaches 
is the understanding of “territorial sovereignty and national sovereignty as the 
distinctively modern way of ordering the ‘international’” (Hall 1999: 3). The use of 
‘nation’ appears to be synonymous with ‘modern’, indicating the underlying 
Wilsonian principle of ethno-linguistic self-determination as the organising principle 
of the Westphalian international order “which holds that the political and the national 
                                                                                                                                     
notion of modernity as a holistic concept. The findings of this thesis will destabilize the latter by 
replacing the modern/premodern dichotomy with the idea of historical specificity.  
 10
unit should be congruent”(Gellner 1983: 1). Thus, IR Theory has long focussed on 
the historically specific nature of the institutions of modern territorial sovereignty, 
whilst at the same time underspecifying and downplaying the problem of its national 
character, relying passively on theories of nationalism to understand this social 
phenomenon (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990; Balakrishnan 1994). 
Those theories, inversely, have usually been developed outside the main discourses of 
International Relations. While some have dealt with the effects of nationalism on 
International Relations (Mayall 1990; Hall 1999), most have neglected questions of 
international relations as a constitutive element in their own theorizations of the 
emergence of nationalism.2  
This somewhat problematic division of labour between IR Theory and 
theories of nationalism tends to leave national difference as an explanans ‘by default’ 
for multi-stateness, rather as being explored as part of the explanandum. In this sense, 
the post-Ottoman territorial pluriverse in southeastern Europe is often 
(mis)understood as the natural outcome of a process of ‘international socialisation’ 
(Halliday 1992: 460) whereby the international system forced, either through military 
means, socialisation through norms, or market and middle class pressure, the Ottoman 
Empire to disintegrate along the lines of their purportedly constituent and virtually 
pre-existing ‘national’ parts. This process of disintegration and subsequent re-
organisation according to the natural precepts of nation-formation is held to be 
synonymous with the establishment of modern sovereignty  
This thesis challenges this conventional wisdom. To rectify this perspective, 
this thesis argues that the key aspects conventionally attributed to the ideal-type of the 
modern state as the constitutive building-block of modern international order – a 
coherent and homogeneous national identity, exclusive territoriality, a secular and 
rational state-apparatus and absolute sovereignty, and capitalist social property 
relations – cannot be conceptualised as co-constitutive, co-eval and congruent aspects 
of the same modernising and universalising process, but need to be disaggregated and 
then re-assembled through a long-term and large-scale historical inquiry into their 
complex, protracted, imperfect and chronologically sequenced and cumulative co-
development to account for the specificity of the process of Ottoman decline and the 
subsequent construction of post-Ottoman regional order. This perspective places 
crucial emphasis on the contested and agent-centred construction of this complex 
phenomenon – demonstrating a historical specificity that cannot be inferred from 
                                                 
2
 See Dufour 2006 for an exception  
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overarching grand narratives – be they Realist, Liberal or orthodox Marxist. More 
specifically, the modern nature of Ottoman rule and the Ottoman reform efforts from 
1789 onwards have been underrated in the literature in the same way that the modern 
character of the late Ottoman nationalist secessions has been overrated. In addition to 
the literature in IR Theory and on nationalism, conventional historical-sociological 
approaches have also failed to adequately theorize this process of imperial 
disintegration and nation-state formation in the Balkans adequately. In particular, it 
will be argued that the specific territorial shape of the post-Ottoman inter-national 
order was neither the result of the logic of geopolitical competition that ‘selects out a 
militarily/geopolitically inefficient state’ (Tilly 1985, 1990; Mann 1994; Spruyt 
1996), nor the direct result of an expansion of the capitalist world economy and 
shifting relations of exchange into the region (Wallerstein 1974; Keyder 1976a; 
Wallerstein, I. 1979; Kasaba 1988), but the regionally specific outcome of social 
struggles situated between pre-capitalist provincial power holders who successfully 
mobilized nationalist projects with highly specific social origins to defend their 
particular and backward looking interests against a modernizing/centralizing Ottoman 
centre. It is the sharpening of this conflict in the 19th century that lead to the 
disintegration and break-up of the Ottoman Empire along specific and socio-
historically configured territorial lines. In other words, this thesis argues that the 
inter-national order in southeastern Europe cannot be seen as a linear and functional 
outcome of a teleological ‘modernization’ process, but locates the shape of the post-
Ottoman regional inter-state order in the contested conjunction of wider geopolitical 
pressures in combination with specific intra-imperial socio-political conflicts between 
the imperial center and provincial elites that shaped diverse regional secession-
projects and the construction of local nationalisms, rooted in pre-modern contexts. 
This, finally, allows for the utilization of the Ottoman example to reveal the 
continuously volatile nature of territorially defined relations of domination, and to 
problematize the constantly transforming nature of IR’s constitutive ontologies - the 
national and ‘the international’. This is presented as a generic problem for a static 
understanding of contemporary international relations that can only be overcome by a 
historical approach. 
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1.2 The ‘Eastern Question’ and the Specificity of the Ottoman Case 
The ‘Eastern Question’ remains a historiographically, conceptually and politically 
contested and highly controversial issue (Macfie 1996: 1-4). This question, in its 
common-sense understanding, revolves around the power-vacuum left by the decay 
of the geo-strategically sensitive Ottoman dominions in the context of a highly 
competitive inter-dynastic system of European states in the 19th century. It concerned 
the future of the weakening Ottoman Empire as much as the management of inter-
dynastic European relations and the balance of power, the maintenance of which was 
contingent on the distribution of the potential Ottoman spoils (Anderson 1966). 
However, what is normally presented as the ‘Eastern Question’ in the singular, 
contains, on closer inspection, a set of further sub-questions, reaching from the 
Russo-Austrian rivalry in the Balkans over access to the Straits, via the control of 
Suez, to the guardianship of the Holy Sites (Clayton 1974). Regardless of the 
proliferation of ‘Eastern Questions’ in the 19th century, the major issue at stake, i.e. 
post-Ottoman international order, is frequently understood to have found a logical or 
natural answer with the emergence of a regional inter-nation system, realizing each 
nation’s right to self-determination, in place of the dysfunctional, backward Oriental 
Ottoman polity.  
Contrary to this assumption, it is suggested here that the Eastern Question has 
not been solved by the creation of multiple national states in the region, as it 
continues to be a pressing, ongoing and open question of international order in that 
particular region of the world, not least, since the post-Ottoman political geography 
still carries strong connotations of its historical inheritance as a ‘Powder Keg’, rather 
than any settled and stable inter-state architecture.3 Hence, the formation of the 
‘Powder Keg’ is not only central to understanding the outbreak of the Great War, but 
continues to discomfort policy makers around the world.4 As was the case in the 19th 
century, the persistence of the ‘Eastern Question’ entails even further sub-questions, 
including the Macedonian question, the Cyprus question, the Kurdish question and 
the Armenian question to name but a few. The ‘Eastern Question’ is therefore 
                                                 
3
 See map no. 1 in the appendix for an overview of the post-Ottoman geopolitical order regarding 
the ‘Powder Keg’ 
4
 In a hearing on April 4, 2009 the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe urged 
the US government to renew their efforts in the Western Balkans due to a recognizable increase in 
political instability: US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (2009): The Western 
Balkans: Challenges for U.S. and European Engagement. Available online: 
http://www.csce.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=ContentRecords.ViewTranscript&ContentRecord_id
=448&ContentType=H,B&ContentRecordType=H&CFID=18849146&CFTOKEN=53 (date of 
access: 10/04/2009) 
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regarded in this thesis not only in ‘antiquarian’ historiographic terms – as History for 
History’s sake - but as a symbolic shorthand for a persisting and unresolved 
geopolitical problem, which still carries important theoretical puzzles and 
implications for International Relations. In consequence, the ‘Eastern Question’ is an 
expression of the inherent tension between the universal and homogenizing 
aspirations of the European ‘international society’ understood in Fred Halliday’s 
terms as “inter-societal and inter-state homology, in domestic values and 
organisation” and the particularistic and heterogeneous outcomes of social 
transformation in the post-Ottoman world in the form of instable national states 
(Halliday 1992: 435). Thus, rather than Ottoman disintegration representing the 
logical end-point of a teleological process of ‘modernization’ that settles the ‘Eastern 
Question’, national fragmentation is merely a reformulation, if not aggravation of the 
problem in territorial/national terms. The ‘Question’ has found a series of historically 
connected temporary answers, but has re-imposed itself simultaneously in ever 
renewed forms. 
Furthermore, the ‘Eastern Question’ represents more than an idiosyncratic 
socio-political and diplomatic conundrum, but remains inserted into the real-life 
battlefield of the notorious East/West divide. In other words, the ‘Serb Revolt’ and 
the ‘Greek Question’, emerging at the beginning of the 19th century, are also 
conceptualised as expressions of a deeper, underlying and almost trans-historical 
struggle between ‘European Civilization’ and ‘Asiatic Despotism’. This thesis takes 
issue with this ‘Euro-centric trap’ and its associated Orientalist reading of ‘Eastern’ 
backwardness by investigating modes of Western expansion beyond the formal 
Imperial experience. The Ottoman Empire and its demise in southeastern Europe 
offers itself as a central object of inquiry as it constitutes the first historical example 
of late-coming state-formation in a pro-Western fashion outside of Europe’s 
continental core, that was not preconditioned by formal colonial expansion. Thus, it 
can be said that the external universalisation of a maturing European inter-state 
system unfolds here for the first time, as it is here that the paradoxical nature of this 
universal, if fractured, expansion and its particularistic outcomes surfaces. However, 
since the history of Ottoman decline is conventionally understood as a process of 
natural evolution, converging towards the European normality of international 
relations, this historical trajectory is largely undervalued as a crucial resource for 
understanding the social and geopolitical development of the post-Ottoman regions, 
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notably the Balkans and the Middle East.5 Throughout this process some forty states 
were created (so far), comprising the current post-Ottoman order. As these highly 
differentiated states and societies have a high degree of social and geopolitical 
instability in common, it seems justified to argue that the post-Ottoman order, far 
from having established a quasi-realist inter-state system where anarchy constitutes a 
balance of power system and a state of (geo)political normalcy and solidity, has 
notoriously fuelled conflicts, provoked international crises, led to economic 
underdevelopment and continues to do so.  
However, the constitution of the ‘Powder Keg’, the ‘Eastern Question’ and 
the ‘Balkanization of Ottoman Rule’, has also fuelled debates within IR Theory. 
Especially the end of the Cold War, which had temporarily imposed bi-polar order , 
and the break-up of Yugoslavia have challenged conventional assumptions in the 
field of International Relations. These debates will be elaborated on in the following 
pages with a view to the explanatory potential of the theoretical innovations generated 
by the so-called ‘historical’ (and sociological) ‘turn’ in International Relations. This 
section will commence with a brief elaboration of the Neo-realist mainstream that 
was the main target of various new theoretical angles developed after the 
aforementioned events in the 1990s. This comprised most notably the project of 
‘social constructivism’ and its emphasis on the social and historical construction of 
the international structures, described by Realism as ahistorical and perennial 
‘givens’. A similar critique has been advanced from within the field of Historical 
Sociology which has made major inroads into the field of IR. Within the Historical 
Sociology of international relations, three major strands will be discussed. Initially, 
the most prominent approach, Neo-Weberian Historical Sociology (NWHS) and its 
emphasis on geopolitical competition as the engine of social transformation will be 
examined. Secondly, the literature review turns to World Systems Theory with its 
emphasis on expanding relations of unequal exchange. Thirdly, a more classical 
Marxist approach that shifts the focus from circulation back to production, class 
struggle and social property relations will be explored. Lastly, the latest innovation 
that has emerged from within this camp of ‘Political Marxism’, the adaptation of 
Trotsky’s theory of uneven and combined development as a theory of International 
Relations will be investigated. All approaches will be tested for their potential to 
illuminate the social transformations that led to the emergence of the post-Ottoman 
                                                 
5
 This thesis will focus on the transformations in southeastern Europe. This is partly due to 
limitations of space but also due to the by and large non-colonial nature of the transformation 
there.  
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inter-national system before it is argued that Political Marxism provides the most 
adequate conceptual perspective for reconstructing and confronting the empirical and 
theoretical problems posed by the ‘Eastern Question’.  
 
 
1.3 Neo-Realism and the Historical Turn in International Relations 
Realism and its scientific successor have long constituted the mainstream in US-
American thinking about International Relations. Kenneth N. Waltz’s initial 1959 
exposition of his theory in Man, the State and War (Waltz 1959), differentiates 
between three institutionally separate spheres of social determination, human 
behaviour, hierarchical domestic politics and anarchic international relations. More 
influential (and more criticised) was his elaboration of the relationship between the 
latter two spheres in his Theory of International Politics (Waltz 1979), which was 
strongly influenced by micro-economic theory. According to this discipline-defining 
treatise, the international system is constituted by three different components. Firstly, 
the ordering principle of international politics is anarchy. As all states are 
‘functionally equal’ and as there is a multiplicity of states, all relations between them 
are conducted within the ungoverned realm of the international. As a shift from 
international anarchy to hierarchy in the form of a world government is unlikely, and 
as all other features of international politics are derived from this ‘ordering principle’, 
Waltz argues for the transhistorical applicability of his theory. While being 
functionally equal rational security maximizers under the structural imperative to 
seek survival under the conditions of anarchy, states, or ‘units’ are only differentiated 
by their relative share of military capabilities. Change is, therefore exclusively 
understood as change in terms of the distribution of capabilities across the units 
within an unalterable systemic structure, which also led to the labelling of Neo-
realism as ‘structural’ Realism (Waltz 1979: Ch. 5). The ordering principle – 
“decentralized and anarchic” (Waltz 1979: 88) – is not to be confused with an anomic 
state, however,6 but as a means of international regulation. Waltz introduces the 
notion of balance of power as a self-regulating mechanism of the international system 
which imposes itself as a rational ‘logic’ independent of any individual state’s 
intentions and, therefore, structurally coerces them into applying rational power-
politics. It is left open, however, whether this regulation necessarily produces peace. 
                                                 
6
 Anomic means ‘norm-free’, without any kind of order; in this special sense, we can also talk 
about the hypothetical, pre-historic Hobbesian state of nature. 
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Even though Waltz is not explicit about the systemic functions of war, it appears as a 
given that balancing and counterbalancing military capabilities generates a form of 
stability, even though the act of establishing order is, as in the Ottoman case, always 
disorderly. “The natural state is the state of war. Under the conditions of international 
politics, war recurs; the sure way to abolish war, then, is to abolish international 
politics” (Waltz 2000: 8). A neorealist understanding of geopolitics therefore implies 
a competitive juxtaposition of self-enclosed entities whose individual security 
dilemmas continuously reproduce potential or actual violent conflicts. It is on these 
grounds, i.e. the all-determining anarchical structure of international relations, the 
balance of power and the recurrence of war and conflict as automatic ordering 
mechanisms, that Waltz prioritizes the continuity and predictability of international 
politics over social change and transformation.  
 
However, it is precisely this inability to deal with change that became a 
contentious issue. The end of bipolarity and the accompanying resurgence in ethnic 
violence shed doubt on Neo-Realism’s ahistorical, positivist and structuralist 
understanding of world politics. With its empirical textbook illustration collapsing, 
Realism was faced with the major ‘embarrassment’ of not being able to explain 
change (Ashley 1984; Kratochwil 1993). The demise of the certainties of bipolarity, 
thus triggered a wave of criticism of Realism and similarly structuralist and path 
dependent approaches in IR. In response, realists usually point to the prevalence of 
anarchy in international relations as an irrefutable transhistorical systemic 
characteristic of world politics. This, they argue, means that change in realist terms 
remains a non-problem: as long as political rule is fractured into separate ‘units’, 
anarchy and all associated assumptions prevail.  
Another empirically inspired source of contention with Realism was the 
increased attention to culture, identity and the constitutive ideology of modernity of 
nationalism.7 This criticism was motivated by the emergence of ethno-nationalism 
and new national movements after the end of the Cold War, exemplified by the break-
up of Yugoslavia. However, like change and transformation, problems of culture and 
identity have not only become relevant to IR due to recent events, but constitute 
important a priori building blocks for explaining the diversified nature of the modern 
international system. 
                                                 
7
 See chapter 2 
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Again, the lack of problematizing these and other supposedly missing 
elements like culture, identity politics or ethnic violence is not thought to constitute a 
problem for Realism since, as Waltz argues, “[t]heory has to be about something. It 
can’t be about everything” (Halliday and Rosenberg 1998: 379). However, while the 
dialogue with realists themselves can be characterized as somewhat fruitless on these 
grounds, the debate in general led to some productive theoretical innovations, as a 
rich variety of critical approaches in International Relations developed out of this 
critical engagement with Realism. The main subject of these approaches was 
consequently to probe the sources of change and transformation. This caused a 
‘historical’ as well as a ‘sociological’ turn in IR. These new ‘turns’ could, therefore, 
equally contribute to explaining the disjuncture between the universal and 
cosmopolitan outlook of European capitalist modernity and the multiple and 
territorially fractured inter-state system that seems to contradict it. This, conversely, 
could help understanding various aspects of the process of Ottoman disintegration. In 
the following section, a brief discussion of five important theoretical developments 
that have tried to implement these ‘turns’ in IR Theory will be discussed with regard 
to their potential for explaining the 19th century transformations in southeastern 
Europe.  
 
 
1.4 Constructivism in IR: On the Inter-Subjective Construction of Social Reality  
Among these critical approaches, it was Constructivism that left the biggest mark on 
the discipline. The constructivist research agenda has developed into one of the most 
productive and influential research programmes in International Relations outside of 
the North American mainstream. Defining Constructivism in a succinct manner is not 
easy, however, given the proliferation of theoretical approaches that are broadly 
associated with this paradigm. Generally, it claims to seize the ‘middle ground’ 
between the liberal and realist contestants in the inter-paradigm debate in IR Theory 
(Adler 1997). Despite the prominence of the constructivist research agenda in 
International Relations, it does not follow a coherent set of theoretical assumptions 
that could be summarized in a succinct way. Ronan Palan (Palan 2000: 576) for 
example proposes a differentiation of constructivist thought in IR into hard and a soft 
variants. ‘Soft’ constructivists are understood here as IR scholars who try to 
overcome essentialized ontologies by studying social context, identities, culture and 
socially constituted norms as a form of international order (Wendt 1987, 1992; Hall 
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1999; Reus-Smit 1999). Hard constructivists, on the other hand, do not consider a 
material reality outside of its social, inter-subjective constitution and have, therefore, 
concentrated, amongst other things, on language theory (Kratochwil 1989; Onuf 
1989, 1998).  
 
Precisely because these approaches are rather diverse, a general summary of 
the theory, or set of theories, necessarily involves a great amount of simplification. 
Expressed in the most generic of terms, social Constructivismis concerned with the 
social, inter-subjective construction of meaning and social reality. In terms of 
International Relations, Alexander Wendt has pioneered this approach with his work 
on the agent-structure problem and his famous revelation that ‘anarchy is what states 
make of it’ (Wendt 1987, 1992). According to Wendt, the meaning of anarchy is not 
perennially fixed, but depends on the actors’, i.e. the states’ inter-subjective 
construction of norms and rules, which, thereby, create an international structure that 
provides some level of predictability of agent behaviour based on shared norms. This 
structure is, however, constantly, if slowly, changing depending on normative, 
philosophical and social transformations (Reus-Smit 1999). Thus, order and anarchy 
become historically specific concepts that do not operate according to realist ‘laws of 
nature,’ but according to socially constructed and consequently malleable rules. 
Hence, the defining condition of IR in Realism is in ‘reality’ not timeless and 
immutable, but a social construct, the meaning of which states have socially and 
inter-subjectively not only shaped but created. The meaning of anarchy, therefore, can 
change, even if it is a persistent, but not unchangeable quality of IR defined by the 
absence of a central authority. In short, ‘anarchy is what states make of it’. Equally, 
states derive their specific identities from the same inter-subjective creation of 
meaning. Constructivism does not refute Realism’s emphasis on the importance of 
structure, but explains its social origins while also setting out the conditions for 
changing it. In consequence, Constructivism does not deny the existence of a material 
world. It is rather the case that the physical world only acquires meaning through its 
socialization via inter-action. The relevance, say, of a nuclear warhead to social 
science and IR is not determined by its material composition, or even by its 
destructive capability, but by the inter-subjective meaning attributed to it within the 
anarchical Cold War structure of the international system. The ontology of structure 
and agents is therefore “largely derived from their function in theory rather than 
everyday life” (Kratochwil 1996: 218). 
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Constructivism’s major achievement consists in its ability to provide a theory 
of change and transformation that nevertheless accounts for the structural and 
geopolitical determination of social outcomes. However, unlike Realism (and 
Historical Materialism ), Constructivism does not entail any foundational assumptions 
about the motivation of human action or the nature of social interaction. Despite the 
diversity within the constructivist school, the various authors start from an emphasis 
on the ideational and socially constructed character of the material world, including 
international relations. Thus, the pluralism within constructivist thinking in IR, which 
is often described as theoretical incoherence, on the other hand constitutes a major 
advantage. This means that apart from the capacity to conceptualize change and 
processes of transformation, Constructivism can be and is frequently applied to a 
variety of different social phenomena. These adaptations range from asserting the 
centrality of norms and rules in international relations (Kratochwil 1989; Reus-Smit 
1999), to the problem of collective identity formation and culture in International 
Relations (Lapid, Y. and Kratochwil, F. V. 1996; Hall 1999) through to historicising 
the origins of the modern inter-state system (Kratochwil 1986; Ruggie 1993) and 
understanding the trans-national activities of multi-national corporations (MNCs), 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and social networks (Risse-Kappen 1995). 
Thus, constructivism’s appeal is not only derived from a capacity to 
overcome the state-centric and static Neorealist paradigm, but also due to its 
theoretical versatility. This is why constructivism’s impact on the discipline of 
International Relations is considerable despite, or maybe precisely because of its 
theoretical pluralism. Even though it would be unfair to argue that Constructivism is 
theoretically incoherent simply because its theoretical premises allow various 
adaptations, these variations, nevertheless make it appear somewhat ‘confused’ 
(Palan 2000). Constructivism is, therefore, better understood as “less a theory with 
well-developed hypotheses than (…) a bundle of social theoretic commitments and 
concerns” (Barnett 2002: 101). 
 
Explaining Diversity? The Social Construction of Culture, Identity and Nationalism 
It is within the constructivist project in International Relations that the re-introduction 
of the ‘national’ as a means of understanding societal diversity was most forcefully 
advanced, since as Lapid and Kratochwil argue, “as a discipline or field [IR], should 
generate its object of study through a careful and comprehensive monitoring of the 
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‘national’” (Lapid, Y. and Kratochwil, F. 1996: 105). The debate about identity, 
culture and the origins of nationalism seem to be well suited to the constructivist 
research program which appears theoretically well equipped to illuminate the nation 
states’ “socially constructed (as opposed to primordially given) nature; their optional 
(as opposed to deterministic) dimensions; their fragmenting/diversifying (as opposed 
to integrating/homogenizing) implications; and their multidimensional dynamic (as 
opposed to unidimensional/static) features” (Lapid 1996: 7). 
National differentiation is a non-problem for Realism, which treats it as an a 
priori ontological given. Explaining the origins of difference should constitute a 
central problem for any theory of the international, however, especially when it is 
built upon assumptions about the inherently conflictual nature of these differentiated 
interests. Constructivists understand difference, therefore, not as an endogenous 
cultural quality of states but as collective identities that are an ideational product 
resulting from states’ self-definition vis-à-vis other states as well as within the wider 
international structure. As Wendt put it: “In any given situation, however, it is the 
nature of identification that determines how the boundaries of the self are drawn 
(Wendt 1996: 52).” This interest is, however, not only derived from recent historical 
events, but is central to the constructivist understanding of IR. Individual state’s 
identities are socially constructed and their meanings are established inter-
subjectively. However, the state agents equally give meaning to the empty realist 
notion of anarchy and the various modes of interaction in the absence of a central 
authority.  
 
Rodney Bruce-Hall’s National Collective Identities 
Despite the centrality of interest in the constructivist research program, relatively 
little work has been done on the problem of nationalism as the contemporary 
specifically modern form of collective identity. Rodney Bruce Hall’s work on 
‘National Collective Identities’ (Hall 1999) presents a notable exception from this 
rule and deserves, therefore, some dedicated attention here.  
Like most constructivists, Hall starts from a critique of realist state-centrism. 
At the core of this criticism lays the distinction between territorial-sovereign actors 
and national-sovereign actors, as well as between the nation and the state as concepts. 
According to Hall, this disjuncture is underrepresented in IR Theory, which hardly 
ever draws from the literature on the phenomenon of nationalism, despite some rather 
obvious potential for an inter-disciplinary cross-fertilization as mentioned above. 
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Such an engagement would reveal that it was only in the 19th century that ‘national’ 
forms of collective identities became the dominant principle underlying sovereignty 
and thereby providing legitimacy to state agents. For Hall this widely unrecognized 
shift from dynastic and purely territorial forms of sovereignty to national sovereignty 
represents a change in the operating logic of the international system and the nature of 
IR altogether (Hall 1999). Once states’ identities are derived from ‘below’, i.e. from 
the more or less democratic expression of a popular will, the potential of national sub-
state groups to reformulate the state and the state’s interest and behaviour means that 
the potential for change and transformation in the international system as a whole 
grows (Hall 1999: 5). Change, therefore, does not initially occur at the systemic level, 
but results from social transformations at the sub-state level, i.e. from non-state 
groups, aiming at recognition as unified collectives. It is this emergence of ‘national’ 
as opposed to ‘territorial’ sovereignty which alters the nature of IR from the realist 
Westphalian to the first “post-Westphalian” system. In this novel system, a ‘will to 
manifest-identity’ replaces the Nietzschean ‘will-to-power’ (Hall 1999: 6) inherent in 
classical Realism. Loyal to his constructivist research agenda, Hall also points out 
how it is not only a change in the actor’s constitution as national sovereigns that 
brings about systemic change, but also how the system itself generates a self-
perpetuating logic, i.e. how it continues to reproduce national collective identities 
through norms, rules and institutions (Hall 1999: 49-50).  
Hall’s work raises an important problem that directly translates into questions 
about Ottoman decline; namely the precise social origin and nature of nationalism, its 
social function and its relation to wider transformation within the international 
system. However, there are a variety of problems with the solutions he offers. Firstly, 
the idea that change is prompted by emerging social groups seeking new forms of 
self-identification and social recognition leaves out the crucial question about the 
social origin of this ‘will-to-identity’. This is not to deny the existence of desires of 
collectives to be recognized as a social or political community as such, but to observe 
that their social origin needs to be explained and the constitution of the collective 
interest needs to be problematized. Hall’s reflections on the problematic notion of 
‘national’ interests are somewhat ambiguous in this regard. While he criticises the 
realist static notion, his own argument appears to accept an unproblematic vision of a 
rationally conceivable common good (Hall 1999: 14-15). Some further elaborations 
on these issues are important due to the central causal role Hall assigns to change in 
collective identities and interests to account for wider systemic transformations. 
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However, before being drawn into the analysis, the origins of these variables 
themselves need to be identified more clearly. Thus, what Hall refers to as the 
‘nationalization of state actors’ in the 19th century, even though central to his theory, 
ultimately remains only very loosely explained as “systemic interactions” (Hall 1999: 
29): 
“…changes in co-constituted individual and collective identity result in changes 
in the legitimating principles of global and domestic social order, and consequent 
changes in the institutional forms of collective action, through which that integrity 
is expressed to their societies. (…) This new structure manifests the new societal 
identity and system change.” 
(Hall 1999: 29) 
 
Even though Hall himself appears to agree that it is in fact necessary to identify 
“factors that conclusively generate strong collective self-identification” (Hall 1999: 
12), his emphasis is on the structural outcomes of national identity formation, leaving 
the explanation for the first part of the equation to an uncritical appropriation of the 
vast body of the theories of nationalism. This is problematic insofar as these theories 
themselves are incomplete and, indeed, as Hall points out, understand the origins of 
nationalism as “endogenous” (Hall 1999: 73). Yet, it is especially the wider systemic 
transformations, supposedly the result of a change in the nature of sovereignty, which 
are absent from this theorization of nationalism.8 This is particularly important since 
Hall himself later acknowledges that the international system reproduces a certain 
form of identity creation, referred to as ‘Sequence 2’ (Hall 1999: 49), hinting, but 
never elaborating the essentially international conditions of nationalism’s emergence. 
Referring to the relationship between national collective identities, the wider 
international structures and their mutual constitution, appears to be a mere 
reformulation of Wendt’s structure-agency problem in identity terms. By explaining 
that not only states, but also national collectives are both agents as well as objects of 
change, Hall does not appear to provide a significant advance either within 
Constructivismor in terms of IR Theory, as this only concerns the mode of 
reproduction of national identities, but not their social origins.  
Furthermore, while Hall’s recognition of the specificity of ‘nationalism’ is 
valuable, the related charge of ‘underspecification’ of actors leaves the overall 
systemic logic of structural Realism untouched. Waltz explicitly accepts the 
possibility of change within the cultural or political constitution as well as in the 
number of actors, thereby still leaving their externally conditioned functional 
                                                 
8
 See chapter 2 
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similarity intact as long as international anarchy prevails. Hall’s criticism that 
Realism cannot account for shifts in the form of sovereignty - here from Westphalian 
to post-Westphalian - will more than likely find no resonance with realists who see 
this as a non-problem because these changes never alter the anarchical structure of the 
system. Both national and dynastic polities have to survive within the anarchical, all-
determining structure of IR (Waltz 1979). This is hard to argue with, especially as 
new actors are far more commonly established by acts of political violence or war, 
i.e. by an assertion of the realist principle of self-help, rather than as a result of inter-
subjective recognition.  
 However, the implicit acceptance of structural Realism and the explicit 
endorsement of theories of nationalism constitute the real problems with Hall’s 
approach. Instead of arriving at a fruitful re-formulation, Hall seems to ‘tag on’ a 
theory of how national collective identities shape the international system, instead of 
developing an international theory that can accommodate their emergence as well as 
their effects. Thus, in terms of IR Theory, Hall’s account constitutes a useful addition, 
an illumination of minor issues within IR, but he does not convincingly undermine 
Realism or substantiate extant social constructivist approaches further. In other 
words, despite Hall’s promising formulation of the national problematique in IR, he 
does not provide an inter-national theory in the sense of fruitfully conceptualizing the 
contradiction between a universal and universalizing modern order and a fragmented 
and fragmenting form of national sovereignty.  
 
Constructivism’s Contribution 
Nevertheless, if Hall cannot reconcile the universal/particular contradiction, maybe a 
more generic understanding of Constructivism can. This might be the case, because in 
general, Constructivism emphasizes that environmental pressures do not 
automatically (re-) produce ‘sameness’, but tend to generate specificities and peculiar 
forms. This is not only true for biological evolution (Kratochwil 1996: 214), but also 
for the spread of the European political form. This amounts to an important critique 
of functionalistic IR Theory which claims, but never explains the reproductive 
capacity of the international system and instead relies “largely on loose organic 
metaphors of growth and decay and problematic analogies, such as evolutionary 
selection” (Kratochwil 1996: 213).  
Constructivism’s contribution is valuable mostly for its powerful and 
important critique of Realism. First of all, the possibility of change and 
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transformation implies that Constructivism rightly points out the historical specificity 
of actors and structures and the need to uncover their social roots. This also applies, 
therefore, to another aspect of the inter-state system, i.e. the fact that it is nationally 
differentiated. Thus, the value of Constructivism provides three major contributions. 
First, it reveals the inter-subjectively constituted nature of international as well as 
national structures that were previously understood as exogenously given. Second, it 
emphasizes the social construction of identity and culture, and, as a consequence, it 
thirdly differentiates between various, historically malleable meanings of anarchy. 
 
 Constructivist premises, if looked at superficially, do not seem to raise any 
contentions. Agents create structures that, in turn, create a limited scope of action. 
Arguing that the material world acquires meaning only through social interaction and 
understanding is somewhat less contentious a claim than elevating this 
epistemological reflection to a universal theory of International Relations. Intra-
societal interaction is not restricted to the creation of inter-subjectivity. It might be 
important to de-essentialize static ontologies, but this does little to explain the origin 
of social dynamics which inspire these social constructions. One very general 
problem appears to be the absence of a theory of human motivation and, for that 
matter, an explicit reflection on the power relations that are inherent in the various 
ways in which meaning is inter-subjectively created. This is especially a problem for 
the central notion of agency. Thus, Constructivism can explain how various agents’ 
original intentions are shaped and controlled by the same structure that originates, at 
least partly, from their own actions, but it does not elaborate on the various 
determinations of human or state activity that may not stand in direct relation to these 
structures.  
 
However, even beyond the obvious problem of a lack of social forces and 
(geo)political processes, Constructivism equally faces some problems within the 
remit of its own assumptions. Crucially, the central question as to why the 
international structure has created functionally similar forms of political-territorial 
rule, even though the “selves and identities are variable” along with their interests 
(Hopf 1998: 176) remains unanswered. A more explicit reflection on the specific kind 
of exchange that produces difference, i.e. geopolitical or economic, public or private, 
transnational or inter-state within the context on identity debates appears to be in 
order. It is, in other words, not just a ‘curiosity to discover the other’ as part of an 
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innocent cultural encounter (Inayatullah and Blaney 1996), but can be anything from 
curiosity to violent competition between a variety of social actors. Those are only 
very vaguely, if at all, identifiable as coherent social groups prior to the identity-
producing interaction. This necessitates a socially and historically specific elaboration 
on the nature and outcome of these encounters. However, how they are conditioned 
and what their underlying motivations are is not captured by constructivist IR Theory. 
This fact points to a wider question about whether collective identities are reducible 
to ‘systemic’ outcomes or, replicating, as Palan put it, the realist essentialism 
Constructivism seeks to overcome by relying too heavily on a “pre-interactional order 
to explain persistent patterns in international affairs, reducing processes of ‘inter-
subjectivity’ to where they had always been in realist discourse—to the status of 
epiphenomena” (Palan 2000: 593). The two points about the absence of power 
relations and the continued structural determination are related. The lack of a theory 
of inter-action originates in the lack of a theory of power relations or, in fact, of 
human motivation altogether. Nevertheless, exploring the power relations within this 
process of social construction is crucial for understanding Constructivism’s own 
research agenda about the creation of identities and inter-subjective structures.  
 
 To summarize, the central problem remains Constructivism’s general 
reluctance to engage with political and geopolitical issues altogether, but instead to 
resign itself to very elaborate and theoretically sophisticated reflections on processes 
of social and ideational generation of ontologies. While this can be a useful critique, 
not only of Realism, but also of an overdetermination by essentialized notions of 
unchangeable social structures more generally, constructivism’s relationship with the 
material, the political, the geopolitical and power remain by and large, unclear. As 
Ronan Palan aptly put it, constructivism, while developing a useful ‘constructivist’ 
epistemological argument, at the same time unnecessarily supports “an illegitimate 
argument privileging ideas vis-à-vis power and interest” (Palan 2000: 590). Despite 
all of these problems with constructivist IR Theory, it seems that there can be little 
contention about the importance of illuminating certain relational and social ways in 
which knowledge, meaning and by extension identity and interests are socially 
constructed and shape the world we live in. It raises questions, nevertheless, about the 
reach of constructivist methodology. In other words, how much of social reality in 
general and of international relations in particular can actually be explained by 
pointing out the inter-subjective construction of interests and identities? More 
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importantly, can this reflection on the social construction of the constitutive ‘parts’ of 
the international system in and of itself explain the way states interact? It is due to 
these deficiencies of Constructivism that it is better understood as a useful 
methodological reflection, rather than a theory in its own right.  
 
 
From Constructivism to Historical Sociology  
In part out of the frustration with Constructivism’s apolitical and, more importantly, 
a-geo-political position another ‘historic turn’ brought Historical Sociology into 
International Relations (Hobden 1998; Hobden and Hobson 2002). Like 
Constructivism, Historical Sociology reveals “how institutions and practices were 
formed”. However, it is arguably more emancipated in its project to denaturalise “that 
which is presented, in any specific context, as inevitable” by revealing the political 
origin of these structures (Halliday 2002: 247). As such, Historical Sociology as a 
theory is less committed to systemic constraints and provides more space for human 
and state agency. In this way, the development of a Historical Sociology of 
International Relations provides another alternative to the dead ends of the inter-
paradigm debate. Historical Sociology overcomes the realist stasis and fruitfully 
historicises the origins of the international system, rather than essentializing them. As 
with Constructivism, a variety of approaches have emerged that are – contra 
Constructivism– less concerned with systemic aspects and more concerned, as 
Michael Barnett put it, with “domestic and societal-level phenomena that their 
respective disciplines judged as important, including industrialisation, 
democratisation, capitalism, bureaucratisation, state formation, social inequality, class 
conflict and revolution” (Barnett 2002: 103). These changes are consequently re-
interpreted taking into consideration their respective geopolitical contexts. Since these 
contexts are equally shaped by actors, International Historical Sociology appears to 
provide a reformulation of the agent-structure problem in more historical terms. As 
opposed to Constructivism, however, it reconstructs the peculiar origins of varying 
international systems starting from the concrete historical, not the abstract logical. 
Instead of a “decided preference for abstract, systemic models that could generate 
timeless laws pertaining to inter-state interactions” (Barnett 2002: 100), change is 
conceptualized by identifying historically particular and regionally specific roots of 
social transformation.  
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1.5 Geopolitical Competition as Agent of Social Change 
In terms of quantity of output, the most significant approach within Historical 
Sociology has developed from a Weberian tradition mainly emanating from the work 
of Otto Hintze whose most fundamental assumption was about the intrinsic inter-
relation between state-formation and war (Hintze and Oestreich 1962; Hintze and 
Gilbert 1975; Tilly 1975). These Neo-Weberian approaches have identified two 
shortcomings in the extant literature on social transformation and International 
Relations. On the one hand, Liberalism and Historical Materialism in particular were 
charged with providing endogenous and economistic explanations for social change 
only (Giddens 1985). This failed to adequately address and incorporate the problem 
of state autonomy as well as geopolitical relations, without which the understanding 
of transformation remains incomplete (Skocpol 1979: 19-24). As far as International 
Relations in general and Realism in particular goes, a similar criticism applies. While 
adequately identifying the importance of the ‘third image’ (Waltz 1959: 159), realists 
in fact used an underdeveloped concept of the state as a ‘black box’ rather than a 
social construct. This project of ‘bringing the state back in’ (Evans, Rueschemeyer et 
al. 1985; Hobson 1997) and arguing for its autonomy as a social actor while at the 
same time emphasizing the relevance of international factors for explaining social 
change increasingly led to a fusion of Weberian Historical Sociology and 
International Relations, which aimed at historicising the emergence of the inter-
nation-state system as a whole (Tilly 1990; Spruyt 1996).  
 
Geopolitical Competition and Institutional Selection  
Systemic geopolitical competition, therefore, takes on a central role in the Weberian 
understanding of change. In the light of intensified warfare exercising pressure on 
individual societies, an abstract modern state develops, as a means of defense, 
efficient governmental institutions where decision making is guided by rational raison 
d’état thinking rather than private, dynastic accumulation (Tilly 1985). The central 
question for Neo-Weberian Historical Sociology is, therefore, whether the 
administration in form of a centralized bureaucracy is autonomous. ‘Autonomy’ is 
understood here as equivalent to ‘modern’ which stands in contrast to Weber’s ideal 
type of a ‘patrimonial’ bureaucracy. Thus, a modern bureaucracy is in place, once it 
has developed an understanding of a general and rational, rather than private interest. 
A truly modern bureaucracy is willing and able to defend this newly realized public 
interest against other particular or class interests, including their own. Hence, the 
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public centralized state becomes separated and is independent from the private 
society. The formation of a modern bureaucracy plays a central part in understanding 
this shift from pre-modern, personal dynastic politics to the depersonalized general 
will of modern states. Survival is only guaranteed once a rational fiscal regime 
develops that channels the state’s economic resources towards external defense, 
rather than private dynastic accumulation. However, this inter-national dimension 
only comes to ‘make states’ once it started to ‘make wars’ (Tilly 1985). While 
conflict is a transhistorical reality, it is only within the modernizing international 
order, characterized by unprecedented levels of geopolitical competition, that the 
semi-Darwinist mechanism imposes its institutional selective rationale (Giddens 
1985; Tilly 1985; Mann 1986; Tilly 1990; Mann 1993; Spruyt 1994, 1996; Hobson 
1997). 
 
At the societal level, the Neo-Weberian focus is on the rational, fiscal-
administrative institutional capabilities of the modern bureaucratic state which it has 
gained through the purifying process of geopolitical engagements. These approaches, 
therefore, emphasize physically, rather than economically, induced social change as 
the crucial element in the history of state-formation and, in this case, imperial decline 
(Tilly 1990: 91-95). Nation-states are the result of a war-prone competitive external 
process. Institutional, economic and fiscal innovations emerged as a result of external 
enmity. Out of this process, the consolidated territorial and internally pacified nation-
state emerges as the most durable of a variety of previously existing state forms. The 
process of institutional ‘outselection’ within a geopolitically competitive environment 
generates through warfare the multiplicity of institutionally similar, yet culturally 
diverse, ‘efficient’ state apparatuses, which make up the modern international order.  
Hendrik Spruyt’s account, for example, implies that ‘Empires’, as opposed to 
nation-states (Spruyt 2005), cannot ensure the viability, coherence, revenue and, by 
extension, military competitiveness to survive in typically ‘modern’ international 
relations: 
The system selected out those types of units that were, competitively speaking, 
less efficient. In other words, the competitive nature of the system determined the 
nature of the constitutive units. (…) Actors intentionally created a system of 
sovereign, territorial states. They preferred a system that divided the sphere of 
cultural and economic interaction into territorial parcels with clear hierarchical 
authorities (Spruyt 1996: 180). 
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This new institutional base is the most competitive one because it produces the 
revenue and by extension the most forceful military apparatus capable of 
withstanding the geopolitical pressures emanating from simultaneously modernizing 
‘units’. This happens by solving the discrepancy between “emerging translocal 
markets and existing political arrangements” (Spruyt 1994: 529).  
 
In contrast, Charles Tilly’s main concern lies with historical enquiries about 
how different forms of collective violence have engendered different social 
transformations (Tilly 1978). With regards to the formation of the modern nation-
state, two paths of state building, the coercion-intensive and the capital-intensive, are 
central in Tilly’s account (Tilly 1990: 20-33). Both start with an assumption about the 
necessity for transformation generated by war making, having intensified the two 
previously existing forms of revenue extraction. Coercion-intensive states are 
characterized by their mainly agricultural regions and the absence of urban centres 
(e.g. Eastern Europe and Russia), whereas capital-intensive regions have more 
developed cities and commercial classes that can be taxed for the benefit of boosting 
the central administration’s revenue (like the Netherlands). However, the most 
successful state form is the capitalised coercive-intensive regions (notably France and 
Britain) where capitalists are incorporated into the state structures through 
constitutional assemblies, a centralized bureaucracy and a salaried standing army 
develops. While coercion-intensive state forms extract revenue in kind through direct 
territorial control of a mainly agrarian society, capital intensive polities extract 
monetary resources from markets and commerce, including free city states. Hence, in 
the former, presumably feudalist form, taxation takes place through the application of 
politically constituted force, while in the latter, presumably capitalist form, state 
income is generated from value-added production and market inequalities. It is, 
however, a combination of the two, an “intermediate capitalized coercion mode,” that 
proved the geopolitically most successful form. This mode was to evolve gradually 
into the nation-state form. In the capitalized coercion mode, “rulers did some of each, 
but spent more of their effort than did their capital-intensive neighbours on 
incorporating capitalists and sources of capital directly into the structures of their 
states” (Tilly 1990: 30).  
The capitalized coercion mode created a capital-intensive base which permits 
a profitable fiscal regime, while at the same time relying on a coercive apparatus that 
is necessary to establish internal order and provide effective external defense. The 
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most important institutional innovation this new structure supports, however, is the 
monopolization of the means of violence in a professionally trained, salaried standing 
army. Once external defense is centralized and masses are mobilized instead of the 
sword carrying nobility, war assumes a different quality. It now becomes total war, 
transforming all other societies through this new form of armed conflict. These 
differentiated forms of development eventually converge into the latter, most 
successful state form due to the constraints imposed by structural geopolitical 
competition. 
 
Tilly also points out that institutional and organizational weakness is not only 
based on patrimonial rule and coercion-intensive revenue generation, but also, to 
some degree, on internal demographic diversity of pre-modern societies. 
Competitiveness, thus, not only involves fiscal-administrative structures and military 
capabilities, but also the ethnic and cultural homogenization of subject people. As 
Tilly put it:  
“In one of their more self-conscious attempts to engineer state power, rulers 
frequently sought to homogenize their populations in the course of installing 
direct rule. (…) But homogeneity had many compensating advantages: within 
a homogeneous population, ordinary people were more likely to identify with 
their rulers, communication could run more efficiently, and an administrative 
innovation that worked in one segment was likely to work elsewhere as well. 
People who sensed a common origin, furthermore, were more likely to unite 
against external threats” (Tilly 1990: 106f). 
 
However, the function of a homogenized subject people exceeds its use as a mass 
army, however. There is also a normative element derived from the much discussed 
right to national self-determination which implies “that homogeneous peoples had 
distinctive political interests, that members of homogeneous peoples owed strong 
loyalties to the states that embodied their heritage” (Tilly 1994b: 133). This 
international normative dimension about the principle of national self determination is 
wedded, therefore, to the imperatives of external defense, thereby establishing a two-
way connection between war and the principle of popular sovereignty. This implies 
that the usually violent processes of ethnic homogenization are both functionally 
necessary as well as underpinning the basis of legitimate modern political authority. 
Thus, geopolitical competition is the agent of change, be that either through direct 
bureaucratic reform or mediated via the break-down of ancient regimes and a 
subsequent state (re)formation (Skocpol 1979).  
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The Weberian Contribution  
At this point a wider problem of Weberian international sociology is revealed. While 
Weberians have extensively reflected on the relationship between state-formation and 
geopolitics in a territorial and institutional/bureaucratic sense, the same cannot be said 
about the ‘modern’ state’s national character. In other words, if there is any 
ontological substance to ‘nationalism’ beyond an outcome of social engineering by 
political authority, then what about its relationship to state-forming geopolitical 
processes? Here, cultural diversity unproblematically translates into the territorial 
multiplicity of the inter-state system. However, geopolitical multiplicity cannot be 
explained with reference to rational institutional efficiency only. This would suggest 
the emergence of larger ‘units’ that can exploit economies of scale, rather than 
smaller state-forms which tend to increase transaction costs. Naturalizing 
homogeneity, rather than historicising ethnic and cultural differentiation, implies an 
acceptance of primordial arguments about the origins of various nationalisms (Smith 
2001). It comes as no surprise, therefore, that Tilly largely ignores the modernist 
literature on the subject (Tilly 1994b: 132-33).9 Thus, Tilly appears to implicitly 
endorse a primordial understanding of national/cultural divisions. National 
diversification cannot be explained with reference to a process of institutional 
outselection, unless underlying unchangeable and primordial ethnic divisions are 
presupposed. This is so because rational efficiency per se would generate unity, not 
fragmentation, let alone the dismemberment of formally unified polities. As this 
underlying multiplicity of national forms is in fact presupposed and not explained, the 
social origin of diversity still requires further investigation. 
However, this illuminates a further-ranging problem as well though. Above 
and below the process of institutional innovation, the neo-Weberian approach remains 
sociologically underdeveloped. On the one hand, the social transformation is 
understood as externally conditioned, with a choice between successful institutional 
adaptation and the state’s death. It does not capture, therefore, the various social 
outcomes that are not easily categorized in either of these two categories of success 
and non-success, such as belated success or partial failure. Equally, it does not 
sociologically decode the social origin and nature of geopolitical engagements, but 
presupposes, rather than explains war as the social engine of transformation. Modern 
standing armies only intensify an already established state of perpetual inter-
                                                 
9
 Here Tilly concedes with reference to Eric Hobsbawm’s modernist argument on the issue 
(Hobsbawm 1990), that he simply “will not compete with him on that hunting ground [of 
explaining the origins of Nationalism]”. 
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European warfare. Hence, modern total war is thought to have generated the 
conditions of its own origin. The argument becomes a regression ad infinitum. Or 
rather, it reifies the static realist ontology of constant and perpetual geopolitical 
competition. Thus, as John Hobson has argued, ‘while neo-Weberianism promises to 
go beyond Neo-realism, much of it in fact perfectly replicates Neo-realism”, which 
makes its description as “sociological Realism” perfectly accurate (Hobson, J. M. 
2002: 64). However, this leaves open the question as to how to understand 
geopolitics, assuming its importance, without reifying a realist argument.  
 
The ‘Second Wave’ 
According to Hobson, this criticism of Weberian Historical Sociology as 
‘sociological Realism’ only applies to the ‘first wave’ namely Skocpol and Tilly. This 
is in contrast to the ‘second wave,’ the main representatives of which are Hobson and 
Michael Mann. Both are thought to provide a decidedly non-realist form of Weberian 
Historical Sociology of International Relations (Hobson, J. M. 2002: 65). Like IR 
Theory, the end of the Cold War has triggered this theoretical advance. Given the 
wave of the criticisms of Realism, Weberian scholars grew conscious not to be 
identified as a mere historical sociological add-on to this increasingly tarnished 
approach and tried to establish a more autonomous approach. Interestingly, the way in 
which this was done was via the incorporation of constructivist thought.  
According to Hobson, the ‘first wave’ suffers from two problems inherent in 
Neo-realism but also neoliberal institutionalism. He charges Skocpol and Tilly with 
reproducing the practices of ‘chronofetishism’ and ‘tempocentrism’ (Hobson, J. 2002: 
5). The first term describes the problem of sealing the present off from the past by 
understanding the contemporary order as “autonomous, natural, spontaneous and 
immutable” (Hobson, J. 2002: 9). Realism, according to this critique, naturalizes 
contemporary social institutions and relations and presents as primordial and 
unchangeable what is, in fact, historically specific and malleable. Beyond this 
ahistorical understanding of the contemporary world, Realism equally projects the 
present socio-political make-up of the world back into the past. This is what Hobson 
calls ‘tempocentrism’, i.e. “a methodology in which theorists look at history through 
a 'chronofetishist lens’”. In other words, the practice of tempocentrism projects the 
present back into the past and seeks to conform historically diverse forms to “a reified 
and naturalized present” that is formed by contemporary institutions. It is “in this way 
[that], the study of international relations takes on a 'transhistorical' quality” (Hobson, 
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J. 2002: 9). While having succeeded in bringing ‘the international back in’, the ‘first 
wave’ has failed to integrate either ‘the domestic’ or a notion of geopolitics beyond 
military necessities. This, most problematically, involves the denial of an 
‘international agential power’ of the state (Hobson, J. M. 2002: 65-66). It is this lack 
of state agency, outside of a geopolitical reformulation of Weber’s ‘iron cage’, that 
the ‘second wave’ Weberians seek to rectify.  
Starting from the question of ‘state autonomy,’ an extensive debate about 
state-society relations has evolved within the ‘state debate’ of Neo-Weberian 
Historical Sociology. Pure autonomy, according to some scholars, is possible only in 
Despotism, which, however, only provides for an instable form of rule as it generates 
dissent (Hobson 2000). Another understanding of state autonomy is, therefore 
proposed by John Hobson who argues that “state autonomy is measured in terms of a 
state’s degree of embeddedness within society” rather than through either a pure 
abstraction or a pure hierarchy (Hobson 1998: 293). Hobson proposes a 
‘structurationist’ approach whereby international structures and state-agency are co-
constitutive. Contrary to the ‘first wave’ semi-Darwinistic inside-out theorizations of 
social transformations, Hobson suggests that international and domestic structures are 
constituted by state agency and provide, therefore, both opportunities as well as 
constraints for state agency (Hobson 2001: 411; Hobson, J. M. 2002: 75). This 
approach avoids, therefore, the realist practice of ‘kicking the state back out’ by 
emphasizing the independent agency of the state.  
 
The Autonomy of the State 
While the emphasis on 'international agential power' provides an important advance 
over base/superstructure and other economistic models as well as a quasi-realist 
international structural determination of state agency, the notion of ‘state autonomy’ 
itself suffers from an ahistorical and asociological concept of ‘the state’. Discussions 
about ‘state’-‘society’ relations and degrees of ‘social embededness’ or ‘agential 
capacity’ of states vis-à-vis ‘their’ society overlook the social content of the state. 
More precisely, they lack a meaningful sociology of the administration itself. In other 
words, this notion of autonomy discounts historically variable constitutions and 
contents of state power by implying the existence of states as rational and unitary 
agents who are only constrained by international pressures. While these international 
constraints cannot be discounted, it does not follow that states are only directed by 
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purified internationally determined raison d’état thinking. Rather, state agency is 
better understood as the outcome of social struggles ‘within’.  
This problem can be illustrated with reference to the Ottoman case. In the 18th 
century, ‘the state’ was constituted by a collection of agents and institutions, central 
and peripheral, all representing different and changing vested interests. The attempt to 
create a ‘coercion-intensive state’ in the late 18th century, starting with Selim III in 
1789 aimed at restoring central power as much as it followed a defensive rationale. 
Until then, power was dispersed, not only in the periphery, but also within the central 
administration. While a ‘rational’ Weberian bureaucracy started to emerge in the 19th 
century at the Sublime Porte, these ‘rational’ and de-personal governmental agents 
faced high levels of resistance by other sectors of the state, whose vested interests 
were challenged by the reform process. Even though just defending their own social 
positions, various agents had always claimed to act on behalf of the central state, or 
rather the Şeriat (the ‘good order’). This applied first and foremost the Sultan and his 
lavish households, but from the 17th century also to patrimonial bureaucrats as well as 
various competing branches of the military and the clergy or ulema. Thus, rather than 
implementing one ‘rational’ (foreign) policy goal, the Sultan’s centralization agenda 
has to be seen as the surface appearance of an underlying social struggle between 
transforming social interest groups within the Ottoman ‘state’. Hence, “the external 
may constrain, or impel, states in their foreign policy, but this is not necessarily so” 
(Halliday 2005: 48), since outcomes cannot be reduced to an outside-in and above-
below smooth rationalization. However, the notion of autonomous state-agency is not 
only problematic with regards to pre-modern ‘unbounded’ social formations or in 
cases of ‘overlapping’ sovereignty, but equally pertains (if to a lesser degree) to the 
state’s contemporary ‘modern’ and territorial form where socio-political struggles 
still mediate and restrict ‘rational’ autonomous decision making.  
 
Causal Pluralism  
Another advance of the ‘second wave’ of Weberian Historical Sociology is its causal 
pluralism, which is said to overcome not only economistic and reductionist historical 
materialist approaches, but also the ‘first wave’ and its geopolitical determinism. 
Instead, a ‘multifactor approach’ (Max Weber’s idea of a multiplicity of social 
causes) is introduced. The most influential example is Michael Mann’s work is in this 
regard. He identifies four sources of autonomous social power relations, namely, 
military, political, economic as well as ideological. These relations are either 
 35
expressed in overlapping networks or in formal organizations. The strength of 
individual social powers is, according to Mann, not determined by the strength of 
human will or needs, but by the strength of the organizational means implemented for 
the pursuit of these needs (Mann 1986: 2; Mann 1993). Hence, the hierarchy of social 
powers changes according to historical context and material or reproductive forces do 
not necessarily take precedence over ideational, military and purely political forms of 
social power. This also means that power relations overlap and are not autonomous, 
but intertwined. Thus, the attractiveness of Mann’s IMEP model and other forms of 
multi-dimensional causal approaches lie in their adaptability preventing the 
determinism of positivist explanatory models. Various social forces are never either 
‘reducible to one another’ nor do they stand in isolation, but are ‘co-constitutive’ 
(Runciman 1989). This multicausal approach, thus, provides a malleable explanatory 
tool-kit capable of capturing the specificities of any given social transformation, 
including Ottoman disintegration (Jacoby 2004a, b, 2008b) and subsequent Turkish 
state-formation (Trimberger 1978). 
 Despite appearing attractive, the notion of causal plurality equally bears 
recognizable problems. Michael Mann’s IMEP model, for example, can be criticised 
on the very grounds of Weberian plurality it stands on due to its limitation to only 
four specific social powers. This led to a debate within Weberian Historical 
Sociology mainly concerned with the issue as to whether military power should or 
should not be distinguished from political power (Hobson 1998: 287). This discussion 
is revealing in some ways, however, as it points to the fact that it is by no means clear 
what can be considered a ‘social power’ in the first place. In a complex world, with 
various contradicting ‘forces’ at play, an infinite number could be almost arbitrarily 
identified and mobilized as explanations for social transformation. This is in part due 
to the fact that Weber’s original argument was inconclusive as to the definition of a 
social force in general, let alone specifying three or four distinctive ones. With this 
lack of clarity as to what social power is constituted by and a potential indefinite 
proliferation of various forms of social power, the causal explanation of concrete 
events and change becomes somewhat arbitrary, potentially leading to, as Ellen Wood 
put it, a denial of “causality altogether” (Wood 1995: 174). This issue as well as the 
clear institutional separation between individual sources of social power in an ideal-
typical fashion is problematic for other reasons too. Specifically, Mann does not 
provide a general theorization of the causal relationships within this quartet of social 
powers, or, indeed, their historical origin. However, the ability to distinguish 
 36
precisely four social powers out of a generic call for ‘multiple’ causes is due to the 
fact that they are in fact specific to capitalist modernity (Wood 1995: 174). This 
constitutes an immediate problem for the Weberian approach and its application to 
the Ottoman case. Mann assigns transhistorical validity to the social powers he has 
identified when they are in fact historically peculiar categories. Mann himself has 
treated the Ottoman Empire more as an object, rather than a subject of international 
relations in his work (Mann 1993). Nevertheless all ‘sources of social power’ could 
be historically discerned within the Ottoman context. The analytical value of this 
separation within the Ottoman context is doubtful, however. Since economic, 
political, ideological and military powers were in fact consolidated within competing 
central and peripheral ruling classes, a dissection of their various ‘sources’ appears 
somewhat counter-productive. Rather than revealing anything about the social origin 
of the transformation, an attempt to dissect distinct sources of social power would 
obscure the fact that military, political, economic and social powers are fused and 
would, therefore, prevent a holistic understanding of the dynamics underlying the 
process of Ottoman decline.  
 
 
1.6 World Systems Theory and Expansion of the World Economy  
Localizing the dynamic of domestic change on the systemic international level is not 
unique to Neo Weberian approaches. This method has also been endorsed by a 
Marxist strand of Historical Sociology. Initially this was developed in form of the 
‘Dependency School’ by the Latin American economists André Gunder Frank and 
Paul Prebisch (Prebisch 1986; Frank 1989). This school combined with the French 
Annales School of Ferdinand Braudel (Braudel 1972) into a wider-ranging research 
agenda labelled ‘World Systems Theory’ (WST). This theory, or rather set of 
theoretical assumptions and historical sociological enquiries, was further developed 
by the American Sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein (Wallerstein 1974; Wallerstein, I. 
M. 1979; Wallerstein 1980) who now counts as the main representative of this school.  
The core assumption of the World Systems Approach or World Systems 
Theory (WST) can be summarized as follows: As opposed to comparative historical 
materialist analyses, WST developed a more international or global understanding of 
social transformation that moved the focus from local subsistence economies towards 
the central ontology of trade and exchange as part of an emerging capitalist world 
economy (Wallerstein, I. M. 1979; Wallerstein 1984). These assumptions are 
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historically derived from the European transformations during the long 16th century, 
where agricultural societies moved from being primarily oriented towards subsistence 
purposes towards production for the world market. This caused the emergence of a 
system of exchange and commerce, the development of free cities and overseas 
empires.  
 
This commercial expansion, in turn, gradually evolved into the modern World 
System comprising different forms of labour control, which were connected to the 
establishment of national states. Thus, different states emerge as superstructures of an 
increasingly differentiated global division of labour as a result of the societies’ efforts 
to adapt to the new international imperatives. This establishes an international 
hierarchy of state/economy complexes divided into a surplus extracting center, an 
emerging semi-periphery and peripheral states concentrating on direct production. 
The core states exploit the surplus labour of the peripheral states through the 
mechanism of unequal exchange, rather than direct control. Thus, peripheral societies 
export mainly raw commodities at cheap prices, which are exchanged with the 
industrial, high value added output of the core states. Hence, the capitalist global 
economy is characterized by a self-perpetuating form of surplus extraction through 
market inequalities, which in turn determines the nature of the inter-state system as a 
functional derivative of this global system of capitalist reproduction. The main 
differentiating criteria of states and indeed the core explanation for territorial-political 
separation are therefore different regimes of labour control depending on the 
respective society’s adaptation to the requirements of the capitalist world economy. In 
theory, social transformation is, thus, explained as part of the changing location of 
particular societies within the global division of labour, mediated by commercial 
expansion and contraction. In practice, however, as inequalities are structurally 
determined, transformation appears unlikely if not impossible. The only change that 
does occur, however, is the change of hegemonies within the group of core states, 
carrying out ‘system maintenance’. While Venice and Genoa held this position in the 
early stage of capitalist development, these were followed by hegemonic successions 
from the Netherlands, to Britain, to the United States.  
 
Changes in labour regimes not only changed economic forms of reproduction but 
also political and, by extension, geopolitical structures. Changes in the inter-state 
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system are, therefore, understood as institutional or ‘superstructural’ adjustments to 
the requirements of the expanding capitalist world economy: 
“All our states have been creations of the modern world, even if some could make 
a plausible claim to cultural linkage with pre-modern political entities. And least 
of all, has the interstate system always been there. The interstate system is the 
political superstructure of the capitalist world-economy and was a deliberate 
invention of the modern world” (Wallerstein 1995: 141).  
 
The process of incorporation into the world economy therefore causes a change in the 
form of political rule as well. Incorporation into the world-economy means 
necessarily the insertion of the political structures into the interstate system. This 
means that the old political structures which already exist in the areas of capitalist 
expansion must either transform themselves into ‘states within the interstate system’, 
be replaced by new political structures or be absorbed by other states already within 
the interstate system (Wallerstein 1989: 170). Within this linear outside-in 
conceptualization of history, pre-modern states are primarily understood to be ‘World 
Empires’ where surplus extraction is carried out through the direct control over 
extensive territories through extra-economic means.  
 
Hence, WST understands national differentiation not only as corresponding to 
the global division of labour, but argues that the inter-state system is in fact 
historically constituted by capitalist expansion. The inter-state system is therefore 
understood not only as specific to a broader notion of modernity, but also to capitalist 
International Relations. In other words, it translates the original Marxist axiom of 
class-divisions into inter-state divisions, whereby individual state/labour regimes 
represent particular, hierarchically ordered class interests.  
 
Beyond this economic determination of political structures, Wallerstein went 
on to develop more dedicated arguments on the problem of racial and national 
differentiation which he acknowledged to be, on the surface, somewhat paradoxical 
divisions given the global reach of capitalism. ‘Peoplehood’, as Wallerstein puts it, 
consists either in the biological category of race, the cultural category of ethnicity, or 
the socio-political category of nation. However, even though all three of them 
constitute forms of collective identities, i.e. they all belong to one abstract category of 
‘peoplehood’, a further differentiation into three more distinct sociological concepts 
appears necessary. For Wallerstein this conceptual division reflects the structural 
division in the world economy. “The concept of ‘race’ is related to the axial division 
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of labour (…) the concept of ‘nation’ is related to the political superstructure [and] 
the concept of ‘ethnic group’ is related to household structures that permit the 
maintenance of large components of non-waged labour in the accumulation of 
capital”, implying that the “axial division of labour” is replicated in a “spatial division 
of labour” (Wallerstein 1987; Wallerstein 1991: 79). Thus, not only sovereign 
national states, but also their underlying principle of multiple nationalisms, owe their 
existence to the functional requirements of the capitalist world system. Nations are 
functional derivates from the division of labour.  
 
World Systems Theory and Ottoman Historiography 
Beyond being one of the most prominent adaptations of Historical Materialism within 
the discipline of International Relations, WST has also had a profound impact on 
Ottoman historiography (Karpat 1972a; Keyder 1976a; Islamoglu and Keyder 1978; 
Wallerstein, I. 1979; Kasaba 1988; Islamoglu 2004). Like the rest of the world, 
Ottoman social relations are determined by their position within the world economy, 
which itself consists in shifting relations of global exchange and the international 
division of labour. Thus, Wallerstein’s differentiation between ‘World Empires’ and 
‘States’ is frequently mobilized to explain the Ottoman transformation more 
specifically. 
Similarly to the Geopolitical Competition model, many historical materialist 
explanations about the decline of the Ottoman Empire ended up following this linear 
outside-in conceptualization of history, whereby, the Ottoman ‘Empire’ was by 
definition outdated and destined for transforming as a result of capitalist expansion. 
Applied in concrete terms, this means that the Ottoman Empire entered the capitalist 
world economy in the 17th and 18th centuries when ‘Ottoman trade with the outside 
… ceased to be transit trade and became increasingly less administered and 
increasingly more an economic process of exchange of Ottoman primary goods for 
manufactured European products’ (Sunar 1979: 369), thereby shifting the Ottoman 
Empire into the ‘periphery’ of the world economy. Kasaba and Wallerstein apply this 
theory to the social transformation of the Ottoman society: 
[I]ncorporation involves a restructuring of the production processes and political 
system of an area such that the incorporated area becomes an integrated part of 
the axial division of labor of the capitalist world-economy and a functioning part 
of the interstate system (Kasaba and Wallerstein 1983: 336).  
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In short, separatist movements and territorial divisions are seen as outflows of the 
global division of labour, determining political organization functionally as well as 
spatially.  
 
The World Systems Contribution 
Apart from theories of imperialism, WST was long seen as the only significant 
contribution of Historical Materialism to International Relations Theory. The 
replication of social, class divisions at the inter-state level arguably amounts to a 
Marxist domestic/international analogy. Class struggles become struggles whereby 
states, or groups of states, rather than providing the primary arena for social struggle, 
come to represent coherent – bourgeois – class interests. Thus, class interests become 
national interests and social struggle becomes identical with inter-state economic 
struggles.  
However, this understanding of the inter-state system, which leaves no space 
for geopolitical struggles that are not economically determined, has been frequently 
attacked for effectively reifying the base-superstructure model. This critique mostly 
came from within Marxism (Brenner 1977; Denemark and Thomas 1988). Etienne 
Balibar, on the other hand, argues in the same volume he edited together with 
Wallerstein on Race, Nation and Class (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991), that the 
commonly assumed congruence between national sovereignty and modern capitalism 
“needs qualifying in several ways” and, further, that “it is quite impossible to 
‘deduce’ the nation from capitalist relations of production” (Balibar 1991: 89). This 
does not amount to an abandoning of the base-superstructure model, but contends that 
the origins of national rule are located in a multiplicity of different bourgeoisies, 
rather than one global or transnational one necessitating the inter-state system for its 
reproduction. Instead, the multiplicity of nation-states is to be found in the “concrete 
configurations of class struggle and not ‘pure’ economic logic”, leading Balibar to 
abandon “linear developmental schemas once and for all” (Balibar 1991: 90). Thus, 
Balibar does not necessarily locate the social origin of national differentiation in the 
division of labour into core and periphery, even though consolidated nation-states 
eventually come to reflect these functional divisions in his view. Despite this last 
minute turn towards WST, Balibar’s recognition of the non-linear and open-ended 
nature of the political process of state formation offers an important, if implicit, 
critique of Wallerstein’s structuralist understanding of the origin of nationalism and 
the inter-state system.  
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However, this structuralism is not only problematic in terms of International 
Relations, or with regards to explaining national differentiations, but also in purely 
Marxist terms alone. While change and transformation constitute central categories, 
these are not thought of as voluntaristic outcomes. Human agency, in other words, 
disappears behind the unstoppable inner workings of the world market, calling into 
question the emancipatory potential of this kind of Historical Materialism. Implicitly, 
however, agency appears to be assigned to a mercantile bourgeoisie which is thought 
to constitute the reforming and/or revolutionary class (Stoianovich 1960; Göçek 
1996). This is highly problematic, for in many cases these social strata were 
incoherent, non-homogeneous or non-existing. To the extent that they did exist, they 
sometimes had no stake in the political process or were granted patrimonial privileges 
more beneficial than the legal certainty of modern states. Overall, it seems very 
problematic to discern an a priori bourgeois interest in national revolt. 
More generally speaking this suggests that a structural Marxist interpretation 
with its emphasis on economically and internationally determined social change fails 
to incorporate historically specific, non-linear forms of socio-political change. WST, 
as Theda Skocpol puts it, attempts “to treat state forms and ‘strength’ (e.g. 
centralization and bureaucratization) as simple functions of societies’ class structures 
and positions in the world-capitalist economic division of labour” (Skocpol 1973: 31). 
In fact, it could be argued from a historical materialist perspective that WST fails to 
recognize the dialectical and contradictory nature of capitalist development itself 
(Cox 1981). World system historiography elevates the gradual evolution of exchange 
relations within and outside of societies, like the Ottoman, to a generic explanatory 
device, rather than understanding these relations as part of a specific historical 
development that requires explanation. Observing historical shifts in the commercial 
relations of various societies and the way in which they impact can provide for 
valuable insights. However, it hardly makes for a comprehensive explanation of 
complex and dialectical social transformations, if it is understood as a one-way 
outside-in automatism.  
 
 
1.7 The problem of International Determinism  
In summary, it can be observed that both established strands in Historical Sociology 
of International Relations, Neo Weberian Historical Sociology as well as World 
Systems Theory rely heavily on the modernizing capacity of European (capitalist) 
 42
modernity. The former emphasizes the generative capacity of warfare in general and 
of modern, total war in particular. The latter, on the other hand, understands 
modernity mainly in terms of an expanding capitalist economy defined in commercial 
terms which is characterized by an international division of labour into core and 
periphery states. Both approaches understand ‘Empire’ as an outdated form of rule 
and demonstrate that these modernizing tendencies transform into nation-states. 
While the Weberian understanding is based mainly on patrimonial, personalized rule, 
aristocratic warfare and coercion-intensive reproduction, World Systems Theory 
understands Empires as territorially extensive despotic societies whose 
underdeveloped agricultural societies fall prey to the inequalities of the emerging 
world economy.  
The universalisation of the inter-state system throughout the world is frequently 
understood, therefore, as a part of a Hegelian teleology of progress whereby the self-
assertion of the world spirit results in an uneven proliferation of ‘national’ revolutions 
and secessions. This transformative, homogenising process re-invents the modern 
European international system by spreading tightly organised state-society complexes 
or nation-states throughout the world by implanting ‘pressure points’ in other 
societies (van der Pijl 1996). Previously ‘passive’ societies had been in a state of 
social stagnation compared to the West’s dynamism and progressive development. It 
is only through the commercial or geopolitical interaction with the emerging 
European system of states that progress and development is achieved by emulating 
Western European economic structures, political institutions, ideology and modes of 
reproduction. Thus, it is only by virtue of external engagement that non-European 
societies develop (Turner 1974, 1989).  
 
The Ottoman Empire provides an apt empirical example to illustrate this point. In 
particular, it is not only held responsible for the retardation of its own society, but 
also for the supposedly European provinces illegitimately under its control, 
effectively preventing development according to their naturally European (i.e. 
dynamic) path. This conventional wisdom is expressed by Perry Anderson in that  
“the Ottoman State, occupant of South-Eastern Europe for five hundred years, 
camped in the continent without ever becoming naturalized into its social and 
political system. It always remained largely a stranger to European culture, as an 
Islamic intrusion into Christendom…” (Anderson 1974: 398)  
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Put in simplistic terms, the problem with Perry Anderson’s account of the Ottoman 
Empire in his ‘Lineages of the Absolutist State’ lies with the continuing operation of 
an ontological as well as epistemological East/West divide. This might seem an unfair 
criticism at first, given Anderson’s elaborate and powerful rejection of Marx’ and 
Engels’ concept of the Asiatic Mode of Production (AMP) in his Notes on the 
Lineages of the Absolutist State as a politically conditioned, Orientalist understanding 
of the ‘East’ reproducing the “traditional European discourse [on Oriental Despotism 
in political theory10] with minimal modifications” (Anderson 1974: 429). The original 
formulation of this differentiation in form of the AMP had emphasized the strong 
central and arbitrary power of ‘Asiatic Despots’, in contradistinction to the emergence 
of a powerful nobility in Europe. ‘Eastern’ societies, by contrast, had a tyrannical and 
arbitrary ruler and no influential nobility in the periphery. This also implied the 
absence of a stable institution of private property. As a result, the static character of 
Asiatic societies and their lack of socio-economic development manifested their 
backwardness as opposed to the more dynamic societies of Western Europe.   
Anderson, furthermore, also attacks the wider claim inherent in the concept of 
the AMP, to function as a general epistemology applicable to all ‘Oriental Empires’. 
This ‘reductio ad absurdum’, i.e. the application of a generic understanding of 
‘Eastern’ rule and social order to a vast variety of highly differentiated societies, blurs 
“distinct social formations into one archetype” (Anderson 1974: 494), leading to an 
inflation of the idea and ultimately to its devaluation (Anderson 1974: 487). He also 
criticises Marx and Engels for overlooking the essentially dynamic (if differentiated) 
character of oriental societies, wrongly assuming, like Mill, their ‘stationariness’ (cf. 
Turner 1974) in stagnant or cyclical forms of development. 
However, this rejection of the AMP does not lead Anderson to challenge the 
underlying ontological and epistemological divide between East/West and 
European/non-European forms of development per se. Rather, his uncritical 
adaptation of mainstream Ottoman/Orientalist historiography in the chapter on the 
Ottoman Empire, entitled the ‘House of Islam’ (Anderson 1974: 361-398), seems to 
accept it as empirically unproblematic. In other words, Anderson himself maintains a 
strong belief in an essential and bounded East/West differentiation that is central to 
his argument without offering an alternative explanation for it (cf. Bailey and Llobera 
1981: 14).  
                                                 
10
 For a more detailed elaboration of the perception of Ottoman rule in European political theory 
see chapter 6. 
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More concretely, turning to the historical reconstruction of the Ottoman land 
regime he makes out a “natural tendency of the system to [...] degenerate into 
parasitic tax-farming” (Anderson 1974: 500). In this sense, he appears to detect a 
fundamental flaw within the Ottoman social structure, thus partially explaining its 
demise and ‘Eastern backwardness’. Equally, while acknowledging the “formally 
milder levels of exploitation” within the Ottoman Empire (as compared to other 
‘Despotic Empires’), he maintains that these were undermined by the corruption of 
the state’s agents and the ”malversations of its distant officers” (Anderson 1974: 471) 
as a structural condition, rather than as a unique historical conjuncture. He continues 
reproducing generalizations such as “the Islamic world was always [...] a vast, 
catenary system of cities separated by a neglected or despised countryside”, and 
identifies a “concealed disadvantage” of ‘Islamic Empires’ towards the ‘Old World as 
a whole’ (Anderson 1974: 517). Thus, arguably, Anderson replaces one 
generalization (‘Asiatic’) with another (‘Islamic’), essentially re-affirming a profound 
differentiation between the West and ‘Chinese and Islamic civilisations’ as “two 
patently divergent morphologies of state and society” (Anderson 1974: 547). In other 
words, his theoretical critique of the concept of the AMP remains unreconciled with 
his historical reconstruction of the Ottoman case, which seems to relapse into the very 
axioms that his critique of the AMP model was designed to overcome. This 
disconnect resides ultimately in the tension between allowing, on the one hand, for a 
proper explication of the modernising potential of the Ottoman Empire enabled by his 
critique of the AMP model, and a simultaneous foreclosing of this potential through 
the recourse to structural limits built into the Ottoman trajectory, grounded in generic 
differences captured by ontological geo-civilisational macro-categories. But as the 
‘East’ remains a residual category in Anderson’s overall narrative, so a unified ‘West’ 
remains its alter ego as a geographical category that turns into a substantive one as it 
was the specific sequence and concatenation of its ‘modes of production’ – from 
Rome via the Middle Ages to Absolutism (Roman Law, feudal private property, 
rationality) – that were so many amalgamated preconditions for the break-through 
towards capitalism driven by ‘bourgeois revolutions’.  
For it was against this conventional backdrop of a qualitative differentiation 
between the East and the West that Anderson develops his argument about the 
historically and geographically unique rise of capitalism in Europe, rather than a 
specific region within Europe. In contrast, it is argued here that such an a priori 
assumption about a ‘modal’ difference between ‘East’ and ‘West’, ‘Europe’ and 
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‘Asia’, ‘Islam’ and ‘the Old World’, obscures the historical and regional specificities 
that provide more meaningful explanations for historically peculiar and malleable 
processes of differentiation. As the following chapters will show, what Anderson 
describes as ill-fated structural flaws of the Porte’s (or in fact Islam’s) ruling regime 
in the periphery, pertain to certain specific moments in Ottoman history. For example, 
contrary to assumptions of a purely ‘Islamic’ ruling regime, the advent of Ottoman 
rule in the Balkans has generated the notion of the Pax Ottomanica in southeastern 
Europe, as it established political order in place of the arbitrary exploitation and 
constant inter-feudal warfare that characterised pre-Ottoman social structures 
(Stavrianos 2000 [1958]: 112-115).11 While Anderson’s elaborations overcome, by 
and large, some of the misperceptions about Ottoman rule as purely static and 
despotic, they leave the Ottoman Empire’s function as Europe’s constitutive ‘other’, 
and the associated distortion in the understanding of the Ottoman transformation, 
intact.  
 
This practice of distortion, articulated first and foremost through the notion of 
the AMP (Hindess and Hirst 1975), relying itself on the idea of ‘Oriental Despotism’ 
(Wittfogel 1957; Wickham 1985), has a long tradition in Western European thinking. 
It was frequently used as the reference point of the ‘despotic other’ on to which the 
enlightened West was able to project its own progressivity as described by European 
Renaissance writers.12 “Orientalism set out to explain the progressive features of the 
Occident and the social stationariness of the Orient” (Turner 1994: 22). Thus, it is not 
necessarily only a cultural difference and a misperceived anti-capitalist attitude of 
Islam that is seen as the ‘origin of backwardness’ in the Ottoman Empire, but the fact 
of their centralized, tributary political organisation which failed to develop the same 
competitive dynamic as European intra-feudal geo-economic competition.  
With regards to Europe, however, there are at least as many similarities as 
dissimilarities. Absolutist Europe saw the development towards political 
centralization and military reform. However, the relations of domination and surplus-
                                                 
11
 This term is used here in a different way. In most conventional historiographic accounts the ‘Pax 
Ottomanica’ refers to the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent (1520 to 1566) when Ottoman 
expansion created an unprecedented era of stability in southeastern Europe. It is used here in a 
more generic sense though as referring to the establishment of geopolitical order conducive to the 
Pax Britannica in the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus by using Ottoman/Turkish 
influence as stabilising factor against Russian ambitions. It should also be noted that Stavrianos 
remains attached to a primordial understanding of Balkan nationalisms and the general de-
legitimation of Ottoman rule associated with it.  
12
 For an overview over the portrayal of the Ottoman polity as archaic and despotic in European 
writing see Anderson (1974: 397f ); see also chapter 6. 
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extraction remained both personalised and surpluses divided between the King and a 
semi-feudal office-holding ruling class. There was no significant qualitative shift in 
the underlying process of surplus-extraction between feudalism and Absolutism 
(Teschke 2003: 189-97; Teschke 2006: 537-38). Relations of exploitation remained 
personalised; methods of surplus extraction were still based on political means. Thus, 
in the same way that European Absolutism continued to rely on personal, politically 
constituted relations of exploitation as a central source of income, the Ottoman 
centralised tax-regime was based on personal rule divided between peripheral quasi-
fiefs and the Sultan as the legally codified ultimate landlord. In both cases, these 
personal/political relations are still not replaced by de-personalised relations of the 
market, but are based on a politically constituted share of sources of taxable income. 
The political and the economic, therefore, remain united clarifying some 
developmental similarities between the ‘Occidental’ and ‘Oriental’ paths, thereby 
rendering at least Anderson’s explanation for the ‘uniqueness of the West’ 
problematic (Berktay 1987). While the findings of this thesis do not necessarily 
coincide with Halil Berktay’s claims about the ‘feudal’ nature of Ottoman power in 
general, Berktay does provide a very adequate description and understanding of the 
late 18th century when an effective ‘feudalisation’ of the previously centralised 
Ottoman land-regime is observable.  
The recovery of the ‘non-uniqueness’ of the East challenges the explanation 
of Western development as the unique origin and location of social change more 
generally. The challenge therefore lies in developing a theoretical framework that can 
accommodate the independent agency and dynamic of ‘Eastern’, non-European 
societies, avoiding deterministic and teleological understandings of transformation, 
without at the same time neglecting the reproductive and expansionist capacity of 
European societies, above all in their most recent form of capitalism. While World 
Systems Theory and Neo-Weberian Historical Sociology help illuminating the latter, 
‘European’ part of this equation, they embrace a passive-adaptive understanding of 
the former. Due to their heavy reliance on the expansionary capacity of European 
modernity, and their teleological understanding of the social transformation from 
‘Empire’ to ‘States’, their approaches are best described as a form of ‘international 
determinism’.  
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1.8 Political Marxism on Capitalism and the Interstate System 
The understanding of the emergence of national states as the result of the 
universalisation of capitalism and the global division of labour constitutes, however, 
not the only historical materialist reading of this transformation from Empire to a 
multiplicity of nation-states. First of all, even if the above transformation is causally 
related to uneven capitalist development in Europe, this nevertheless does not mean 
that the definition of capitalism in World System terms is necessarily the most useful 
one. Dissatisfied by WST, other Marxist historical sociological accounts have 
emerged which locate the question of the specificity of Europe and the origins of 
capitalism within a problematique of International Relations. This also pertains to the 
theory of social property relations developed by Robert Brenner. Brenner proposes a 
de-naturalized account of capitalist development that avoids the early Marxist 
teleological conceptions of history and instead starts from specific social property 
relations and their associated social struggles. The unintended, non-linear outcomes 
of these conflicts lead to change, social transformation and eventually the emergence 
of new social property regimes, most crucially agricultural capitalism in 16th and 17th 
century England. However, due to the emphasis on the historical specificity of class 
constellations and social property regimes, no wider structural abstraction or 
overarching ‘logic’ is derivable from recognizing these changes (Brenner 1977, 
1987). Ellen Wood followed Brenner when criticising conventional Marxist 
interpretations of capitalist transformation in Europe which identify the expansion of 
commerce from towns and cities radiating outwards through bourgeois agents into an 
emerging World Economy as the ‘prime mover’ of the transition. Addressing the 
politically constituted and therefore regionally variable, rather than ‘logical’ 
economic nature of the transition, Wood developed the notion of ‘Political Marxism’ 
(Wood 1991, 1995; Wood, E. M. 2002).  
In this account, the origin of capitalism and its subsequent spread are 
understood as an unintended outcome of social struggles within the agrarian class 
constellation of late-feudal England. In this perspective, bourgeois or peasant social 
forces did not establish capitalism following an agenda for liberation or reform. 
Whereas peasant uprisings led to emancipation in France and to a second serfdom in 
Eastern Europe, it was only in England that the class tensions over property rights and 
the terms of exploitation produced the social conditions conducive to the rise of 
capitalist social relations. Thus, agrarian capitalism did not emerge as an intended 
objective, purposefully pursued by social actors, but as a specific outcome and by-
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product of social struggles over sources of income (Brenner 1987). The core 
characteristic of capitalism is therefore not production for exchange on the market, 
but the commodification of labour power and land. Pointing out the concrete 
historical, rather than systemic or pre-determined social origins of capitalism, implies 
that capitalism is not a European or even universal necessity, built into the long-term 
history of Europe, but a regionally specific and historically developed, unique social 
property regime which “individual actors will find it rational and possible to follow” 
(Brenner 1987: 18). However, this acceptance only prevails as long as the social 
property regime can engender cohesion and is not dislodged by further social 
contestation, implying the potential for transformation and, by extension, agency.  
 
Thus, Political Marxism starts from a different definition of capitalism –
conceptionally, regionally and chronologically – compared to WST. Consequently, 
different conclusions about the relationship between the interstate system and 
capitalism are drawn.13 Centrally, Political Marxism understands capitalism not 
simply as a purely economic category, but as a holistic sociological concept that 
captures wider social relations peculiar to modernity. Capitalism is differentiated 
from feudalism as a fundamentally different system of social reproduction with 
associated forms of political organisation. In pre-capitalist formations, the production 
process, or the economic is politically institutionalized. Hence, surplus extraction is 
carried out through extra-economic means, i.e. through direct physical and politically 
constituted control. Accumulation, therefore, is always political as well as necessarily 
associated with territorial command which, in turn, equals income (Brenner 1989: 
26). Thus, economic and political powers are fused. Property is constituted through 
political force, rather than private contracts.  
In capitalism, on the other hand, surplus extraction is no longer carried out 
through political violence and social relations receive a depersonalized definition. 
Reproduction takes place within markets in which factors of production, most 
importantly waged labour and land, are commodified. Appropriation, therefore, is 
primarily carried out through the depersonalized, economic compulsion of the market 
                                                 
13
 Political multiplicity is not understood as a general abstraction, but as a historically specific 
ontology. Different social formations conduct historically specific kinds of social relations, 
constituting a variety of relations that do not lend themselves easily to a transhistorical 
dichotomous inside/outside ontology and the associated epistemology of modern International 
Relations theory. Political Marxism refutes the possibility of such a general abstraction and relies, 
instead, on historicised notions of political multiplicity, which is therefore equally not structurally 
maintained by the competitive ‘logic’ of the capitalist world economy (cf. Chase-Dunn 1981).  
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within a system of centralized, depersonalized territorial states which exercise a 
monopoly over the means of violence and guarantee the sanctity of contracts. Hence, 
this new capitalist social property regime changed the nature of sovereignty as well. 
Reproduction does not rely on direct politically substantiated extraction through 
extra-economic means and contains, therefore, a non-territorial or better: trans-
territorial impulse. However, it does generate a specific kind of capitalist/sovereign 
state, which not only creates an environment of legal and physical, internal and 
external security for the smooth operation of the market. This new modern sovereign 
not only guarantees the operation of the market. Rather, it constitutes the market itself 
as a social form through political means. Hence, the separation between economic 
and political power in modern capitalist sovereignty is itself politically constituted 
(Wood 1981).  
 
Political Marxism as International Theory  
The major contribution of Political Marxism to International Relations resides, in 
principle, in the possibility of a historical materialist understanding of social 
transformation that avoids structuralist and economistic ‘models’ and allows for a 
dialectical as well as historically and regionally specific understanding of social 
transformation. As the nature of sovereignty changed according to specific social 
property regimes, they also changed the international environment within which these 
sovereigns operate. While Brenner and Wood have not systematically dealt with the 
subject matter of International Relations or Geopolitics as a distinctive problem, a 
variety of adaptations of Political Marxism within the discipline of International 
Relations have emerged over recent years. 
The introduction of Political Marxism into the study of IR has prompted at 
least three theoretical innovations. Building on Wood’s work, Justin Rosenberg’s 
critique of structural Realism in The Empire of Civil Society emphasizes the 
historically specific origin of the realist concepts of anarchy and balance of power in 
capitalist modernity. While other inter-state systems were determined by the socio-
economic nature of their constitutive elements, such as the Ancient Greek polis or the 
Italian city states of the Renaissance, modern sovereignty as defined by the separation 
of the political and the economic equally produces a determinate international system 
(Rosenberg 1994). Rosenberg demonstrates how the anarchical inter-state conditions 
and the ordering mechanism of the balance of power are predicated on the separation 
of the economic and the political in modern capitalist sovereignty, rather than acting 
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as timeless features grounded in the mere fact of societal multiplicity. The fact that 
surplus extraction is no longer carried out through direct coercion translates into a de-
territorialisation of the process of international capital accumulation as an increase in 
income is no longer contingent upon territorial accumulation. According to Justin 
Rosenberg, it was this transition from premodern ‘imperial’/‘feudal’ socio-economic 
relations to modern capitalist international relations that institutionalized the 
functional similarity, or billiard-ball character, of internally hierarchically organized 
modern states whose external interactions naturally re-produce the balance of power 
under the conditions of anarchy structural Realism describes (Rosenberg 1994: Ch. 
5). Rosenberg’s work intervenes, therefore, directly into the inter-paradigm debate in 
IR by arguing that rather than being mutually opposing international theories, 
Liberalism and Realism represent two sides of the Janus-faced nature of modern, 
capitalist international relations.  
Benno Teschke’s critical reconstruction of the emergence of the Westphalian 
system of states in his Myth of 1648 builds on Rosenberg’s work but also takes issue 
with Rosenberg’s structuralist reading of the ‘separation-argument’, by following 
more closely Brenner’s theory of social property relations. On this basis, he also 
problematises the historical relation between the rise of capitalism and the inter-state 
system in so far as the latter cannot be derived from the former. Based on Brenner’s 
insight into the political nature of accumulation in pre-capitalist societies, Teschke 
transferred this notion to pre-capitalist geopolitics which were characterized by 
competitive forms of geo-political accumulation, i.e. pre-capitalist conflicts over 
territorially constituted sources of revenue (Teschke 2003: 61, 220; Teschke 2006: 
536). Hence, pre-capitalist IR is characterized by constant inter-feudal warfare – a 
dynamic that led over time through processes of political and geopolitical 
accumulation towards an inter-state order in pre-capitalist Europe. Teschke’s account 
denaturalizes the notion of modern sovereignty and territoriality and argues that it 
was only during the late 19th century, rather than with the Peace Treaties of 
Westphalia in 1648 - the era of absolutist ‘territorialisation’ of rule - that the 
European inter-state system was gradually transformed through the agency of 
capitalist Britain towards a capitalist inter-state order. Continental Absolutism 
consequently reformulated the personal relationships and dependencies of feudalism 
on the level of a centralized state through office venality without fundamentally 
altering the conditions of personalized politics and property. Strategies of social 
reproduction, therefore, continued to be politically constituted. As a result, Old 
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Regime geopolitics continued to be dominated by competing forms of geopolitical 
accumulation in the form of inter-dynastic rivalries. The geopolitically superior 
challenger emanating from the English heartland of capitalism forced the social 
transformation of backward societies, which leads to a gradual, incomplete and 
contradictory process of social and political transformation on the Continent. As 
opposed to Rosenberg, Teschke emphasizes the processual and incomplete character 
of the feudalist/absolutist transitions, the centrality of class struggles and geopolitical 
conflicts and the specific nature of these transitions embedded within various ‘special 
paths’: 
“But in one way or another, on pain of extinction, pre-capitalist states had to 
accommodate, assimilate, or adjust - or invent radical counterstrategies, most 
notably socialism. These variations in state responses express the explosive 
confluence of the different timing of competitive exposure to Britain and other 
advanced capitalist states and pre-existing domestic class constellations that 
ruled out certain state strategies while ruling in others. While the initial impetus 
towards state modernization and capitalist transformation was geopolitical, state 
responses to this pressure were refracted through respective class relations in 
national contexts, including class resistance. In this sense, the 'alignment of the 
provinces' generated nothing but national Sonderwege (special paths)” (Teschke 
2003: 265f).  
 
The territorial fragmentation through which capitalism developed, i.e. the 
inter-state system, is therefore not an outcome of capitalism, but an absolutist legacy, 
which causes the subsequent unevenness of capitalist development and the variety of 
outcomes. Hannes Lacher’s work, on the other hand, has mobilized similar findings 
to provide new perspectives on debates about Globalization and territoriality (Lacher 
2003, 2006b), which aim at circumventing the divide between sceptics (Veseth 1998; 
Rosenberg 2000) and (hyper)globalists (Scholte 2000) by emphasizing that the 
geopolitical pluriverse, i.e. multiple state forms, are a historical heritage of inter-
dynastic rivalries based on the previously dominant forms of social reproduction, i.e. 
geopolitical accumulation (Teschke and Lacher 2007). Thus, the political economy of 
globalization and the geopolitical dynamics inherent in the territorial nation-state 
system (Lacher 2005) are not competing or chronological forms of development, but 
were always at the core of modern international relations. Lacher sets out the problem 
of a spatial ‘logic’ of early capitalism. If capitalism is a totalizing drive which 
engenders a political infrastructure suited for the regulatory needs of a globalizing 
capitalist economy, what could be expected logically would be the enlargement and 
fusion of territorial rule for the purpose of easing trade. However, what was 
observable historically within the Ottoman (as well as the Habsburg) Empire was a 
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further fragmentation of political rule simultaneously adjoined with a quantitative 
growth in transnational exchange relations. The problem is that “if the relations of 
exploitation under capitalism are inherently global(ising), then why are the capitalist 
relations of domination not corresponding to their spatial extension, to the capitalist 
world market and global social relations?” (Lacher 2000: 51). Thus, Political 
Marxism also directly explains and problematizes the important problem of the 
persistence of politico-territorial differentiation within the totalizing tendencies of 
capitalist modernity by revealing the Absolutist origins of the territorially divided 
inter-national order.  
 
The Fragmentation of Rule and Capitalist Modernity  
This wider problem can be reformulated for the purpose of the current project. 
Imperial disintegration and post-Ottoman nation-state formation is understood as part 
of this transformation from premodern to modern sovereignty. And “one aspect of 
this transformation was the tendency for the borders of the state and the boundaries of 
nations to become more congruent, whether through movements of national secession 
or unification” (Lacher 2006a: 131). With regard to the Ottoman Empire, this 
transformation thus implied a shift from the fused political and economic power of 
the Sultan to a separation of the two and the depersonalization of political rule in the 
modern national state. Once political affairs are de-personalized, “the individual (…), 
with the help of self-discovered, self-imposed norms, determines himself as a free and 
moral-being” (Kedourie 1993: 17). The process of de-personalizing social relations 
and political rule in modern societies therefore triggers a process of alienation within 
the modern political subject which can only be overcome by supporting the latter with 
a framework of reference capable of establishing reality and, consequently, social 
cohesion within the modern nation. National secession is therefore understood as 
being congruent with the nascent moment of an abstract, de-personalized state, the 
separation of the private from the public and the economic from the political: in short 
modern sovereignty. 
 
Why, then we can then ask, does southeastern Europe see the disappearance 
of a polity comprising a large internal market which had initiated a process of 
political modernization and partly established a depersonalized Weberian 
bureaucracy? This conundrum is primarily (if not only) a problem for Marxist IR 
Theory, because if the bourgeoisie ‘creates a world after its own image’, why do the 
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transnational market and the national state not follow the same totalizing logic 
inherent in global capital? As the following historical re-construction of Ottoman 
decline demonstrates, territorial fragmentation was not a world after the bourgeoisie’s 
image, because the social classes that did fit this Marxist ideal-type most closely were 
either absent or opposed to the nationalist projects. The absence of a 
capitalist/nationalist agency, however, does not mean that capitalism was not created 
‘from above’ by a state-class, after independent states had been created, because, as 
Ellen Wood put it, “capitalism, in some ways more than any other social form, needs 
politically organized and legally defined stability, regularity, and predictability” 
(Wood, E. M. 2002: 178). And those ‘goods’ are normally still provided for by the 
modern nation-state. It does not, however, provide at the same time any answers as to 
why the geopolitical layout of the Balkans became fractured, and why these 
revolutions from above were successful only when carried out by multiple, nationally 
differentiated state classes instead of the technologically, institutionally and arguably 
intellectually more advanced, Ottoman one.  
 
Nationalism and Social Property Relations 
One answer to this question could be found in the concept of nationalism. Nation-
state consolidation or national secessions are usually associated with the spread of 
capitalist modernity. Ellen Wood had originally explained Nationalism as an uneven, 
rather than modern social phenomenon, emerging from class and institutional 
contradictions within the absolutist state (Wood 1991: 25–38). What is problematic, 
however, is not only the equation of absolutist with modern sovereignty that had 
substantiated the ‘Myth’ of 1648, but also the equation of ‘national’ with 
‘modernized’ rule. Frederick Dufour has recently elaborated on this problem, 
contending that the origin of nationalism is to be found in the “combined 
transformation of social-property regimes in England and France” (Dufour 2007: 
588), thus emphasising the inter-national origin of nationalism beyond the internal 
contradictions outlined by Wood. Thus, for Dufour the capitalist landed aristocracy 
gave a national form to its social interests (Dufour 2007: 594) under the impression 
of inter-national imperatives for transformation, transforming political subjectivity 
without social change. This matches Benno Teschke and Hannes Lacher’s argument 
about the pre-capitalist origin of multiple states. However, while this problematizes 
the important transition towards the national character of post-Absolutist rule, it still 
does not provide a dedicated account of the problem of national/territorial 
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differentiation and secession. These are not recognized as an integral part of the 
problem of capitalist transformation. What Political Marxist literature has not yet 
developed, therefore, is a specific answer to the question about the origins of 
processes of national differentiation beyond the transition from absolutist to national 
rule.  
 
Excursus: Multiple Modernities14 
At this point it appears pertinent to distinguish between various forms of modernity 
and their respective social origins. By pointing out the distinction between territorial, 
absolutist, national and, lastly, modern capitalist sovereignty, Teschke, Lacher and 
Dufour have already elucidated the need to dismantle a holistic form of modernity 
that understands the transformation as a sharp historical sequence, driven by an 
underlying teleology, where the same modernizing logic transforms a variety of 
phenomena into a new social whole. The historical reconstruction presented here 
equally aims at disentangling various notions of modernity. This not only concerns 
the difference between “the Enlightenment project and the ideology of capitalism” 
(Wood 2000: 426), but also between capitalist, territorial and national sovereignty, or 
the social, spatial and epistemic dimensions of modernity.  
Capitalist sovereignty is understood here in Political Marxist terms as the 
depersonalization of rule, involving the separation of the private from the public and 
the economic from the political. It pertains to the system of social reproduction as 
well as to the nature of sovereignty. Secondly, territoriality, i.e. the unique form of 
exclusive territorial control between physically and cartographically manifested 
frontiers, pre-supposes the establishment of a monopoly over the means of violence. 
However, it does not presuppose either the national character of rule, or 
depersonalized social relations and the creation of an abstract political authority. 
Thus, as Teschke and Lacher have pointed out, the sharper delimitation of the 
‘outside’ from the ‘inside’ in Absolutism, does not necessarily signify a deeper social 
transformation. Crucially, however, monopolizing the means of violence and the 
                                                 
14
 Shumel N. Eisenstadt has developed the idea of ‘Multiple Modernities’, as “the best way to 
understand the contemporary world – indeed to explain the history of modernity – (...) as a story of 
continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs (...) carried forward 
by specific social actors in close connection with social, political, and intellectual activists and also 
by social movements pursuing different programs of modernity, holding very different views on 
what makes societies modern” (Eisenstadt 2000: 2). While this thesis finds itself broadly in 
agreement with this statement, the notion of ‘Multiple Modernity’ itself is used differently here as 
the need to disaggregate, not only the culturally and geographically differentiated amalgamations 
of ‘modernity’, but also the different properties of social order conventionally associated with the 
notion of ‘modern sovereignty’.  
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transition towards a standing army creates new forms of external violence and 
warfare. Lastly, national sovereignty, which has its origin in the Enlightenment, is 
conducive to the creation of the modern political subject as it supplies a form of 
depersonalized political ideology that replaces personal relations of domination. 
Nationalism, therefore, appears to be coeval with the establishment of capitalist 
sovereignty. However, as the highly diversified socio-historical origins of nationalist 
movements suggest, the institutional form of capitalist sovereignty and its national 
content have to be separated. In other words, a holistic notion of modernity does not 
explain the multiplicity and differentiation of national forms. While national cohesion 
fulfils certain social functions for creating the modern political subject within the 
abstract territorial state, national divisions do not. Rather, processes of nation- and 
state formation are best understood as compatible in long-term outcomes but 
disjointed in social origins.  
Thus, even though all three forms of modernity are compatible with each 
other and while they all transiently converge, not in a determinate, but in a semi-
contingent way towards a homogenous holistic capitalist, territorial and national form 
of sovereignty, their origins are nevertheless socially differentiated and need to be 
conceptually differentiated as well. The fact of their historical convergence does not 
allow for a converse teleological argument about their abstract or logical inter-
relation. Put differently, the three different expressions of modernity discussed here; 
social, spatial, epistemic - are all politically constituted and are not reducible to one 
another. They have to be seen as originating within the context of various specific 
social struggles that overlapped and inter-related, but cannot be subsumed a priori 
under a meta-narrative of modernization. 
 
The Contribution of Political Marxism  
In summary, it can be argued that Political Marxism is best understood as a response 
to the problem of international determinism. Instead of understanding pre-capitalist 
social forms only in relation to a totalizing capitalist developmental rationale, 
Political Marxism aims at overcoming teleology and determinism by recognizing the 
transformative role inherent in the nexus between specific forms of social 
reproduction and the associated social struggles within historically grown, unique 
social contexts. This generic emphasis on the potential for transformation through 
social struggles and shifting social property regimes means that Political Marxism’s 
explanatory scope goes beyond explaining social and institutional changes that are 
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associated with the transition from pre-capitalist to capitalist social relations as well. 
Hence, Political Marxism claims that these elements constitute transhistorical aspects 
of human interaction which apply to capitalist as well as pre-capitalist social forms 
alike. Taking these elements as the starting point for a historical materialist 
theorization of IR avoids the reproduction of teleological and unidirectional narratives 
of modernization. Political Marxism, thus, retrieves, theoretically, the irreducible 
agency of social forces that translate into specific historical analyses that avoid 
structural, deterministic as well as pluralistic or contingent explanations. Locally 
specific outcomes are no longer either reduced to structural imperatives or left to 
pluralistic explanatory arbitrariness. Thus, instead of ascribing a reproductive, 
totalizing capacity to European modernity, Political Marxism re-conceptualises these 
transformations as sui generis outcomes of socio-political conflicts situated within 
wider social transformations that are interconnected through the prism of international 
relations. 
 This requires an ontological clarification about the realm of ‘the 
international’. On the one hand, the central theoretical premise of Political Marxism is 
the importance of social struggles and situated historical developments, as opposed to 
abstract logics and semi-scientific models. On the other hand, these struggles operate 
within the central transhistorical ontology of societal differentiation, which itself 
necessitates the clarification of the notion of the social, the inter-societal as well as 
the various processes of interaction if it wants to avoid a proto-realist reification of 
geopolitical competition. Two answers to this problem are available. Either the 
understanding of the inter-societal realm is specific and can only be established 
through a careful historicisation of its social constitution and the associated dynamics. 
This understanding rules out structural or systemic transhistorical regularities that 
could be abstractly theorized. Alternatively, a theory of the international could be 
developed that is capable of reformulating the dialectic between historically mutating 
social forms, their differentiation and the inter-societal sphere their interaction 
generates. 
 
 
1.9 The Expansion of Capitalism: Uneven and Combined Development 
The Theory of Uneven and Combined Development (U&CD) constitutes an attempt 
to provide just such a theory in abstract and transhistorical terms. Initially, however, 
this approach emerged from the historicisation of capitalist expansion. Justin 
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Rosenberg revived Leon Trotsky’s notion of historically uneven and socially 
combined development as a means of conceptualizing the various and fractured 
transitions towards modernity.15 Initially it was Isaac Deutscher who recovered 
Trotsky’s premise that capitalism spreads in an uneven fashion and combines with 
local social structures which produces different forms of capitalist systems and 
political outcomes. Capitalism’s spread is, thus, not so much mediated through the 
expansion of markets and bourgeois agents, but by backward states’ responses to the 
geopolitical pressures generated by the fiscally and militarily superior capitalist state-
society complexes, first and foremost Britain. This process creates a globally unified 
market place within a nationally diversified geopolitical system. The Russian 
example is used as the textbook-case to validate this theory: “Forced to advance 
under superior economic and military pressure from the West, she [Russia] could not 
go through all the phases of the ‘classical’ cycle of western European progress” 
(Deutscher 1963). Thus, the source of social change lies not so much within the social 
formations themselves, but “in the generic conditions of their coexistence”, or the 
intra-societal realm of world politics. As Rosenberg put it 
“Instead of the homogeneous ‘world after its own image’ (Marx 1973:71) 
projected in the Communist Manifesto, this process was actually proliferating a 
multiplicity of unique patterns of ‘combined development’, whose political 
instability and international connectedness fundamentally altered the social and 
geographical co-ordinates of revolutionary crisis and opportunity”(Rosenberg 
2006: 3). 
 
Thus, rather than putting the emphasis on the development of a capitalist, market-
based economy and the emergence of a politically powerful bourgeoisie as the agents 
of social change, as in World Systems Theory, agency is usually located within a 
conservative state-building elite whose primary concern is indeed not social change, 
but rather how to prevent or channel it from above in the light of international 
competitiveness. Thus, it is first and foremost the concerns for international survival 
that determined the Ottoman’s specific “historical and geographical location within 
social structures of humanity” (Rosenberg 1996: 8). Capitalist expansion and social 
change in general is, therefore, not seen as an economic process but rather as a 
political and geopolitical process, “in which pre-capitalist state classes had to design 
counterstrategies of reproduction to defend their position in an international 
                                                 
15
 Initially Justin Rosenberg elaborated this theory as a way to understand the expansion of 
capitalism his Isaac Deutscher Memorial lecture (Rosenberg 1996); recently a variety of Marxist 
IR scholars have broadly identified with this theory, e.g. Dunn and Radice (2006); for the latest 
developments on the treatment of uneven and combined development as ‘general abstraction’ see 
(Rosenberg 2006; Matin 2007; Callinicos and Rosenberg 2008; Rosenberg 2009) 
 58
environment which put them at an economic and coercive disadvantage” (Teschke 
2003: 265). These state-classes had to adapt to the system by reinventing it anew for 
themselves. As a result, capitalist expansion creates a succession of special paths,16 
i.e. highly differentiated political adaptations of the same supposedly superior 
Western institutions. Thus, in having to adapt to the new international system, 
backward states, like the Ottoman Empire, were left no choice but a “pre-emptive 
state formation in a pro-Western fashion” (Bromley 1994: 104). The Porte and other 
‘backward’ social formations, such as Russia, were “neither an uncapitalist, nor a 
capitalist state” (Rosenberg 1996: 8). Transformation takes place ‘from above’, i.e. is 
leaped over, or as Robbie Shilliam argued with regards to the Bolshevik Revolution, 
is ‘substituted for a missing universalistic sociality’ (Shilliam 2004: 67). This is not to 
say, however, that the Ottoman Reform Movement had similar social origins, or that 
it was similar in nature to the Bolshevik Revolution, but simply that it followed 
similar incentives.  
 
Uneven and Combined Development as International Historical Sociology?  
Starting from this history of capitalist expansion, Justin Rosenberg has recently 
developed a broader, further reaching application of this theory. The central abstract 
problem, which uneven and combined development is trying to overcome, is the 
division between classic sociological and contemporary international theory and the 
problematic conceptualizations of the international these two strands develop. His 
critique of social theory, international theory and the Historical Sociology of 
International Relations, thus, claims that all of these previous approaches have failed 
to ontologically incorporate the international as a constitutive element of social 
‘internal’ transformation. While social theory understands the international as “a 
contingent element, an appendage to internalist sociological modes of explanation” 
(Matin 2007: 420), theories of the international have reified proto-Realist 
assumptions about an essentialized, autonomous prior sphere of geopolitical 
interaction that is abstracted from its constitutive parts and therefore theoretically 
external to social theory. This leaves the international “powerfully acknowledged, but 
analytically unpenetrated” (Rosenberg 2006: 310). 
The way in which the theory of uneven and combined development proposes 
to overcome this problem can be summarized as follows: Sociology is always 
                                                 
16
 The idea of the ‘Special Path’ or ‘Sonderweg’ has its historiographic origin in Hans-Ulrich 
Wehler’s analysis of the Prusso-German state formation in 1871 (Wehler 2003). 
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international sociology, which means that Social Theory is always and necessarily 
also international theory. Why is this so? At the highest level of abstraction, the 
problem occurs because the established ontological and methodological confines 
between ‘social’ and ‘international’ fail to apprehend the true, uneven and combined, 
nature of social development. Due to differentiated bases of subsistence and the 
different ways of engaging with nature for the purpose of subsistence, development is 
always fractured and uneven. Since development is divided into multiple paths, or in 
other words multilinear, it is also always interactive. Unevenness implies a 
multiplicity of societies, which entails an anarchic realm of interaction. It is, 
therefore, due to the multilinearity of societal development that societies influence 
one another; hence development is not only uneven and multilinear, but also, 
inevitably, combined. Hence, societies influence one another in their developmental 
trajectories through various forms of interaction.  
However, they do not only do so on a bilateral basis, but also on a wider, 
systemic level, where the sum of their interaction constitutes a new sphere of social 
reality that is neither entirely abstracted from the social actors that it is constituted by, 
nor reducible to the sum of their intentions. Hence, the “interactive multiplicity of 
social development” (Rosenberg 2006: 312), even though it is comprised of 
differentiated social formations, takes on a life of its own, whereby it is neither just 
extrapolated from domestic factors, nor prior to them. Rather, it becomes, through a 
series of knock-on effects “an uneven causal ‘pattern’ without a visual centre” 
(Rosenberg 2006: 322). What is proposed, therefore, is a “quilted, serial, decentred” 
(Rosenberg 2006: 323) notion of the international, the ontology of which is 
sociological as well as systemic. 
This new inter-societal ‘life of its own’, in consequence, impacts back onto 
‘internal’ social development through interaction. The international is not merely in-
between or above societies as a systemic imperative, “but rather in a dimension of 
their being which cuts across both of these ‘places’ and reaches simultaneously into 
the ‘domestic’ constitution of those societies themselves.”(Rosenberg 2006: 327). 
Thus, it is here that the crucial process of ‘combination’ of the social and inter-
societal spheres of social activity takes place leading to the amalgamation of two 
spheres of causality, social and international, which should never have been separated 
in the first place. Put succinctly, “[t]he unevenness of development (…), entails 
multiplicity; and this multiplicity, we have added, is everywhere expressed in a 
condition of inter-societal coexistence which gives rise to diplomacy” (Rosenberg 
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2006: 320) and other forms of international life. In consequence, the problematique of 
the unhelpful conceptual, methodological and disciplinary divisions between 
International Relations and Social Theory is resolved.  
 
The Contribution of Uneven and Combined Development  
One of the questions that arise from an adaptation specifically of Trotsky’s theory is 
its universal applicability. The Theory of Uneven and Combined Development was 
developed in the light of the Russian example of adapting to unevenly expanding 
capitalist social relations. Hence, the initial suspicion would always be that it also 
only pertains to explaining processes of uneven and combined – capitalist – 
development, i.e. the relations between capitalist and pre-capitalist societies. In fact, 
Rosenberg himself appears to suggest as much in 2005: “Conjunctures of capitalist 
world development must thus be theorized as conjunctures of this historical-
international process of ‘uneven and combined development (Rosenberg 2005: 41).” 
On the other hand, only because a theory has been developed within a specific 
context, does not rule out its universal applicability per se. Justin Rosenberg and 
Kamran Matin’s efforts (Matin 2007) at applying uneven and combined development 
to pre-capitalist eras and to thereby discover ‘universal laws’ of human coexistence 
are extensive and include solid, theoretically sound reconstructions of pre-capitalist 
social transformations. However, despite these convincing efforts, a closer look at the 
central concepts of the social and the international raises difficult questions about a 
tranhistorical reading of Trotsky’s theory (cf. Davidson 2009).  
 
Problematizing the Social  
The concept of consolidated, territorially delineated polities or societies is specific to 
the modern containerization of social relations. Uneven and Combined Development 
builds on a critique of this ‘territorial trap’ in IR (Agnew 1994). To this end, an 
essentialized inside/outside distinction is replaced by a sociological one. However, 
even though this is theoretically illuminating and entails a more credible claim to 
universal applicability than Realism’s essentialism, it leaves the problem of assumed 
social boundedness intact. If unevenness of development creates social 
differentiation, which in turn creates a sphere of inter-societal, as opposed to 
‘internal’ social activity, this still assumes the boundedness, or rather the clear 
delineation, territorial or otherwise, of the social. As the following will show, 
historically specific forms of social order generate different forms of social 
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interaction as well as different understandings of the perceived ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, 
usually not clearly distinguishable from one another. Arguably, the notion of a clear 
and unambiguous inside/outside delineation hinges upon the emergence of collective, 
homogenized identities within the modern nation-state generating ‘selfs’, ‘others’ 
and, by extension, an unambiguously definable realm of inter-action. This is not to 
argue, however, that geopolitics is in general historically unique to this form of social 
order, but rather that the realm of geopolitics is constituted by different actors and 
forms of interaction at specific historical conjunctures. These unique relations cannot 
be appropriated by identical and transhistorical ontologies and associated 
epistemologies developed by modern International Relations theory. Without 
engaging in semantic pedantry, it can be argued that employing the ‘inter-national’ as 
an unambiguously defined ontology is best restricted to understanding the historically 
unique relationship between the contemporary forms of social cohabitation, i.e. 
national, territorial states. Equally, if ‘unevenness’ is the differentiating criterion for 
all historical and regional forms of social life, this begs questions of the pre-modern, 
extra-European historiographic identification of unevenness. While it is widely 
accepted that ‘society’ or ‘polity’ are highly contested notions (Ferguson, Mansbach 
et al. 2000), the same can be said about the concrete historical expression of 
developmental differentiation and unevenness.  
 
Problematizing the International  
Societal differentiation constitutes the international, not as a historically specific 
quantity but as a logical part of human development. Thus, the international is not a 
historical form, but as foundational an ontology as the concept of society itself. Thus 
the case can indeed be made for a transhistorical notion of the international. However, 
even if the abstraction of the international as a transhistorical category is left 
untouched, the question of social boundedness still has an immediate effect on the 
differentiation between the social and the inter-societal realm. Even a sociological 
construction of two separate spheres of interaction, still assumes the clear delineation 
of two social spheres. However, in the absence of a clear definition of the social and 
overlapping social loyalties, the question can be raised as to whether this “coexistence 
of developmentally differentiated but reproductively similar (non-capitalist) 
societies” (Matin 2007: 429) means that they are necessarily mutually exclusive.  
Apart from the ‘social’, the differing forms of interaction require some 
elaboration. What kind of interaction can be logically assumed if merely based on the 
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fact of societal multiplicity? Why and how does coexistence lead to interaction? Are 
the inter-societal ‘encounters’ discursive, violent or otherwise? Is interaction always 
competitive based on the assumed scarcity of exploitable resources? Alternatively, 
are they best understood as acts of collective self-definition, social engineering or an 
expression of a collective ‘will-to-power’? The question is whether the variety of 
possible interactions can be abstracted at all or whether the only way of 
understanding interaction is indeed historically specific. Linked to the problem of 
interaction are the various forms of ‘combination’. For it is in this process of 
combination that social change is located. Due to the centrality of this historical 
juncture, some elaboration on this crucial moment not only in pre-capitalist contexts 
is of interest. 
By extension, one can finally ask what the nature of ‘the international’, if 
understood as a “causal pattern without a visual centre,” really is. On an empirical 
level, interaction takes on many forms. Neo-Weberian Historical Sociology and 
World Systems Theory tend to privilege one form of interaction over another. Uneven 
and Combined Development, on the other hand, proposes a more abstract notion of 
the international. It is this generalization that allows for a more universal applicability 
of its central claims. However, it leaves questions about the generative nature of 
interaction, namely the transformative moments of ‘combination’ to the concrete 
historical analysis. It is specifically the lack of a reflection on power and social 
struggles within processes of combination, but also the concrete nature of 
‘interaction’, most notably the role of violence and war, that leaves some open 
questions in this regard. The formulation of the theory of uneven and combined 
development at the highest level of abstraction not only tends to reify and 
transhistoricise the notion of ‘the international’, it provides little guidance as to how 
to turn these abstractions into more concrete determinants for explanation. 
 
Historical Specificity or Universal Laws?   
Trotsky’s formula, while claiming universality, was not developed in the abstract. 
The realization of a necessity of interaction and combination, which then causes 
change, was based on the concrete observation of how specific interactions had 
initiated unique processes of combination and, by extension, transformation as result 
of capitalist expansion. Trotsky claimed that ‘unevenness of development’ was the 
“most general law of the historic process [which] revealed itself most sharply and 
complexly in the destiny of the backward countries (...) under the whip of external 
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necessity” (Trotsky 1964: 85). This does not conclusively answer the question, 
however, whether his observations of the historically peculiar trajectory unfolding in 
front of his eyes reveal a more transhistorical law of human development, based on 
more abstract notions of society, the international, unevenness, interaction and 
development. Do pre-capitalist forms of coexistence lead to interaction, combination 
and change? More fundamentally, how can one locate ‘unevenness of development’ 
as the most crucial form of differentiation within pre-capitalist social relations? Given 
the socio-historical origins of Trotsky’s theory, its transversal application is an 
ambitious, if not necessarily impossible, project. Whether it serves the purpose of 
explaining the emergence of a post-Ottoman international system in southeastern 
Europe will be investigated in the following historical reconstruction.   
 
 
1.10 Political Marxism, Collective Identities and Nationalism 
Starting with diversity, rather than trying to submerge its explanation under a 
totalizing narrative of capitalism or imperialism, and by deciphering the dialectical 
relationship between this expansion and a variety of responses, Political Marxism 
provides, to speak with Simon Bromley a useful “empirically open Historical 
Materialism  [which] is perfectly capable of [also] generating a theory of the state” 
(Bromley 1994: 188). However, the origins of differentiation and coexistence remain 
pertinent questions also for Political Marxism, not least since capitalist modernity 
itself cannot explain differentiation. In the light of the extremely variable historical 
expressions of difference, it remains difficult to develop abstract theories about it. 
Historicising this particularization as a pre-modern legacy, sufficiently consolidated 
by ‘enlightened’ Absolutists rulers which “capitalism can leave (…) intact” (Teschke 
2003: 267) only partly captures the problem. To be sure, this is a legitimate 
suggestion to the degree that capitalism within its own logic does not require a re-
configuration of political space. However, it does not apply to societies outside of the 
European core of dynastic inter-state relations. ‘National’ culture enters the equation 
only as a result of modernisation, i.e. as something that is ‘purified’ by a 
homogenising state apparatus after territorial fragmentation has already occurred. 
This cannot explain, however, the spatial transformations towards a ‘national’ space 
that have occurred outside of this dynastic core of states and before any noticeable 
transition into capitalist modernity.  
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In the concrete case of the Ottoman Empire, the problem therefore remains, 
that all the noteworthy reform efforts culminating in the Tanzimat period are perfectly 
explicable within the remit of Political Marxism and uneven and combined 
development as an effort to ‘catch up’. However, the reaction to the centralization 
effort, in the form of nationalist secessionist movements, which, rather than emulating 
Westernization, at least initially oppose it, is a quandary that neither of these theorize 
recognize as a specific problem. Put differently, if a capitalist international system 
leaves borders intact and territorial fragmentation is simply a historical legacy, why 
does it take on a national character, that in some parts, like the Ottoman Empire, 
alters the territorial layouts and consequent geopolitical relations significantly?  
The real issue lies, therefore, not only with introducing ‘the international’ as a 
‘constitutive element’ into our analysis. This should usefully be a second step. 
However, it cannot be but a second step. The international requires a careful 
definition based on a notion of the social. Thus, it is initially important to establish 
what is meant by differentiated ‘modes’ of social interaction in the first place. What is 
required, therefore, is a theory of what constitutes a pre-capitalist social formation. 
This in turn could be based on a more distinctive reflection on the origins of 
collective identities, which is only very incompletely captured by theories of 
nationalism. In this context, the formative role of modern forms of mass violence and 
total war merits consideration as well. Theories of nationalism and International 
Relations have dealt with forms of building collective identities through violent 
conflict (Van Evera 1994; Conversi 1999), although they have mostly assumed a 
conscious engineering of identities through violence. What is proposed here instead is 
the possibility of an unconscious and unintentional process of nation-formation out of 
modern mass conflicts. The initial differentiation and later territorial amalgamation of 
communities that had previously shared a social and physical space peacefully, is not 
always and necessarily the outcome of politically directed projects, but could be the 
unintended consequence of a violent conflict that has its origins elsewhere. The 
radicalization of identities and societies can therefore be understood as the result of 
geopolitical contestations with distinct social origins. This is not to say that Political 
Marxism cannot accommodate theories of collective identity formation and the 
effects of mass violence. It is to say, however, that it is pertinent to avoid either 
relegating difference to a superstructural expression of an economic or bureaucratic 
transformation, a mere historical legacy, or employing a cultural essentialism which 
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accepts as given ‘the nation’ as a timeless social reality with no origin or need for 
explanation.  
 
 
1.11 Structure of the Argument 
This chapter has set out the context of International Relations Theories within which 
the historical sociological reconstruction of Ottoman disintegration will be 
undertaken. Contrasting Constructivism, Neo-Weberian, World Systems and Political 
Marxist approaches, it was argued that while Political Marxism offers the most 
promising potential for a successful theorization of Ottoman disintegration, it has to 
be extended and refined so as to problematize the notion of difference, nationalism 
and the effects of mass violence.  
 
Consequently, chapter two will discuss the social and political phenomenon 
of nationalism. Various theories on the subject, which conventionally understand the 
phenomenon of nationalism as coeval with the emergence of a holistic set of modern 
social relations in Western Europe will be examined. This theoretical discussion will 
reveal, on the one hand, the paradoxical nature of the phenomenon of nationalism 
itself. Rather than embodying the political ideology of the Enlightenment, nationalism 
has come to represent a backward, exclusive form of social organization, more 
closely related to German Romanticism than the French Enlightenment. The cause for 
this reformulation of nationalist thought, it will be argued, lies in the intensified 
continental wars, especially the Napoleonic expansions. This, in turn allows for a 
critical reflection on the theories of nationalism which have, thus far, only 
insufficiently acknowledged the problem of international relations and geopolitics. 
This also implies that nationalism does not represent an autonomous social dynamic. 
Theories of nationalism therefore confuse modernization and differentiation of rule. 
Instead of juxtaposing dynasticism and nationalism as two historical sequences, this 
thesis will argue, with reference to historical evidence, that the further spatial re-
definition of political rule on the basis of so-called ‘nationalities’ had their origin in a 
variety of specific pre-capitalist social conflicts, rather than modern Enlightened 
principles like popular sovereignty.  
 
Chapter three will start the historical reconstruction and focus on the 
emergence of regional power centres in a state which is usually characterized as 
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highly centralized. First the Ottoman historiographic context will be elaborated, 
which is dominated by organicist theories of imperial decline on the one hand and 
methodological nationalism on the other. The historicisation of the original provincial 
order from the moment of territorial stagnation will briefly be outlined, its mode of 
reproduction contextualized, before illuminating the process of ‘externally’ 
conditioned ‘internal’ social change. These changes led to the emergence of a quasi-
aristocratic landed regime in the 18th century, which entered into a protracted conflict 
with the Sultanate over its attempts to centralize and fiscally consolidate the state, 
establishing the central centre-periphery dynamic which eventually led to a protracted 
series of internal and external crises.  
 
A dedicated historical account of the Greek secession will be presented in 
Chapter four. A critical review of conventional narratives of the ‘Greek War of 
Independence’ which is usually understood as the liberation from an Ottoman Yoke 
will introduce this chapter. The historical reconstruction will initially focus on the 
social origins of the Greek struggle. This will disclose that while a Greek Nationalist 
movement existed in the form of a secret society in Odessa, the existence of this 
movement per se is insufficient to explain the secessionist dynamic. It will be 
revealed that the origin of the secessions is not nationalism, but the effects of the 
social conflicts outlined in chapter three. The post-Ottoman development of Greek 
sovereignty will illustrate, furthermore, that secession as a concept needs to be 
dissected from social change and Revolution.  
 
Chapters five and six will problematize the notion of the international and 
steady forms of inter-societal interaction from two different perspectives. Two case 
studies will show that any assumptions about stable, long-term international ‘logics’ 
as explanatory devices are problematic. Chapter five will elaborate on the 
international environment within which the Greek Revolt took place in order to 
discern the influence of the international as a constitutive element to this history of 
state formation. On the one hand, this will show that Greek autonomy only came 
about due to external intervention, rather than autonomous Greek military strength. 
On the level of the international itself, this historical reconstruction will demonstrate 
that, despite liberal institutional arguments to the contrary, the international system of 
the post-Napoleonic Vienna concert was in fact unpredictable and difficult to 
conceptualize within International Relations. Namely, while the conservative spirit of 
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1815 would have contradicted the intervention in the Greek Revolt, the eventual 
military involvement of Western Powers was motivated by Balance of Power 
thinking and the expectation of sustained Russian expansionism in the Balkans. 
 
Chapter six will consider the wider relations between ‘Europe’ as a whole and 
the Ottoman Empire. At the centre of this chapter lies the claim that these relations 
have been shaped by a long standing Orientalist tradition which was fuelled, 
according to Edward Said and others, by the social conditions of European modernity 
itself. However, as will be argued here, rather than being an outcome of the ‘ego-
anxiety’ that modern de-personalised social relations have generated, this ‘tradition’ 
is grounded on geopolitical encounters between various European Powers and the 
Porte that were aggravated by neo-absolutist strategies or power. This shift is 
reflected in a change of the vocabulary describing the Ottoman Empire from 
‘tyranny’ to ‘despotism’. It will be argued in consequence, that, instead of one 
overarching Orientalist rationale, various European societies have in fact many 
applied many Orientalisms. This implies that there are also many ‘Orientals’ apart 
from the Ottoman Empire. Orientalist representations and distortions nevertheless 
survived into the contemporary world and compromise Realpolitik in European-
Turkish relations. This further substantiates the need to historicise geopolitical 
relations according to specific circumstances, instead of the futile quest for an 
abstract, ahistorical ‘logic’.  
 
Chapter seven will summarize the historical and theoretical findings of this 
thesis. Historically, the reconstruction of Ottoman decline will show that 
fragmentation of political rule cannot be understood as an outcome of an international 
modernist ‘logic’. It will be established that the historical/social manifestation of the 
post-Ottoman national polities as well as their national character are the result of 
essentially pre-modern and pre-capitalist social struggles and cannot be understood as 
a direct or functional derivative of geopolitical or capitalist totalizing ‘logics’ 
universalizing the European inter-state system on the Balkans. 
These findings will demonstrate the uncompromised requirement to not only 
historicise social transformations, but also the international itself. While this is not to 
argue that interaction does not generate stable channels of communication and 
common law between states like the diplomacy that surrounded the Greek Revolt, this 
cannot amount to an explanation of all forms of inter-state relations, conflict and 
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cooperation alike. The very definition of the international, based the emergence and 
disappearance of its constitutive parts, societies, as well as the radically shifting 
dynamics between them, hinges upon the concrete historicisation, which arguably 
renders any attempt for theoretical abstraction from these constantly mutating 
relations problematic. On the theoretical level, this will show that Constructivism, 
Neo-Weberian Historical Sociology, World Systems Theory and Uneven and 
Combined Development can all contribute to this new understanding of Ottoman 
imperial decline. However, none of these theories is successful in comprehensively 
theorizing the events surrounding this process. While Political Marxism has its own 
limitations with regards to nationalism and violence, it is still endorsed as the most 
promising way of understanding the social and historical evolution of the Eastern 
Question.  
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2 Nationalism and Geopolitics  
International Relations and the Formation of Nations  
 
“The savage who loves himself, his wife and child, with quiet joy, and in his modest 
way works for the good of his tribe, as for his own life, is, in my opinion, a truer 
being than that shadow of a man, the refined citizen of the world, who, enraptured 
with the love of all his fellow-shadows, loves but a chimera”. 
        Herder (1969: 306) 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
'The 'historical turn' in non-orthodox IR has considerably improved our understanding 
of a) the wide historical variations in the nature of political communities that 
constitute geopolitical orders, and b) the specificity of the notion of 'modern 
sovereignty' and the historical construction of the 'modern inter-state system'. In the 
process, non-realist approaches have largely abandoned the exclusive focus on the 
political and geo-political level of explanation by retrieving and re-incorporating the 
socio-economic and ideational dynamics, as well as the actors involved in these 
historical constructions. However, this chapter argues that these approaches are 
incomplete in at least three key respects. 
 First, there is a strong 'euro-centric' bias in most of these accounts, raising 
the question as to what degree the 'European experience', itself internally 
differentiated due to spatio-temporal divergences in regional trajectories of state-
formations, can be mobilised for understanding the specific dynamics of 'non-
European' developments. Geographically, the emergence of modern sovereignty and 
the ensuing new international order has concentrated on its historical place of origin, 
i.e. Western Europe. The question as to how this order was universalized and spread 
beyond this locus of origin does not lend itself easily to generalisations of the kind 
frequently employed by the most prominent strands in the historical sociology of 
International Relations whose explanations tend to rely on a self-imposing capacity of 
the modern European international system. 
 Second, relatively little attention has been paid to the problem as to 
how the ‘national’ character of the ‘modern’ or capitalist form of sovereignty is 
universalized – implying that modern sovereignty emerges simply when “the political 
and the national unit are congruent” (Gellner 1983: 1). As extant 'euro-centric' IR 
approaches tend to neglect the dimension of 'nationalism-formation' within their 
wider accounts of state- and inter-state formations, this chapter will re-examine the 
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role of nationalism-formation in relation to the Ottoman case by reviewing the extant 
literature on modern nationalism.  This literature will include both wider sociological 
approaches as well as IR theories that deal with this problem. Notably, little attention 
has been paid to the division of nationalism into a ‘French’ cosmopolitan and a 
‘German’ communitarian tradition. The chapter argues that the import of an 
undifferentiated and unitary/generic concept of European nationalism in both 
literatures into debates on the Ottoman case disables the explanatory usefulness of 
both approaches - IR theories of nationalism and sociological theories of nationalism 
- and obscures the specificity of the role of nationalism-formation in the narrative of 
the decline of the Ottoman Empire.  
 Third, this tendency is aggravated by a generic portrayal in these literatures of 
'nationalism' as one essential component of a much wider master-concept - 
modernity. Conventionally it is argued that “in order to become truly modern, [the 
Ottoman Empire] was perceived to having to transform necessarily into a nation-state, 
or rather a variety of nation-states” (Abou-El-Haj 2005: 62). Hence, the emergence of 
nationalism is (mis)understood to embody the spread of Enlightenment ideology in 
the region. However, this kind of argument struggles to explain the specific kind of 
nationalism that came to bear in the post-Ottoman context. Paradoxically, as was the 
case elsewhere in Europe (notably the Austro-Hungarian Empire), the spread of the 
universal ideology of nationalism resulted in the establishment of various 
particularistic states, rather than the adoption of Ottomanism as a form of universal 
civic nationalism as intended by the agents of reform. An explanation is, thus, 
required for “why anyone should have wanted to turn the pre-modern (...) ‘low’ 
cultures into modern, literate ‘high’ cultures, rather than adopting the nearest high 
culture [e.g. Ottomanism] of the dominant ethnic population in the state” (Smith 
1998: 38). This paradox inherent in the Enlightenment between the universal and the 
particular is, thus, reborn in the philosophical foundations as well as the practice(s) of 
nationalism (Halliday 1992: 445). Out of the study of the Ottoman case develops a 
need to problematize the contradictory nature of European nationalism(s). 
Thus, the co-constitution of several macro-dimensions that define 'modernity' 
- nationalism, capitalism, the modern-state, rationality, liberal political subjectivity - 
leads to a problematic 'package-concept' that needs to be unbundled to understand the 
specific interactions and spatio-temporally sequences, but not generic temporal co-
constitution, of these macro-phenomena in the Balkan context as part of ongoing 
socio-political struggles over the precise territorial and social definition of power and 
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property. What is required, therefore, is an explanation of the national content of the 
modern Weberian form of de-personalized political territorial rule and the 
corresponding spatial re-ordering of the inter-national system in the region. Crucial in 
this regard is the relationship between the social transformation and the creation of 
demographically and ethno-linguistically homogenous political subjectivities within 
the newly established ‘modern’ states. Contrary to assumptions about the congruity of 
‘modernity’, ‘nationalism’ and ‘capitalism’, this chapter suggests that late Ottoman 
state formations are not outcomes of a universalized European modernity, either in its 
nationalist or capitalist form. Thus, not only the Franco-German division within the 
concept of nationalism needs to be deciphered, but also the social, spatial and 
epistemic expressions of modernity.  
Against these holistic temptations, this chapter will argue that nationalism-
formation in the late-Ottoman provinces, especially Greece, was the outcome of 
specific social struggles between the Ottoman centre and provincial landlords within 
their wider geopolitical context. Furthermore, this chapter will argue for the 
consideration of the effects of mass armies on the formation of mutually exclusive 
identities. The deployment of modernized military structures meant that, on the one 
hand, whole populations were involved in the military struggle. On the other hand, it 
also involved the collective threat of physical extermination, leading to the relational 
creation of consolidated, homogenous national identities. It is arguably through this 
physical, geopolitical differentiation, itself resultant from social struggles, that 
nationalism emerges.  
 
This argument will be substantiated in three steps. First, the main strands in 
the wider literature on nationalism will be critically reviewed. This will show that this 
literature suffers from three limitations. Namely, its inherent modern functionalism 
does not sufficiently recognize the socially specific conditions leading to the 
emergence of nationalism-formations. This specification would include a 
differentiation between the particularistic logic of the German tradition in Gottfried 
Herder’s cultural nationalism and the universal appeal of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 
political nationalism (Barnard 1983). Most importantly, however, the established 
discourse on nationalism does not sufficiently problematize the geopolitical contexts 
within which nationalism emerges. This will show that while the constructivist and 
English School’s efforts in this regard have produced important insights into how 
nationalism impacts and changes in the international system, they equally fail to 
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introduce an explanation of nationalism that considers the geopolitical conditions of 
its emergence. A brief elaboration of Miroslav Hroch’s account of late Habsburg 
nation-formation will reveal the importance of specific social contexts for 
understanding the emergence of national divisions. These are themselves subject to, 
and constituted by, geopolitical environments. This dialectical process between local 
and regional social struggles and wider geopolitical contexts does not necessarily 
correspond to a pre-conceived national form as a homogenous and natural political 
formation. Finally, on the basis of these critiques, an argument about the geopolitical 
formation of national divisions through mutually ‘constitutive’ forms of violence will 
be formulated with reference to the Ottoman context.  
 
 
2.2 Modernist Theories of Nationalism 
Amazingly, the discipline of International Relations has usually left questions about 
the nature and origin of nationalism to a wide range of non-IR scholars. This is why 
the importance of calls for an opening of International Relations towards theories of 
nationalism can hardly be overstated. Like the historical turn in IR, the wider debates 
on nationalism started flourishing after the end of the Cold War and the emergence of 
various post-communist nationalist movements. In particular, the violent and 
turbulent break-up of Yugoslavia has prompted much reflection on the themes of 
nations and nationalism within a variety of social science disciplines.  
The debate initially evolved around the primordial vs. modernist approach to 
understanding nationalism (cf. Özkirimli 2000). Primordialism, or as it is sometimes 
called ‘perennialism’ assumes the continuity and long-term lineages of nations as 
historically grown, but largely unchanged and unchangeable forms of social 
collectivities holding corresponding territorial claims to ‘homelands’ (Smith 1991, 
1992). In contrast to these practices of essentialising and naturalising national 
differentiation, modernist theories of nationalism point to the voluntary, constructed 
and historically specific nature of these social formations and elaborate on the process 
of their social construction, frequently associated with the advent of European or 
capitalist modernity.17 This literature on nationalism has produced a vast proliferation 
of studies. The original ‘pioneers’ include, amongst others, Elie Kedourie (1993), 
                                                 
17
 Due to restrictions of space and the increasing academic consensus in favour of the modernist 
argument (Özkirimli 2000: 220), this debate will not be elaborated in greater detail. Instead, the 
modernists’ general premise about the artificial and historically specific character of nations is 
accepted in principle. 
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Ernest Gellner (1983), Eric Hobsbawm (1990), Bendict Anderson (1983) and Tom 
Nairn (1981, 1997).  
Most of the arguments advanced by modernist theories of nationalism 
recognize capitalist (or ‘industrial’) development as central to an explanation for the 
emergence of nationalism. However, they conceptualize capitalism in very different 
ways. While Gellner, in an apparent bid to avoid historical materialist terminology 
(while ultimately making a materialist argument) prefers the term ‘industrial society’, 
Benedict Anderson refers to it as ‘print capitalism’ and Tom Nairn as ‘uneven 
capitalist development’. According to Ernest Gellner, whose personal background in 
socialist Czecheslovakia made him wary of being identified as a Marxist, ‘industrial 
society’ required a common high culture for its reproduction. National culture, 
therefore, was “no longer merely the adornment, confirmation and legitimation of a 
social order which was also sustained by harsher and coercive constraints; culture is 
now the necessary shared medium, the life-blood perhaps rather the minimal shared 
atmosphere, within which alone the members of the society can breathe and survive 
and produce” (Gellner 1983). Thus, a certain degree of cultural homogeneity is 
understood as a requirement for the smooth operation of industrial capitalism. 
Benedict Anderson’s arguments about the consequences of the introduction of a 
capitalist print-media enterprise looking for, and consequently creating a market of 
literate, nationally educated “citizens” is slightly more elusive about its association 
with capitalist development (Anderson 1991). It was, according to Anderson, through 
the introduction of print-capitalism that common vernaculars were created. The profit 
motive and the stimulation of demand are, therefore, central underlying assumptions 
within his argument. Eventually, the thus ‘imagined community’ of the nation takes 
on a quasi-religious function in secular societies. Lastly, Eric Hobsbawm’s account 
(Hobsbawm 1990) equally emphasizes the relationship between capitalism and 
nationalism as an elite project, whose role he saw “in the creation of industrial 
economies and the transition from local to national economic systems. European 
nationalisms during the "liberal era" (1830-80), for example, helped to justify the 
creation of national economies and the integration of ever larger territories and 
populations into unified economic and political institutions” (Kramer 1997). He duly 
points out the mismatch between the global reach of liberal economics and the 
national nature of political structure. Thus, while economists had to recognize the fact 
that the 19th century world economy was inter-national as opposed to global 
(Hobsbawm 1990: 25), they had not found an explanation for this national 
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fragmentation. In his more recent work, even Anthony Smith, who has built his career 
on emphasising the essential and culturalist nature of nations and their transhistorical 
boundedness to an inherited territory (Smith 1983), has conceded some ground to this 
prevalent modernist conception of nationalism. Being primordialism’s godfather, he 
does not claim that nationalism is merely an epiphenomenon of capitalist 
development, yet he nevertheless sees capitalism and nationalism as the two social 
forces having “shaped the modern world” (Smith 1998: 47). Tom Nairn most 
explicitly refers to uneven capitalist development as emphasizing a ‘reactive’ form of 
nationalism. In other words, nationalism is understood as a defensive mechanism 
employed by the ‘sufferers’ of capitalist development (Nairn 1981, 1997). 
Nationalism, thus, appears as a project to consolidate state development territorially 
in the form of the nation-state in the light of the contradictions of uneven capitalist 
development. 
“Capitalism, even as it spread remorselessly over the world to unify human 
society into one more or less connected story for the first time, also 
engendered a perilous and convulsive new fragmentation of that society. The 
socio-historical cost of this rapid implantation of capitalism into the world 
society was nationalism’. There was no other conceivable fashion in which 
the process could have occurred” (Nairn 1981: 341). 
 
In other words, capitalist development, as a result of its global, yet uneven spread, 
generates multiple national societies.  
 
In essence, modernist theories of nationalism tend to portray capitalism and 
nationalism as intrinsically interlinked, complementary developmental paths into the 
totality of an unfolding globalising modernity. Gellner’s approach, for example, was 
aptly described by Benedict Anderson as a theory “that nationalism is at bottom 
nothing more (or less) than a necessary and thoroughly functional response to the 
Great Transformation from static agrarian society to the world of industry and 
mechanical communication” (Anderson 1994: 10). It is not clear, however, how this 
does not apply to Anderson’s own argument, given his identification of nationalism 
as an intrinsic part of an unfolding modern world. In other words, Gellner and 
Anderson fit “nationalism to certain universal and inescapable sociological 
constraints of the modern age” (Chatterjee 1993: 22). This means that ‘national’ 
fragmentation is explained with reference to capitalist development only. Nationalism 
as a separate sociological concept distinct from capitalist development becomes 
superfluous as an explanans and becomes part of the explanandum instead (Brubaker 
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1996). Hence, on the one hand, there is the problem that nationalism becomes a 
product of a holistic trajectory of modernity rather than a distinct phenomenon 
necessitating a more specific explanation. On the other hand, it remains unclear why 
this modern totality expands outward in a territorially fractured, rather than universal 
manner. In other words, the problem exposed initially between the universal and the 
particular is also reflected within the literature on nationalism. Political subjects were 
diversified and territorially fragmented in a more radical and substantive way than 
ever before at a time when universal political philosophies and institutionally 
homogenous forms of social organization emerged.  
 
The Janus Face of Nationalism  
This conceptual tension between the universal scope of ‘modernity’ and the 
contradictory fragmenting territorial outcomes is not only a problem emerging from 
studying the history of capitalism, however. It is, rather, already visible in the 
intellectual history of nationalism as expressed in the division into its 
Rousseauean/French/Enlightenment/Cosmopolitan form in Western Europe and its 
Herderian/German/Volk equivalent in Germany. Even though this differentiation 
between ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ or ‘French’ and ‘German’ forms of nationalism was 
extensively studied within the literature of nationalism itself (e.g. Plamenatz 1973), 
the way in which International Relations has adopted the study of nationalism as a 
‘modernist -international- imperative’ fails to differentiate between diverse forms of 
nationalism. As will be shown in what follows, it is precisely the variability of the 
underlying social forces of various nationalisms that render its understanding as a 
coherent social phenomenon or a generic explanatory category highly problematic. 
Obscuring these distinctions between various nationalisms renders invisible the 
underlying contradiction between a racially exclusivist historical manifestation of 
popular sovereignty and a contradictory cosmopolitan Enlightenment with allegedly 
identical historical/philosophical origins. The latter’s truly contradictory character 
becomes evident if considered that nationalism is mostly understood to express 
political emancipation, poised to produce a modern, emancipated and liberated 
national subject. Originally, nationalism “could not but foster the belief that the 
struggle against Absolutism and tyranny bore a definite universalistic undertone 
(…),which had to do more with a human, rationally constituted community and less 
with an excluding fatherland” (Koutalis 2003). Yet in its concrete historical 
expression, it usually produced the opposite – programmes of national 
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homogenization that led to exclusive forms of sovereignty which usually did not even 
keep the promise of political emancipation for the homogenized parts of the 
population either. The following will try to answer the question as to when and how 
the perceivably universalistic, emancipatory ideal of the Enlightenment turned on its 
head and created exclusive forms of ‘national’ political subjectivity. This process of 
discursive ‘otherization’ (or demonizing of a social group as a mirror image) leads to 
exclusion, repression and expulsion of elements considered incongruous with 
homogeneity, culminating in genocidal practices (Mann 2005). As Elie Kedourie put 
it: “in fact, it is these countries which most clearly show that nationalism and 
liberalism far from being twins are really antagonistic principles” (Kedourie 1993: 
104).  
This brief elaboration on the binary nature of nationalism goes to show that 
there are difficulties with directly relating exclusive nation-state formation and ethnic 
homogenization to capitalist modernity. The restrictive, constraining and fragmenting 
nature of nationalism does not usually constitute or even coincide with popular 
political emancipation. Rather, using capitalist modernity as an explanation implies 
an ex-post historicisation of actions and events that were, at the time, not purposive or 
intent on emancipating political subjects (Özkirimli and Sofos 2008), but contingent 
on social struggles outside of the theoretical remit of theories of nationalism. This 
core contradiction within the concept of nationalism, therefore, replicates a problem 
we have already encountered when dealing with the expansion of capitalism. 
Nationalism and capitalism, according to Anthony Smith, the two defining features of 
modernity, propose a theoretically universal political ideology, the universalization of 
which, paradoxically, expresses itself in various forms of differentiation and societal 
segmentation.  
 
 
2.3 Collective Identities and the Enlightened Creation of Political Subjectivity  
One has to consider the impact of modernity, or at least modern forms of sovereignty, 
in another way as well though. De-personalized modern rule and the division of the 
private from the public, at least theoretically, turns royal subjects into rights-bearing 
formally equal citizens. This serves as the basis for developing modern notions of 
citizenship based on national self-determination. ‘Freed’ in this way from 
personalized forms of domination, nation-states are frequently associated with the 
"new order in freedom, based upon the autonomy of the individual" (Kohn 1967). It is 
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not merely the facilitation of exchange and the sophistication of production that 
requires new means of communication provided for only by multiple national 
societies that make this a phenomenon so specific to the ‘industrial society’. Beyond 
the functional needs of the new social order, nationalism also fulfils a socio-
psychological function. It was the ‘freeing’ of the individual that necessitated new 
forms of social cohesion after leaving its stationary and heritable position in the pre-
modern society.  Dislocating the subject in an abrupt and violent exposure to the 
impersonal relations of the market as the environment within which it would have to 
reproduce itself has left individuals instantaneously vulnerable to the contradictions, 
existential as well as epistemological insecurities of the modern world. These could 
only be overcome by the creation of a superimposed, collective social identity. This, 
then, was done by evoking ‘nationalist’ myths, history and language. Industrial 
society generates not only homogeneity, as such, but the new individual requires new 
forms of social cohesion and identity. This position complements Benedict 
Anderson’s emphasis on nationalism as a neo-religion emanated through print 
capitalism within modern secular society.18 The conditions for the emergence of 
nationalism are not just located within a transformed mode of production, but within a 
new kind of political subjectivity, i.e. that of the ‘industrial society’. Social relations, 
thus de-personalised, spelled the end to divine legitimacy. Previously, a religious 
value-system, codified internationally in the Peace of Augsburg’s cuius regio eius 
religio principle, used to provide subjects with their static, spiritually ordained space 
in society. This new secular source of political subjectivity [nationalism] not only 
filled the gap that the decline of religion as the typical dynastic ruling ideology had 
left, but was also associated with new forms and structures of social interaction.  
 
Modernity and the Enlightenment then generate, according to this liberal story 
of the emerging inter-national state-system, the process of self-realisation. The latter, 
however, is only possible within the community, or rather within a multiplicity of, 
more specifically, ‘national’ communities. It could be argued that this is a 
transhistorical reality of human social life, for as Kedourie put it with reference to 
Fichte and Kant, it is always a truism that “man attains a determinate position in the 
scheme of things and fixity in nature only because he is in a particular association” 
(Kedourie 1993: 32). National self-determination, according to most theories of 
                                                 
18
 Anderson suggests that it would “make things easier if one treated it [nationalism] as if it 
belonged with ‘kinship’ or ‘religion’ rather than with ‘liberalism’ or ‘fascism’” (Anderson 1991: 
5). 
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nationalism, constitutes a distinctly modern condition since this process is only 
required because of a preceding process of alienation of the individual in modern 
society which necessitates self-realisation beyond a mere subsistence-economy level. 
Thus, the Enlightenment and nationalism are understood to provide the foundation for 
defining polities by their political constitution based on a ‘popular will’. The 
expression of the latter is thought to take place within established pre-state ethno-
linguistic communities. It is, therefore, only “with the spread of nationalism, [that] 
natural frontiers came to mean the frontiers of a nation as determined by a linguistic 
map” (Kedourie 1993: 10).  
 
The problem with these modernist theories of nationalism, whilst creating the 
strong link with secularisation which is normally taken to be part of a wholesale 
model of capitalist modernity, is, however, according to Elbe, that “they do not 
investigate in greater detail this ‘need’ for meaning and identity” (Elbe 2002: 81). 
This problem has been highlighted by Elbe’s reading of Nietzsche’s ‘incomplete 
nihilism’ as the driving force behind European nationalist sentiments:  
“Structural and Marxist accounts are effective in explaining the self-
interest of certain segments of society to advocate nationalist sentiments, 
but, despite the complexities of their positions, often face greater difficulty 
in explaining why people actually believed the nationalist ideas and why 
they acquiesced in their own exploitation” (Elbe 2002: 83). 
 
This is a legitimate question and Elbe claims to have found the answer in a 
timeless condition of humanity: their need for loyalty and solidarity as well as self-
identification. This condition is, however, neither restricted to modernity or Western 
Europe. Thus, in Nietzsche’s account, Christianity and modern nationalism are both 
“examples of the will-to-truth that is evident in much of the history of European 
culture” (Elbe 2002: 82) – constituting two closely following psycho-social sequences 
of European historical development. Whilst Nietzsche’s approach to nationalism is 
convincing to the extent that the modern nation-state did fill this ‘nihilistic gap’ with 
the kind of meaning and existential security previously provided for by religion, it not 
only overlooks the specificity of de-personal relations within capitalist modernity, but 
it also raises the question as to whether a Nietzschean account can comprehend how 
nationalism emerges in non-European or non-Christian societies where the influence 
of the Enlightenment and secularism cannot be taken for granted in a similarly 
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effectual way.19 The new nationalisms in the Middle East and the Balkans were, for 
example, more harmonizing with religion than in some parts of Western Europe. But 
even here the break with religious forms of legitimacy is still not complete as the 
continuously strong position of Christianity in European conservatism compellingly 
illustrates. Rather than two mutually exclusive sequences of identity formation 
replacing one another, the clergy actually transgressed from its initial opposition to 
one of the major catalysts of Christian nationalist movements. This form of national-
religious amalgamation was especially strong in the Greek case.20  
 
However, there is another aspect to the emergence of nationalism(s) 
concerning the dialectical way in which these histories have been ‘created’.  This 
process increasingly influenced and formed not only their own ‘national’ narratives, 
but also the ‘other’ outside, i.e. the relational aspects of this self-definition.  This, 
therefore, goes beyond the problem of nationalism within its ‘domestic’ parameters, 
but also concerns the geopolitical dimension of the emergence of nationalism. There 
exists an odd silence about this problem within the social theories of nationalism. 
This is why the following section will discuss the potential for an international theory 
of nationalism.  
 
 
2.4 International Relations and Nationalism  
This case of mutual neglect between nationalism and International Relations is 
duplicated within the literature on International Relations. Despite the centrality of 
the concept of the ‘national’ to the discipline defining subject of the ‘international’, 
surprisingly little attention has been paid to nationalism within International Relations 
(Lapid, Y. and Kratochwil, F. 1996). One exception to this rule, Bruce Hall, has 
already been discussed. Apart from Hall, another noteworthy attempt to problematize 
nationalism in International Relations (or rather in International Society), has been 
deployed by the English School scholar, James Mayall. He develops an account of the 
effects of nationalism on International Relations (Mayall 1990). In doing so, Mayall 
                                                 
19
 For a discussion of the influence of the Enlightenment in the Balkans see Fischer-Galait (1975) 
and Sugar (1975)  
20
 It has to be noted here that Greek nationalism was not supported by the Patriarchate of 
Constantinople. This is not to say, however, that landed clergymen did not take part in the revolt or 
that the newly founded autocephalous church of Greece did not help the secessionist effort. 
Equally, the national movement itself was always keen to point to its strong Orthodox/religious 
character. Lastly, the ethnic differentiation between ‘Greeks’ and ‘Turks’ was drawn on the 
religious denominations within the Ottoman Empire. 
 80
puts the idea forward that Absolutist ‘sovereignty’ is generally opposed to the new 
social phenomenon of ‘nationalism’. The former is constituted by a system of dynasts 
establishing their domain through divine legitimacy, whereas the latter constitutes a 
form of liberal emancipation from dynastic rule through implementing popular rather 
than dynastic sovereignty. According to Mayall, these two essentially contradictory 
appearances of sovereignty then develop forms of mutual ‘accommodation’. This 
means in most cases, however, that nationalism and dynastic territoriality ‘merge’ 
and, thereby, ‘freeze’ the territorial integrity of existing pre-national states (Mayall 
1990: 35). However, nationalism ‘overcomes’ sovereignty, in the sense of a territorial 
reconfiguration of political rule, only in a minority of cases. 
From this it is clear that Mayall does not problematize the social origins of 
nations and nationalism per se. Instead, he appears to borrow from the primordial 
literature. ‘People’, in his account, are either “historical communities” or “those 
whose collective identity is being created within frontiers handed down to them” 
(Mayall 1990: 2, 150). Thus, while Hall accepts the premises of the modernist 
literature on nationalism (Hall 1999: Ch. 2), there appears to be an implicit 
endorsement of a perennialist argument, despite the fact that, as Brubaker observes, 
this position has now lost most academic support (Brubaker 1996: 15).  
Lastly, as previously mentioned, Tom Nairn, through his appropriation of 
uneven development as a cause for the rise of nationalism, relates the emergence of 
nationalism to international relations. More precisely, he claims that nationalism is 
part and parcel of the periphery’s effort to catch up and, having realized their 
backwardness in relation to other social formations, form strong, defensive societies 
with a national character. This nation-formation is not, therefore, pursued according 
to an ‘internalist’ dynamic or transformation, but out of an ‘externally’ conditioned 
necessity to pursue further development (Nairn 1981). Hence, Nairn’s greatest 
emphasis is on inter-national unevenness of development as a generic condition for 
nationalism’s rise.  
Even though this consideration of the historically observable unevenness 
between Western, metropolitan development and the backwardness of ‘late-coming’ 
societies presents an inter-national dimension to the study of nationalism, Nairn’s 
understanding of national differentiation strictly in terms of unevenness is 
problematic. It does not question the constitution of different, multiple societies prior 
to uneven development. Equally, it fails to consider the role of geopolitical conflicts 
and their outcomes in relation to nationalist developments. In other words, it explains 
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the emergence of a generic form of nationalism (e.g. ‘Ottomanism’) but not the 
emergence of multiple post-Ottoman nationalisms. In the context of the Balkans, 
however, development occurred broadly within one – Ottoman – society while 
national/territorial differentiation was arguably more owed to the unintended results 
of military engagements, rather than a direct territorial reflection of pre-independence 
informal developmental differentiations.  
In sum, the study of nationalism within IR has mostly focussed on the impact 
of emerging national movements on International Relations. While this constitutes an 
important aspect capable of enriching the analysis of various specific transformations, 
this did not usually entail a critical engagement with the theoretical premises of the 
sociology of nationalism itself. Rather, constructivist and English School accounts 
have thus far appropriated the findings of this literature uncritically, albeit on 
different strands therein. This means, in turn, that, like theories of nationalism, 
Mayall and Hall omit how geopolitical and world historical developments have 
contributed to generating the social conditions of nation-formation. To the degree that 
these dimensions are problematized at all, modernist arguments, based on the 
geopolitical or capitalist generation of change as international determinism, are 
usually reified. Thus, like Bruce Hall, James Mayall is concerned with the effects of 
nationalism on the international system, externalising the study of nationalism’s 
origin to the dedicated body of literature. This means that Mayall as well as Hall, 
despite their promising research questions, do not problematize the vital juncture 
between international relations, geopolitics and the emergence of multiple 
nationalisms. In other words, the question remains unanswered as to how geopolitical 
dynamics constitute a crucial part of explaining the origin of nationalism. It can be 
confirmed, therefore, that just as theories of nationalism remain silent on the issue of 
international relations, International Relations literature itself, to the extent that it 
problematizes the issue of nationalism at all, embraces these theories – including all 
their shortcomings.  
 
The Modernist (mis)understanding of Nationalism in International Relations 
The above critique does not suggest, however, that the study of difference and the 
historical emergence of a multiplicity of societies received no attention in the field of 
International Relations (e.g. Walker 1993; Inayatullah and Blaney 2003). However, 
there is a problem with the way in which IR has tried to approach this problem -in 
that nationalism is only considered as part and parcel of a wider transition towards 
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modern IR, which is thought to logically complement territoriality of rule and 
capitalist social relations, including their national form. This is an argument 
particularly developed within historical materialism. Here the argument goes that 
‘goods’ required for the smooth operation of the market and capital are provided for 
by the modern territorial nation-state (cf. Wood, E. 2002a). Equally, liberal notions of 
national self-determination are thought to be derived from the universal emancipatory 
claims of the Enlightenment. This is in contrast to the ahistorical realist notion of 
national ‘units’.  
In consequence, Ellen Wood calls for a disentanglement “[of] the 
‘Enlightenment project’ from the culture of capitalism”, for there are, according to 
Wood, “various cultures of the Enlightenment [which] are united in their difference 
from the culture of capitalism”(Wood 2000: 405). However, she still holds that “[t]he 
emergence of capitalism was closely tied to the evolution of the modern nation-state, 
and that close link has shaped the development and expansion of capitalism ever 
since. The global economy as we know it today is still constituted by national 
entities” (Wood, E. 2002a: 17). Thus, “the universalisation of capitalism has also 
meant, or at least been accompanied by, the universalisation of the nation-state” 
(Wood, E. 2002b: 25).  
 
As previously mentioned, on a conceptual level, it seems difficult to defend 
the natural congruity of a variety of nationalisms, capitalism and modern states as 
various mutually re-affirming planes of the same totalizing modernity. The 
concurrence of nationalism as a mass-mobilising political identity, capitalism as a 
mode of social reproduction and territorial rule as a modern form of political 
organisation cannot itself establish a causal nexus between these elements of 
modernity. Hannes Lacher critiques historical materialism altogether for falling into 
this trap of confusing capitalism with other elements of modernity. For him, 
“Marxists have always been insistent that these phenomena are not autonomous, but 
are the superstructural expressions, in the realms of politics and ideology, of the real 
innovation: the rise of a capitalist economy and a bourgeois class” (Lacher 2006a: 
101). This presupposition is necessary, for “if capitalism has only spread across 
Europe in the 19th century (and even then in a protracted way), then what are we to 
make of the great innovations of modernity: the scientific revolution, individualistic 
subjectivity, rationalist epistemologies foremost among them?” (Lacher 2006a: 101). 
And what are we to make of nationalism as the specific form of modern sovereignty? 
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Lacher is critical of what he identifies as a mainstream Marxist position, namely that 
every feature of modernity is reduced to a “superstructural expression” of it. This 
means that, in general, “we have to be careful to attribute not too much generative 
power to capital” (Lacher 2006a: 102). Yet, this is not only a problem for Marxist 
approaches, but IR theory in general. As was demonstrated, assuming a causal link 
between capitalism and nationalism is precisely what the vast majority of available 
explanations of ‘nationalism’ do. However, as Hannes Lacher and Benno Teschke 
have pointed out, global capitalism does not require the inter-nation-state system for 
its reproduction, since multiple and territorially facetted realms were a historical 
‘legacy’ of absolutist inter-dynastic rivalries rather than capitalist development 
(Teschke and Lacher 2007). Neither was nationalism in its ‘pure’ French form a 
theory of various territorially defined ethnic nationalisms, but a theory of 
cosmopolitan republicanism. The problem for grand narratives in historical 
approaches to IR theory is, therefore, the supposition of the reproductive logic of 
capitalism producing particularistic outcomes.  
 
What is required, therefore, is a theory of nationalism that can account for the 
historically specific social origins of various nationalisms, instead of subsuming them 
under a meta-narrative of global modernization. In opposition to Gellner, Miroslav 
Hroch has explored the possibilities for such a theory. In addition to a general 
argument about the variable social origins of various nationalisms, or rather for the 
social formations that entered the collective historiographic memory as ‘nations’, 
Hroch was critical specifically of Gellner’s construction of a strong link between 
industrialization (read: capitalism) and nationalism, which, according to Hroch was 
far from clear (Hroch 1985, 1994). He makes the crucial distinction between what he 
generalizes as ‘Western European’ societies where “the late feudal regime was 
subsequently transformed, by reforms or revolution, into a modern civil society in 
parallel with the construction of a nation-state as a community of equal citizens” 
(Hroch 1994: 80) and ‘Eastern European’ societies where national movements aspired 
to secede from polities thought to misrepresent their interests. It is only the latter 
movements that entail a spatial element in the form of a claim to a ‘homeland’ of a 
specific group. Hroch further differentiates national movements by distinguishing 
between various phases and types. While some of these ideal-typical categorizations 
are, by Hroch’s own admission, problematic, he nevertheless provides the important 
insight into the differentiated social origins of nationalism that modernist theories 
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tend to subsume under a theoretical grand narrative. Consequently, Hroch defines the 
Nation as 
“a large social group characterized by a combination of several kinds of 
relations (economic, territorial, political, religious, cultural, linguistic and so 
on) which arise on the one hand from the solution found to the fundamental 
antagonism between man and nature on a specific compact land-area, and on 
the other hand from the reflection of these relations in the consciousness of 
the people” (Hroch 1985: 4-5). 
 
Hroch’s approach does not attempt, therefore, to develop a new, ‘correct’ theoretical 
account of nationalism. Rather, he rightly emphasizes the variety of social causes 
behind the variety of nationalisms. Thus, as Hroch put it, “all defensible conclusions 
remain no more than partial findings and all 'theories' should be taken as projects for 
further research” (Hroch 1994: 78). He also does not understand the success of 
nationalism as a result of the linear ‘concentric diffusion’ of Enlightenment ideals.  
This is because “nation-building was never a mere project of ambitious or narcissistic 
intellectuals, and ideas could not flow through Europe by their own inspirational 
force. Intellectuals can 'invent' national communities only if certain objective 
preconditions for the formation of a nation already exist (Hroch 1994: 79)”. Instead, 
he suggests that national movements are only possible on the condition of a general 
social crisis within the old order. Thus, essential ‘difference’ does not lead to political 
fragmentation as part of an ideological permeation of Nationalist thought. What 
Hroch described as “a social tension or collision that could be mapped onto linguistic 
(and sometimes also religious) divisions” (Hroch 1994: 86) is not only the pre-
condition, but rather the deeper cause for the emergence of national movements. 
Thus, social conflicts, which are not necessarily a direct outcome of Enlightenment 
ideology or capitalist expansion, were expressed in the language of national 
‘liberation’. Hroch’s account can serve as a reminder, therefore, not to confuse the 
discursive expression of a movement and the ‘real’ underlying social conditions of its 
emergence. Moreover, these include geopolitical as much as social causes. Thus, 
while Hroch, like most other writers on nationalism, does not include any explicit 
reflections on international relations, his historically and theoretically open 
explanation of the various social origins of Nationalism avoids Anthony Smith’s 
essentialism as well as the modernist’s functionalism.  
 
 
 
 85
2.5 Geopolitics and Nationalism  
This missing, more dedicated reflection on the international causes of nationalism is 
what will be attempted in the following section. It will illuminate the intrinsic 
relationship between nationalism and political violence. The conceptual relationship 
between nationalism and international relations is understood here in historical terms 
as geopolitical encounters, which frequently took on a physical and violent form and 
generate, rather than reflect, difference.  
According to Neo-Weberian Historical Sociology (Tilly 1990: 114f), it is not 
the requirements of the market, but  increasing geopolitical competition that 
necessitates the homogenization of a subject people as part of a wider state-building 
project. A series of revolutions from above designed to meet the increasing challenge 
‘from outside’ were substantiated by the ‘nationalisation’ or ethnic homogenization of 
these societies (cf. Rae 2002). Nationalism, therefore, is conceptualised as the cultural 
backbone of socialisation programmes sustaining processes of defensive 
modernization. Indeed, it is this military consolidation that usually precedes capitalist 
development, rather than resulting from it. This differentiating moment does not 
come about as a result of various nationalisms being intellectually persuasive. 
Exploring the relationship between nation-formation and the geopolitical appears to 
yield results. Violent encounters establish clear distinctions between various 
‘nations’, rather than geopolitics resulting from conflicting interests between pre-
existing nations with mutually conflicting interests. Due to the relational definition of 
identity, the social definition of ‘a nation’ and, by extension, power is only fully 
consolidated via the encounter with a perceived collective enemy, as previously, 
“despite their intellectual and social wealth, the Greeks did not know who they were” 
(Glenny 2000: 26; Triandafyllidou and Paraskevopoulou 2002; Triandafyllidou 
2005).  
In sum, it can be argued that differentiation, rather than being a reflection of an 
intrinsic cultural disparity or unevenness of development, is understood here as a 
subjective definition of the communal self, which is usually a consequence of various 
forms of social practices (violence, commerce, etc.). Hence, in the Greco-Ottoman 
context, the ethno-genetic differentiating impact does not come about as a conscious 
or voluntary act of social engineering by elites ‘from above’, but as an unwilled effect 
of the collective experience of (modern) political violence. Hence, as Daniele 
Conversi put it, “[w]hat matters here is the effect of (external) violence and (internal) 
experience upon social organisation, particularly the organisation of space and 
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identity” (Conversi 1999: 570). As political violence changes with the introduction of 
salaried, standing armies, it is the historically unique experience of total war that 
produces particularly tight, mutually exclusive forms of social cohesion. “The result 
of the [modern] conflict is thus to heighten walls between groups where boundaries 
were hitherto tenuous, rarefied, or non-existing” (Conversi 1999: 568). In the Greek 
case, Sofos and Özkırımlı have recently described this process as “constitutive 
violence”. Rather than pre-existing divisions providing a perennial cause for conflict 
(like in realism), it is the violent encounter itself that “provides the basis of a common 
framework for interpretation and self-identification for the insurgents, and confirmed 
the role of the Ottomans or the Turks as the ‘Other’” (Özkirimli and Sofos 2008: 26).  
This military encounter cannot provide a satisfying explanation of 
differentiation in its own right though, since it was itself the product of social 
conflicts not associated to nationalism. In the context of the Greek revolt, nationalism 
did not succeed through the emanation of a national ideology, which was of little 
influence, or by the largely absent capitalist (under)development. Rather, it was mass 
warfare introduced by the modernizing Ottoman and Egyptian troops with 
Napoleonic training that explains the success of nationalism.  
The broad differentiation between French and German philosophies of 
nationalism has shown, however, that not only their constitutions are highly 
differentiated, but also their representations as different social trajectories. Romantic 
nationalism is “a reactionary defence of German Kultur against the civilisation 
française and English pragmatism” (Ringer 1990: 85-90). Herder, in other words, can 
be read as a reaction to the Napoleonic invasions (Dufour 2007: 599), whereas the 
French Republican ideals arguably had lost their appeal in France itself at the very 
latest by the end of Napoleon’s reign. Hence, instead of a self-sustained permeation 
of ideology or the expression of a capitalist superstructure, nationalism is best 
understood as an aspect, and indeed, beginning of a process that Hans-Ulrich Wehler 
called ‘defensive modernization’ starting a long process at the end of which stands 
the establishment of a capitalist inter-national system.  
 
 
2.6 Nation-formation as non-transition   
This chapter started out claiming that no convincing argument can be made about the 
congruous development of the Weberian territorial form of sovereignty, the capitalist 
mode of production or the national character of depersonalized rule. This is in 
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accordance with one central premise of this thesis which claims that various forms of 
‘modernity’ have to be understood as having distinct and specific social origins. This 
becomes especially clear when looking at the complex historical development that led 
to the creation of ‘modern’ states in the Balkans. The southeastern European 
trajectory into what is conventionally understood to constitute ‘modernity’ defies 
notions of a unilinear trajectory towards a global capitalist/modernist/national 
functionally coherent totality. What is required, instead, then, is the dissociation of 
capitalism, the Enlightenment, nationalism and other features conventionally 
subsumed under the label of ‘modernity’. What is proposed here is an investigation 
into their distinctive socio-historical origins within historically and geographically 
specific contexts.  
With regards to the Ottoman Empire, this means that “the standard 
evaluations of Ottoman ‘backwardness’ are exaggerated when applied to the end of 
the 18th century” (Sugar 1977: 282), while the ‘modern’ and Enlightened character of 
the nationalist movements that came to replace Ottoman rule is commonly overstated. 
In other words, what is argued here and what will be substantiated in the following 
historical reconstruction is that national secessions do not per se represent 
modernization of political rule or the international system. This disjuncture between 
national secession and modernity will be affirmed in three ways.  
First, nationalist movements in the Balkans were, at least if measured by their 
result, not secular. Most of the post-Ottoman state formations accommodate a 
religious dimension with the seceded states through the establishment of 
autocephalous churches. Rather than nationalism and religion being two mutually 
exclusive sequences of identity-forming ideologies replacing one another, as 
described in the Nietzschean narrative, religion constituted a major catalysts of 
nationalist movements. The conservative understanding of Balkan nationalisms 
would be that “most of the Balkan Enlightenment emphasized Western scientific 
achievements in order to defeat Orthodox religious conservatism” (Roudemotof 1998: 
26). This, however, is problematic on two counts. On the one hand, modern Greece 
and other post-Ottoman state formations did not become secular. Instead, Orthodox 
religion was re-formulated and reframed through newly founded national 
autocephalous churches replacing the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople as 
the spiritual authority. On the other hand the most ‘secular’ polity emerging from the 
Ottoman maze was the Republic of Turkey itself.  
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Secondly, the reactionary post-Napoleonic European order would not have 
legitimized a state emerging from a successful social revolution. Along with the 
balance of power, preventing social change and revolt was one of the core objectives 
of the post-1815 Concert of European powers. This is why the legitimizing act for all 
the new Balkan states consisted in the appointment of European dynasts as 
constitutional monarchs. Thus, rather than applying the French Enlightenment ideal 
of popular sovereignty to the newly emerged ‘modern’ polities, the new nation states 
were forced to import rulers from European families21, such as the Wittelsbach 
(Greece), Saxe-Coburg and Gotha (Bulgaria) and Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen 
(Romania) gentries. This was, however, not so much a requirement of institutional 
borrowing from Western Europe in order to create an effective Weberian bureaucratic 
complex, even though the import of modernizing European bureaucrats was a side 
effect. Rather, it was a form of imposing the established 19th century dynastic norms 
onto the region. To the extent that it was effective at all, 19th century internationalism 
thereby universalized dynastic rule, rather than liberal Enlightenment thought. Indeed 
the effective way to reconcile the philosophical claims of the latter with the political 
reality of the former was German romanticist nationalism.  
The third constraining factor of the 19th century world order was the balance of 
power. The British hegemon remained very reluctant to accept the Greek cause for 
independence just as it saw an Arab uprising as a last resort to the Sultan’s resilience 
one century later. As will be explained in what follows, Britain had relied on the Pax 
Ottomanica up until the outbreak of the First World War as a means of regional 
‘order’ in southeastern Europe and the Middle East. Indeed, the Empire was formally 
acknowledged as a European power in the Treaty of Paris of 1856 after the Crimean 
War.22 The Pax Ottomanica, therefore, can be seen as the southeastern branch of the 
Pax Britannica. In the light of the economically and militarily most advanced state in 
principle supporting Ottoman rule, it remains difficult to equate raison d’état 
thinking, modern rule and hegemonic ‘order’ with the fragmentation of political rule 
into purportedly ‘national’ constituents. Not least since thousands of lives were 
sacrificed by the Realpolitik of France and Britain aiming at preserving the Empire 
during the Crimean War. 
 
 
                                                 
21
 One exception was Serbia which had preserved a native ruling dynasty as well as a semi-
independent clergy. 
22
 For a discussion see chapter 6. 
 89
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that the various approaches to the problem of 
nationalism, both in the broader sociological and anthropological literature as well as 
within International Relations Theory, suffer from various shortcomings. On the one 
hand, these approaches deal with the world political dimension of nationalism only 
insofar as effects, rather than causes are concerned. On the other hand, to the degree 
that the problem of international relations as a cause are introduced, this comes in the 
form of a universalizing modernity, which comprises the nation form, besides 
capitalist social relations and territoriality, as an epiphenomenon of a wider transition 
towards a holistic understanding of modernity. It was argued that this holistic, 
modernist understanding of nationalism is problematic as it leaves no space for 
regionally and historically specific social transformations. Lastly, it was argued that 
there lies a peculiar generative capacity in forms of mass violence as they have 
developed since the Napoleonic wars. This, however, should not be read as a grand 
theory to counter extant approaches, but is, rather, a specific historical explanation 
applicable to the current example.  
On the basis of these realizations, this chapter problematized the distinction 
between a French Republican ideology of nationalism and its contradiction in the 
form of a cultural, Herderian form of authoritarian nationalism. It was this latter, 
contradictory form that included notions of ethnic purity and exclusion as a self-
defining act, with all its violent and vicious reverberations (Mann 2005). Instead of 
the realization of a French-Republican universal understanding of nationalism and the 
cosmopolitan worldview of Enlightenment philosophy, nationalism in the Ottoman 
context has to be seen as a process of cultural homogenization, which produces 
racially exclusive forms of sovereignty as well as causing one of the first historic 
examples of ethnic cleansings in a non-colonial environment.23 Equally, the European 
system of states was concerned with the preservation of Ottoman rule, rather than the 
realization of a national right to self-determination. The question about the underlying 
social dynamics that caused this shift from universality to particularity therefore 
persists. 
It is important to note, however, that this process of ethnic purification under 
the cloak of ‘modernization’ is still ongoing as is illustrated by the break-up of the 
                                                 
23
 The overall numbers of victims and the exact start of atrocities are contested in Turkish/Ottoman 
and Greek nationalist historiographies respectively. However, the clear differentiation between 
Muslim and Christian subjects in the Ottoman legal system enabled the identification of ‘enemies’ 
for both sides, leading to well documented mutual expulsions and mass killings.  
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former Yugoslavia. This and other cases of violent ‘national’ secession serve as a 
reminder for the ontological and historical indeterminacy of the spatio-temporal limits 
of ‘the social’, the violent manifestation(s) of which, starting from the 19th century, 
has been mostly futile and destructive more than ‘ordering’ global social relations. 
Instead of seeking a ‘natural’/’national’ order of things, it is arguably more useful to 
accept that the definition of ‘the social’ is a specific result of social transformations 
and struggles that are neither reducible to an intrinsic nature or functional 
requirements of a totalizing capitalism, modernity or Enlightenment. Nor do they 
represent a finite design of the world map. 
Modernist theories of nationalism have helped advance this insight by 
denaturalizing the concept of the nation and by revealing the social, rather than 
perennial content of this phenomenon. More problematically, however, the modernist 
argument was further developed into an automatism of nation-creation as a result of 
capitalist development perpetuating the spread of a homogenous European national 
form. In contrast, it was argued here with reference to Miroslav Hroch and Political 
Marxism, that various nationalisms have distinct and specific social origins, 
explicable in terms of unintended outcomes of social struggles over property and 
control over exploitable resources. Thus, while different nationalisms can, empirically 
speaking, in principle emerge from similar social constellations, the wide variation of 
concrete sources prohibits the induction of a general abstraction from which a grand 
theory about the global spread of nationalism could be developed.  
 
The problematic and contradictory relationship between the theoretical claims 
regarding a universal European modernity and its peculiar fragmenting socio-political 
outcomes in southeastern Europe leaves some open conceptual and historical 
questions.24 As was argued above and will be shown in the following chapters, 
answers to these questions have to be found in the specific dynamics of changing 
social relations between the centre and the periphery of the Ottoman Empire from the 
17th century onwards. After having elaborated the conceptual issues at stake, this 
thesis will therefore now turn to the historical reconstruction of these social 
transformations in the late Ottoman Empire.  
 
 
                                                 
24
 This is not to argue that fragmentation was unique to southeastern Europe, but rather that the 
peculiar ways in which fragmentation occurs here and elsewhere require specific explanations in 
each instance.  
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3 Revisiting Ottoman Decline 
The End of Ottoman Expansion and the Social Origins of ‘Modernity’ 
 
‘A world-empire expands to the socio-technical limits of effective political control of 
the redistributive process, and then either shrinks or disintegrates.’ 
       Wallerstein (1979: 390) 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The issue of ‘imperial decline’ has recently resurfaced within the field of IR. This has 
been precipitated by debates about the apparent demise of the American capitalist 
Empire, given a series of disastrous military engagements, an increasing negative 
foreign trade deficit, a crumbling US-led financial industry, the fall of the US Dollar 
as the world’s leading currency and the moral and symbolic decay of symbols of 
American power worldwide. These recent developments have prompted a return to 
the general interest in the concept of ‘empire’ within International Relations literature 
(Lieven 2003; Münkler 2005; Colás 2007; Pijl 2007). One result of this rise of 
interest in ‘Empire’ was the differentiation of different meanings of Empire, from so-
called premodern, territorial or multi-national Empires, like Russia, China, Austria-
Hungary as well as the Ottoman Empire, to Gallagher and Robinson’s useful 
distinction between formal and informal Empire (Gallagher and Robinson 1953), to 
Hardt and Negri’s all-encompassing global Empire of capital (Hardt and Negri 
2000).25  
Despite these vastly differing understandings of Empire, organic notions of 
rise and decline, expansion and contraction as natural and transhistorical trajectories 
remain a constant characteristic of the debates (Gilpin 1981; Doyle 1986; Kennedy 
1989; Motyl 2001; Spruyt 2005). In other words, the rise and decline of ‘Empires’ is 
frequently characterized as part of the organically cyclical nature of any imperial 
formation, independent of their concrete historical formation. The Soviet, British, 
Spanish, Roman and Byzantine cases, to name but a few, are said to illustrate this 
point. With the recent failure of the United States in the Middle East, US Power is 
also supposed to have reached a point of ‘imperial overstretch’, after which a long 
and protracted period of ‘imperial implosion’ is likely to follow. This notion of 
Imperial cycles returns in important respects to Oswald Spengler’s original notion of 
a quasi-biological rise and decline of (in this case Western) civilisations, a process 
                                                 
25
 For an introduction into the conceptual history of the term ‘Empire’ see Colás (2007: 5-17). 
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that is thought to be inevitable, irreversible and, as such, natural (Spengler 1991). 
Phases of decline, according to this tradition, lead to intense periods of inter-
hegemonic conflict and ultimately a chaotic period of imperial hegemonic succession, 
which can explain the origins of the Great War amongst other things. What the US 
faces in 2009, the Ottoman Empire is thought to have faced in 1683. After a long 
period of successful conquest extended the sphere of Ottoman influence to the gates 
of Vienna, Ottoman territorial expansion finally came to a halt and, since then, 
retreated from its vast possessions in southeastern Europe and the Middle East - 
leading inevitably to its ultimate failure in 1922-23. 
 Rejecting this notion of ‘Imperial failure’, this chapter contends that 1923 
represents not so much a ‘terminal demise’, but a re-incarnation. To substantiate this 
claim, this chapter will break with the prevailing unilinear conception of late Ottoman 
history and reconstruct a different narrative of Ottoman imperial decline. More 
specifically, it will be argued that, on the basis of a systematic incorporation of the 
social relations and conflicts that constituted and pervaded the Ottoman polity, a 
reconstruction of post-1683 developments shows that, rather than following a path-
dependent process of imperial contraction, the deeper causes of Ottoman 
disintegration were rooted in the Porte’s unremitting efforts to modernize and 
centralize the state apparatus. This generated a state-threatening resistance among the 
provincial notables. Consequently, it will be argued here that organic and 
deterministic theories of imperial decline are historically superficial and theoretically 
problematic. Quasi-realist theories of hegemonic/imperial decline obscure important 
processes that are crucial for understanding the nature and dynamic of disintegration 
and, by extension, the post-Ottoman political and geopolitical developments in the 
region. Most notably, they obscure the social origin of nationalist movements by 
naturalizing their emergence in the form of a Wilsonian narrative of national self-
determination. A critique of organic theories of the rise and decline and their 
teleological understanding of Ottoman transformation, which neglects historical 
specificity, logically also implies a critique of methodological nationalism in general 
and, more specifically, its impact on post-Ottoman nationalist historiography. 
In the first section of this chapter these conceptual issues with late Ottoman 
historiography will be discussed with reference to the problem of methodological 
nationalism in the Historical Sociology of International Relations. This will establish 
the need for a new historical and sociological narrative of the late Ottoman Empire, 
which seeks to overcome the problematic practice of “[u]sing the nation-state as an 
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inevitable culmination point” as well as “the 19th century as a base for understanding 
the earlier centuries of Ottoman history” (Abou-El-Haj 2005: 61). Instead of 
understanding the 19th century as a momentary appearance of modernity, the 
following narrative will therefore start reconstructing the process of Ottoman social 
transformation from the end of territorial expansion onwards. This will show that the 
second failed siege of Vienna in 1683 is widely and accurately understood as a crucial 
juncture which radically altered the traditional social fabric of the Ottoman Empire, 
both in the center as well as the periphery. However, this cannot justify the 
construction of teleological narratives of the Ottoman history between 1683 and 1923, 
especially within the historical materialist literature. In contrast, this chapter will 
follow a recent opening in Ottoman historiography that aims at rescuing the 
specificity of the social processes that characterized this period from a unidirectional 
and methodologically nationalist reading of Ottoman decline (Adanir and Faroqhi 
2002; Abou-El-Haj 2005; Finkel 2005; Reinowski 2006).  
The historical part will start by discussing the impact of the end of expansion, 
first on the Ottoman land regime and second on the Ottoman central administration. 
This brief summary of the most crucial social changes from 1683 onwards will 
demonstrate that the transformation in the 18th century that culminated in the Ottoman 
modernization movement and the formation of post-Ottoman sovereign states is best 
understood as a social dynamic grounded in the antagonistic relationship between 
emerging peripheral aristocracies and an increasingly assertive central state in 
Istanbul. This will demonstrate that even though all parties to this conflict were 
subject to various geopolitical stimuli and world economic influences, this was not 
the result of a uniform and unidirectional trajectory towards an inevitable inter-
national ‘modernity’, but the product of a specific set of social struggles over sources 
of income and property.  
 
 
3.2 Nationalist Historiography and Ottoman Decline  
Any historical transformation can be described as a dialectical process. However, 
understanding them simply as a binary inside/outside dialectics only, might obscure 
the role of other actors or spheres of interaction there might be within what can most 
generically be labelled ‘the social sphere’. ‘International history’, thus, not only takes 
place at what Rob Walker famously termed the conjuncture between a mutually 
constitutive ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, but also at various different levels, which might 
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not lend themselves easily to this clear modernist dichotomy, most famously 
authorized by Kenneth Waltz’s ‘Man, the State, and War’ (Waltz 1959). This binary 
ontology is not always the methodologically most useful way of understanding social 
transformations, even if they carry strong geopolitical implications. The realist 
reduction of historically extremely diverse social formations to transhistorical ‘units’ 
within an anarchical ‘structure’ has attracted wide-spread criticism for its lack of 
understanding of the social and geopolitical change outside of this problematic 
dualism (Walker 1987; Schroeder, P. 1994).  
This problem is not unique to Realism, however. In fact, it points to a wider 
problem within the social sciences, most poignantly described as ‘methodological 
nationalism,’26 i.e. the practice of reading contemporary national confines into the 
past. In contrast, the concept of ‘global sociology’27 aims at overcoming the 
epistemological dangers and ontological shortcomings attached to this practice by 
breaking up the modernist-nationalist confines of International Relations and 
replacing them with a more holistic, global, notion of the social. Yet, this concept is 
problematic for other reasons. The various calls for developing a world sociological 
approach, on the one hand, run the risk of losing track of historically unique social 
practices. In other words, while various forms of social relations persist trans-
historically, any notion of geopolitics needs to be carefully historicised within any 
given social and historical environment so as to avoid historically specific ontologies, 
such as the ‘inter-national’. This not only applies to the national/international, but 
also to the ‘global’. Historicising geopolitics needs to consider all aspects of the 
“broad set of interrelationships” that constitute geopolitical practices (Halliday 
1999b: 190), which cannot be subsumed by historically specific modernist, post-
modernist or ‘globalised’ understandings.  
On the other hand, it is equally not a recent transformation of social relations 
towards a ‘globalised’ world necessitating the rethinking of these divides. Rather, 
these ‘national’ Weberian ‘iron cages’ were never an ontologically accurate and 
methodologically sound way of conceptualising social reality into two neatly 
enclosed ‘national’ and ‘international’ categories of social interaction. The problem 
of methodological (inter)nationalism is due (and this continues to be the case) to the 
                                                 
26
 The term ‘methodological nationalism’ was coined by the Portuguese sociologist Herminio 
Martins (1974). For a more recent cogent critique of methodological nationalism see Chernilo 
(2007) , Wimmer and Schilerr (2002); for the specific implications for International Relations see 
Chernilo (2009) 
27
 The concept of ‘global sociology’ was first developed by Wilbert E Moore (1966); also see 
Turner (1989, 1990) 
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reproductive logic of knowledge construction within national academies, established 
only relatively recently as part of the nationalistic project of post-Napoleonic state-
formations. Similar conditions apply to the formation of historiography as a national 
science geared towards historical legitimation of rule.  
 
In the case of Ottoman historiography, this relatively common problem is 
exasperated by the ‘national’ or ‘ethnic’ bias within all geographical branches of post-
Ottoman historical scholarship. Turkish historians, until recently, discounted Ottoman 
history in favour of a narrative of the Turkic or Hitite tribes. Work on Arab and/or 
Balkan history, on the other hand, has a section on Ottoman ‘legacies’ (Brown 1996), 
describing them as an irregularity in their otherwise ‘homogenous’ linear national 
historical accounts. Inversely, Ottoman periods also fulfil two functions within 
Balkan nationalist historiography. Firstly, Ottoman rule constitutes the distinctive 
historical ‘other’ against which the non-Anatolian peoples of the Empire define their 
relatively new national ‘self’. Secondly, the Ottoman ‘interregnum’ usually serves as 
a universal explanation of ‘backwardness’ in the region. Having been under an 
‘Oriental’ regime, the so-called ‘Turcokratia’, prevented these societies from 
developing in accordance with their respective naturally more dynamic ‘European’ 
trajectories. One example of a historian emulating a ‘national’ bias is the Macedonian 
Annales Scholar, Traian Stoianovich: His conclusions might be owed to some degree 
to his theoretical preoccupations but his repeated credits to the Christian merchants of 
the Balkan Lands as the social engine behind the national, anti-Ottoman projects 
remain striking: 
“The outstanding positive factor, however, in the spiritual and political 
awakening and cultural redirection of the Balkan peoples was the growth of a 
native merchant or middle class, which drew to the Balkans stray rays of the 
"siecle de lumieres" and accepted, however hesitatingly at first, the onerous task 
of creating new nation states” (Stoianovich 1960: 235). 
 
Despite ascribing a central role to the ‘merchant class’ for the emancipatory struggle -
a historically problematic assumption in and of itself- it is, more strikingly, the 
unspoken supposition of the pre-existence of a variety of ‘Balkan peoples’ that points 
to the issue at stake here. There is a distinct origin of these historical inaccuracies. 
Indeed, this is the monopolization of national historiography by these newly created 
states. The art of state-building has involved practices of producing nationalist 
narratives which obscure alternative ‘pre-national narratives’. This projection of a 
nationally consolidated state ethnos back into the past does not just represent a 
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misfortunate distortion, but is itself politically constituted (Deletant, Hanak et al. 
1988; Kramer 1997). However, even if there is no conscious political agenda behind 
these various ‘national’ reconstructions, nationalistic narratives are nevertheless 
continuously reproduced in less conscious forms, including literature serving no such 
purpose. This makes it difficult to navigate around nationalist historiography, since 
much of the empirical and archival primary work has been completed with the 
funding and guidance of nationalistic research agendas.28  
The following historical analysis of long-term Ottoman social transformations 
attempts to rescue Ottoman historiography from the post-Ottoman nationalist 
narratives in order to recover “…the profound impact of [the Ottoman] changes on 
the nature of the emerging national states in the area [which] have often been ignored 
or interpreted in line with the writers' ideological and national biases” (Karpat 1972a: 
243). This is not intended to replace a narrow ‘Serb’ or ‘Greek’ narrative with an 
equally restrictive Ottoman one. Rather, it is meant to practice a more open historical 
sociology conscious of these issues. As a result, this chapter understands Ottoman 
history not merely from an ‘internalist’ dynamic while equally avoiding a 
deterministic and universalizing understanding of ‘the international’. In doing so the 
three main lines of interaction in the late Ottoman Empire will be identified as, firstly, 
the Ottoman relations with European Great Powers, specifically Austria and Russia, 
secondly the relations between provincial elites and the centre and, lastly, the 
transformations within the center of Ottoman rule in Istanbul.  
 
 
3.3 The Teleology of Ottoman Decline 
The problem of nationalism in historical sociology plays out with regards to the 
Ottoman Empire by way of naturalizing the nation-state form of political rule. This, 
however, implies that disintegration is understood as an intrinsic and inevitable part 
of a wider process of ‘modernizing’ political rule. In other words, the implication of 
universalizing the nation-state model is the naturalization of imperial decline, thereby 
developing an ingenious teleological historiography. The contemporary and familiar 
appear as the rule, whereas the past is externalized as an outdated and often 
illegitimate mirror image onto which the nation’s progress is projected. This means 
that with regards to the Ottoman Empire, not only Realism theories of imperial 
                                                 
28
 For a historicisation of Europe within national confines see Anderson (1974); for an 
authoritative nationalist account of southeastern Europe see Stavrianos (2000 [1958]) 
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decline, which base their claims on the cyclical nature of ‘imperial’ rule in general, 
but also a variety of Marxist explanations about the decline of the Ottoman Empire 
tend to follow a deterministic, linear conceptualisation of history.  
 
These assumptions are grounded in the historical trajectory of Ottoman 
foreign relations from 1683 onwards. On an ideational level, the Ottoman worldview 
and the corresponding understanding of international relations were based on a notion 
of the ‘inside’ as the community of believers, the umma, or the Darülislam (‘the 
house of Islam’) and the ‘outside’ as the community of non-believers, the dawla, or 
the Darülharb (‘the house of war’). Thus, war and violent expansion were inevitable 
and “no permanent peace was possible, in so far as it was ever possible, when the 
shari‘a mandated that all agreements with non-Muslims were merely temporary 
truces” (Aksan 2006: 107). This constant readiness to go to war constituted, to a large 
extent, the Sultan’s power base. This means that territorial decline directly leads into 
a crisis of legitimacy (Faroqhi 2004: 8). It is important to note, however, that this 
state of war was merely hypothetical and, as Suraiya Faroqhi points out, by no means 
represents the practice of Ottoman foreign relations in their entirety (Faroqhi 2004: 
3). While a ghâzi, or border lord regime existed that gave the Ottoman frontier a 
military quality in southeastern Europe, the established practice itself, ghazâ “was not 
jihad and did not adhere to jihad's legal norms; rather, it was an activity in which 
people of any faith or origin could join” (Darling 2000: 137). Thus, while Holy War 
against the Dawla constituted the spiritual legitimation of violent conquest (Darling 
2000), this conquest was economically, rather than religiously driven (Anderson 
1974: 364). Overall, as Faroquhi observes, it was precisely because the Ottoman 
Islamic identity was beyond doubt and did not depend on constant violent 
manifestation, that an overall sense of pragmatism prevailed (Faroqhi 2004: 5). What 
William McNeill called Europe’s ‘Steppe Frontier’ (McNeill 1964) is, therefore, 
better understood in relation to a geopolitically driven mode of production and not as 
a faith-based practice. In other words, while an institutionalized constant readiness to 
pursue Islamic conquest existed in theory, its actual practice needs to be understood 
as a form of political and geopolitical accumulation, explaining the long-term 
consequences of the end of expansion, as it occurred after 1683. This we will turn to 
next.  
Given this form of social reproduction, the end of territorial expansion leads 
to an economic crisis. This crisis has the potential to spiral into more general political 
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instability. In fact, the elements of society that had relied on the military frontier for 
their subsistence were hard hit by its closure (Abou-el-Haj 1969). As a result, the 
‘closing’ of the Ottoman border is frequently understood as the historical benchmark 
that many explanations for Ottoman decline rest upon. Here, Ottoman history from 
1683 to 1923 is characterized as a narrative of teleological decline. The unique trend 
in the Marxist literature on Ottoman decline is, therefore, a focus on the mode of 
social reproduction based on direct territorial control. Simon Bromley is one example 
amongst others who contends that  
“…any dynamic that this society possessed was based on perpetual military 
conquest; the Ottoman polity was a 'plunder machine' (Jones 1981). In such a 
social order, the cessation of territorial expansion implied a gradual 
disintegration of the state and an increasingly counter-productive form of 
surplus extraction” (Bromley 1994: 48). 
 
Equally, Perry Anderson sees the beginning of decline already in the 16th century:  
“Once territorial expansion ceased, however, a slow involution of its whole 
enormous structure was inevitable [as] the stoppage of extensive acquisition of 
lands and treasure was inevitably to lead to much more intensive forms of 
exploitation within the bounds of Turkish power, at the expense of the subject 
rayah (peasant) class. The history of the Ottoman Empire from the late 16th  to 
the early 19th century is thus essentially that of the disintegration of the central 
imperial State, the consolidation of a provincial landowning class, and the 
degradation of the peasantry” (Anderson 1974: 378). 
 
Immanuel Wallerstein is similarly explicit about the inevitability of this process of 
imperial decline:  
“The end of territorial expansion of the empire had been a severe blow to a 
foundation block of its structure, the timar system, in which newly acquired 
land was distributed to intermediate officials (sipahis) who served as local 
representatives of the central state and in particular as its tax collector” 
(Wallerstein 1989: 172).  
 
Despite originating from vastly different historical materialist traditions, all three 
scholars imply that, given its mode of social reproduction, based on the accumulation 
of territory, geopolitical defeats had to translate into socio-economic crisis – read 
decline and disintegration. These interpretations offer an enormous improvement over 
primordial nationalistic accounts, since they spell out the constitutive link between 
pre-capitalist modes of surplus extraction that shaped Ottoman rule, substantiated by 
territorial expansion. Furthermore, it is unquestionable that from the 17th century 
onwards, after having reached the limits of its territorial expansion at the second siege 
of Vienna in 1683, the Ottoman expansion stopped and domestic crises increased. 
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The Ottoman-Russian war of 1768 – 1774 and Muhammad Ali’s Egyptian challenge 
to the central power of the Porte are only two episodes in a series of events that 
illustrate this point. Already sixteen years after the ‘limits of expansion’ were 
reached, the Sultan suffered his first territorial losses to Austria and Venice. These 
losses were codified at the Peace of Karlowitz in 1699 and again at Passarovitz in 
1718. When analysing post-1683 Ottoman military history as a whole, these defeats 
can indeed be seen as the beginning of a historical trend, or as Anderson puts it, as the 
starting point of a historical process of ‘involution’ with Austria-Hungary and Russia 
as the main geopolitical contenders. In purely empirical terms, the geopolitical 
environment is, therefore, accurately described by these decline narratives.  
The problem is rather with the usage of this long-term trajectory as a holistic 
explanation for the uneven process of Ottoman decline. It is argued here that even 
though large scale transformations occurred as a result of territorial stagnation, this 
ex-post rationalization of Ottoman decline cannot replace a historical sociological 
reconstruction of developments that were neither path-dependent nor predetermined. 
Rather, it produced incomplete and regionally specific results that are not reducible to 
these larger transformations. Most importantly, the long-term decline narrative 
obscures a detailed view of the social changes within the Empire that ultimately 
transformed into secessionist movements that produced the post-Ottoman inter-
national system.  
 
However, like the previously mentioned cyclical, organic and deterministic 
theories of imperial decline, standard historical materialist explanations tend to 
interpret “the last centuries of the existence [of empires] unidirectionally as a history 
of decline” (Reinowski 2006). This underrates the historically contingent and 
geographically specific developments in the vastly diverse history of Ottoman 
regions. The problem is that they draw a macro-conclusion with all the benefits of 
hindsight from the period of territorial stagnation while discounting the specific 
constellation of social agents involved in this process. In contrast, it is argued here 
that while the ‘closure of Ottoman borders’ did set off social conflicts; these did not 
immediately and undoubtedly initiate a period of ‘decline’. By subsuming a complex 
and uneven development, which was marked by Ottoman successes as much as by 
Ottoman defeats under a unilinear narrative of decline, Marxist accounts have not 
sufficiently moved beyond realist, World Systems and Neo-Weberian accounts. What 
they fail to explain is why the Ottoman Empire, persisting from 1683 to 1923, saw 
 100
periods of relative recovery, both financially as well as militarily and, finally, why its 
ultimate demise in 1923 was marked by the foundation of arguably the most 
formidable and prosperous country emerging from the Ottoman realm, the Republic 
of Turkey.  
 
 
3.4 The Transformation in the Ottoman Land Regime 
3.4.1 The Traditional Ottoman Land Regime: Centralization through Diversity  
The Ottoman state is conventionally characterized by its high level of centralisation 
(Kunt 1983)29, which nevertheless retained a relatively high level of local autonomy. 
In order to detail this specific social structure, the following section will first briefly 
outline the Empire’s mode of ‘soft’ conquest, its mode of reproduction and the kind 
of provincial structure this produced. This is important, as many explanations focus 
on the ethno-linguistic variety of the ‘Sick Man of Europe’ as the reason for his 
decline. However, as the following will show, the management of diversity was at the 
heart of the Ottoman structure. This will reveal that, contrary to the view of the 
‘despotic other’ or the big anomaly illegitimately superimposing a stationary ‘Asiatic 
Mode of Production’ on to naturally ‘dynamic’ societies, the late Ottoman Empire 
was a social formation which had many similarities to European development. Whilst 
Perry Anderson is right to state that there was no formal institution of feudalism, we 
can observe the development of locally and regionally increasingly autonomous 
power-centres at least from the 16th century onwards.  
In the most general of terms, the Ottoman polity was structured according to a 
binary model as a result of the 14th and 15th century conquests, which necessitated a 
compromise between the settling of nomads and a strong central administration 
inherited from the Byzantine predecessor (İnalcık 1956, 1964; Mardin 1969). The 
central organs of surplus-extraction were the so-called timars which were small 
landholdings and the sanjaks as administrative districts with a local governor, a so-
called bey, as their head. The Re’aya (direct producers) were not tied to the land in 
the same way they were in Europe as “it was, in fine, the Sultan's will alone that 
decided a man's status in society” (İnalcık 1964: 44). Equally, all ownership of land 
lay with the sultan and land-use was, consequently, granted at most for a lifetime to 
the quasi-lord, the timariot. On top of the rent payable in kind, the timar-holder had to 
                                                 
29
 Kunt contends that the period of actual centralization the Empire was famous for, was in fact 
relatively short.  
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provide military service to the Sultan. “As a rule sipâhis (cavalrymen) who composed 
the main force of the Ottoman army were given timars in the villages throughout the 
newly conquered country” (İnalcık 1956: 107). Property could neither be 
accumulated (other than by the Sultan himself) nor inherited, thus ensuring the 
unchallenged power-base of the Sultan. The maintenance of this power base was the 
main responsibility of the local bey administrators, who were only answerable to the 
Sultan directly. They had to control and enforce a strictly regulated tax regime which 
tightly fixed the level of surplus-extraction from the peasants. The ideological base of 
this land-regime could be found in Islamic law, or the holy order of the Şeriat. Thus, 
even though there were several categories of land-ownership, which also provided the 
ulema (the clergy, consisting of medrese teachers, kadi judges and imams) with 
holdings, like waqf land, the Sultan retained a divine, not only political, but also 
economic authority onto which the whole socio-political fabric was based and which 
eventually also provided the foundation for the defence of his empire. The beys tried 
to maintain a delicate local balance of power: “As part of Istanbul’s effort to prevent 
the growth of autonomous structures in the provinces, [the governor] sought to create 
more effective checks and balances among local notables, Janissary garrisons, 
Bedouins, and tribes” (Quataert 2000: 104). This policy of keeping the periphery 
relatively powerless by implementing a system of checks and balances had ensured 
the maintenance of a tight control on taxation and income throughout the periphery, 
whilst at the same time upholding a precarious balance of power between direct 
producers and (temporary) overlords. It provided social as well as fiscal stability and 
the sipâhi cavalry, together with the infamous Janissary slave soldiers, provided the 
backbone of Ottoman military might. This socio-economic structure prevented the 
constitution of a hereditary semi-feudal local ruling class with a power-base 
independent of the centre, as “the ‘askeri [ruling class] were not an aristocratic class 
with historically established rights, but membership of it was contingent upon the will 
of the sultan” (İnalcık 1956: 112). This is how the conventionally held assumption 
about the absence of feudalism in Ottoman lands was substantiated.30  
 
The socio-historical importance of the association of land tenure with military 
service cannot be overstated. On the one hand, this meant that land ownership was 
contingent upon the physical ability to, at least indirectly, control and police. On the 
                                                 
30
 For an overview on the debate on the existence of Ottoman or ‘Turkish’ feudalism, see Berktay 
(1987) 
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other hand, it meant that an increase in revenue was largely conditional upon 
territorial conquest, a striking similarity to feudal Europe, which also provides the 
governing idea regarding assumptions about the unilinear histories of decline. While 
the Siphai’s right to usurp surpluses was contingent upon his military performance, 
direct producers, or reaya, had a centrally enforced hereditary usufruct rights to the 
land. In this context, as opposed to many claims by Balkan national historians, direct 
producers could be either Muslim or Christian, whereas military service was reserved 
to Muslims, even though it should be added that the possibility of conversion to Islam 
existed. However, timars were not just the formal conduits through which 
geopolitical accumulation took place by providing militarily successful men with land 
holdings as rewards. They could also be obtained by newly conquered local rulers, 
subject to appropriate fees payable to Ottoman officials and at least informally subject 
to conversion to Islam: “The Ottomans preserved to a great extent the land-holding 
rights of these [conquered] people in the form of timar or bashtina. Thus, the great 
families of the Balkans, for example, (Seigneurs, Voyvods) frequently retained the 
greater part of their patrimonies as great Ottoman timar-holders, and when they 
adopted Islam they took the title of bey and were eligible for attaining the highest 
administrative posts” (İnalcık 1956: 115). As a result, Ottoman rule in the conquered, 
culturally ‘different’ parts, left the social structures, if not untouched, largely intact. 
“While they introduced their own administrative system they continued to work 
mainly through existing leaders” (Sugar 1977: 237). For these local leaders, on the 
other hand, “the timar system did not necessarily mean a revolutionary change in the 
former social and economic order [of the newly acquired territories]. It was in fact a 
conservative reconciliation of local conditions and classes with Ottoman institutions 
which aimed at gradual assimilation” (İnalcık 1956: 103). The rationale behind this 
form of conquest was, of course, not limited to extracting bribes in exchange for new 
positions as an additional source of revenue. Indeed, merging the Ottoman land-
regime with existing social hierarchies provided the Ottomans with a very efficient 
and cost-effective system of governance in the periphery. Surprisingly, even the 
newly co-opted landlords could benefit from their own defeat in this way: This “slow 
process of integration of the different elements in the conquered lands by one unified 
centralist administration under an absolute ruler” (İnalcık 1956: 122), also provided 
the existing Balkan landlords with many advantages over the insecurities of 
constantly contested feudal sovereignty or Arab nomadic territorial instability that 
had preceded the arrival of the Ottomans. “Seeing that their position and lands were 
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effectively guaranteed by the strong Ottoman administration, the majority of these 
Christian soldiers might not have been averse to the change” (İnalcık 1956: 115). The 
Ottoman social formation, far from constituting the famously discussed Oriental 
Despotism (Wittfogel 1957), provided for a comparatively laissez-faire regime of 
‘soft’ and gradual assimilation after the outright physical occupation. This allowed for 
the coexistence of culturally diverse people without implying exploitative relations 
along cultural lines of social separation. Stavrianos sums up the sophistication of the 
Ottoman land regime: “Indeed, its outstanding feature was strict control of the siphais 
so that they could neither exploit the re’ayas [primary producers] nor defy the state. 
During the early years of Ottoman rule, when this timar system was in its prime, the 
re’ayas enjoyed security and justice. But by the end of the 16th century the system 
began to break down…” (Stavrianos 2000 [1958]: 139). The breakdown of this order, 
its causes and consequences starting in the late 17th century had central long-term 
implications for the formation of, and transition to, national polities.  
 
 
3.4.2 The Formation of the Çiftlik and the Rise of the Âyân  
Due to the deteriorating geopolitical situation in the late 17th century, old forms of 
Ottoman rule and surplus-extraction through the timar system increasingly came 
under pressure. The significance of this historical conjuncture in which the Ottoman 
countryside, most notably the Balkans, underwent dramatic and major social change 
in the late 18th century can hardly be overstated. Indeed, these changes established the 
conditions for an intense and prolonged power-struggle between the countryside and 
the centre which was eventually pivotal to any understanding of the late Ottoman 
secessions. The rise of a powerful local semi-nobility, the âyân, and their 
unprecedented large landholdings, the çiftlik, are central developments in this regard. 
As has been pointed out earlier, land-regimes were pivotal for both raising revenue as 
well as manpower. As fiscal and military requirements were interconnected in that 
way, “the revenue crisis beginning in the 16th century was exacerbated through 
increases in expenditures. The most important increase was in the requirements of the 
military” (Islamoglu and Keyder 1978: 50). The origins of this new landed nobility 
continue to puzzle historians. Indeed, beyond the empirical, it also fuelled a debate 
over the ‘feudalization’ of the Empire which stood in contradiction to the traditional 
Marxist analysis of the Ottoman Empire as a typically ‘Asiatic Mode of Production 
(AMP)’ (Keyder 1976b; Wickham 1985; Berktay 1987; Jacoby 2008a). However, 
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given the high levels of regional diversity and the constant but uneven change within 
it, the conceptualization of the new land regime was, and continues to be, no easy 
task.31 “The older Ottoman land regime was passing away and being replaced by one 
in which privately owned estates encroached on former common lands and 
dispossessed the peasants. The causes of the rise of these çiftlik estates – their nature 
and extent – is among the most bitterly contested issues in Ottoman historiography” 
(Mazower 2000: 19).  
 The World System scholars, for example, see the formation of large estates as 
the result of landlords realizing new potential for generating profit within the 
expanding world markets. With the introduction of new crops, landlords “lured by 
huge potential profits from grain exports, began to increase their privileges at the 
expense of the direct producers” (Mouzelis 1978: 5). The historical significance of 
the rise of large landholdings with unprecedented rates of surplus-extraction and 
productivity, i.e. the commercialisation of production for a world market, in World 
Systems parlance, means that the Ottoman Empire ceased “to be a self-contained unit 
of reproduction” (Islamoglu and Keyder 1978: 53), thus making it vulnerable to the 
inequalities of the world market. This vulnerability was first felt by the ‘Price 
Revolution’, i.e. the inflationary effect of cheap Silver imports from the New World 
on the Ottoman economy which lead to a crisis in Ottoman finance between 1556 and 
1625 (Barkan and McCarthy 1975; Kasaba 1988: 12). More importantly, the 
increasing penetration of the pan-Ottoman and, in particular, the Egyptian market 
with British cotton products, is thought to have lead to the decline of the native cotton 
industry which caused a shift towards the export of raw material and foodstuffs and 
import of high value added goods. Charles Issawi describes this process as an 
effective de-industrialization of the Ottoman economy, which was, however, followed 
by a period of re-industrialization (Issawi 1980). Thus, the Ottoman economy as a 
whole increasingly shifted into a disadvantageous position within the emerging global 
markets (Issawi 1966; cf. Eldem 2005; Eldem 2006), leaving the Ottoman economy, 
amongst other problems, with a significant trade imbalance. These developments 
constitute, therefore, prima facie evidence for the World Systems Theory. Hence, in 
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 Chris Wickham, for example, claims that Asiatic and feudal modes were contemporaries, 
whereby the tax regime of the centralized despotic state was superior to the rent extracting feudal 
system. This observation, as accurate as it may be, nevertheless requires some modification. Even 
though both ‘modes’, ‘Asiatic’ (tax) and ‘Feudal’ (rent) did exist, the crucial observation is not 
their contemporaneous occurrence, but the competition between different social actors in the 
center and the periphery they represent. In other words, the tax collecting central state was neither 
superior nor inferior to the rent extracting feudal regime. Rather, these two regimes regime 
competed for surpluses. 
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WST parlance, the Ottoman economy ended up occupying a position in the 
‘periphery’, while industrialized Turkey advanced into the ‘semi-periphery’ (Keyder 
1976a; Islamoglu 2004).32 This shift, in turn, generated local social transformations. 
The structural core-periphery relation of inequality and exploitation was thus 
solidified and legally codified with the introduction of the so-called ‘capitulations’, 
which in the long run not only led to the ‘peripheralization’, but also to a general 
weakness of the Ottoman polity as a whole. This process can be seen as a core factor 
that lead to state bankruptcy in October 1875.33  
This was caused by the center’s ambition to re-appropriate surpluses now on 
their way to the world market. Consequently, the continuing financial malaise 
“created contradictions which became manifest as the legal and political requirements 
of [a rising] merchant capital clashed with the existing institutions” (Islamoglu and 
Keyder 1978: 55) and eventually led to the rise of local potentates who “could add 
political authority to economic accumulation and as such became known as âyâns” 
(Islamoglu and Keyder 1978: 52). These new local potentates were interpreted as 
predecessors of a “variety of entrepreneurial, agrarian, and commercial groups [who] 
in the 19th century, put forth a series of demands: the âyân demanded feudatory rights 
and the later groups demanded a new rational, legal system capable of meeting the 
needs of the differentiated system in which they activated” (Karpat 1968: 71-72). 
Thus, this commercial class, in collaboration with a ‘bureaucratic bourgeoisie’ in 
their service, is seen within the World Systems paradigm as the ultimate agent of 
social change, which should, in view of an inadequate Ottoman response to their 
demand, eventually lead to modernisation, ‘national’ fragmentation, and, hence to the 
‘Demise’ of the Ottoman Empire (Göçek 1996).  
These views on the process of the social change, however influential they might 
be, face some important limitations. On the one hand, external weakening was not in 
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 Interestingly, within the World Systems ontology, the Ottoman Empire was always considered a 
peripheral economy, whereas the Republican era, having gone through a radical capitalist 
transformation, is usually categorized as a semi-periphery. On the ‘peripheralization’ of the 
Ottoman economy see Keyder (1987: 25f); on Turkey’s status as semi-periphery see Wallerstein 
(1976) 
33
 The historiography of the capitulations has suffered from economistic interpretations as unequal 
trade agreements cementing Western European commercial penetration. Initially capitulations 
were not necessarily either limited to trade issues, or prescribing unequal terms, nor were they 
restricted to the Ottoman Empire. Capitulations entailed a whole set of rules regulating the life of 
foreigners within the Empire, but later also came to include trade issues. The 1838 Anglo-Ottoman 
Baltalimani Convention, however, matches the above mentioned descriptions as it established 
British commercial domination over the Ottoman Empire to which the capitulations regime 
eventually contributed.  
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the interest of the two most advanced countries, France and Britain. As Misha Glenny 
has pointed out,  
“[it] was clearly never the conscious intention of either Britain or France to 
ravage Turkey by allowing the Empire to accumulate debt. Indeed, both 
countries were keen to preserve the Empire at all costs. But it remains true that 
a combination of European fiscal recklessness and Turkish profligacy played an 
important role in sparking off the Great Eastern Crisis” (Glenny 2000: 87). 
 
More illuminating still, is the further trajectory of the Ottoman transformation. The 
social origin of the âyân is in fact not clear-cut: 
“The origins of the âyân, or the âyânlik as the institution was called, remain 
obscure. […] The first indication that the term had acquired any more specific 
connotations came during the Austro-Turkish war of 1638 – 99. At that time, 
the term âyân was used to refer to certain wealthy individuals, elected by the 
people, who acted as intermediaries between the local populace and officials of 
the Porte in matters of finance, taxation and military recruitment” (Sadat 1972: 
346f). 
 
This latter functional characterisation of the new landed class already points towards 
another way of explaining their origins: “The obsolenscence of the Ottoman military 
apparatus became apparent during the long and inconclusive wars with Austria 
between 1593 and 1606. As a remedy, the central government ordered the provincial 
officials to form mercenary units and equip them with firearms” (Kasaba 1988: 15f). 
However, in order to meet the risen short-term demand for soldiers as a result of 
military defeats, the Porte could no longer solely rely on the cavalry of the timar-
holders (Timarlı Sypahis) or the standing army of Janissaries (which were 
concentrated in and around Istanbul). As such, the Porte “ordered the provincial 
administrators to form mercenary units equipped with firearms” (Kasaba and 
Wallerstein 1983: 344), so-called sekban troops. The increase of surplus extraction 
sometimes led to an abandonment of farms by peasants, who couldn’t afford the cash 
tax anymore and subsequently turned into social bandits and potential rebel armies 
(Sunar 1979). These mercenary troops had a significant long-term impact on the 
social fabric of the Ottoman state. “[W]hen unemployed, these sekban troops became 
a menace to rural order; they practiced brigandage on their own, and demanded illegal 
dues and protection money from the peasants” (Kasaba 1988: 16). Thus, on the one 
hand, an element of social disorder war created. On the other hand, this element 
could, on occasions, be utilized as a readymade standing army always keen on 
military employment and detached from any long-term political loyalties. However, if 
in employment, the maintenance of these sekban troops was merely the responsibility 
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of the local notables, and new firearm technology made it relatively cheap to equip 
them with low cost and versatile weaponry. As a result, local notables felt confident 
to be able to raise the level of taxation from direct producers, the reayas, with the 
Ottoman centre incapable of implementing a traditional tax regime. This is important 
insofar as the level of surplus-extraction had previously been under the tight control 
of the Porte through local administrators. In the 18th century, these so-called âyân, i.e. 
landlords that enjoyed unprecedented independence compared to their predecessors, 
the timar holders, started filling these posts themselves as a self-reward for their 
increased military services. This led to a fortification of their local power-base which 
put the government into a contradictory situation between the increasing power from 
the countryside and an increasing need to defend the Empire externally. This dynamic 
had two effects, both of which are highly significant for understanding the emergence 
of Nationalist movements. The first effect centred on Istanbul and the infamous 
Janissary corps, who could serve as a short-term military remedy without having to 
compromise the landed regime. Traditionally their ranks had been filled by the 
devşirme,34 a child levy on the Christian subjects of the Porte making the Janissaries 
an elite corps, unable to develop any independent social power. This, however, like 
the land regime changed once the Sultan became more and more dependent on their 
military force. Eventually, Janissaries could marry within their ranks, thereby 
constituting a Platonian incestuous community of guardians who vigorously 
preserved their vested interest until finally violently eradicated by Mahmud II in 
1821.35 
Secondly, and more importantly, at the end of this process stood the 
establishment of de-facto, but not de-jure, private property with the creation of the 
çiftlik land-holdings. This private property was supposed to have its origin in a shift 
in the mode of production, rather than anything political. Çiftliks did not only differ in 
terms of size, but more importantly in terms of autonomy from the Porte. Most 
importantly, the ability to circumvent caps on taxation set by the Ottoman state and to 
extract surplus from the peasants independently without the Sultan’s consent as well 
                                                 
34
 The practice of raising a child tax on the Christian subjects of the Sultan was introduced in 
reaction to the growing influence of notables in the military and the administration. It was, 
however, not applied to all Christian subjects, but only those deemed not ‘ethnically’ Christian like 
some Slavic tribes. In reality this meant that these practices were exercised arbitrarily, usually 
sparing the parts of the population who were influential or economically too valuable, like Jews 
and Armenians.  
35
 The Janissaries’ relative social autonomy is of special importance for explaining the origins of 
the Serb uprising. Here, the central Ottoman administration had lost control over the Janissaries 
and, thereby, failed to stop overexploitation and repression of the local population, which led to 
the uprising directed against Janissaries specifically, rather than Ottoman rule in general. 
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as making these landholdings, at least unofficially hereditary36, amounted to a break-
down of Istanbul’s social power which had been secured for centuries by the effective 
non-hereditary timar system. It is this that created the local power-base that would 
eventually constitute the central pre-condition for Ottoman decline: “While the 
central bureaucrats could keep their representatives under some semblance of control 
through frequent rotation and by playing different officials against each other, there 
was little they could do to curb the expanding power and influence of the âyân” 
(Kasaba 1988: 151). Thus, the agents of anti-Sultanic disobedience were not an 
incipient commercial or even national class. Rather, they were a newly constituted 
seigniorial class, keen on retaining and enlarging its surpluses, possible only on the 
basis of the geopolitical predicaments the Porte found itself in. Surely, new sources of 
income were also acquired by the âyâns by selling produce to European as well as 
‘home’ markets. The ultimate realisation of gains was, however, made possible much 
more by the politically constituted, unimpeded, higher level of surplus-extraction 
from the peasants based on the central state’s inability of regional political control, 
rather than by exploiting the inequalities of markets. This is why the âyân’s collective 
interest did not consist in political and technological ‘progress’, but much more in 
stagnation and preserving the status quo.  
 
 
3.5 Institutional Change  
The beginning of the centralization and modernization of the Ottoman Empire is 
usually dated at 1838 when the Gülhane Rescript initiated the Tanzimat period. This 
obscures, however, how the Sultanate of the late 18th century had already initiated a 
concerted effort to modernize. In fact, similarly to China, the Ottoman Empire had 
always also been a bureaucratic empire, building on a long tradition of a central 
administration or ‘Ruling Institution’. This central organization was adapted from its 
Roman/Byzantine predecessors as a means of establishing political control over the 
tribal elements in Anatolia and Rumelia (Mardin 1969: 270-272). Like the 
Janissaries, the bureaucracy was staffed by slaves recruited through the devşirme, 
who were bound by the concept of beytu mali-lmuslimin, i.e. the imperative to ensure 
the Şeriat and the public good. This meant that these professional slaves were untied 
from any heritable social connections, while being “at the mercy of sultanic fiat: 
                                                 
36
 Timars had been de-facto hereditary as well; however, it was at the discretion of the Sultan to 
accept or reject the heir. A right he did not excessively make use of.  
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neither their lives nor their property were protected (Mardin 1991).” This system was 
intended to maintain the absolute authority of the Sultan. The bureaucracy was 
differentiated within the palace into “the enderun (‘inside’), housing the sultan, his 
harem and their slaves, and the birun (‘outside’), which housed government 
functions” (Findley 2006: 69). Officials were trained at the enderun in a bid to keep 
them close to the Sultan (Heper 1976: 509).  
 
However, during the 17th century recruitment through the child levy had 
become “obsolete and dysfunctional” (Quataert 2005b: 99) while the central 
administration spilt into a variety of independent households establishing patrimonial 
relationships within the Palace. Şerif Mardin describes these relationships as “the 
most characteristic aspect of Ottoman polity” (Mardin 1969). Reproduction within 
this web of semi-autonomous private households depended on personal relationships 
and the Sultan’s influence was restricted to “arranging marriages between members 
of ruling elites and women from the imperial harem”, thus creating “densely webbed 
relationships between the dynasty and its servants” (Quataert 2005a: 101; Findley 
2006: 71). Far away from establishing a rational meritocratic bureaucracy, this 
engendered a system of multiple rivalling palace households, where recruitment into 
the bureaucracy was determined primarily by hereditary rights and only secondarily 
(at best) by merit (Abou-El-Haj 2005: 31-32). Even though the social power of the 
central administration towards the periphery did not diminish and ensured constant 
levels of surplus-extraction from the countryside, the internal mechanisms of social 
reproduction within the household system in effect curtailed Sultanic power. This 
consequently rendered the Grand Vezir as "acting head of state” (Chambers 1964: 
313: 259), as he “took the most important part of the record keeping and 
communication work under his own supervision and moved into new quarters 
separate from the Palace. The entire scribal profession became functionally 
differentiated” (Mardin 1991: 117).  
The further development from the 17th century onwards was characterized by 
the emergence of these Pasha and Vizier Households, maintaining their social power 
well into the Republican era. During the 18th century, in a bid to raise revenue, the 
previously closed household system was gradually opened towards other sections of 
the society and recruitment was increasingly based on office venality. This had the 
effect of increased levels of surplus extraction by the ‘new’ bureaucracy to cover the 
cost of investment into office, which in turn favoured the further spread of tax 
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farming. Thus, a short-term raise in revenue was achieved at the expense of long-term 
loss of central control. By way of conclusion it can be observed, therefore, that, as 
opposed to the provisions of the Şeriat, “[i]t is highly improbable that at any point in 
Ottoman history sultans had the absolute monopoly of power…” (Abou-El-Haj 2005: 
33).  
 
Just as the Sultan could not rule independently from the wider bureaucratic 
structures, these developments did not occur in isolation from the Ottoman’s 
geopolitical environment. Preceding the concrete institutional ‘responses’ to Russian 
and Austrian military superiority in the early 19th century, a shift in the Ottoman 
concept of International Relations itself took place. Bounded territoriality and 
physical borders (as opposed to the military frontier) had previously been an alien 
concept to the Ottoman state. Once the “insufficiency of the Ottoman military arm as 
an instrument of foreign policy” had been realized (Abou-El-Haj 1967: 489), frontiers 
were transformed into borders and foreign relations were formalized, developing 
rules and regulations for co-existence instead of conquest. Thus, “the 1699 treaty of 
Karlowitz forced a transition in Ottoman diplomatic strategies from dictation to 
negotiation with equals, and the gradual rationalisation of diplomatic relations on 
European terms” (Aksan 2006: 107). The closure of the military frontier, thus, 
imposed the principle of diplomatic reciprocity on the Ottoman Empire, which led to 
the increasing use of ahidname, or ‘capitulations’, i.e. specific regimes establishing 
the rights and duties of foreign visitors, like pilgrims or merchants to the Ottoman 
Empire. 
This is when the already existing scribing service within the Ottoman 
administration started assuming the important duty of meeting and corresponding 
with foreign diplomats (Findley 1980b: 57). The formalization of relations with 
Europe encompassed an increasing demand for interpretation and translation into 
European languages, most importantly French. Formulating treaties in a written form 
constituted a major shift from the Ottoman preference of oral agreements. In the long 
term, these formalizations not only had an ‘external’ effect, but also an internal one. 
Namely, it was this forced opening of formalized foreign relations that led to the 
increased staffing of the Porte’s offices with professional, multi-lingual civil servants, 
mostly of Christian denomination. Social change occurred on two levels, therefore. 
The formalization of foreign relations with the Ottoman’s immediate environment 
initiated the growth of scribal professionals within the structures of the pre-existing 
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patrimonial bureaucracy. The thus induced institutional growth was neither 
specifically modern nor itself necessarily coincidental with the introduction of a 
‘rational’ administration, not least since the Janissaries and Ulema could retain their 
heritable positions well into the 19th century. However, it laid the foundations for the 
bureaucratic elite that acted as one of the main agents of modernization in the 
Ottoman Empire. 
 
 
3.6 Neo-Absolutist Restoration through Effective Modernisation  
Selim III 
The other agent of reform was the military. Enthroned in 1789, Sultan Selim III found 
himself in a similar position towards the âyân as Goethe’s sorcerer’s apprentice 
towards his broom: “Die ich rief, die Geister, Werd ich nun nicht los”.37 He and his 
indirect successor Mahmud II (1808–39) started restoring central power – a process 
quickly faced with resistance from within the patrimonial bureaucracy (Chambers 
1964: 305-306). Thus, as Karpat argues, the entrenched social power of the 
households, Janissaries and the conservative Ulema combined constituted a major 
obstacle to reform. Social change required change first and foremost within the 
various administrative quarters of Istanbul itself (Karpat 1972a: 257). As a result, it 
can be seen as a strategic mistake by Selim to focus on the military more than the 
bureaucracy. His reaction can be understood both as a reaction to military weakness, 
especially compared to Russia and Austria, but also as an attempt to curb the social 
power of the morally defunct and militarily decaying Janissary slave corps (Shaw 
1965: 291). Usually the Ottoman army was constituted by the siphai cavalry men and 
Janissary slave soldiers. Selim’s ‘new model’ standing and salaried army, or Nizam-I 
Cedid, was supposed to provide a more reliable and efficient form of defense which 
could re-establish the absolute power of the Sultan. This encompassed an autonomous 
treasury to fund the new army as well as the direct involvement of French military 
advisors. As funding for the new army implied the re-distribution of surpluses, it was 
rightly recognized as initiating the monopolization of violence and fiscal relations in 
the Ottoman Empire. Hence, the Nizam-I Cedid reforms threatened vested interests in 
Istanbul and the periphery alike. Due to this agenda to transform the traditional 
Ottoman structures of social power, resistance rose from notables and Janissaries who 
deposed Selim in 1807 and destroyed the new corps.  
                                                 
37
 Spirits that I've cited/My commands ignore 
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Mahmud II  
While Selim fell victim to his own ambitions, Mahmud II successfully carried out the 
destruction of the major contenders for power and physically destroyed the 
Janissaries in what could be called an Ottoman ‘night of the long knives’ in 1826. 
Equally, he started challenging the âyân from 1815 onwards, even though they could 
not be removed as easily as the Janissaries. As opposed to Selim’s focus on the 
military, Mahmud’s main target for reform was palace education, with the intention to 
change the patrimonial bureaucracy. Again, foreign relations played a major part in 
the transformation of the latter. In the 1790's Selim III had already installed 
permanent diplomatic missions in London, Vienna, Berlin, and Paris. These 
intensifying diplomatic relations are often understood as the prime channel of 
Westernization whereby “prolonged exposure to modern ideas and values” leads to an 
appreciation and understanding of these new values by the bureaucratic agents in 
question, thus initiating social change from above (Chambers 1964: 311).  
 
While this might be true to the extent that change was initiated from a 
bureaucratic class hovering ‘above’ society, this reading neglects the Sultan’s agency 
and his desire to restore central power rather than endorsing Western values. Mahmud 
was aware that “without checks on his power, that is without the Janissary corps, the 
ayans and through them the ulema, the sultan himself became an absolute ruler” 
(Karpat 1972a: 254). Thus, instead of understanding bureaucratic reform as an intent 
step towards realizing ‘Western values’, centralization decreased the potential for 
political contention and established a quasi-Absolutist regime. Comparable to the 
Absolutist restoration of the Kingly powers in France, centralizing social power 
initially served the purpose of restoring the Sultan’s exclusive control over his realm 
in conjuncture with building geopolitically more competitive military structures. 
Mahmud’s and Selim’s efforts are, therefore, best understood as a form of neo-
Absolutist restoration of Sultanic glory overcoming rivals for power in the periphery 
and the center alike.  
The impetus for modernization did not, therefore, emanate from a growing 
civil society seeking more efficient and market friendly forms of political 
administration. Rather, it was the barrier to effective state control they constituted that 
made modernization as a means of challenging their social positions an imperative for 
asserting central power.  
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The Tanzimat 
Instead of Mahmud’s and Selim’s incomplete reform efforts, many accounts of 
Ottoman modernization start with the Tanzimat (Price 1956: 70 - 81; Weiker 1968). 
This is accurate to the extent that the 1839 Gülhane Rescript did initiate the most 
radical reforms. Most importantly, this included the introduction of an Ottoman 
citizenship law in 1856 and the 1858 Arazi Kanunnamesi Land Code which 
established a form of private property rights commensurate with the Sharia.38 One 
fundamental difference between the earlier modernization attempts by Selim and 
Mahmud is the central agency of the now transforming bureaucracy during the 
Tanzimat period. While it had been Selim and Mahmud’s desire to replace the 
households with more loyal as well as better-educated elites, one unintended 
consequence of their reforms was that some of these elites had started shifting their 
loyalty to an abstract ideal of the state (Findley 2006: 80). Thus, while geopolitical 
circumstances forced the administration to react to the military weakness of the 
Empire, once trained in the art of statecraft, bureaucrats equally constituted a 
considerable force for further-reaching change. Thus politicized, the bureaucracy 
started assuming not only an ‘instrumental’, but also a ‘substantive’ kind of 
rationality. It propelled social transformation itself in opposition to the traditional 
social structures it had previously defended (Heper 1976: 511). 
 
The Young Ottomans 
One specific administrative organ developed into the heart and soul of the 
modernization movement, namely the Terciime Odasi or Translation Bureau. Foreign 
relations were increasingly conducted by Muslim, professional salaried officials from 
1833, since the Greek Dragoman interpreters who had traditionally staffed the 
Empire’s foreign service were suspected of sympathies with the Greek revolt. It was 
this translation bureau which constituted the social foundation of the ‘Young 
Ottoman’ and, combined with military and medical academies, the ‘Young Turk’ 
                                                 
38
 The Arazi Kanunnamesi Land Code maintained the legal prescripts of the Ottoman kanun, 
which de-jure ruled out private ownership of land, as, according to the Şeriat, all land belongs to 
God. Despite being conservative in its legal nature, the reform initiated a gradual de-facto 
liberalisation of old Ottoman land titles, including legalising the sale and inheritance of deeds. 
Moreover, deeds were for the first time centrally registered at the defterhane land registry. 
Notably, the reform’s aim to centralize the land regime, to promote peasant ownership of land and 
to strengthen the empire’s tax base was not achieved as many local notables and sheiks 
successfully used the new legal instruments for usurping much of the land. For a detailed 
description see Karpat (1968: 86-90). 
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movements.39 Thus, long before the Turkish state formation was successful, the 
personalized rule of the Sultan and the traditional patrimonial bureaucracy was 
undermined from within the Translation bureau.  
 
Ottomanism  
This new bureaucracy also launched the citizenship law of 1869. This project, 
referred to as Ottomanism, intended to install a universal form of popular sovereignty 
creating for the first time formally and legally equal rights independent of religious 
denomination as part of the Tanzimat reforms. While frequently described as merely 
a product of Western diplomatic lobbying and political pressure, this law was 
nevertheless implemented by an indigenous, yet Western educated bureaucracy. 
However, as the core emphasis in the so-called Hatt-i-Humayun was on a process of 
‘emulation’ and the “formal, mechanical and institutional aspects of transformation” 
(Mardin 1962: 5; Karpat 1972b), it soon faced opposition from disaffected Moslems. 
More precisely, it fuelled a schism between technocratic reformers and liberal Islamic 
intellectuals that had already occurred at the beginning of the Tanzimat period when 
some of the reformers fell out with the Tanzimat’s eminent leaders, Ali Pasha and 
Fuat Pasha. These ‘technocrats’ focussed on a ‘Realpolitik’ reaction to geopolitical 
necessities, the recovery of political and fiscal control, without at the same time 
implementing any form of popular representation. However, the reform process did 
not only generate a technocratic bureaucracy under Reşit Paşa and reformist army 
generals, but also led to the emergence of an Ottoman intelligentsia and ultimately 
enriched the Ottoman intellectual life in more unique ways than emulating Western 
concepts. In other words, the Ottoman reform movement cannot just be read as a 
constant process of more or less passive adaptation, but is also the result of “local 
Turkish developments which were only indirectly the product of Western influence” 
(Mardin 1962: 8).  
This local agency is, thus, recognizable first and foremost in the constitution 
of a more self-conscious Ottoman reform movement, the Young Ottomans. 
Dissatisfied with the superficial character of the Tanzimat for having remained 
essentially authoritarian in political style and strengthening mostly the Sultan’s 
control over taxable resources, the Young Ottomans were concerned with the 
introduction of further-reaching reforms like a truly representative government, the 
                                                 
39
 For a comprehensive account of the Young Ottomans see Mardin (1962); for the Young Turks, 
or the Committee for Union and Progress, see Zurcher (1984) 
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rule of law and modern citizenship. It was from within this group, which also refused 
to recognize any progressive character in the nationalist movements that demands for 
a further-reaching transformation within the Ottoman borders emerged. This demand 
for reform also applied to political identity. Hence, rather than passively imposing a 
Western legal concept, the Young Ottoman’s adaptation had in fact generated an 
interesting synthesis between European citizenship and the Ottoman Şeriat: 
Ottomanism.  
The citizenship law established for the first time formally and legally equal 
rights for all Ottoman subjects. The concept of Ottomanism was intended to sustain 
this new legal institution with the creation of a non-national, cosmopolitan Ottoman 
political identity. Significantly though, this reformed, universal political identity was 
not thought of in terms of an ethno-linguistically homogenous population. For the 
Young Ottomans, Ottomanism appeared to conform with the ideals of French 
Republican universalism, explicitly rejecting Turkism (Karpat 2000). This identity 
based on the name of a ruling dynasty simply denoted a territorial demarcation of 
political subjectivity, instead of an ethnic, religious or linguistic identification. It even 
led to a short-lived constitutional period from 1876 to 1878 and the first Ottoman 
parliament. However, while in principle true to universalism, it still needed to 
incorporate Islamic elements. In other words, it interpreted the Şeriat in terms of a 
liberal and quasi-democratic political philosophy. This attempt to reconcile “twentieth 
century liberalism with seventh-century Islam (...) no doubt involved some very 
unorthodox reinterpretation of Islamic concepts, but [had] been accepted (...) by 
nineteenth and twentieth century intellectuals throughout the world of Islam” 
(Zurcher 1984: 6). 
 
The Catastrophe of 1877/78 and the Hamidian Restoration  
Like many other Ottoman transformations, the end of the Young Ottoman’s reformist 
aspirations came in the form of military defeat during the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish 
war. The greatest impact on the ambitions of Ottomanism was the end of the Empire 
in the Balkans. Having suffered military defeat that led to significant territorial losses, 
not only to the rising Christian Balkan states, but also to Britain (Cyprus), Sultan 
Abdülhamid II abandoned constitutionalism and dissolved Parliament. Surrounded by 
expanding Christian states and anxious about European colonial aspirations, 
Abdülhamid II consolidated his absolutist restoration by engaging in a discourse of 
pan-Islamism in order to preserve the remainder of the now largely Muslim 
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population of the empire into a coherent state. Despite the fact that the Ottoman 
Empire was – yet again – saved from Russian designs by a decisive British 
intervention, it was the specific outcome of this geopolitical encounter that also led to 
the restoration of the Caliphate – if merely in rhetoric terms (cf. Karpat 2001: 136-
138).  
Thus strengthened, the Islamic identity inherent in Ottomanism was itself not 
necessarily conducive to political unity among Moslems due to the variety of 
sectarian understandings of Islam present within the Empire. While Christians were 
guaranteed minority rights, Moslems were expected to adopt one single Sunni 
mainstream interpretation. This constituted a shift insofar as local government as well 
as Islam were previously not subject to state control, whereas Ottomanism attempted 
to homogenize Islam through the same uniform Sunni reading guarded by the Turkish 
Republic to this day. Even though all of these developments dealt a striking blow to 
the spirit of the Young Ottomans, the newly assertive Sultan had tried to 
accommodate them by deploying them within the growing system of education. This 
led to a gradual infiltration of reformist ideology via schools and universities, notably 
the Galatasaray school now headed by one of the eminent Young Ottomans, Ali 
Suavi. While it is true that Abdülhamid engaged in a discourse of pan-Islamism 
aiming to reaffirm identification of an increasingly disaffected Muslim majority with 
the Ottoman state, it is nevertheless worth noting that his institutional reforms were 
further reaching than the Tanzimat, a fact sometimes obscured by his seemingly 
reactionary Islamic authoritarian style (Shaw 1976; Shaw and Shaw 1977).  
 
The Young Turks  
Irrespective of some historical and philosophical continuities, the next generation of 
reformers were quite disparate in character compared to the Young Ottomans. The 
transformation from Young Ottomans to Young Turks was, therefore, more than in 
name. The Young Turks remained, according to Karpat, still “dedicated Ottomanists” 
keen to preserve internal unity across the Middle East in an age of constant secessions 
(Karpat 2000: 25). Initially, their main concern was with organizing resistance against 
Hamidian neo-Absolutism. The first organized opposition group was established in 
the Military Medical College, when four students founded the İttihad-i Osmani 
Cemiyeti (Ottoman Unity Society). This transformed into the Salonici ‘domestic’ 
movement which was founded in 1906 as Osmanli Hürriyet Cemiyeti (Ottoman 
Freedom Society) while an exile movement, the Committee for Union and Progress, 
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formed in Geneva around the same time. Their forces combined in the famous 1908 
revolt which led to the re-constitution of parliament and the restoration of the 1867 
constitution.  
Like with the Young Ottomans, it is difficult to delimit the intellectual remit 
of the Young Turk movement as it went through various transformations. While 
generally more defensive in character, due to its social origins in an officer class, the 
term ‘union’ in its name referred to the unity of the (ethnic) elements, upholding the 
ideals of Ottomanism. As Kayali and others have pointed out, the conventional 
understanding of the CUP as an agent of Turkish nationalism in reaction to which 
Arab nationalism developed, is therefore based on a misperception, which 
underestimates the degree to which the CUP remained loyal to a belief in uniformity 
of all Ottoman subjects (Kayali 1997). That the CUP already engaged in a process of 
‘Turkification’ is, according to Kayali, a wide-spread historical myth targeted at the 
Ottoman government by its internal and external enemies which happened to be 
invigorated by mainstream Turkish and Middle Eastern historiography (Kayali 1997: 
82f). Even the eminent authority on the Young Turks, Erik J. Zürcher calls the CUP 
“ardent Ottoman nationalists” (Zurcher 1984: 22). Generally though a distinction can 
be made between the exiled Ottoman intellectuals who understood national unity to 
include different ethnicities and the officer corps, which had either not problematized 
the issue at all, or had planned to subordinate it under a wider state-building rationale, 
namely through the process of ‘Ottomanization’ (i.e. homogenisation of some sort) of 
minorities.  
 
The Slow Death of Ottomanism  
This objective gradually evolved into a different form of modernization from the 
Tanzimat’s initial plans for a Union of the peoples (ittihadi anasir), since the agents of 
modernisation themselves were, for the first time, of an ethno-linguistic and 
religiously more homogenous origin. More important still was their social 
background. They were no longer the bureaucrats and intellectuals of the Tanzimat 
and the Young Ottoman movement, but graduates from army schools, who should 
ultimately become the cradles of the Republic. The most profound impact on their 
actions was yet again through military defeat on the Balkans. Losing the 1912-13 
Balkan War had a deeply demoralizing effect on the Young Turks, not only because, 
like so many wars before that, it ended in defeat and loss of territory, but primarily 
because the defeat was inflicted on them at the hands of former Ottoman provinces. 
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Their victory was convincing evidence that a kind of nationalism similar to the ones 
on the Balkans held the only promise for salvation. Thus, the preservation of 
independence against the threat of potential colonization was given priority over the 
inclusion of non-Muslim elements within the modernized state. As a result, the 
Young Turk’s overarching goal was not the territorial preservation of the Empire 
anymore, but the military fortification of the Anatolian rump state. Even though this 
process of ‘Turkification’ had, irrespective of their name, not been the Young Turk’s 
original intention, they increasingly focussed on the Anatolian heartland and, thereby, 
paved the way for the more exclusive and restrictive project of Turkish nationalism.40  
 
Important insights can be gained from a historical sociology of the new 
administrative class at the Porte and its role in the social transformations. As the 
multiple and meaningful transformations within this class has shown though, this 
cannot amount, as Weberians argue, to a meaningful explanation in its own right for 
the social change that took place. Equally, the explanatory power of an intellectual 
penetration by enlightenment philosophy is usually overstated. I.E. Petroysan, for 
example, appears to be convinced that the origins of Westernization in the Ottoman 
Empire lie in the dissemination of Western philosophy, rather than Ottoman social 
relations (Petrosyan 1980). The internal and geopolitical power struggles that 
generated the expansion and transformation of these elites question how far European 
political philosophy can serve as a meaningful explanation for change, instead of 
being a symptom of it. As was argued, Ottoman institutional innovations were 
primarily triggered by the stark necessity of containing peripheral power which 
constituted at the same time a major obstacle to, as well as a great incentive for, 
political reforms. Thus, the origin of impersonal rational bureaucracy lies not so much 
in the ideational appeal of ‘modern’ European thought (Göçek 1987), but in the 
forced commencement of formal external relations the closure of the military frontier 
had implied and the subsequent evolution of social conflicts (Abou-El-Haj 1967; 
Abou-el-Haj 1969; Findley 1972). The European enlightened modernizers and their 
philosophies were, just like the reactionaries within Istanbul and the periphery, a 
product of, as Hamid Enayat put it, “European military, economic, and cultural 
encroachments since the end of the 18th century [since it was only then] that Muslim 
                                                 
40
 Among the most important intellectual origins of Turkish Nationalism are the political 
pamphlets by Ziya Gökalp (1959), see also Parla (Parla 1985). 
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elites started to write separate works on specifically political topics" (Enayad 2005: 
3).  
 
Thus, initially, in a comparable way to Neo-Absolutism in Europe, 
modernisation in the Ottoman context is best understood as a means of restoring 
Sultanic power. While the means with which the restoration of Sultanic power was 
carried out are borrowed from administrative, technological and military advances of 
Europe, this was not founded upon an ideological conviction, but rather caused by the 
needs of dynastic restoration. However, this dynasty retained its distinctly pre-modern 
character (i.e. personal political relations of the Ottoman polity) until the middle of 
the 19th century. Only once this bureaucratic class developed a sense of Realpolitik, 
did it transform into a proactive agent of change advancing the de-personalization of 
social relations and ultimately the separation of political from economic relations.  
It is not suggested here, however, that the Tanzimat can be read as a clean 
watershed between pre-modern and modern rule. The gradual evolution of an 
understanding of Realpolitik within parts of the Ottoman administration does not 
imply that a Primat der Aussenpolitik had been established as a new universal 
Ottoman foreign policy overnight. Raison d’état thinking only gradually effected 
actual state policies. Personal interests of the members of the court, the bureaucracy 
and other forms of vested interests continued to prevent the operation of ‘pure 
reason’. Since ‘external’ relations continued to be dominated by a plurality of social 
forces, “the decision-making process in ‘foreign policy’ appears to be very diffuse” 
(Faroqhi 2004: 7). Hence, the most significant drive for reform was the 
unprecedented loss of revenue and political control over the provinces, which was 
both effect and cause of the Ottoman’s geopolitical predicament. In other words, 
reform was not merely the means of choice for meeting a new challenge, but has to be 
understood as growing out of an attempt to restore the social power and property of 
the Sultanate.  
 
 
3.7 From ‘Periphery’ to ‘Nation’?  
While it is not very contentious to argue that bureaucratic reform did not equal social 
change, it is the converse argument about the various secessions representing a 
necessary break with this tradition, that this study takes issue with. On the other hand, 
this raises the question as to what degree we can actually ascribe explanatory power 
 120
to the whole process of modernisation for the eventual creation of national states, as 
opposed to simply modern and centralized states. Wehler’s concept of defensive 
modernisation could conceptualize the process of Ottoman centralization very well. 
However, it cannot account for the transformation as a whole since it equally fails to 
account for the emergence of successor states and secessionist movements and 
especially for their national character. Filling this gap, the following section will 
analyse the link between the rise of local notables and nationalist movements.  
 
As one authority on the rise of local notables observes, the Sultan’s and the 
bureaucracy’s centralization agenda was, “obviously, (…) well designed to offend 
every vested interest in the realm, and the results were predictable” (Sadat 1972: 
359). Initially at least, the Porte’s attempt, thus, triggered a consolidation of 
provincial power.  
“The results were to encourage the feudality to greater excesses. The âyân, 
although never formally organized, began to act as a corporate entity, 
taking collective action against any attempt of the government to violate 
the status quo. The Janissaries of Rumeli openly revolted and defeated a 
regiment of the new troops sent against them; and both âyân and Janissary 
Agas hired gangs of brigands and mercenary soldiers to terrorize and 
dominate the countryside” (Sadat 1972: 360).  
 
It is indeed interesting to note that the establishment of an independent Greek 
state marked the first successful nationalist project - only three years after the 
Sultanate had started to seriously challenge local notables who “owed most of their 
wealth and influence to the fiscal and administrative anarchy that reigned in the 
Ottoman Empire” (Kasaba 1988: 85). Thus, nationalist projects seem to have 
emerged only in response to the attempt to bring this power struggle to an end, i.e. to 
endanger the social power-base as well as substantial sources of income. İnalcık 
points towards this coincidence more explicitly: “In 1812, nevertheless, immediately 
after the conclusion of the peace treaty with Russia, Mahmud began to suppress the 
principal âyân in the provinces” (İnalcık 1964: 53-54).  
In and of itself this does not amount to evidence about an intrinsic link between 
nationalist movements and seigneurial coalitions of landlords trying to escape the re-
enforced Ottoman tax-collector. Firstly, coincidences do not necessarily establish 
causal links. Secondly, the vast lands of the Ottoman Empire are much too diverse to 
advance such an all-encompassing claim in the first place. A more crucial observation 
is to be made about the ensuing conflict between a centralizing Ottoman state and 
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peripheral power holders. This center-periphery struggle created social contradictions 
ultimately preparing the ground for secessionist struggles. Arguably, their nationalist 
character was due to instrumental, rather than genuine ‘ethnic’ or ‘racial’ reasons. As 
Sadat observes for the Serb case, rather than the seigniorial regime itself acting as an 
agent of nationalism, “it was this seigniorial reaction which led to the rearming of the 
Serbs and of the Greek armatoloi, and it was this reaction which provoked the Serbs 
into revolution” (Sadat 1972: 360).41 Thus, for Sadat, instead of the âyân themselves 
providing the irredentist power-base, their reaction to the centralisation efforts by the 
Porte produced contradictions in the social fabric that lead to new struggles as a result 
of which novel political ideologies took hold. The only possible generic conclusion in 
a realm as diverse as the Ottoman lands is that the power-struggles emerging from a 
combination of geopolitical challenges and social contradictions is ultimately the 
conditio sine qua non for any attempt to explain national secessions in the Balkans 
and the Middle East.  
 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that historical materialist explanations of Ottoman Decline 
have rightly emphasized the importance of 1683 and the end of territorial expansion 
as a crucial turning point in Ottoman history. However, they have failed to give 
adequate attention to the social dialectic this stalling of conquest has generated. 
Socio-economically, the end of expansion led to the breakdown of the traditional 
Ottoman land regime, initiating a process of ‘feudalization’ and the emergence of a 
landed aristocracy. In contrast, the end of expansion formalized Ottoman social 
relations with European states, gradually transforming the Ottoman bureaucratic 
structures in Istanbul, fuelling a competitive dynamic between two institutionalized 
‘cultures’ within the Ottoman Empire. The first “may be called the culture of the 
Palace, the second that of the provinces” (Mardin 1969: 270). The intensified 
competition between these two social forces developed into what Şerif Mardin and 
Metin Heper have recognized as a continuous center-periphery conflict which is ‘Key 
to Turkish Politics’ (Mardin 1969; Mardin 1973b; Heper 1980).  
While the external challenges of geopolitical competition and the development 
of world markets created a situation which led to the rise of these internal challenges, 
it was only the resulting social dynamic itself that led to the crucial social 
                                                 
41
 The argument is more explicitly made by Leopold von Ranke about the Serbian revolt (1848).  
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transformations preceding the national secessions. Thus, this dynamic did not develop 
or mature during the 19th century, but had been growing previously. This does not 
mean, however, that local notables can be identified as agents of nationalism per se, as 
might have been the case elsewhere.42 However, even if local notables themselves did 
not become champions of National revolt (and sometimes they did as the example of 
Ali Pasha of Janina shows), the social conflict between a modernizing Ottoman central 
state and various centres of autonomy is nevertheless crucial for comprehending the 
subsequent ‘nationalist’ struggles. 
A deterministic, linear narrative of Imperial Decline obscures these important 
developments triggered by specific agents and relegates them to inevitable events all 
attributable to the same all-encompassing modernizing pressure. Such an approach is 
always substantiated either by a primordial understanding of nationalities, or fails to 
provide a specific explanation for the process of nation-formation beyond the fact 
that it took place. Inside/Outside distinctions instead of being understood as 
historically evolving, instable and mutating, socially, discursively as well as 
politically constructed categories, assume a pre-political, primordial quality. Not only 
space but also time is ‘nationalised’ in this manner. A pre-emptive comparative 
approach is adopted that builds on pre-conceived notions of ethno-linguistic 
difference which prevent us from comprehending the tumultuous, non-linear and 
incomplete historical trajectory of the Ottoman lands into geo-political modernity. It 
has been shown that the developments leading to Ottoman disintegration cannot be 
conceptualized as a unilinear narrative of decline, naturally culminating in the 
formation of Nation-states. Rather, they are best understood as a unique process of 
social transformation that is not solely explicable in terms of a large-scale trajectory 
towards ‘modernity’. 
 
The following chapter will attempt to overcome these shortcomings by 
providing a historical reconstruction of this transformation that locates the Greek 
secession within the dialectic struggle between a centralizing state in Istanbul and the 
semi-feudal regimes in the Ottoman periphery. This will explain how the breakdown 
of the traditional social fabric of the Ottoman Empire led to the secession of the 
Modern Greek state. As a result, it will be shown that national secession did not 
                                                 
42
 The anti-Habsburg Hungarian National movement of 1848 is a telling example. However, this 
does not allow for an argument, amongst others made by Sandra Halperin, for the uniformly noble 
origin of Nationalist struggles (Halperin 1997: Chapter 3). While it is true that Nationalism is not 
inherently incompatible with the interests of the Ancient Regime, it is equally problematic to 
locate the Ancient Regime as the unique social origin of Nationalism.  
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indicate a decisive break between pre-modern and modern sovereignty in 
southeastern Europe.  
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4 Liberation from the Yoke or Preservation of the Old Regime?  
The Greek ‘Revolution from Outside’ 
 
'Between slavery and slavery there is no difference. To make a revolution and 
overthrow the yoke, you did nothing. That is what '21 did. To not fall back under the 
yoke - that is revolution.' 
        Skarimbas (1995) 
 
“I may be Greek now, but I was practically a Turk then, and I’m not ashamed of it 
either, and I’m not the only one, and this country’s full of people like me!”  
 
Louis de Berniéres (2004) 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Previously, we have identified the problem of naturalizing national secession as if it 
represented a ‘normalisation’ rather than disruption of sovereignty, and, by extension, 
international relations. However, a large body of literature within International 
Relations and historical sociology is indeed dedicated to the problem of disruptions, 
or ‘anomalies’. These are, however, conventionally identified as social revolutions.43 
As with nationalism, there exists a considerable body of literature on this topic within 
wider social theory (if not necessarily within IR). However, the same cannot be said 
about what is conventionally understood as a sub-type of revolution: national 
secessionist struggles.44 These are usually theorized either within a ‘revolution’ or 
‘nationalism’ paradigm, simply denoting the territorial outcome of a social 
transformation which has its origins elsewhere. This appears to be the explanation 
most commonly applied to the Greek case as well, whereby a ‘national’ revolt 
brought about social change by disposing of the Ottoman overlord. Within this 
paradigm, Turkish/Muslim equals exploitative landowning class and Greek/Orthodox 
Christian equals exploited direct producers. As will be shown in the following, these 
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 To name but a few: Halliday (1999b), Panah (2002), Skocpol (1979) ,Trimberger (1978), Walt 
(1996)  
44
 As Linda Bishai reminds us “secession is one of the richest veins yet to be minded in 
International Relations” (Bishai 2006: 2). Apart from her own work there are indeed only a few 
dedicated reflections on secession within IR, see also Barktus (1999). Barktus uses a rational 
choice model, where unified rational actors conduct a cost/benefit analysis. As will be shown 
below, this framework is hardly applicable to the complex and highly differentiated social fabric of 
the Greek secession. See also Meadwell (1999). Meadwell deals with this problematique only from 
a post-1945 perspective, where the right to national self-determination had entered the discourse 
within the post-colonial ‘international society’. This was not the case for the period covered by this 
chapter, i.e. the early 19th century. 
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distinctions are not as clear cut as the prevailing understanding of the Greek secession 
makes us believe. There is a continuing debate whether “the Greek liberation 
movement in the 1820’s [was] strictly a War of Independence from Ottoman rule or 
was it also a social revolution” (McGrew 1976: 111). In other words, do we have to 
make a distinction between an independence struggle and a ‘Revolution’? The logic, 
or as Viva Ona Bartkus put it, the ‘Dynamic of Secession’ (Bartkus 1999) does not 
necessarily lead to or is coincidental with a wider social dynamic towards change that 
equals a revolution. Hence, do we, as William W. McGrew seems to suggest, have to 
enlarge our theoretical toolkit in order to accommodate the kind of social change that 
involves territorial change? An answer to this question remains pertinent, for despite 
the broad reception of critical theories of nationalism, 19th century nationalist 
secessions are nevertheless understood in most IR literature as a step towards 
universalizing ‘modern’ sovereignty emanating from the British/French ‘Dual 
Revolution’ (Hobsbawm 1962). In consequence, the principle of national self-
determination, prominent with Liberal (Woodrow Wilson) and Marxist (Stalin 1912; 
Lenin 1972) political theory alike, was universalised. The implication is always that 
national secessions equal revolutions, themselves epitomizing social change. This 
equally applies to the kind of change that is genuinely popular, or ‘from below’, as 
well as to the social change ‘from above’ imposed by bureaucratic professional 
cadres. Either reading of this history emphasizes the transforming capacity of the new 
Western European socio-political order. Social change, thus, comes about due to the 
ideological and economic appeal of the Enlightenment, modernity and/or capitalism 
and the French Revolution. In the conservative reading of this history, any secession 
is an epiphenomenon of wider social changes, which means that the Greek secession 
came about as a result of - a usually unexplained - “concentric diffusion” (Canefe 
2004: 110) of a totality of a new social order that necessarily involved a 
nationalization of territory by means of secession from the Ottoman Empire. In other 
words, secession was triggered by ‘revolutionary’ agents, who were “…influenced by 
the European Enlightenment”. Hence, “the Greek revolutionaries endeavoured from 
the outset to create a modern state embodying the liberal ideas of the West” 
(Michalidis 2006: 155).  
Relating this to the social history of the Balkans invokes some questions as to 
how this universalization of Western and liberal forms of social organization should 
have taken place at the beginning of the 19th century. Firstly, there is a mismatch 
between the Christian identity of the revolutionaries and the strong social power of 
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the prevalent Orthodox religion and culture in the region, which did not only 
peacefully co-exist, but constituted a central institution of Ottoman rule. Secondly, 
there are the various attempts by the same European Powers from where these new 
kinds of social order supposedly originated, to preserve the Ottoman Empire, which 
was grounded in both the post-Napoleonic spirit of ‘restoration’ as well as the 
conscious maintenance of the Pax Ottomanica.45 It still remains unclear exactly where 
“the spark that ignited the war of independence and the subsequent establishment of a 
nation-state endowed with institutions owing their origin to the French Revolution” 
(Koliopoulos and Veremis 2002: 3) had come from and how it could possibly be so 
successful under these circumstances. 
Given the variety of unanswered questions surrounding the Greek Question, 
this chapter will challenge widely accepted assumptions about the national 
naturalization of political space through secession from the Ottoman Empire. It will 
firstly aim at providing a counter-narrative to the above mentioned history of 
naturalizing the national as the modern form of rule. In doing so, the central concern 
of this chapter does not lie with denying the role of Western European influence and 
the connection to wider geopolitical transformations, as such, but much more with 
shifting the attention away from a narrative of an automatism of universalization 
towards the complex, but also backward and conservative nature of the Greek 
secession in particular. It will be shown that Greek society, prior to the late 18th 
century, did not develop in opposition to Ottoman rule, but as a central part of it. 
Nationalism penetrated the social fabric from far afield, but not in the form of a direct 
implementation of Western European ideals. The crucial part of the explanation lies 
within the relations of the local social structures and a modernizing Ottoman center. 
This hypothesis is supported by the fact that, at least in its initial phases, vested 
interests were preserved, rather than successfully challenged by the Greek secession. I 
will secondly argue that, at least in this case, a conceptual distinction between social 
revolution and secession is not only merited, but imperative on the grounds that even 
though social revolutions sometimes do express themselves in territorial re-
configuration(s) of political space, this does not constitute a necessary and causal 
relation. Nor, in fact, can this be applied in the reverse. In other words, secessions, or 
the overthrow of a sometimes distant central/imperial government, do not per se 
indicate meaningful social change, as long as local social structures remain in place or 
at least unchallenged.  
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 For a detailed discussion see chapter 5  
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In the following section, this argument will be developed towards the 
backdrop of the struggle for Greek national secession from 1821-1833. In doing so, 
this chapter will first look at the most established perception of Greek nationalism 
from the perspective of what is called here the Hellenic ‘liberation paradigm’. The 
majority of conservative nationalist historiography of Greece (Petropulos 1968; 
Clogg 1973; Woodhouse 1977; Clogg 1979, 1992; Koliopoulos and Veremis 2002) 
presents the Greek uprising as a form of ‘liberation’ from the ‘Ottoman yoke’ whose 
“advocates of dynamic action to overthrow Ottoman rule in the Greek lands were 
much influenced by the revolutionary doctrines of the French Revolution” (Clogg 
1979: 43). The established Greek historiography appears to rely on the idea of a 
bourgeois revolution, or at least allocates a central role in the Greek nationalist 
project to the merchant bourgeoisie. This argument is congruent with the absence of 
an educated critical mass amongst the largest part of the population, the direct 
producers (Mouzelis 1978: 12), who were traditionally interested in the strong control 
of landowners Ottoman governance had offered (Clogg 1976: Chapter 2). The 
importance of a masonic movement called the Filiki Eteria (Friendly Society)46 
developing from within the diaspora merchant community based on the Russian 
Black Sea shores for the formulation and emanation of nationalist thought in the early 
19th century is indeed difficult to deny. However, as will be shown, their efforts were 
relatively isolated from the ‘mainland’ Greek elites and where they did apply 
themselves directly, in the Principalities of Walachia (today’s Romania and Bulgaria), 
the revolt was unsuccessful. However, once the revolt was set in motion on the 
Peloponnesus, a commonality of interest was discovered given an already present 
maturing social conflict between the vested interests of conservative Greek Orthodox 
families with the accelerated modernizing efforts by the Porte. In this context, critical 
Greek historians argue that there is a need “to dispel an erroneous idea, often held by 
nationalist writers of the 19th and 20th centuries: Ottoman occupation. A presence 
which lasted for five centuries and which imposed a new political, administrative and 
social order cannot be reduced to a temporary military situation of different peoples 
in conflict with each other” (Castellan 1992: 209).47 Building on these findings, this 
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 The spelling varies within the English language literature: Philiki Ektairia, Filiki Etaria or 
Philiki Hektaria to name but a few. 
47
 For other critical approaches see Gourgouris (1996), Ktiromilides (1993, 1994b; Kitromilides 
1989), Kostis (2005), Koundoura (2007); Misha Glenny’s comprehensive study on the whole of 
the Balkans and Caroline Finkel’s recent re-interpretation of Ottoman history include similarly 
critical arguments (Glenny 2000; Finkel 2005). Maria Todorova’s critical perspective covers the 
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chapter will argue that even though there was a discernible penetration of Western 
European nationalist ideology through the Diaspora merchant class organized within 
the Filiki Eteria, the deeper cause of the Greek secession lies within the social 
struggles between the centre and the periphery. Including this dimension into the 
analysis is important, for, while it removed the Muslim population, landlords and 
peasants alike, the secession left the established Christian local social hierarchy 
largely intact.48 This is not to say, however, that social struggles beyond the inter-elite 
conflict played no role. The military class constituted by landless peasants is of 
particular relevance in this context. However, their actions were not inspired by a 
liberal ‘intellectual’ or ‘bourgeois’ call for revolution, but resembled much more a 
peasant uprising. These so-called brigands’ intentions mainly originated from the 
increasing efforts of pooling social power both by local primates on the one hand and 
the Ottoman central state on the other. Having grown within the mountainous 
prebendal economy of the pre-capitalist Ottoman agricultural society, the penetration 
of their traditionally conflicting sources of revenue – policing and banditry – by a 
competing modernizing central state produced a growing number of unemployed and 
discontented arms bearing men for whom revolt, even though not necessarily a 
nationalist one, appeared as an appealing opportunity for improving their social 
situation. Finally, these conclusions will be related back to the overall question of 
national secessions and revolutions within International Relations. This chapter will 
close by emphasizing the social, geographical and cultural specificity and complexity 
of these transformations which serve as an illustration for the limitations and 
sometimes even dangers of both nationalist and teleological narratives and 
substantiate the need to extract ontologies like ‘social’ and ‘the international’ 
carefully from historically specific contexts.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
whole of the Balkan Peninsula (Todorova 2005; Todorova 1994; Todorova 1997). While her 
postmodernist critique is useful in breaking up the mainstream nationalist discourse, she does not 
offer a meaningful explanation for events of her own; for a critical comparative Turkish/Greek 
history of nationalism in the region see Özkirimli and Sofos (2008) 
48
 Vassilis Filias for example argues that whilst the outbreak of revolt was owed to the success of a 
bourgeois movement, the Orthodox old regime held considerably more social power and was 
therefore able to swiftly appropriate the revolt and direct it in favour of its own purposes (Filias 
1972).  
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4.2 Markets and Merchants: The Enlightenment Story of Greek ‘Liberation’ 
4.2.1 The Hellenic Lineage 
In many ways it is evident how the above understanding came to dominate the 
historiography of the Greek Independence struggle. I call this narrative here the 
‘Hellenic liberation paradigm’. This paradigm not only, controversially, assumes “the 
historical continuity of Hellenism from classical times through to the formation of the 
modern Greek state,” (Kitroeff 1989: 269) but also understands the Ottoman presence 
as an exploitative and unjust form of rule, which was finally ended as part of a 
teleological notion of development thriving to ‘liberate’ a historically coherent 
society in the years from 1821 to 1832. This nationalist historiography of Hellenic 
lineage and ‘Greek awakening’ continues to dominate the discourse due to its state 
founding and supporting purpose. The less influential debates about the social 
construction of Greek nationality, however, developed long before the already 
discussed nationalism debates in the 1980s emerged. For good reason, they developed 
in conjunction with the very emergence of the Greek Question in the 1820s. Central 
to this initial debate was the challenge to the Hellenic linearity argument by the 
Tyrolean Jakob Phillip Fallmerayer. Having witnessed the popular currents of 
Philhellenism in Bavaria49, he set out to investigate the history of the ‘Hellenes’ in his 
‘Geschichte der Halbinsel Morea während des Mittelalters’ (The history of the 
Morea peninsula during the Middle Ages) (Fallmerayer 1830: vii ) starting from an 
impartial, if not outright pro-Greek position. His conclusions, however, were far from 
unclear or uncontroversial: 
“The race of the Hellenes has been wiped out in Europe. Physical beauty, 
intellectual brilliance, innate harmony and simplicity, art, competition, city, 
village, the splendour of column and temple — indeed, even the name has 
disappeared from the surface of the Greek continent.... Not the slightest drop 
of undiluted Hellenic blood flows in the veins of the Christian population of 
present-day Greece” (Fallmerayer 1830: 55). 
Even though his motivation remains speculative and he might have had a slavophobic 
background, Fallmerayer, in principle, made an important point about the 
impossibility of the transhistorical preservation of the Greek ‘nation’ from Classical 
Greece into the early 19th century. He contended that the Hellenes had left the Morea 
in the Middle Ages which was then later inhabited by Slavic (and ultimately Turkish) 
tribes with no Hellenic heritage. What seems to be forgotten easily by advocates of 
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 Bavaria was by no means the only country within which Philhellenism was popular. Most 
notably France and, naturally, Russia were the other centres of Philhellenic movements.  
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the historical continuity argument is that the first Hellenic constitutional monarchy, 
headed by a European dynast born in 1830, not only defied its oligarchic Athenian 
heritage institutionally, but also that a unified Greek state was, on the condition the 
Byzantine Empire is considered more of Roman than of Greek origin (which it 
usually is by Greek nationalists), without historical precedence altogether.  
Fallmerayer, an eminent historian at the time, teaching at intuitions in 
Augsburg and Landshut triggered uproar by Bavarian and other Philhellenes, but his 
assumptions about the essentially Slavic origin of what became known as the ‘Greek’ 
population could be instrumentalized as a powerful argument in favour of an anti-
Russian and pro-Ottoman foreign policy, endorsed first and foremost by Britain.50 
This earned Fallmerayer the reputation of being one of the first advocates of 
Realpolitik in relation to the Eastern Question (Veloudis 1982: 39-42). Yet, what was 
at stake with Philhellenism – most famously reflected in the Greek travel literature of 
Lord Byron51 – were not only questions about Greek historiography, but also 
questions about Europe. Much of the European Enlightenment understood Greece to 
constitute “the missing link for the rejuvenation of European civilization” (Kasaba 
2003: 11). Naturally, within the Greek “War of Liberation” fought against an 
‘Oriental’ regime, an Asiatic Despot provided a real-life geopolitical manifestation 
for projecting Europe’s progress onto the ‘Turkish’ mirror image (Yapp 1992). As is 
explained elsewhere, this European identity formation on the bandwagon of the Greek 
Revolt was soon to clash with the illiberal realities on the ground.52  
 
 
4.2.2 The Neohellenic Enlightenment  
Despite the fact that arguments insisting on a historical continuity from Classical 
Greece to the 19th century remain, at best, doubtful, there was doubtlessly a sui 
generis intellectual movement that can justly be labelled the ‘Greek Enlightenment’. 
However, the protagonists of the Greek Enlightenment had their social origins in an 
exile Greek community, the so-called heterochthons, who had gained their 
‘Enlightened’ views mainly through French education. In the liberation paradigm it is 
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 Interestingly, this policy was also supported by Karl Marx in a 1854 Article (Marx 1854) 
51
 Official British policy initially opposed Greek Independence for geostrategic reasons, but there 
existed noticeable support for the Greek struggle within the educated elites, most crucially within 
the City’s circles of high finance; see Finlay (1877); see also chapter 5 
52
 See chapter 6 
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this proto-bourgeois class which had “acted as the catalyst which started the whole 
revolutionary process and gave it direction” (Mouzelis 1978: 12-13). 
This potentially revolutionary bourgeoisie in the form of a Greek diaspora 
was spread across Europe, but from 1774 large communities developed around the 
Black Sea shores. According to most mainstream historiography, the importance of 
this Christian Orthodox merchant community grew simultaneously with Ottoman 
decline (Stoianovich 1960). On the one hand, Catherine the Great enticed a variety of 
minority groups, amongst them Christian subjects from the Ottoman Empire, to settle 
in what was labelled the ‘New Russia’ after the Russian conquest of the territories 
around the Black Sea from the Ottomans in 1774.53 According to Catherine’s 
rationale, these new Russian possessions required economic and demographic 
revitalization in order to generate fiscal revenue from these largely unpopulated 
regions. There was also a defense rationale to this project, however, as populating the 
empty steppe was thought to deter a potential Ottoman territorial reappraisal 
(Kardasēs 2001: 11). In the pursuit of this scheme the proverbial ‘Potemkian 
Villages’ have their origin, as Catherine’s minister Grigori Alexandrovich Potyomkin 
ordered the erection of fake settlements in order to please Catherine when she 
inspected the progress of settlement activity in the Crimea in 1787. This is not to say, 
though, that this policy was unsuccessful altogether. While the settlement of Germans 
and Slavs was aimed at providing a productive force to cultivate the empty land, the 
Jewish and Armenian settlers were supposed to grow trade networks capable of 
realizing profits from the new produce, with the most noteworthy communities being 
established in Odessa and Sevastopol. This was necessary in the light of the 
remarkable absence of a native merchant class. “…The aim was to grant privileges to 
engage in trading activities to settlers with a strong tradition in business enterprise” 
(Kardasēs 2001: 13). Indeed, the Christian Orthodox community who lived in the 
European parts of the Ottoman Empire appeared to fit this bill just fine and followed 
the Russian invitation. However, this project faced significant geopolitical 
impediments given the topography of the region leading to the maritime isolation of 
the Black Sea trading routes. Consequently, Catherine’s plans were commercially less 
successful than originally envisaged, leading to a surplus merchant population who 
were often unemployed and discontent.  
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 See chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of how the Küçük Kaynarca treaty establishing the 
Russian dominance in the Black Sea.  
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At the same time, Ottoman modernization had brought with it a diplomatic 
revolution at the Porte. While the Sultan previously shunned foreign dignitaries in 
much the same way as the Chinese Emperor, the closure of borders had initiated an 
increased international role of the Ottoman Empire, which simultaneously augmented 
the importance of Phanariot ‘Greeks’54 who remained in the Ottoman Empire as 
Dragomans (or translators) of the Porte. According to Jonathan Irvine Israel, this new 
class of translators started to satisfy the need for trans-national Christian 
intermediaries who had been unnecessary during the time of continued Ottoman 
expansion and purely hostile relations (Israel 2006: 318-19). Once territorial 
stagnation commenced in the 17th century, external relations went from a state of 
continuous competition and violence to a state of consolidation, which, as was shown, 
initiated a process of strengthening the Ottoman administration’s competence in 
foreign relations, led by Christian Orthodox subjects of the Sultan. Thus, while the 
pre-1821 ‘Greek’ merchants in Russia experienced challenging times, the ‘Greek’ 
bureaucrats of Istanbul prospered.  
It was at this historical juncture that the Greek Enlightenment emerged as an 
intellectual movement, which is not to be confused with an identifiable potential for 
local social change. Consequently, at the beginning of the 18th century, the central 
figures of the Greek Enlightenment were still part of the Sultan’s administration. 
Alexander Mavrocordatos (1636 – 1709) could be called the first eminent figure of 
the Greek Enlightenment. He was the first Dragoman of the Porte and passed this 
office on to his son, Nikolas (1670 -1730). As Nikolas went on to be appointed to the 
office of hospodar of Wallachia and Moldavia, the two Principalities under Ottoman 
suzerainty which would later become the cause of much contention between Russia 
and the Ottoman Empire, he in fact founded what could be called the Mavrocordatos 
dynasty in today’s Romania and Bulgaria. The eventually more influential part of this 
movement was in the service of the Tsar, however. Rigas Velestinlis (1757–1798) 
and Adamantios Koraes (1748–1833)55 could be identified as the central figures of 
this intellectual movement. Interestingly, Vesentinli’s ‘Republic of Virtue’ did not 
advocate a separate national state, but foresaw a multi ethnic, multicultural state with 
a ‘Hellenic’ Republican constitution. This state is, thus, premised on the insight of the 
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 Phanariots were Greek noble officials named after the Phanar district of Istanbul. They had been 
entrusted with large parts of the Ottoman administration, namely all foreign relations, translations 
and the administration of the Principalities of Walachia and Moldavia as so-called hospodar 
Princes 
55
 Rigas Velestinlis is also known as Rigas Feraios. For a collection of pamphlets and essays by 
Velestinlis and Korais, see Clogg (1976); for a discussion of Korais see Chaconas (1942). 
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supposed archaic nature of Ottoman rule, but as opposed to popular wisdom, does not 
draw from this the necessity of national dismemberment, but merely a replacement of 
the ‘Oriental’ central authority with a ‘Hellenized’, libertarian version of it. Due to 
the ambiguity of Rigas’s thought, expressed in his emphasis on ‘Greek’ rule by which 
he meant a cosmopolitan democracy in the Ottoman Empire more than ethnically 
exclusive territorial rule, he is considered to represent the already discussed 
problematic “transition from Enlightenment cosmopolitanism, of which his ideas 
constitute a distinct expression, to the age of nationalism in the Balkans” 
(Kitromilides 2003: 437). As opposed to territorially and ethnically exclusive 
nationalism, the ‘Republic of Virtue’ constituted a truly revolutionary manifest which 
did not understand secession as an integral part of social change. Instead, Rigas 
proposed to transform all Ottoman subjects into modern citizens, creating a 
multicultural civil society under a ‘Hellenic’ constitution that was to replace the 
Sultan’s rule. Rigas, thus, refused to see the ethnic and linguistic diversity so 
frequently cited as the essential reason behind Ottoman weakness and decline as a 
problem or even guide for further development, not least “since neither Montesquieu 
nor Rousseau excluded the possibility of an extensive republic” (Kitromilides 2003: 
470). The appropriation of Rigas as an advocate of cultural nationalism by the 
‘liberation paradigm’, in the sense of a philosophy of ethnically exclusive 
territoriality, is therefore difficult to reconcile with his proposed ‘Republican 
Hellenism’ (Kitromilides 2003: 474). Rigas’s understanding of ‘Hellenic’ was in 
purely normative terms, explicitly denying any ethnic implications. The Greek 
nationalist reading of his thinking as a theory of ethnic exclusion and, later, with the 
Megali Idea of territorial expansionism, can only be seen as a remarkable, if not 
outright dangerous misrepresentation. While this was already problematic and 
inflammatory, it set in motion a process at the end of which “the European territory of 
the disintegrating Ottoman Empire became a field of bloody jostling between 
militaristic states that excluded each other – while they all oppressed national 
minorities – with the bisectional mediation of European imperialisms” (Koutalis 
2003). Interestingly the first modernist political thinkers within the Ottoman 
administration itself, who were of similar social origin as the representatives of the 
Greek Enlightenment, faced a similar fate when the Young Turk movement in its 
final pre-Republican stage, ethnically constrained the much more inclusive and 
cosmopolitan political project of Young Ottomanism. It is worth mentioning at this 
point, however, that the policy of ‘Turkification’ developed not least in opposition to 
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this emerging ethnically exclusive Greek irredentism (cf. Özkirimli and Sofos 2008). 
These mutually exclusive as well as constitutive forms of territorial sovereignty can 
be seen as the long-term result of the emergence of Greek cultural nationalism. In this 
they stood in opposition to the original vision of the Neo-Hellenic Enlightenment they 
were supposedly derived from. In other words, Rigas’s original conception of 
Hellenization explicitly denied the understanding of Greece as the “distinct 
geographical, political and cultural space” (Peckham 2001: 21) it was to become soon 
after.  
Koraes, on the other hand, was not of a similar intellectual calibre. He 
epitomized, as Dean Kostantaras put it, the “diaspora awakener” (Kostantaras 2008: 
702). Having studied in Paris and Montpellier and being deeply influenced by the 
French Revolution and the American Independence struggle, these figures were, 
according to Kostantaras, not only passive consumers of nationalist thought, but 
active participants in the wider intellectual transformation going on in Europe at the 
time. This is why also Anthony Smith sees Koraes’s contribution to nationalist 
thought as on a par with Rousseau, Fichte, Herder and Mazzini (Hutchinson and 
Smith 1994: 4). However, it is important to note that the literature produced by these 
pioneers of Greek nationalism had little impact on the Ottoman lands that were to 
become Greece. On the other hand, they were warmly received by other self-declared 
‘Greeks’ in Russian service, most importantly the Russian foreign minister and later 
first President of Greece, Count Ionnais Capodistrias (1776–1831), and the leader of 
the uprising in the Principalities, Alexander Ypsilantis (1792–1828). These two 
personalities from within the Tsarist administration were to establish the 
organizational and military core of the uprising respectively.  
In sum, this vision of a ‘Neohellenic Enlightenment’ had “linked the task of 
recovering Hellenic antiquity with the dissemination of European intellectual, 
scientific and technological developments, ideals and values” (Özkirimli and Sofos 
2008: 23). It is noteworthy that the ideological motivation was mainly held on the 
part of the Greek diaspora nobility and echoed in some of the Enlightened Absolutist 
European dynasties, who supported the Greek cause in straight contradiction to their 
commitments to the conservative values of the Vienna international order. However, 
as the eventual nature of the Greek state up until the early 20th century illustrates, this 
vision was not shared by any indigenous elements within the territories known to 
have been part of Ancient Greece. As many local nobles (so-called primates) as well 
as the Orthodox clergy held rather advantageous social positions and were unwilling 
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to relinquish these, the chances of success for this ‘revolution from outside’ appeared 
to be meagre.  
Maria Koundoura describes the origins of these romanticised ideas about 
Greek independence in Russian exile as a somewhat irrational and “nostalgic desire 
for a home one knows one cannot have but still longs for”. According to her reading, 
this is “not part of an existential search for locatedness but the product of a necessary 
dislocation, usually economic or political” (Koundoura 2007: 46). This indeed 
appeared to be the psychological state of the ‘Greco’-Russian elites in question, even 
though it has to be mentioned that their dislocation was the somewhat natural state of 
most individuals associated with ‘Greekness’ – either of noble or mercantile – 
‘transnational’ – origin. It is important to note that this ‘quest’ for a homeland or 
‘real’ Greece, as Koundoura calls it, did not arise out of an economic, political or any 
other form of grievance the Ottoman regime was culpable of, since it was completely 
removed from the Black Sea at that point. This means that any form of discontent 
must have been generated within the context of the Russian ‘exile’.  
It is, therefore, not very likely that the source of the exiles’, or as they as they 
are known in Greek historiography, ‘heterochthon’s dissatisfaction would have been 
shared in the Morea or, in fact, any other part of what we know as Greece today. 
Nevertheless, the liberation paradigm rests upon the assumption of the generally 
collective and grassroots nature of the struggle. In other words, Greek nationalism is 
not just understood as what it was, i.e. an abstract elitist concept residing mainly 
within the heterochthon Grecophone nobility, but is synthetically translated into a 
large-scale popular penetration of European Enlightenment thought. These ideas then 
were supposed to have awoken an intrinsic long held popular desire for ‘liberation’ 
from an exploitative Ottoman ‘yoke’. This is why French liberal political ideology 
was thought to naturally combine with the discontent of the illiterate peasant masses 
into the powerful social mechanism of revolution, liberation and secession. 
 
4.2.3 The Filike Etaria  
With the conceptual framework as well as the social fuel readily available and 
naturally converging, the success of the uprising was thought to simply rest on the 
central organization and careful planning by a secret nationalistic society called the 
Filiki Eteria (Friendly Society). This quasi-masonic lodge was set up by three 
unsuccessful members of the mercantile Greek diaspora at the then Russian Black Sea 
port of Odessa in September 1815. At its inception the society was comprised of 
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Athanasios Tsakalov, from Moscow, Nikolaos Skoufas, from Odessa and Emmanuil 
Xanthos, from Xenos - all of whom had, at least in theory, a significant interest in the 
stability of the region as their entrepreneurial interests had been hurt by the 
continuing Ottoman-Russian conflicts. War and upheaval was to threaten the already 
slack trading activities and revenues. It was, nevertheless, mainly from within this 
society that the idea of an independent Greek state and an anti-Ottoman struggle was 
propagated, rather than from the representatives of the Greek Enlightenment. This 
socio-intellectual origin of the Greek ‘awakening’ could, thus, lend credit to the 
World Systems argument about an increase in mercantile activity and, by extension, 
political ambition, due to the expansion of the ‘world economy’.  
Despite this seemingly unambiguous empirical evidence, there remain, 
however, various theoretical problems with the unquestioning identification of this 
bourgeois mercantile class with nationalism. Firstly, their primary source of social 
identity was Orthodox or Muslim religion, rather than any form of modern ethnicity. 
To be precise, the Orthodox community was just as diverse as the rest of the Ottoman 
population, with its members only being identified as Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians and 
Macedonians as a result of various state-formations.56 Secondly, even though many of 
these Orthodox subjects had constituted the trans-national mercantile class of the 
Ottoman Empire, many others remained direct producers, who were, as a rule, 
uneducated and illiterate. As Reşat Kasaba elaborates, the argument about a native 
Greek Enlightenment was mostly a reflection of European Philhellenic wishful 
thinking, rather than being based on any real existing social movements at least as far 
as the Peloponnesus was concerned (Kasaba 2003). Thirdly, it appears not 
unproblematic to link the expansion of trade with the emergence of nationalism. The 
vast majority of ‘Greek’ merchants having settled in Odessa and elsewhere in 
southern Russian were not inclined to migrate into ‘their’ homeland after 
independence since they had “entered the dominant social strata of their places of 
domicile” (Kardasēs 2001: 14f). On the contrary, the welcoming conditions in Russia, 
with a large degree of local autonomy granted, attracted migration from the 
                                                 
56
 Both Armenian and Jewish mercantile classes were treated separately. While the Armenian 
community was significant, the Jewish population was smaller in comparison and had no 
connection to a nationalist uprising prior to Zionism. There was no power contestation with the 
Ottoman regime or the Young Turks. As a matter of fact, the latter’s attitude towards the Zionist 
movement unfolding in Palestine is subject to much historiographic contestation. Many Arab 
suspicions about the Young Turk movement supporting Zionism helped shaping anti-Ottoman 
Arab Nationalism, see Dawn (1993: 17-18). Some British sources, on the other hand, thought to 
have identified a "Judeo-Masonic-Zionist-conspiracy” behind the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, 
whilst, finally Israeli historiography tends to emphasize the Ottoman restrictions on Jewish 
settlement activities, see Öke (1986: 216); for an overview see Olson (1986) 
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Peloponnesus towards the Black Sea shores even after independence. Equally telling 
is the fact that the same is true about the ‘Greeks’ living in Anatolia and other parts of 
the remaining Ottoman Empire, including those in the service of the Sultan’s 
bureaucracy, who showed no inclination to move to their supposed new ‘homeland’ 
until forced to do so as part of the post-war mandatory population exchange of 
1923.57 Moreover, from a theoretical point of view, it seems generally problematic to 
a priori equate the mere presence of merchants with a self-conscious and politically 
ambitions social collective.  
 
In the Greek case, this class, precisely because its fortunes were derived from 
costly ship building activities, was actually not entirely distinct and abstract from the 
landed aristocracy. In particular, some of the Aegean Islands owned renowned 
shipbuilding enterprises, making the Ottoman-Greek mercantile fleet one of the 
biggest in the Mediterranean. However, as capital markets were not developed or 
inaccessible to the region, merchants were dependent on agricultural revenues 
extracted from large landed possessions to finance ship building. Access to 
agricultural produce as initial trading goods for overseas trade was equally of 
importance. Thus, even though influential Greek ship owning families with their 
prominent presence in the City of London remain famous to this day, this mercantile 
class, whilst growing into an emerging world economy, was not necessarily of an 
urban, bourgeois origin and was in many cases either identical or at least still linked 
through kinship and clientelism to the Greek landed nobility, the so-called primates.  
In sum, the motivation of the initial three individuals making up the Filike 
Etaria without doubt remains obscure (Frangos 1973). Unless we take Greek 
independence to represent the design for a wider Balkan uprising as envisaged by the 
early revolutionaries, aiming at replacing the Ottoman ‘multinational’ Empire by an 
equally cosmopolitan Byzantine resurrection, it remains unclear how a further 
particularization of rule, rather than the unification of markets (like in the more 
intelligible Italian and German cases) could have benefited a merchant’s trading 
interest or be conducive to creating a liberal Enlightened polity. Even though the 
Filiki Eteria seems to confirm an argument about a Greek bourgeois revolution, even 
conservative historians like Richard Clogg concede that it is often overlooked that 
“very few of the established and wealthy merchants either within or without the 
                                                 
57
 On an unrelated note, it is interesting to observe that a significant number of Christian peasants 
migrated in the opposite direction. 
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Empire (…) were prepared to have anything to do with the seemingly madcap 
conspiratorial schemes of the Etaria. The bulk of the ‘merchants’ who did enrol were 
merchants’ clerks or little more than pedlars, men on the margin of society, who had 
failed to adapt to xeniteia, or exile from their own traditional societies” (Clogg 1979: 
49). Hence, there are various problems with overstating the influence of the Etarists, 
not least since they were not representing a socially discontent mass movement. Yet, 
even if a purely intellectual appeal of an elite driven Enlightenment ideology is taken 
to be the causa causans of the Greek secession, this does not necessarily clarify which 
exact normative prescriptions would be derived from the intellectual permeation 
facilitated by the Etarists. Fred Halliday, for example, enumerates a proliferation of 
possible effects of the Enlightenment on the International, which are by no means 
limited to national secession outright (Halliday 1999a). Even if there were a hazy 
impact of the Enlightenment, this did not straightforwardly lead into a large-scale 
popular support for a national cause, as the lack of success of the revolt in the 
Principalities illustrates. In other words, a mere intellectual appeal of Enlightenment 
thought to small parts of the heterochthon (exile) Greek community cannot 
convincingly explain a historical event of the magnitude of the Greek secession. Any 
critical mass with the potential for such a large transformation, to the extent that it did 
exist, must have been unconscious of Western European political thought at the time, 
seeing as access to this discourse was limited to the elites. Thus, it is not so much that 
the local Greek Revolt drew “intense support from those dwelling outside the nation” 
(Kostantaras 2008), but, if anything the other way round, i.e. that the Greek national 
project was conceived of and pursued first and foremost in a geographically distant 
area, by distant people, with no obvious direct connection to any local revolutionary 
potential.  
 
 
4.3 Orthodoxy and the Rum Millet  
In the following section this claim about the remarked absence of a revolutionary 
class within Greece proper will be substantiated further by a more detailed look at the 
local social structures. As we have seen, the appeal of Enlightenment thinking and the 
mercantile/bourgeois political potential leaves much to be desired by way of a 
powerful explanation for the Greek secession. As we have further elaborated, the 
argument about a Hellenic lineage is equally difficult to sustain. The Byzantine 
lineage, on the other hand, was historically closer. In fact it was this Eastern Roman, 
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rather than Hellenic identity, which was preserved under Ottoman rule as a 
centralized ecclesiastic community in the form of the Millet System. This so-called 
Rum Millet58 included all Orthodox Christian subjects of the Porte and provided, 
apart from the spiritual authority, a form of cultural semi-autonomy including social 
and family legislation (Davison 1982; Karpat 1982; Stamatopoulos 2006). The Rum 
Millet was constituted mainly by the Orthodox clergy and a Christian landowning 
regime, the primates. This so-called Greek nobility could win a lot from Greek 
independence, yet it also stood to lose out once the movement would exceed a mere 
secession aimed at disposing of Ottoman fiscal rule and take on the character of a 
wider social upheaval with the potential of significantly altering the relations of social 
power and property ownership. For the Rum Millet elites, social change was a threat 
whether it was conceived of in Odessa, Istanbul or elsewhere, while, on the other 
hand, severing ties with the Ottoman treasury nevertheless appeared to be a very 
attractive prospect. They needed to ensure (and eventually did) that the ongoing 
transformations never exceeded the ousting of an increasingly demanding overlord in 
the form of the Sultan. 
 
Even though the Rum Millet was in effect part of the Ottoman ruling regime, 
it could still serve as a perennial dividing line between two mutually ‘foreign’ 
Christian and Muslim communities which then received territorial identities in the 
19th and 20th centuries. The Ottoman social structures institutionalized religious 
difference as well as formalizing inequality before the law according to the three 
Abrahamic religions (Braude and Lewis 1980).59 This could have been said to provide 
“a primordial line of demarcation” (Mavrogordatos 2003: 117). As this 
Christian/Roman community had been institutionally preserved ever since the fall of 
Constantinople in 1453, Orthodoxy could be used as a prime social marker, not least 
since it implied legal inequality in terms of the Ottoman Islamic laws of which 19th 
century national movements could build upon.60 The trading and cultural links to 
Europe institutionalized through the Rum Millet could equally serve as a channel for 
the presumed intellectual penetration of European libertarian thinking. This means 
that from the outset, as Richard Davison put it, “the hypothesis that the Millets would 
                                                 
58
 ‘Rum’ is derived from (Eastern) Roman nation, see: Roudemetof (1998) For a historiographic 
discussion of the term Millet see Braude (1984) 
59
 A separate Armenian legal community (Islahat Fermani) was formed as part of the Tanzimat in 
1856 
60
 This argument was, amongst others, advanced by the eminent Turkish historian (1982). 
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serve as agents or channels of Westernization in the Ottoman Empire appears, then, to 
have some basis” (Davison 1982: 319).  
 
Even though the modern Turkish word ‘Millet’ in fact does translate into 
English as ‘nation’, Davison’s own test of this hypothesis leads him to the assumption 
that “the millets were also conservative, probably much more so than they were 
agents of change” (Davison 1982: 332). Rather than Christians constituting a 
homogenous class of direct producers and Muslims making up an ethnically 
homogenous class of landowners, class and social divisions were not identical with 
religious and what came to be ethnic divides. Apart from many Greeks occupying 
high ranking positions within the administration, “in fact, the [Orthodox] Patriarch 
was a recognized Ottoman official, holding the rank of vizier and serving as 
intermediary between the Orthodox Christians and the imperial government” 
(Stavrianos 1957: 336). Renk Özdemir just recently pointed out that not only had 
“both Muslim and non-Muslim Ottomans (…) intersecting definitions of ‘belonging’” 
but also that within the context of the Orthodox Millet, “neither the state apparatus 
nor the religious institutions within its realms ascribed ethnicity, let alone race, to 
their religiously defined communities until nationalisms began to rise ” (Özdemir 
2008: 21-22). These pre-existing social differentiations, consisting mostly in religious 
and to a lesser degree linguistic communities, thus, far from constituting the 
underlying cause of the conflict, if anything, may have been exploited in a process 
that has its origins elsewhere. As paradoxical as this may sound for a state that also 
embodied the Islamic Caliphate, but Christian Orthodoxy served almost as much as a 
foundational state ideology for Ottoman rule as Islam did. The Ottoman state 
remained true to its Byzantine heritage throughout its final struggle in 1922/23. 
Evoking religiosity as the main social ‘divider’, therefore, is not conducive to 
identifying the dynamics underlying the Greek struggle, even though doing so has 
been a common and central part of the liberation paradigm.  
 
Rather than simply being identical with Orthodox Christianity, the modern 
concept of ‘Greekness’ as a collective identity was fed from two sources. On the one 
hand, it had indeed a traditional religious origin embodied in the Christian Ancient 
Regime of the Rum Millet. In contradiction to this traditionalist origin, it was fuelled 
by the liberal ‘Greek Enlightenment’, mostly generated in exile, but maintaining a 
generally progressive outlook. In other words, the agents of social stasis and change 
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were paradoxically supposed to pursue the same political agenda – Greek 
nationalism. Given the social position of the Rum Millet, some doubts can be raised 
as to whether Greek independence really does stand in an ‘Enlightened’ liberal 
tradition. Furthermore, the Orthodox community was headed by a clergy that was 
deeply entwined with the centre of Ottoman power, i.e. the supposed ‘oppressor’ 
through the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. In consequence, the question 
as to where exactly the ‘Greek Enlightenment’ had its social base remains wide open. 
This, finally, leads to the assumption that the purely religious community of the Rum 
Millet cannot be equated with what was to become the modern ethnic Greek nation. It 
is hard to see how social change would be generated from within the Ottoman Rum 
Millet, as the independence struggle was threatening to break up its cosmopolitan 
scope, as well as menacing the social position of its Orthodox leaders. In sum, it 
remains doubtful whether the intellectual impulse of the Enlightenment or the pre-
existing social differentiation in the form of the Rum Millet can be considered a 
motivating force for the 19th century opposition to the Ottoman center.  
 
 
4.4 The Muslim Bonaparte 
It is argued here that it was the Sultans Selim III (1789-1807) and Mahmud II (1808-
1839) that generated this opposition. Given the diversity and high degree of 
autonomy of the various parts of the Ottoman Empire, to many, their attempts to 
territorially consolidate and centralize their domain necessarily implied a degree of 
over ambition, if not delusion. Selim lost his life to a palace conspiracy as a result of 
his challenge to various vested interests. His premature death might be less surprising 
when looking at the list of groups and individuals profiting from the ineffectiveness 
of the Ottoman state. Namely, this included the âyân nobles, derebey local 
administrators and the notorious Janissary slave soldiers whose reign of terror in 
Serbia had led to the first of the Balkan uprisings in 1804. As we have seen, many of 
these were semi-independent autonomous centres of power within the Ottoman state 
structures which had succeeded in bypassing the Porte’s formerly effectual capacity 
of central control and taxation. This, naturally, led to an “intense conflict between 
modernizing efforts and local conservatism” (Roudemotof 2001: 101).  
 
Yet, the decisive challenge in the ‘Greek’ context was, paradoxically, not posed 
by any elements from within the Rum Millet or the Etarists, but by a Muslim 
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Albanian who had no obvious connection to, or interest in, the Greek project. Being 
one of the most powerful amongst the local notables, if not the most powerful, save 
Muhammad Ali, Ali Pasha of Janina, or Ibrahim Pasha (1741–1822)61, as he was also 
known, was initially not related to Greek nationalism. His scheme was from the 
outset to diminish and, if necessary for the maintenance of his autonomy, to dispose 
of Ottoman rule wherever he could. In pursuit of this agenda, Ali Pasha created a 
semi-Empire of his own around the district of Janina (today’s Albania and 
northwestern Greece, also known as Epirus and Thessaly) where he had originally 
been appointed as the de jure governor by the Sultan himself. However, Mahmud II 
reversed his predecessor’s policy of appeasing the powerful ‘Lion of Janina’, and 
started to directly and militarily challenge what had become a formidable obstacle to 
Ottoman state-building in the region. This provided Ali with incentives not only to 
befriend, but also to actively support the Etarist’s agenda. Dennis Skiotis claims that 
the general revolt of the Greeks in the spring of 1821 was intimately tied to Ali 
Pasha’s revolt, even if they had entirely distinct social origins and political purposes. 
Even if we were to assume that Ali Pasha was generally indifferent towards the 
‘Greek’ cause, he decided to exploit their discontent to his own ends, once he 
“realized that in late 1819 and early 1820 (…), it was Ottoman policy to reduce him 
at all costs” (Skiotis 1976: 99). In the pursuit of this aim, Ali Pasha even went so far 
as to convert from Islam to Orthodox Christianity so as to appeal to his newly found 
‘Orthodox brothers’ to help him support his cause for ‘liberation’. Arguably, playing 
the Greek and the implied Russian card was Ali’s last resort. In Skiotis’s words “had 
the Ottomans purposely set out to raise allies for Ali, they could scarcely have acted 
as efficaciously” (Skiotis 1976: 105). Thus, Mahmud II’s attempt to challenge Ali 
Pasha’s non-nationalistic, paternalistic Greco-Albanian62 quasi-state at the same time 
as the emerging Greek Nationalist elements, unintentionally forged these otherwise 
rather disperse interests into an alliance of convenience and inadvertently created a 
powerful enemy, the combined fighting power of which seriously undermined the 
little faith that was left in Ottoman military prowess. It was this decision by Sultan 
Mahmud to try and subdue Ali Pasha by force that, according to Skiotis, ensured the 
success of the Greek revolt:  
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 For a detailed biographical account see Fleming (1999) 
62
 Debates persist to this date as to whether ‘Albania’ ethnically belongs to Greece. Notably, 
however, Greece abstained from supporting the Kosovan liberation movement and was the only 
NATO member not to take part in the 1999 intervention in Serbia in a bid for regional stability 
and/or pan-Orthodox solidarity.  
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“…Sultan Mahmud II, an arrogant and stubborn ruler whose consuming 
ambition was to reassert the absolute power of the sultanate, saw fit to challenge 
the redoubtable Albanian vizier. His decision was to have catastrophic 
consequences for the empires. It led ultimately to a disastrous foreign war, 
during which the sound of Russian cannon was to reverberate in Constantinople 
itself, and it saw a subject people gain full independence, an example for other 
to try and emulate” (Skiotis 1976: 98).  
 
 
4.5 The Conservative Turn 
The relative strength of the local conservative forces initially appeared to be feeding 
into the overall effort to overthrow Ottoman rule, albeit for vastly different reasons. 
However, given the Christian Orthodox and traditionalist character not only of the 
primates, but of the vast majority of the population, this poses the immediate question 
of how to bring about an actual Revolution whilst exploiting the social power of what 
could be called an ancient regime? Therefore, conservative Greek historiography 
needs “…to bridge the gap between the conspiracy that existed for the most part on 
paper and the full mobilization of resources once the day of reckoning came. Hence it 
is not surprising that some have questioned the importance of the Eteria particularly 
since, once the revolution had begun, it seems to have exercised little or no influence 
on events” (Dakin 1973: 46). The following section problematizes this relationship 
between the ‘modern’ nationalist forces emanating from the Greek diaspora and local 
social forces involved in the physical struggle with the Sultan’s armies.  
This is of great importance, for the liberation paradigm has frequently blamed 
the ‘hostile take-over’ of the new state by conservative forces after a successful 
bourgeois/national revolution for all problems associated with the development of 
post-revolutionary Greece. In principle, however, those conservative forces were also 
required by the liberal project since various imperatives existed to present the revolt 
as an Orthodox and anti-Islamic Christian liberation struggle. On the one hand, this 
was necessary in order to gather the support of the conservative nobles as well as the 
generally deeply religious mass of the population, but also internationally since the 
Greek insurgency had to signal to the reactionary European Concert (and especially 
its most ardent supporter the Tsar) that their revolt was not “inspired by demagoguery 
or Jacobinism. It was rather a crusade of Christians against Muslims, the attempt of a 
Greek nation to remove the barbaric Turkish yoke and revive the culture of its famed 
ancestors” (Petropulos 1968: 43). However, this would be a circle difficult to square, 
as a focus on the Orthodox religiosity of a movement that had, supposedly, its roots in 
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the same Enlightenment and revolutionary tradition that had brought chaos to Europe, 
created a dilemma. The revolutionary leaders could not claim to be guided by both 
fundamentally opposing influences, i.e. a deeply conservative Orthodox influence 
which was in fact associated with Ottoman power and a liberal revolutionary and 
above all secular Enlightenment ideology, promising social change, individualism 
and secularism.  
Thus, unsurprisingly, “as it did elsewhere, the French Revolution caused a 
serious rift in Greek society. Following the lead of Russia’s Catherine II, the 
Patriarchate of Constantinople [rather than the Ottoman administration itself] now 
became the centre of reaction. The conservative clerics gained the upper hand, and 
often those who had started out as liberals turned conservative” (Petropulos 1968: 
39). This created complex and contradictory social positions for many conservative 
Greek elites of the Ottoman Empire. In particular, however, the Orthodox clergy 
faced a paradoxical situation as it could interpret conservatism in either a 
Byzantine/Ottoman manner and uphold its allegiance to the Sultan or in a Greek 
territorial way and support the independence movement. For some who had always 
been part of the Ottoman ruling elites, like the primates (Christian landowners) or the 
Phanariots, the choice was fundamentally between maintaining their established 
social positions and taking a conservative view in line with the essentially Ottoman 
Patriarchate as well as the European inter-state system or to put themselves at the 
spearhead of the Nationalist revolt in the hope of further improving their positions 
obliterating the Ottoman tax collector. Once the revolt was in full swing, however, the 
primates, “who stood to lose so much in case the rising should prove abortive, had 
necessarily to join in, for fear that if they remained aloof they would be confounded 
with the tyrant” (Petropulos 1968: 60). The clergy, on the other hand, who had 
initially defended the Sultanic polity as the guardian of the divine Orthodox order, 
was relieved of their dilemma by the assassination of the Patriarch and his clergymen 
in Constantinople by a mob on Easter Monday 1821 as a reprisal for the outbreak of 
the revolt.  
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4.6 Brigands without a Cause63 
Thus far, only the social location(s) of various ruling classes and their respective roles 
in the struggle with the Ottoman centre have been discussed. While this is important, 
an eminent need persists to clarify the position of the majority of the population, the 
direct producers. Their role could easily be relegated to mere passivity, not least since 
they continued to disappoint Philhellenic European contemporaries, who found them 
to be, as Lady Montagu observed, “…ignorant peasants who do not know what butter 
is, nor what their antiquity represents” (Koundoura 2007: 45). Establishing a lack of 
peasant agency would leave another question unanswered, namely about the social 
origin and driving force of the fighting men. Indeed, this question is best answered by 
looking back to the creation of Sekban troops explained in chapter 3. The emergence 
of arms-bearing landless peasants is a phenomenon that, while not restricted to the 
Balkans, is nevertheless very typical of it, not least due to its geography. Social 
banditry, the study of which Eric Hobsbawm pioneered in the late 1960s (Hobsbawm 
1969), was, as will be shown, crucial for the social transformation under 
investigation. With regards to Greece, it was  
“…above all in the mountain regions, in certain towns and in certain islands, 
that the Greeks enjoyed almost complete autonomy. Since cavalry was not 
effective outside the plains, the Ottoman Turks had failed to subjugate higher 
regions such as Mani in southern Peloponnesus, or the Pindus-Agrafa 
Mountains, Vermio, Pereira, Olympus or Parnassus. …Throughout the many 
mountains of Greece there were Kleftochoria (bandit villages) which were a 
law unto themselves” (Dakin 1973: 17).  
 
Remarkably, however, ever since Hobsbawm’s original 1969 account and despite the 
importance of this social phenomenon for the understanding of many transformations 
within international social history and the history of state formation,64 no major work 
has yet been dedicated to this social phenomenon from within the discipline of 
International Relations. While this provides important openings for future research, 
there are already problems with Hobsbawm’s famous work. Hobsbawm tends to 
identify bandits with revolutions (Hobsbawm 1969: 106-119).65 However, at least in 
the Greek case, their political self-understanding as revolutionaries, let alone 
nationalists, has to be challenged. As will be argued here, the Brigand’s struggle had 
                                                 
63
 Here I contend with Koliopoulos’ assertion about the political motivation of the Brigands: 
Koliopoulos (Koliopoulos 1987). 
64
 Apart from the Greek and Anatolian cases, the most prominent historical role Brigands held was 
in Sicily. Here, however, the historical sociology of these original peasant movements is very 
extensive (Blok 1974; Sabetti 2002) 
65
 Hobsbawm (1969: 106-119), for a critique see Blok (1972, 2001) 
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an apolitical character until usurped by the ‘national’ discourse. In order to revise this 
simplified and therefore problematic clear-cut identification of ‘Brigands with a 
Cause’ (Koliopoulos 1987), a more detailed glance at the variety of local ‘Greek’ 
bandits and brigands appears to be in order.  
It has already been shown that certain social transformations led to “the end 
of the rural prosperity and relative peace so crucial for the well-being of an 
agricultural empire”. Peasant unrest was largely channelled into the creation of so-
called sekban troops, through the spread of small, handheld firearms, even though 
“the transition between rebel and milita-man (and back) was easy to accomplish” 
(Neumann 2006: 45). The so-called Klefts in the Morea boasted similar social 
structures and akin to the Anatolian case, Greek historians generally distinguish 
between two kinds of arms-bearing ‘Klefts’: Kapi and Armatoloi. The former were in 
the service of Greek landowners (primates) employed to protect property not reliably 
secured by Ottoman law-enforcement, whilst the latter were working for the Ottoman 
administration itself as a local armed police force mainly to ensure tax collection, 
generally representing the interests of the Sultan or the local Beys. Apart from their 
differing sources of employment, these two varieties of Brigands were fairly 
comparable to each other in the kind of employment they pursued. Their structures 
were strictly hierarchical with the so-called Capitanoi constituting the undisputed 
leadership amongst them, holding a social status located between the Rum Millet 
elites and the direct producers. Both sides “employed them to protect their property, 
to assert their local influence, and even to carry on their feuds with rival families” 
(Dakin 1973: 18). With the decentralization of power starting in the 16th century, the 
shift in the traditional ruling regime impacted on the exercise of politically constituted 
violence, however. Employment through Ottoman offices decreased while the 
number of privateers rose. This not only meant an increase in the number of Kapi, but 
also increased the number of landless Brigands, carrying out robberies. Both groups 
were in principle employed to “curb these disorders and losses of treasures” (Dakin 
1973: 18) the social practice of robbery caused to ‘Greeks’ and ‘Turks’ alike. “In 
other words they employed brigands to put down other brigands it was not unusual to 
name the Armatoli ‘tame’ Kelfts as opposed to the ‘wild’ Kelfts who remained a law 
unto themselves, or outlaws pure and simply” (Dakin 1973: 18). Appropriating their 
military services was, therefore, a perfectly reasonable act of statecraft to either 
prevent them plunging into lawless practices of robbing people, or in order to ‘send a 
thief to catch a thief’ (Batalas 2003) – incompatible though as this may have been 
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with the establishment of a monopoly over the means of violence and a modern state 
apparatus.  
Whether ‘tame’ or ‘wild’ Kleft, both groups’ sources of subsistence were 
threatened by the political agenda of centralization, as they were both based on the 
effective absence of state control. With the official forms of employment under threat 
by a modernizing Ottoman state, the Klefts were pushed towards the ‘wild’ form of 
brigandage as the sole source of their income and lived off raids on the villages. The 
advent of the territorial state, thus, meant, on the one hand, that these armed brigands 
could no longer live off sporadic raids on villages in the plains, whilst at the same 
time their total numbers grew. It also meant, however, that demand for their 
traditional modes of employment would shrink if they did not wish to subjugate 
themselves to the Sultan’s or any other form of, sometimes competing, state-like 
authority. In fact, the Klefts had attempted to circumvent both Ali Pasha’s as well as 
the Porte’s state building projects. Their ultimate aim was to thwart any centralization 
efforts altogether and continue in their semi-autonomous living conditions in the 
ways that had previously been guaranteed by the geography of the region. Thus, 
“…thousands of these warriors had literally nowhere to settle unless they entered the 
Napoleonic service or the service of Ali Pasha” (Dakin 1973: 44), neither of which 
was an attractive option to these men who were used to a high degree of autonomy. 
After an attempt to be recruited into the Tsar’s service failed in 1817, they started to 
form into an increasingly radical potential. This was not marred with a concrete 
political agenda other than retaining their traditional forms of subsistence based on 
self-rule.  
This potential was nurtured by increased taxation pressures felt throughout 
the Ottoman Balkans. Ciftlik formations led to overexploitation and the consolidation 
of landed estates which, for most direct producers, implied a noticeable deterioration 
of living conditions in comparison to the traditional timar system. Combined with the 
Porte’s centralization agenda and in the light of the Sultan’s continuous geopolitical 
predicament, this led to a peasant flight from the arable plains. In terms of the general 
economic conditions, the end of the Napoleonic wars also had an immediate impact. 
The unusual peace in Europe revived agricultural production in Europe, which lead to 
a slump in prices due to oversupply. This meant that agricultural revenues fell, since 
the Ottoman monopoly to supply the war torn European markets collapsed. “In 1820 
the harvest in Western Europe reduced gains even more and left a large number of 
sailors in both islands unemployed and a great source of unrest” (Petropulos 1968: 
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36). The number of peasants joining Klefts rose due to these deteriorating socio-
economic conditions. Hence, this Kleft revolutionary potential was not released by 
the Etarists. In fact, using the term ‘revolutionary’ appears inaccurate. Rather, the 
highly personalised center-periphery struggle between Ali and Mahmud led many to 
take up opportunities as mercenaries on either side. This still does not explain, how, if 
at all, this pressure was transformed into a nationalist struggle, not least since the 
genesis of a ‘Greek’ identity out of this struggle was not complete until well into the 
twentieth century (Triandafyllidou and Paraskevopoulou 2002).  
In other words, even though ‘Bandits’ may have constituted a potential for 
revolt, they usually did not develop a political direction for expressing their 
discontent. If political or ideological perspectives were present at all, these were not 
usually articulate, i.e. they can be seen, at best, as a precursor to a political 
transformation (Hobsbawm 1969: 106f). Arguably, this geographically secluded, 
uneducated class was from the outset very unlikely to channel its discontent into a 
project of national secession or, indeed any further reaching politico-ideological 
venture beyond an immediate remedy of the perceived social injustice. Their aim was 
simply to re-establish traditional forms of socio-economic life. Anton Blok has 
rightfully criticized Hobsbawm’s somewhat romanticised account of social banditry, 
as “by themselves, social bandits lack organisational capacity” (Blok 2001: 14) or 
political conviction. More importantly, bandits are fickle. As Blok observes with 
reference to cases from Sicily, their class allegiance swiftly shifted once they entered 
a socially more advanced position. Far from being Hoodesque avengers of the poor, 
they were targeting landed peasants just as much as landowners (Blok 1972: 496). 
This equally applies to the Greek case, where social pressures led to the emergence of 
a dissatisfied social bandit/ex-peasant class lacking a political idiom. This, however, 
coincided with the import of the political project of Greek nationalism from Russia, 
which lacked a large domestic base of social power. These two social strands 
converged in a short-lived anti-Ottoman marriage of convenience under the specific 
socio-economic circumstances of the 1820s. As the rapturous history of post-Ottoman 
Greek national state formation goes to show, it lacked any coherence beyond the 
commonality of purpose in attempting to expel the Ottoman tax collector. Overriding 
the Ottoman regime promised a return to banditry that would be activity undisturbed 
by a centralizing state. This, on the other hand, naturally jeopardized the support of 
any new state. Consequently, banditry did not disappear as a result of secession. 
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Rather, it remained a social reality, much bemoaned by the Great Powers, as the 
noveau Greece simply externalized this problem. 
 
 
4.7 The Social Origin of the Greek War of Independence  
The Revolution, thus, occurred in two parts of the Empire which were not only 
geographically, but also socially disjointed from each other. While the Principalities 
were plunged into revolt mostly by an Etarist/Hospodar conspiratorial coalition, the 
revolt in the Peloponnesus was more genuine or ‘from below’ and involved local 
power holders as well as lower classes. These, however, had no ideological links with 
the Etarists and their Westernized rhetoric. This explains why the revolt was 
unsuccessful in the Principalities, whereas the uprising in the Peloponnesus not only 
successfully overthrew, but also expelled the Ottoman regime. It was, thus, not due to 
the ideological appeal of the nationalist project, but due to the large scale incursion of 
Ottoman forces brought in to curb Ali Pasha of Janina in 1820 that the Kleft/Peasant 
revolutionary potential was increasingly mobilized. The outcome of Greek 
independence was not by nationalist design, but via a physical struggle emerging 
from the center-periphery conflict. In other words, the Greek revolt grew out of a 
decidedly non-national conflict between a centralizing Porte and autonomy-seeking 
peripheral elites in the form of Ali Pasha. The peasants who had remained on their 
land and had not turned into arms bearing men seemed to participate spuriously at 
best.  
 
The physical struggle, far from being the logical result of an ideological 
nationalist penetration emanating through a modern ‘Greek’ system of education, has, 
thus, a twofold origin. First, the conflict between an autonomous local lord was 
combined with the material crisis of unemployed military men and landless peasants 
with an equally strong desire for autonomy. Both groups of actors were threatened by 
an increasingly monopolized modern state apparatus. This revolutionary potential did 
not spark simply due to the inability to find alternative modes of employment, but 
only gained momentum in reaction to the influx of Ottoman forces deployed to curb 
Ali Pasha of Janina’s local power base. The fact that ‘Greeks’ fought on both Ali’s 
and the Sultan’s sides as mercenaries at the initial stages of the conflict goes to show 
that the social origin of their struggle was not so much the result of their natural 
nationalist inclination, but rather the conscious decision to opt for the more reliable 
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sources of military employment. Greek independence itself, however, did not offer 
this opportunity, but rather the ensuing chaos that left plenty of scope for banditry and 
corruption. The conservative historiography notoriously overrates the extent to which 
“news and ideas [which] were spread by small traders, drovers, builders and sailors 
(…) from the middle of the 18th century onwards” (Dakin 1973: 26) could actually 
have a significant impact on the social fabric of the not only highly conservative, but 
also very fractured and particularized, ‘Greek’ community. What the Etarists and the 
Greek national discourse did was to temporarily consolidate these individual social 
struggles into one, short-lived, ‘coalition of the willing’. This revolt, thus, rather than 
simply replacing the Ottoman with a new ruling class, had the potential to lead to 
meaningful social change, as it “initiated a process of true social mobility through the 
carrying of arms, both because the function of fighting was indispensable to a society 
engaged in war and because of the military system of irregular warfare which 
prevailed” (Petropulos 1968: 73). This potential was used to overthrow the Ottoman 
‘yoke’, but whether it was utilized to provide for social change remains to be seen. As 
Clogg observes, “the ruling elites in Greek society were so wedded to the existing 
status quo, however, that [any revolutionary effort] was clearly going to be no easy 
task” (Clogg 1979: 43). As the post-Ottoman history of Greek state formation goes to 
show, this was in fact a formidable task.  
 
 
4.8 The New Greek State 
Between November 1829 and February 1830, Russia, France and Britain decided on 
the future fate of the newly born Greek state at the London Conference.66 After 
having influenced the struggle militarily in favour of the Greek movement by 
destroying the combined Ottoman/Egyptian fleet in October 1827 at Navarino67, the 
London Protocol established that an independent Kingdom of Greece was to be 
established and to be ruled by a monarch from a smaller European dynasty. This form 
of international mediation, which reconciled the powers’ reactionary demands and 
maintained, simultaneously, the balance of power in the region, was to become a 
model for the subsequent secessions from the Ottoman Empire, Serbia, Bulgaria and 
Romania. Regardless of the international determination of the future fate of ‘Greece’, 
                                                 
66
 For a detailed account of the international response to the Greek struggle see chapter 5. 
67
 Many observers at the time assumed an accidental outbreak of the battle. This account concurs 
with the mainstream understanding of Navarino as a previously agreed and coordinated military 
intervention as is evidenced by the presence of the large fleet in the Aegean; see Woodhouse 
(1965).  
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there are those who see the post-Ottoman formation as the epitome of the modern 
state with the constitutional monarchy that came in place of the Porte creating an 
abstract state apparatus, thereby establishing the institutional separation of the private 
and the public on the one hand, and the economic and the political on the other. The 
advent of private property seemed to be secured by the departure of the traditional 
Ottoman land regime. This ‘modern’ state was thought to guarantee individual rights 
in the sense of personal independence and legal and formal equality before the law. 
Moreover, the institution of private property was guaranteed by the departure and 
expropriation of the majority of Muslim landlords. According to conservative Greek 
historiography, this was the result of a popular ‘Greek’ will for democracy and 
modern Western institutions - including institutions of representative democracy - 
which were genetically poised to revive the Athenian heritage. These tendencies were 
subdued first by the Ottomans and later by the foreign implemented Bavarian 
Regime, which “showed little sympathy for the aspirations of those who had actually 
fought for independence…[and] showed little sensitivity to Greek tradition in 
fashioning the institutions of the new state after western European models” (Clogg 
1992: 49). Once left to the ‘authentic’ Greek revolutionary agents after the coup 
d’état against King Otho in October 1862, and especially after the First World War, 
however, institutions developed which supposedly “marked a continuity between 
classical and modern Greece through the intermediary of the Greek Enlightenment 
movement” (Triandafyllidou and Paraskevopoulou 2002: 79).  
Contrary to this opinion, it has been argued here that a territorially 
consolidated ‘Greek’ state had no historical antecedent which this idea of Hellenic 
linearity could have been built upon.68 To the extent that a tradition of democratic 
institutions was revived, those were far from universally implemented or accepted. 
This sheds doubt on the assumption that post-Ottoman Greece revived an ‘old’ 
tradition of democracy. The following will look at various political institutions and 
developments after the departure of the Ottoman forces and examine their purportedly 
modern character, especially with regards to the existence of an abstract, de-personal 
state apparatus in a Weberian sense. This will show that the emerging Greek state 
failed to introduce modern sovereignty. The attempts that were made in this direction 
were met with fierce local resistance as it disrupted traditional ways of life in a way 
                                                 
68
 Pre-Ottoman ‘Greek’ sovereign structures could include the system of the Rum Millet, the 
Byzantine Empire and the Classical system of dispersed city states, none of which have 
institutional similarities with the 19th century Greek formation, which, as will be shown, developed 
only slowly into what could be called ‘sovereign maturity’ well into the twentieth century.  
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comparable to the Ottoman efforts. In particular, the changes implemented by the 
Bavarian bureaucrats who tried to introduce a “centralized government and 
bureaucracy [which] now submitted both landowners and peasants to a common 
dependence on the local representatives of a distant and unsympathetic authority” 
(Campbell and Sherrard 1968: 83) were contested. Whether this new authority was 
supposed to be Turkish, European, Greek or Ottoman in ‘ethnic’ origin arguably did 
not matter, for on the one hand, there was no developed concept of ethnicity at the 
time. On the other hand, the problem was not so much with the cultural or ethnic 
colour of authority, but much more with a centralized political authority as such. The 
conventional wisdom, however, tends to discount the extent to which the Greek 
insurrection had its origin precisely in the attempt to evade a centralizing regime. The 
center-periphery conflict so vital for understanding the process of disintegration itself 
was, thus, not solved or obliterated by the secession. Rather, it was reconfigured 
under a different guise with the fundamental conflicting lines between a landed 
Ancient Regime in the form of the primates and a modernizing central bureaucracy in 
form of the so-called Bavarocracy remaining intact. In other words, it was the foreign 
ruler’s desire to “suppress the local bandit-rulers and construct a modern centralized 
state [which] rejected the Byzantine Ottoman tradition in favour of a revival of 
classical Greece” (Roudemotof 2001: 102) rather than a local native aspiration for 
reviving the Classical heritage which became the engine of social transformation in 
this post-Ottoman polity.  
 
4.8.1 Institutions  
Initially this might seem an unfair assessment of the post-Ottoman Greek situation. 
Even though still in the midst of the war effort, new political structures still emerged. 
A National Assembly was called in 1827, which duly elected Count Capodistrias as 
the first President of Greece when he arrived on 7 January 1828. His agenda was 
indeed to modernize and centralize the state. To no one’s surprise, however, in doing 
so he stirred up the very conflict looming from the outset. Once European 
interference brought a reasonable prospect of success to the revolt, the struggle for 
political (re)organization in post-Independence Greece was in full swing. This 
conflict, as was outlined above, was characterized by the continuous conflict between 
the conservatives and progressive/liberals, or the ‘Romeic’ and the ‘Hellenic’ 
factions. It is the latter, though, whose social composition, origin and, above all, 
motivation appears more obscure and contradictory, whereas the former can be 
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relatively clearly identified as the ‘old Regime’ of the Rum Millet. The Hellenists 
were keen to centralize power early on, while the local notables were eager to retain 
their local power base. In either model, political participation was meant to be 
restrictive which reflected a widely held assumption across the whole political 
spectrum of the early national Greek elites that “‘subversive’ and ‘demagogic’ 
theories associated with the French Revolution and particularly with its radical phase 
were never allowed to reach the people, let alone to influence statecraft” (Koliopoulos 
and Veremis 2002: 22). Any move towards a truly popular form of political 
participation in government was not only subdued due to a desire to retain established 
bases of social power and vested interest, but also since radical social transformation 
was deemed unacceptable by most European powers, first and foremost by Greece’s 
natural ally, Russia.  
 
4.8.2 The Megali Idea 
The Megali Idea irredentist policy, aiming at the expansion of the Greek polity into a 
revived Byzantine Empire, took hold within Greece as “the sole source of internal 
unity in a politically fragmented society” (Campbell and Sherrard 1968: 91). Trained 
as a Russian diplomat and loyal to the principles of Realpolitik, Capodistrias had, for 
good reason, attempted to convince various political constituencies of the need for 
internal consolidation and territorial saturation, putting on hold, if not to rest, this 
‘Great Idea’. However, as geopolitically wise as this may have been, it was 
nevertheless socially problematic, for on the one hand disunity persisted and 
eventually cost Capodistrias his life. On the other hand, territorial saturation 
prevented a regulation of the bandit’s inimical position towards the state. The Megali 
Idea would have provided an opportunity to channel the traditional revenue 
generating activities of the irregular forces – village raids – by equipping them with 
an ideological superstructure which would allow for raids across the Ottoman-Greek 
frontier, while at the same time, galvanizing and subordinating them to a greater 
Greek irredentist national agenda. This way, however, banditry continued to 
constitute one social problem for the young state – amongst many others (Tzanelli 
2002). 
 
4.8.3 The Regency 
Not least under the impression of this disunity which identified the Greek state as a 
source of geopolitical unrest and instability, the London Conference decided to 
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impose a foreign monarch. In the midst of the post-Ottoman internal struggle, the 
Vienna system imported its own model of sovereignty, i.e. a European dynasty, 
which, at that time also meant the introduction of an autocratic version of 
‘modernity’, strictly based on a backward vision of dynasticism. The introduction of a 
Bavarian administration in the spirit of the Vienna reaction has to be seen as an 
attempt to circumvent the ideological appeal of liberal enlightened nationalism and 
the social change that this might imply. However, just as Capodistrias’ administration 
caused wide-spread resentment amongst large parts of the population, so was the 
Bavarian attempt to govern modern Greece in a Western European, i.e. neo-
Absolutist fashion destined to trigger recognizable resistance. In consequence, exactly 
31 years after Capodistrias’ assassination on October 7 1831, the first Greek monarch, 
King Otho, was ousted by an angry mob and was forced to return to his native 
Bavaria in October 1862. This should not be read as evidence, however, that deposing 
Bavarian rule marked the end of the ongoing center-periphery conflict.  
 
Initially, the Bavarian Regency’s (1832- 1862) efforts to create a 
constitutional monarchy encountered equally strong opposition, even though it had 
been well aware of the strong provincial powers it needed to incorporate into the new 
state. Nevertheless, “Bavarian state-making encountered strong resistance from 
almost all the elements of Greek society but especially from the local oligarchies, the 
clergy, the primates, and the captains of the irregular formations”. Most crucially, the 
Bavarian efforts to incorporate the irregulars into a new standing army proved 
difficult. “The majority of captains and their bands were neither incorporated into the 
paramilitary units nor actually desired to be so incorporated” (Batalas 2003: 160-
162).  
Faced with so much opposition, the Regency tried to calm the restless spirits 
by introducing a constitution in 1844 in reaction to an attempted overthrow. 
Somewhat unsurprisingly, this constitution was, according to Campbell and Sherrard 
“anything but liberal in spirit” (Campbell and Sherrard 1968: 86), retaining political 
prerogatives with the King, who governed more through his minister Ionnais Kolettis 
(1773-1847), “who had studied the art of patronage and intrigue” during his time in 
Ali Pasha’s court. These skills of statecraft were desperately needed by the new King, 
whose popularity was far from supreme. Indeed, “…the fact that the regency and the 
king were not Orthodox and the suppression of the local bandits (…) created the 
widespread impression of an attack on Orthodox traditions” (Roudemotof 2001: 104). 
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This was, of course, no misperception. After all, attempting to change the political 
and social structures that were traditionally defined by Orthodox religion could 
always be read as an attack on Orthodoxy itself. Accordingly, there were not less than 
14 peasant revolts during the Regency, most of which “were a reaction against 
taxation or were incited by local overlords who demanded financial rewards from the 
state” (Roudemotof 2001: 104). This state, however, was no longer ‘Turkish’, but 
independent and Greek. Hence, resistance was arguably not against the Catholicism 
of the Bavarian King, but against political centralization and a functioning fiscal 
regime in general.  
 
Kolettis, aware of these local sensitivities, attempted to form a power-base for 
the young and foreign monarch by building “a popular following by openly corrupt 
methods which he justified by the observation that parliamentary democracy was 
unsuited to the conditions of Greek society” (Campbell and Sherrard 1968: 86f). 
Public offices in parliament, government and regional administration were sold to the 
highest bidder. Kolettis thus introduced a system of office venality typical of 
European neo-absolutist dynasties, which in Greece, as in Europe, effectively restored 
the power of established primates within a ‘modern’ centralized bureaucracy and 
provided the institutional infrastructure for a compromise between the King and the 
local power holders within, what Clogg calls, a ‘parliamentary dictatorship’ (Clogg 
1992: 52). As for the Klefts, Otho and Kolettis also devised a strategy to incorporate 
them into the state. On the one hand, he paid them to rig the democratic elements 
imposed onto him by the 1844 constitution. As a result, bandits supported the King’s 
power base by starting “to terrorize electors to cast their votes as they ought to, or at 
least to prevent opponents from reaching the ballot-boxes, but also from time to time 
in the more honourable work of creating disorder on the Turkish frontier…In return 
for these commissions brigands enjoyed the protection of their political patrons if 
they were arrested for crimes…” (Campbell and Sherrard 1968: 88). As a result, only 
12 out of the 53 elected opposition deputies physically survived the King’s inventive 
election campaign. Secondly, as opposed to Capodistrias, King Otho was a staunch 
supporter of the Megali Idea, even though he was forced by outside powers, including 
Russia, to compromise on the territorial ambitions of the state, thus making him the 
visible and disliked impediment to Greek territorial aggrandizement.69 This 
                                                 
69
 For an overview over Greek territorial acquisitions after 1821 see map no. 2 in the appendix. 
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resentment grew out of proportion to the degree that King Otho was taken out of 
office in a bloodless coup in 1862.  
 
The fact that the Greek throne was artificially created and imposed from 
outside did not imply that it was merely a powerless institution of representation. 
Despite not having direct land-ownership, the early twentieth century dynastic 
practice of Europe, where both Otho and his successor George had their origin, was 
implemented in Greece in a similar fashion through personalized office venality and 
their autocratic style of government. This distribution of power in favour of a 
coalition between landholding elites and a foreign monarch, equally was no accident 
or result of the King’s ruthless pursuit of personal benefit, but by design of the 
guarantor Powers. Aware of the weight the new Hellenic dynasty carried, not least 
with regard to its geostrategic position, France, Britain and Russia passed a balance of 
power clause in the London Protocol of 1830 which clearly banned any member of 
the Concert from occupying the Greek throne. This limitation was reflected in the 
selection of Kings from the smaller dynasties of Wittelsbach and Schleswig-Hostein-
Sonderburg-Glücksburg.  
 
4.8.4 The Personalized Politics of ‘Modern’ Greece 
The political landscape after the War of Independence can be characterized as 
follows: On the one hand, “the old patrons or oligarchs had little difficulty in 
exploiting and strengthening the clientage system to thwart the attempts to impose a 
European or modern political system”. On the other hand, these attempts were half 
hearted in the sense that they were emulating a form of absolutist rule, meaning “the 
political sphere was not sharply differentiated from the spheres of social and personal 
relations” (Psomiades 1976: 150).  This situation was to endure well into the 20th 
century even after the introduction of constitutional monarchies, parliamentary 
elections, the political participation of at least some social groups and the 
development of a professional bureaucracy that led to the gradual formation of a 
bourgeois middle class. However, due to the persistence of office venality, this new 
professional/bourgeois class did not represent a “radically different political type” and 
so “the system of local notabilities and patronage persisted, particularly in the 
countryside where the majority of the electorate still lived” (Campbell and Sherrard 
1968: 113). This meant that these new professionals and state structures developing 
under Capodistrias and King Otho focussed mainly “upon the management of 
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conflicts within the framework of the ruling class” (Kostis 2005: 21) as direct 
descendants of the Rum Millet. This may, however, not necessarily constitute a big 
revelation, for these political structures and socially entrenched vested interests 
expectedly will not change over a brief period of time. Thus, even conservative 
historians admit, that “Patron-client relationships permeated society at all levels and, 
indeed, have continued to be a pronounced feature of society until the present” (Clogg 
1992: 60f).  
 
What this goes to show, though, is the fact that national secession cannot be 
understood as a form of social revolution but has to be seen as the obliteration of the 
perceivably ‘foreign’, i.e. Muslim, element from society as well as ending a semi-
tributary relation with an unloved, yet more and more assertive central Ottoman 
administration. This equally lends support to the assumption that post-Independence 
Greece was not, for a long time, a modern state in the sense of an ideal-typical 
separation of the private from the public. Due to the continuing problem of Klefts 
raiding the Greco-Ottoman border, much resented by Britain as it was (Tzanelli 
2002), the Greek state effectively retained a military frontier (Kostis 2005: 21-22) 
which found its most far-reaching and radical expression in the Megali Idea. Land 
ownership, on the other hand, was still pooled amongst the established competing 
clans from the Greek ‘old regime’, made up of primates, the captains, the clergy and 
the shipbuilding and seafaring merchant dynasties from the Aegean.  
 
So if there were an impetus for a ‘real’ modernisation of political rule, this 
must have come from outside, namely from the guarantor powers, rather than from 
within the conflict-ridden and politically disunited indigenous ‘Greek’ society. After 
the assassination of Capodistrias it was left to the Bavarian Regents to ‘modernize’ 
the state. In doing so, however, it introduced the Bavarian model to its full extent, i.e. 
it retained personalised rule and dynasticism within modern territorial rule. In other 
words, it was a half hearted revolution from outside, rather than above, or even 
below, since the ideals of Greek nationalism were introduced by an exile Russian 
born and trained elite and actual state modernization was carried out by the guarantor 
powers. Thus, Greece during the Othonian time appears to have undergone only 
marginal social transformation with the Rum Millet power structures essentially 
remaining intact, save for the Bavarians. This observation should not be confused, 
however, with the argument frequently made by nationalist Greek historiography 
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which claims that Greek development was only held back by outside intervention. If 
anything, it was outside intervention that gave the only, if weak, impetus for change.  
 
4.8.5 Capitalist (under)development 
Moreover, this absence of change is also reflected in the continuing 
underdevelopment that is fairly unanimously accepted within Greek historiography. 
There appears little evidence to suggest a meaningful capitalist transformation prior 
to the consolidation of the Greek state in the late 19th century had taken place. During 
Ottoman rule, “productive industry beyond the scale of simple workshops (…) was 
absent” (Campbell and Sherrard 1968: 92; Sakellaropoulos 1985). Production was 
generally limited to shipbuilding and textile, and a large-scale commodification of 
land and labour was absent, not least given the contentious property issues that lasted 
well into the independence era. The socio-historical reality of Greek backwardness is, 
thus, usually not subject to debate and accepted across a wide variety of Greek and 
Balkan historiography. Most economic historians agree that, if anything, post-
Independence Greece can be understood as Michael Palairet put it, “evolution without 
development” (Mouzelis 1978; Palairet 1989).  
A more controversial debate evolved around the competing explanations for 
this lack of development. Unsurprisingly, Greek nationalist historiography, in a 
culturalist tradition, locates backwardness in the corruption and social stationariness70 
the Ottoman ‘interference’ had inflicted on the Greek natural propensity to grow and 
prosper as an intrinsically European society. Similarly, post-Independence 
backwardness is thought to have been caused by an impending interference of the 
same European powers whose societies the young state was trying to emulate in its 
effort to catch up. The Hellenic liberation paradigm remains true to its emphasis on 
the Greek mercantile class as the only agents of change. However, as was shown 
earlier, these classes occupied a less than central space in the revolt, with many of 
them even opposing it outright. This view is further substantiated by the fact that even 
after independence the centres of ‘Greek’ commerce were still outside of the borders 
of the new state, namely Istanbul and Smyrna (today’s Izmir) (Örs 2006). The revolt, 
rather than being the carefully coordinated result of a bourgeois ‘Dream Nation’, 
developed out of the uncoordinated anti-Ottoman activities of unsuccessful merchants 
by the Black Sea, Greek nobility in Russian service, local power magnates in the 
                                                 
70
 The concept of social stationariness in relation to ‘the Orient’ is identified by Bryan S. Turner as 
specific to utilitarian and Marxist social theory, see Turner (1974); see also Chapter 1, pp 40-43. 
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Morea and bandits on the loose (Vergopoulos 1978). Most economic activity within 
the new state continued to be highly traditional family farming. Moreover, where 
large landed estates had been established, these were tightly controlled by the 
primates who continued to impede social change.  
Development and social change was, therefore, either entirely absent or very 
slow due to what can be called the ‘persistence of the old regime’. Even though the 
Ottoman expulsion was coordinated by exile nationalists, it was still considered 
desirable by the old local regime, even though their desire for wider social change 
was limited to say the least. As a consequence, the dynastic revolution from outside 
was increasingly infiltrated by the old regime. As Mouzelis observes, these old elites 
started taking over “the expanding state apparatus and to gear the whole political 
system to the safeguarding and promotion of their interests” (Mouzelis 1978: 14). In 
the meantime their struggle with the liberals, aiming at a transition towards a modern 
state, a foreign imposed quasi-absolutist ruler and the preservation of local vested 
interest degenerated into a full scale civil war in the aftermath of the War of 
Independence. Thus, economic growth and capitalist development only occurred after 
the first major geopolitical challenge forced consolidation onto the old regime. After 
the Crimean War and the ousting of King Otho in 1862 “…Greece experienced a 
considerable expansion of her economy during the last four decades of the 19th 
century” (Campbell and Sherrard 1968: 96). Thus, the newly independent Greece, 
like its former Ottoman supra-state before, can be seen as a classical late-comer. This 
was not the result of Ottoman mis-rule, however, as secession, if anything, delayed 
the process of catching up rather than epitomizing it.  
 
The Issue of the National Estates 
In light of the absence of development, and in line with the argument about the 
persistence of the old regime, a preservation of the traditional Ottoman Rum Millet 
land regime could have been expected. This was, however, not the case as the 
expulsion of Muslim landlords during the revolt created a large availability of land, 
which was thought to have constituted a unique chance to distribute wealth as a 
means of creating a more equitable society and to initiate social change 
contemporaneously with national independence. The land issue, i.e. the question as to 
how to distribute large amounts of valuable land, is more commonly known as the 
question of the ‘National Estates’. The outcome of this inevitably conflictual 
distribution process and the degree to which it did or did not generate social change 
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can, thus, be seen as a litmus test for the viability of the liberation paradigm’s claim 
about the historical co-incidence of social transformation and secession. According to 
the conventional story, the National Lands “…came under the direct control of the 
state. In addition, the state directly controlled all the land that had not been officially 
granted by the Ottoman Empire and…[thus]…impeded on the development of a class 
of large landowners…” (Batalas 2003: 167).  
Initially, this begs the question as to which state is supposed to have 
controlled the distribution given either the complete absence, the lack of stability or 
the personalized nature of the young Greek political institutions. This narrative, rather 
than reflecting the actual historical realities, is based on an ideal type development 
envisaged in Capodistrias’ best laid plans, which, however, went awfully wrong. 
These plans had intended, on the one hand, to compensate for their efforts the 
Brigands who had fought in the uprising. However, this was not meant as a form of 
material compensation, but also as a sign that the revolt had actually kept its promise 
of transforming the society. On the other hand, a widespread distribution of small 
parcels of land was intended to prevent the accumulation of large estates and the 
associated emergence of independent centers of power, which, as the Ottoman 
experience had shown, crippled any state’s centralizing efforts.  
While it was clear that the re-distribution of Ottoman lands was not easily 
achievable, the complete failure of the program is still remarkable. This was partly 
due to an attempt by primates to expand their own holdings, which, in turn, was 
motivated more by the potential social effects of land distribution, than 
straightforward material benefit. Their rationale was that any peasant freeholdings 
would immediately threaten a reaction of those peasants working on the primate’s 
holdings: “Hence, the frozen status of the ‘national estates’ and the continuing tenant 
status of their cultivators served as a barrier against a force which, once set in motion, 
could have resulted in a fundamental reordering of the entire landholding regime and 
the social order based on it” (McGrew 1976: 126). While there is agreement that large 
scale land distribution in the end did not occur until 1871, disagreement about the 
cause for it persists. The liberation paradigm argues that redistribution efforts were 
thwarted by Bavarian indifference, while, previously the true liberal and egalitarian 
intentions of Count Capodistrias were thwarted simply by his ‘untimely death’ 
(Koliopoulos and Veremis 2002: 166).71  
                                                 
71
 Capodistria’s attempts to distribute land had challenged many vested interests. As such, his 
assassination is better described as the outcome of a conflict with the primates, rather than a 
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Critical approaches, on the other hand, emphasize the continuous social 
strength of vested interests as the reason behind the lack of transformation. At the 
same time, the land was needed to create revenue, first for the war effort and later for 
the construction of the thus far non-existing and fragile centralized military and fiscal 
infrastructure. Short-term revenue could best be generated by selling the National 
Estates, or, more commonly, to use them as securities for gaining further loans from 
the City of London - an act of what McGrew called financial incompetence of the 
young state (McGrew 1976: 127). Even the large-scale redistribution of land that did 
occur in 1871 was of limited effectiveness. The further territorial expansion of Greece 
in 1881 via a formal purchase of land from the Ottoman Empire in Thessaly after the 
Treaty of Berlin provided some relief on this issue. Turkish landlords were outsold by 
wealthy diaspora Greeks, a transaction which was based on the emerging notion of 
private property both within Ottoman and Greek jurisdictions. This was followed by a 
full expropriation of peasants by removing the Ottoman legal structures that had 
previously safeguarded their rights to usufruct, thereby turning them into waged 
labourers, sometimes worsening their conditions dramatically. We can speak here of a 
form of Greek enclosure which marks the eventual transformation towards capitalist 
agriculture. This capitalist transformation, however, brought with it new forms of 
exploitation which “were at times so oppressive that many Greek peasants crossed the 
northern borders to resettle in the Ottoman Empire” (Batalas 2003: 168). 
 
4.8.6 Between ‘Border’ and ‘Frontier’  
Peasant migration was one form of reaction to the introduction of capitalist social 
relations. The other we have already seen, was a return to brigandage. Their 
continued strength proved to be one of the more formidable challenges for 
consolidating the Greek state, both socially but also territorially. Brigands, as Batalas 
observes, had successfully undermined three previous attempts to form a regular army 
due to their “hostility (…) toward the formation of regular military units that would 
bolster the authority of the emerging nation state” (Batalas 2003: 157). This hostility 
was encouraged by their desire to uphold their freedom to bear arms for the purpose 
of generating revenue at their will, thus putting them into a similar relation towards 
the new Greek state as towards the Ottoman centralizing regime. For them, “political 
independence was not a goal that was actually pursued” even though “the War of 
                                                                                                                                     
misfortunate and ‘untimely’ coincidence. From the primates’ point of view his death was timed 
rather well.  
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Independence became (…) an opportunity for achieving greater economic and 
political power within their individual jurisdictions” (Batalas 2003: 157). This 
explains their participation in the overall struggle. However, this willingness was 
conditional upon their success to prevent a unified nation-state and a centralized army 
formidable enough to break their arms-bearing power-base. As a result, Capodistrias 
and Otho devised a strategy of co-opting the captains rather than outright disarming 
them. Whilst this appears to have been the only feasible option at the time, the offer 
to turn a blind eye towards continued banditry practices instead of trying to absorb 
irregulars into a standing army was also with an eye to using them in future 
geopolitical encounters. Nevertheless this policy resulted in “…the modern Greek 
state’s inability to impose a monopoly of the means of coercion” (Batalas 2003: 150). 
This led to a process Achilles Batalas labels ‘inverse racketeering’, i.e. a situation 
where the state, rather than imposing a monopoly over the means of violence, tries to 
monopolize the already existing means of violence by purchasing man power whether 
needed or not. Thus, “the ‘racketeers’ (i.e. bandits-irregulars) provided the state, via a 
patron-client relationship, with protection against themselves and other bandits” 
(Batalas 2003: 150). It was, therefore, exactly these units which were the only ones 
capable of confronting the Ottoman forces and supplying the state with military 
vitality. Given the absence of any functioning or efficient fiscal system to pay them, 
their revenue was either generated in the traditional, destabilizing ways, or, by 
channelling their form of subsistence outwards. This resulted in an active 
encouragement of raids on the Ottoman border. The only element of Greek society 
that had constituted a proto-‘revolutionary’ fighting force was not incorporated into 
the new state and found itself in exactly the same social position as prior to the revolt. 
Externalizing the bandits’ mode of reproduction in fact meant that the ‘modern’ 
Greek border reverted to the military frontier the Ottoman Empire had started to 
‘close’ from 1699 onwards. This meant that Greece was a distinctly pre-modern 
social form which continued to engage in a weakened form of geopolitical 
accumulation. This incomplete transition, reflected in the Megali Idea, had a dramatic 
impact on the new state’s external relations and, by extension, the history of 
subsequent state formations in the entire region. 
 
The persistence of irregulars and the need to incorporate them into what was 
to become the ‘modern’ Greek state meant that from 1827 up until 1923, territorial 
expansion, either in the form of occasional border raids, or, in form of the Megali 
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Idea, were a socio-economically conditioned, essential characteristic of the Greek 
polity. Both of these state-forming strategies stood at odds with the international 
system to which this new state owed its existence. “…Considering that the Protecting 
Powers were unwilling to support Greek irredentist policies, Greek state elites 
searched for the right circumstances to assault the Ottoman Empire” (Batalas 2003: 
166). Those Powers, tired of the unruly nature of the new border, continued piracy in 
the Aegean as well as their own agents’ exposure to frequent robberies, eventually 
tried to coerce their young client state into maintaining the international balance of 
power. This culminated in the Royal Navy blockade of Greek ports in January 1850. 
Palmerstone’s rather short-sighted policy, however, created the detrimental effect of 
an even heavier reliance of Otho’s regime on Russian support. As a response to the 
constraints imposed by Britain,72 Greek officials, well aware of the origin of the 
problem and their complicity in it, blamed the persistence of banditry as a social 
phenomenon on Ottoman sabotage, rather than on the lack of social integration. As a 
result, the bandits served “in the Neohellenic imaginary both as a “scourge” and as a 
demonstration of Greek irredentist heroism, a dangerous “disease” and an almost 
innate Greek virtue” (Tzanelli 2002: 49). In their social reality and despite their 
hypothetically advanced social position as ‘liberators’, secure employment in the new 
Greek state was only scarcely offered and integration was still only gradual. 
Nevertheless, this coincidence between the rise of a socially disadvantaged, 
potentially violent class and a national project set in motion the latter’s incomplete 
conversion from outlaws to the military establishment of the newly formed nation-
state. The fact that social integration, slow as it may have been, eventually did occur, 
differentiates the Greek bandits markedly from their more famous Sicilian 
counterparts featuring in Blok’s account. Lacking such a state defining heroic role, 
the Sicilians operate within the interstices of an Italian state to this day.73  
With the Crimean War, the consolidation of bandits took place as demand for 
their services rose again. It is, thus, only with the, so to speak, second Greek 
revolution, i.e. the overthrow of King Otto in 1862, that more meaningful social 
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 Amongst those were budgetary restrictions on military spending. Due to outstanding loans 
Britain was in a particularly powerful position to control Greek finances. The same applied to the 
Ottoman Empire whose finances were managed directly by Britain and France from 1875 
onwards.  
73
 See Blok (1974). The Irish liberation struggle is often claimed to have similar social origins and 
a political integration of the IRA as well as the ending of its criminal operations remains a political 
issue. Equally, the Kosovan Liberation Army (UÇK) is frequently charged by Serbian politicians 
of being in effect the military arm of organized crime, rather than a political or independence 
movement.  
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change, albeit only gradually, set in. Indeed, this social change was, according to 
Kostis, primarily conditioned by the shifting geopolitical dynamics around the young 
Kingdom, most importantly after the Crimean War. This change mostly consisted in 
the shifting of the geopolitical focus from the Ottoman Empire to the Balkans. This 
was substantiated by a series of national schisms within the previously united 
Orthodox Church. The creation of an autocephalous Greek Church and the denial of 
the Patriarchate was indeed a contentious issue not only domestically, where 
conservative forces saw it as a Protestant or Catholic conspiracy. These national 
schisms also involved a geopolitical dimension, however, which was tightly 
connected to Slavophobic tendencies within the new state. Greece’s Slav neighbours 
had already formed sub-forms of Orthodoxy prior to the establishment of the Greek 
autocephalous church, albeit with the Patriarchate’s and Ottoman consent. This 
already constituted a break within the Rum Millet, but, in the light of Ottoman 
collapse matured into a regional conflict, mostly over the Macedonian question. 
Having come under pressure from both Serbian but more so from Bulgarian 
aspirations, which exceedingly clashed with the Megali Idea and the social need for 
irredentism, the new Greece, at least temporarily, considered a rapprochement with 
the Ottoman Empire, considered the lesser evil in the face of a Pan-Slavist threat 
(Campbell and Sherrard 1968: 103). The Ottoman Empire was weak and depended on 
the same European powers as Greece, whereas Pan-Slavism was backed by the 
continuously aggressive Russian ambitions, which were more virulent than ever since 
the new Greece, even though being strongly Orthodox, tended to disappoint Russian 
expectations as an ally. 
 
 
4.9 Conclusion 
As the preceding brief overview over the struggle for independence has shown, 
liberation is a problematic concept if applied to the Greek case. The only liberation 
that doubtlessly took place is the liberation from the Ottoman tax collector. As for the 
social structure of the new polity, the major change consisted in the departure of the 
Muslim part of the population, landlords and peasants alike. The fact that the former 
had held a considerable part of landed property provided an opportunity for social 
transformation in the form of the National Estates, which were not seized.  
The ‘social fuel’ of the secession, bandits and landless peasants, on the other 
hand, were “too poor, too religious, and too well-integrated into the Ottoman society” 
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(Kasaba 2003: 2) to respond to the call of the European intellectuals to raise their 
arms. Their motivation was a different one. This was shown by their lack of 
cooperation in the creation of a central authority, which was unable to incorporate 
into the new state. State building turned out to be difficult as it was confronted with a 
“complex problem of centrifugal sectionalism, which had formed the social 
background of the repeated civil wars that had almost ruined the War of 
Independence (1821-8)” (Kitromilides 1994: 162). The social change that did occur 
was, thus, limited to eroding the ‘Turkish’ part of the ruling Ottoman regime as well 
as channelling the still powerful established ‘Greek’ vested interests into the foreign 
imposed institutions of the new polity. “Insofar it is considered self-evident that 
transition takes place through the adoption of a new institutional framework by the 
revolution, while at a local level the structures of power remain unaltered, riddled 
with patronage exchanges and the attempt to appropriate the state apparatus” (Kostis 
2005: 19). The chaotic and continuously violent aftermath of the Greek secession in 
comparison with the earlier Ottoman practices goes to show that “the Sultan had the 
well-being of his Christian subjects at heart, for they were one of the chief sources of 
the imperial revenues, and if he failed, as he often did, to curb administrative 
malpractices and petty tyranny in the provinces, it was not because he was tyrannical 
himself but because (…) his writ had ceased to run in the extremities of his realm” 
(Dakin 1973: 20). 
As patronage and clientelism persisted, the political decision making process 
– especially elections – remained violent in character. As already established under 
the Othonian regime, parliamentary elections regularly plunged into a form of “civil 
war” (Campbell and Sherrard 1968: 100). Nevertheless it is evident that from the 
1880’s onwards the eventual turn towards state modernization was engineered by a 
native class of professional elites acting as real ‘revolutionary agents’. Thus, after an 
unsuccessful ‘revolution from outside’, Greece eventually underwent, after the 
emergence of a bourgeois class of “professional men and salaried clerks working in 
financial, commercial, and government institutions” (Campbell and Sherrard 1968: 
98) its very own ‘revolution from above’. Hence, almost 100 years after Selim III had 
initiated a comparable process, the newly established state converged on a similar 
developmental route when effective state centralisation was realized through a variety 
of fiscal and infrastructural measures introduced by the new Prime Minister, 
Charilaos Tricoupis (1832-1896). 
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Greek State Formation and the National 
In terms of the applicability of theories of nationalism, this means that not only did a 
social transformation that would merit the label of a revolution not take place, but 
also that the social conditions for the emergence of a ‘national’ de-personal political 
subjectivity were absent. Post-Independence Greece was not a modern or even 
industrial society and social relations remained localized as well as personalized. 
Secession, in other words, did not turn subjects into citizens. Rather, by eradicating 
the layer of autonomy and local self-rule inherent in the Ottoman Millet system, it 
created a stronger, and widely resented ‘national’, but foreign constitutional monarch 
further strengthening local particularism. The social origin of the secessionist 
dynamic was not a direct expression or product of nationalism as explained by 
modernist theories of nationalism. In the case of Greece, this relation between 
nationalism, as an abstract intellectual construct and the vested interests as the 
concrete social reality is neatly demonstrated by the conflict within the emerging 
modern state, torn by the dilemma between the Hellenic Enlightenment and the 
Ancient Regime of the Rum Millet.  
The identification of a clear and coherent liberal Greek national project 
overlooks many aspects relating to the origins of the struggle. It assumes the 
imminent spread of an enlightened national ideology from its conception in Europe 
into the Balkans74 with an immediate impact on an inherently trans-national merchant 
class and a presumably largely uneducated peasant people. Greek nationalism is 
developed by an exile mercantile class and nobility who stand in the Russian and 
other European courts’ services (Harlaftis 2005). The ‘export’ of this ideology to the 
perceived Greek homeland was by and large unsuccessful because it lacked any 
native social base. Nationalism’s source of strength was neither the Enlightenment 
nor capitalist penetration, but a coalition of Klefts, Armatoloi and primates, 
concerned with retaining, or re-establishing their bases of social power. The absence 
of a large following and the restriction of the nationalist discourse to exile elites 
constitute evidence that the national element of the revolt neither indicates, let alone 
explains social change. 
Equally, being Muslim/Turkish is considered indistinguishable from being a 
surplus-extracting landowner in the Greek liberation paradigm. This obscures that 
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 Even accounts which generally mobilize the conventional account of a real-existing 
bourgeois/capitalist transformation in the 19th century Ottoman economy, admit that this did not 
necessarily entail a politico-ideological penetration of Enlightenment thought and if so, only in a 
‘retarded’ fashion. See Fischer-Galati (1975); for a more open-ended argument about the relevance 
of Liberalism for the Balkan transitions see Mishkova (2006). 
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these distinctions were far from clear cut, but were multi-facetted and more complex 
than modern ethnic divisions. Rather than speaking of a clear historical, cultural, 
political, economic and technological rupture between a ‘backward’ Oriental-
Ottoman regime and a ‘modern’ Enlightened Greek state, it appears to be more 
appropriate to conceive of a long-term trajectory, a process from pre-modern to 
modern sovereignty within which the secession does not represent the great leap 
forward. Theories of nationalism are therefore not necessarily inadequate in general. 
However, they do not apply to this particular historical setting of the early 19th 
century Ottoman Empire because they pre-suppose a transformation as causal that has 
not taken place in southeastern Europe.  
This, naturally, begs the question as to what does explain the ‘national’ and 
territorial differentiation of 1821 that developed out of this social struggle. Even 
though most forms of social identification remained locally grounded, one significant 
transformation did take place. The kind of international homology imposed in the 
Greek case, was neither the Enlightenment or capitalist modernity, nor a functional 
derivate thereof, nationalism, but the physical and territorial dissection of mutually 
antagonistic homogenous communities through the application of mass political 
violence. Atrocities and campaigns of mass killings committed against Christian and 
Muslim civilians alike by the belligerent parties not only reciprocally aggravated 
processes of ethnic cleansing, but also motivated, in part, the involvement of 
international powers in the conflict. Here, Mahmud’s scheme to invite French-trained 
Egyptian forces to the battle field in reward for sharing the spoils of the war with 
Egypt’s Albanian vassal, Mohammed Ali, proved particularly counter-productive.75 It 
was the atrocities committed by these much more effective (in a negative sense) 
troops that not only further fuelled the spiral of mass violence, but was also the main 
reason for the international intervention without which the Greek insurrection would 
not have been successful.  
More importantly still, this led to the consolidation of two opposing forms of 
clearly distinguishable ‘national’ communities. What had been a matter of faith now 
became a matter of exclusive territorial control. Hence, Muslims became ‘Turks’ and 
Christians became ‘Greeks’, both attached to a distinct territory thus creating the 
conditions of internal hierarchy and external anarchy. Even though a full reciprocal 
ethnic purification was not achieved until the population exchange in 1923, the War 
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 Not least since Ali’s later campaigns against the Sultan were triggered by a frustration with the 
lack of financial or territorial rewards from the Greek adventure. 
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of Independence set in motion what Heather Rae called ‘pathological 
homogenization’ (not that there is a non-pathological form of homogenization) of a 
subject people. On the one hand, it seems difficult to associate this violent process 
with political emancipation, the Enlightenment or any other form of human progress 
(Rae 2002: Chapter 1). On the other hand, this should not be confused with ‘ordering’ 
the international through violence (cf. Kalyvas, Masoud et al. 2008).  
Thus, even if this transformation is non-national, non-capitalist and pre-
modern, it is far away from being irrelevant. It matters decisively, not only as a 
critical historiographic contribution to the reconstruction of the Greek secession, but 
also for the discipline of IR. For it delimits from the early 19th century onwards, the 
nature of further social transactions by forming clear and unambiguous delimitations 
of distinguishable ‘societies’. This not only means that between 1821 and 1833 the 
social acquires, for the first time, a national definition. Rather, the modern concept of 
‘society’ itself becomes historical reality for the first time. Arguably, the Greek 
secession not only re-formulates the ontology of ‘society’, it generates it. By 
extension, this is equally true for ‘the inter-national’. Relations between 
distinguishable ‘societies’ create an identifiable, anarchical realm of inter-action.  
Beyond the historical constitution of the central ontologies of IR, the war of 
independence also set in motion a geopolitical dynamic unique to southeastern 
Europe. It established the geopolitical ‘layout’ of the region that was to become the 
‘Powder Keg’. Greek territorial ambitions, the origins of which have been clarified 
above, led to another attempt at implementing the Megali Idea, repeated again during 
the 1974 putsch in the Republic of Cyprus. Thus, it led to a variety of geopolitical 
encounters with the Ottoman Empire, the Republic of Turkey and a variety of Balkan 
states without which the future development and state formations in the region would 
be incomprehensible. This goes to show that 1821 is not only the beginning of an 
independent Greece, but equally represents the emergence of a new international 
system in the region. 
This is not to say, however, that geopolitical dynamics prior to 1821 did not 
influence the region’s development. The Greek secession did not occur in isolation 
from its geopolitical and world economic environment. In other words, the Greek 
national insurrection is not intelligible without developing an understanding of “the 
country's [or rather: the Ottoman’s] participation in the interstate system” (Kostis 
2005: 30) at the time. This participation in the already established, dominant 
European interstate system, which gave a new quality to the pre-existing social 
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conflicts within the Ottoman Empire, will be looked at in more detail in the following 
chapter.76 
                                                 
76
 While the inter-national system between Absolutist powers matured within the Great Powers of 
Europe at the time, southeastern Europe and the Middle East only started a gradual transformation 
towards a similar territorial, inter-state system. As a result, the international does not enter the 
explanation as a general abstraction derived from multiplicity but rather as a concrete 
manifestation of Absolutist European inter-state relations on the one hand and as an emerging 
system of late Ottoman national movements on the other. This generates a specific set of relations 
and dynamics which cannot be subsumed under a single ontology. 
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5 Peter’s Testament vs. British Hegemony  
The Great Powers and the Greek secession  
 
We must progress as much as possible in the direction of Constantinople and India. … 
We must hasten the downfall of Persia, push on to the Persian Gulf, if possible re-
establish the ancient commercialities with the Levant through Syria, and force our way 
into the Indies, which are the storehouses of the world. Once there, we can dispense with 
English gold. 
   
The Testament of Peter the Great, Article 9 77 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In some ways, defining ‘the international’ appears less of a problem looking at 19th 
century Europe when compared to the Balkans. After all, a distinguishable 
international system, made up of clearly defined, mostly neo-Absolutist states had 
emerged from the rubble of the Napoleonic disruption. In this way, ‘the international’ 
could simply mean the Vienna Concert of powers, not least since it was this Concert 
that exercised the most tangible influence in the Greek Question. Regardless of this 
undeniable fact, limiting the analysis to Great Power politics still appears somewhat 
problematic and would be liable to the charge of state-centrism. For example, the 
deteriorating conditions of the peasantry in the Morea, which is central for 
understanding the Greek Independence struggle, can be understood in terms of a 
conflict of situated local social forces. However, these are influenced by a manifold 
of ‘external’ dimensions, starting from the centralizing Ottoman state, the Vienna 
system and, not least, global geopolitical and economic developments. The same 
applies to the Porte’s own drive towards centralization which was fuelled by the 
immediate and pressing need to raise income and efficiency of taxation as well as 
military flexibility in response to the increased geopolitical pressures during the 18th 
and 19th centuries. Thus, instead of a strictly binary inside/outside distinction, 
geopolitical relations appear to be structured rather like a Matryoshka doll, or an 
onion, with multiple layers of social interaction, none of them reducible to the ‘logic’ 
of the layer above, yet at the same time incomprehensible without looking at the 
onion as a whole. One of these layers we have already dealt with was the idea of an 
ideological penetration through an influential liberal Enlightenment which had 
prepared the intellectual ground for the Philiki Etaria. However, this impact was 
much more marginal than conventionally assumed. Equally, the economic 
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transformations have had an only marginal impact, with a capitalist transformation 
not taking place until many years after the secession.  
What remains, therefore, from an International Relations perspective, as the 
unique form of ‘external determination‘, is the top layer of the onion – the Great 
Powers and a classical study of 19th century International History which will be 
presented in this chapter. This is of great importance, for, as the eminent Balkan 
historians Jelavich and Jelavich have duly pointed out, “…outside intervention 
[which] was to be more influential in determining the final outcome than were the 
actions of the Greek leaders themselves” (Jelavich and Jelavich 1977: 38).  
This ‘Great Power’ dimension underwent a significant transformation in the long 
19th century, which, according to Paul Schroeder, diminished the ‘logic’ of intra-
European colonial/territorial competition and increased the cooperative, normative 
elements of this order (Schroeder, P. W. 1994). The Vienna Settlement ended the 
Napoleonic conquest of most of Europe which itself was premeditated by the French 
Revolution. It was, however, of wide-ranging consequence as it widely spread a 
political ideology and institutions which were adverse to the absolutist dynastic rule 
that had preceded it. After the Napoleonic forces were famously beaten at Waterloo 
by a coalition of Britain, Prussia and Russia in 1815, the peace conference at Vienna 
which restored the old inter-dynastic order gained fame as one of the most successful 
periods of international governance, inducing a 100 Years Peace to be broken only by 
the ‘Galloping Gertie’ leading to the First World War (Schroeder 1972).  
This institutionalist interpretation of the Vienna era was also influential in the 
historiography of the Eastern Question. The post-Napoleonic inter-state system is 
frequently employed by IR theorists and international historians alike as the prime 
example for an international ‘order’ deserving of its name, successfully disciplining 
all of its members and creating a consensual international order – including the 
establishment of the Greek state (Schroeder 1983; Schroeder, P. W. 1994: 614-621, 
637 – 642).  
However, there is no historiographic consensus about this interpretation of the 
international dimension of the Greek Question. Rather, there exist two fundamentally 
opposing ways in which the geopolitical dimension of this conflict and its outcomes 
can be understood. These two strands reflect the discipline-defining inter-paradigm 
debate (Powell 1994). While Schroeder’s and others (eg Meadwell 2001) interpret the 
concert as a consensual, conscious creation of an internationally agreed normative 
institutional order, a realist view interprets Vienna as a period of remarkable, but only 
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relative stability, which was not consciously or normatively created but 
fundamentally based on the conditions of anarchy, self-help and – crucially – the 
balance of power mechanism. Realists argue for the immutability of Great Power 
struggles and the structural constraints of an anarchical international system. 
However, they equally emphasize the continuity of Russian expansionism which was 
only mediated, rather than eradicated by the Vienna order. 
This chapter will in principle concur with the realist argument and submit that the 
geopolitical environment of the Greek Question was characterized first and foremost 
by the pursuit of geostrategic interests of the Romanov Empire and the British 
balancing policy trying to curtail these ambitions. Prior to Vienna, Catherine the 
Great’s expansionist agenda is historiographically undisputed as she intended to seize 
the opportunity of Britain’s preoccupation with the American War of Independence to 
enlarge her grip on Eastern Europe.78 In this spirit, “the project of driving the Turks 
out of the Balkans was the kind of affair that appealed to Catherine’s vanity” 
(Ragsdale 2006: 512). However, whilst the institutionalist historiography identifies a 
break with this tradition in 1815, it will be argued here that a continuity of Russian 
imperialist foreign ambitions can be discerned, at least as far as the Near East is 
concerned. Contrary to the realist conclusion about the structurally aggressive nature 
of Russia, it will be argued that her outward drive was not caused by a timeless 
‘logic’ of anarchical inter-state relations, but was owed to the specificity of Russia’s 
own geopolitical predicament forcing new forms of social reproduction focussed 
around the Black Sea. Due to the topography of the region and the lack of warm 
water ports, this ‘forced’ the Russian hand towards the Ottoman Empire and, more 
precisely, onto the Straits and Constantinople. The new geopolitical order in the 
Balkans was, however, not entirely conducive to Russia’s own interest, but the 
outcome of the systemic compromises between the Great Powers.  
 This argument will be substantiated in three steps. First the debate on the 
Greek Question within International Relations will be revisited. The struggle over the 
international response to this crisis was reflected in a debate between institutionalist 
(Schroeder 1983) and realist (Cowles 1990; Kagan 1997; Rendall 2000, 2006) 
interpretations of the Vienna era. This debate will be summarized and reflected in 
light of a more detailed historical reconstruction of the Great Powers’ response to the 
Greek dilemma. This will reveal, secondly, a major deviation of one traditional 
lynchpin of British foreign policy, the Pax Ottomanica. British support for the Greek 
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struggle was motivated mainly by the necessity to contain the expanding Russian 
influence in the entire region, whereas Russia, conversely, curtailed her territorial 
ambitions in favour of a balance of power regime in the region. Thirdly, it will be 
shown that these ambitions, epitomized by the Russian occupation of the Black Sea 
shores in 1774, mainly consisted of designs on the Straits for both defensive and 
commercial naval purposes. Thus, while there was some degree of moderation of 
Russian ambitions from 1815 onwards, this was owed to a Russian balance of power 
rationale, rather than a normative consensus reached at Vienna. This finding, finally, 
supports the realist over the institutionalist interpretation of the international response 
to the Greek question. Thus, the London Protocol which institutionalized Greek 
independence was not based on a normative consensus about the ‘inter-national’ 
nature of the new order, but represented the least common denominator of competing 
Great Powers. Interestingly, these Great Power influences were directly reflected in 
the infant Greek political landscape with the Russian, English and French parties 
constituting the cornerstones of the first multi-party system of the Greek polity.  
 
 
5.2 The Vienna Concert – the Genesis of ‘Modern’ IR?  
As mentioned above, on February 3 1830 “the London Conference issued the 
protocol which established an independent Greek state under the guarantee of the 
three powers” with a European monarch as the head of state “as a concession to the 
conservative temper of the Concert of Europe” (Petropulos 1968: 48-50). Hence, 
European support for Greek Independence as not motivated by Enlightened 
Nationalist ideology or European Philhellenism. While in principle sympathetic to the 
Greeks, supporting revolt and upheaval clashed with the reactionary spirit of the time. 
This also raises the question as to whether this compromise came about due to the 
shared ‘rational’ and conscious creation of a new form of international order, or 
simply because it was the lowest common denominator; a negative balance of power 
compromise within an anarchical international system that was preventing a wide 
ranging solution to the issue. It was the international response to the Greek Question 
in particular which served as an arena for this historical reformulation of the inter-
paradigm debate.  
 
Paul W. Schroeder is one of the most prominent, if by no means uncontested 
institutionalist historians of the Concert period. He holds this era to be of a 
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historically unprecedented quality in establishing peaceful and cooperative relations 
between the Great Powers. To him, the common description of the Vienna accords as 
‘restoration’ constitutes a historical distortion, for “only a few regimes, and none of 
the great powers, really wanted or tried to do this” (Schroeder, P. W. 1994: 586). 
Schroeder understands this period as an economic and mostly domestically driven 
period of ‘recuperation’ instead, characterized by economic crises and political 
upheaval, none of which would allow for restoring an international order beyond a 
domestic consolidation of power in Neo-Absolutist regimes. It is this need for 
domestic recovery which dictated peaceful international relations to most dynasts. 
The late 18th century had been, in contrast, characterized mainly by the escalation of 
Great Power conflicts – owed to the escalating logic of mutually aggravating balance 
of power policies (Schroeder, P. W. 1994: 586f). In other words, the shared belief in 
“Balance-of-Power rules and practices were not a solution to war in the 18th century 
(if they ever have been) but a major part of the problem” (Schroeder, P. W. 1994: 6). 
To Schroeder, therefore, “the European equilibrium established in 1815 and lasting 
well into the 19th century differed sharply from so-called balances in the 18th” 
(Schroeder 1986: 2) since it represented a new and progressive kind of international 
system, rather than a return to the kind of habits captured by Realism.  
To Schroeder, this systemic change was not the conscious rational choice of 
individual statesmen of the likes of Metternich to restore a pre-Revolutionary and pre-
Napoleonic status quo ante based on shared norms of dynasticism as reflected in the 
concept of ‘restoration’ (Kissinger 2000). Rather, the creation of a novel order based 
on the common adherence to international norms and rules was the result of 
‘systemic’ constraints and necessities. Schroeder utilizes the historic example of the 
Russian ‘constraint’ in the Greek Question, as the prima facie evidence for the 
transformative capacity of the system (Schroeder 1983: 612). For example, it was 
interpreted as a sign of taming Russian territorial ambitions that the Tsar refused to 
take part in the Greek War of Independence. This reluctance to help the Orthodox 
brothers was based, according to Hudson Meadwell, on a common fear of revolution 
amongst European Princes which produced a system, or a structure, of “Monarchical 
Solidarity”. Hence the spectre of social revolution had, in fact, a pacifying effect on 
the international system. Inter-dynastic relations followed the common goal to 
preserve the status quo, and with it, evidently, the dynast’s social power (Meadwell 
2001: 172f). Even when Nicholas decisively won another war against the Ottomans, 
this time triggered by the unwise closure of the Straits to Russian shipping, in 
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September 1829, he was said to have exercised remarked restraint - even though he 
would have had a strong motive, the military capacity as well as a golden opportunity 
to dispose of Russia’s naval constraints by gaining full control over the Straits at this 
occasion (Kerner 1938). To Schroeder, Russian foreign policy after 1815 is therefore 
best described as “conservative, legalistic, antirevolutionary, and oriented toward 
peace and great-power cooperation” whereas with regards to the Eastern Question, 
Russia “more than once came to Turkey’s aid to save it from other enemies” 
(Schroeder 1983: 4). 
There remains a question, however, as to what degree the Concert was 
functional as an international regime given the explicit exclusion, up until 1856, of 
one of the major ‘units’ of the system, the Porte, from the newly instituted and 
celebrated international order. Matthew Rendall, in response to Schroeder, agrees on 
the perceived lack of decisive Russian action when the historical juncture and 
capabilities all seemed to favour Russia’s long-term objectives. Whilst Schroeder 
explains this with reference to the new Vienna system and its structural tendency for 
containment, Rendall explains it by referring to Tsar Alexander’s exceptionally 
peaceful character – a point well illustrated by his successor Nicholas’s more 
assertive foreign policy (Rendall 2000: 54). This temporary shift from Peter’s and 
Catherine’s outright expansionism and the moderation seen after the Napoleonic 
invasion is, according to Rendall, not the result of the coercive capacities of the 
international system at the time, however. He explicitly points out that Alexander did 
not fear Western intervention should he act in favour of the Greek revolt (Rendall 
2000: 63). Indeed, whilst he did show sensitivity for the wider European states 
system, he ultimately insisted that the Greek struggle was a “purely Russian Affair” 
in principle (Rendall 2000: 71). In the absence of a systemic obstacle to a full-scale 
war and given the traditionally hostile nature of Russo-Turkish relations, the question 
as to why Alexander I did not intervene more decisively still has to be answered by 
the realists. Rendall answers this with reference to Russia being territorially saturated 
and Alexander’s personal conservatism which naturally pitched him against any 
revolt – including the ones directed against his arguably greatest adversary. This 
reaction, or rather lack thereof, he claims, is, therefore still best understood through a 
realist lens, yet one of a ‘defensive’ kind, which he deploys in opposition to John 
Mearsheimer’s ‘offensive’ variety of Realism (Mearsheimer 2001: Chapter 10; 
Rendall 2006). Rendall aims at accommodating what he sees as an exception from the 
rule of a continuously expansionist Russian Foreign policy within his overall realist 
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narrative. Thus, it was not so much the underlying anarchical conditions that changed, 
but much more the personality of Alexander I, who was the ‘tamed’ exception 
proving the aggressive Russian rule. After this brief elaboration of both opposing 
approaches, I will now turn to a more detailed historical discussion which should 
clarify how to best understand the international response to the Greek Question. 
 
 
5.3 The Ottoman Empire and Russia at Vienna  
Institutionalist cheerleaders for Vienna usually rely heavily on the fact that the Great 
Powers reacted in a by and large uniform way to the Greek struggle – which was less 
than sympathetic, remaining largely true to its conservative spirit. Even generally 
liberal and pro-Hellenic Western European statesmen at the time complained about 
the Greek revolt as a major disturbance of the newly established order. Amongst 
others, “an exacerbated British prime minister, the Duke of Wellington, was 
prompted to complain that ‘there never was such a humbug as the Greek affair 
altogether’” (Clogg 1979: 56). From the outset “the rulers of Europe responded to the 
news of the Greek Revolution with marked disfavour”. Even the Tsar, like Britain, 
France, Prussia and Austria “tried to ignore the Greeks and hoped that the Sultan 
could snuff out the revolt” (Petropulos 1968: 43). To put it mildly, the international 
environment at the time did not seem to favour the Greek cause and the unity on the 
matter seemed to confirm the operability of the Metternichean system. The 
conservative and reactionary forces of post-Napoleonic Europe were opposed to 
revolution in general, even though, coincidentally, it was precisely the most 
conservative of forces, i.e. the Austrian and Russian spearheads of the reaction that 
could have gained most from weakening the Sultan and (especially in the Russian 
case) from Greek autonomy, possibly under Russian protection using the blueprint of 
the 1826 Akkerman Convention establishing a semi-independent Serbia. Yet, Russia, 
even in the light of the brutal assassination of the Ecumenical Patriarch of 
Constantinople on Easter Monday 1821, did not move beyond the emission of a brief 
note of protest, despite growing internal pressure to intervene. Austria, on the other 
hand, had previously taken an active part in suppressing the revolt by extraditing one 
of the eminent intellectuals of the Greek Enlightenment, Rigas Velestinlis, to the 
Porte in 1798. He was duly executed on transfer to Istanbul in Belgrade on June 24 of 
the same year. According to the institutionalist reading of this period, the reluctance 
to get involved in the Greek affair was not only owed to the prevailing reactionary 
 177
and anti-revolutionary spirit, but was also due to the ‘consensus’ about Ottoman 
territorial preservation as the best possible geopolitical order of the region.  
A realist counter to this institutionalist reading would argue that the 
maintenance of Ottoman territorial integrity as a solution to the eastern question was 
much more a British than French, Russian or Austrian preference. Even before the 
formal establishment of the Vienna system, which generally appeared to operate in 
the Sultan’s favour, Britain aimed at institutionalizing this policy of Ottoman 
preservation wherever possible. Making the Empire the southeastern European pillar 
for its hegemonic balance of power policy in this geopolitically highly sensitive and 
yet volatile region had the advantage of excluding any other of the Great Powers 
(especially Russia) while the Porte was weak enough to be gullible, yet also strong 
enough to avert a full Russian invasion. This was almost a logical extension of British 
Blue Water policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. Ottoman territorial integrity was, 
thus, not primarily an imperative derived from a post-Napoleonic conservative status 
quo ante thinking, but is better understood as the southeastern corner stone of a wider 
European and Middle Eastern geopolitical grand design of the British Empire. This, 
in turn, was determined by the need to maintain the trade routes through the Levant 
towards India. Nevertheless, due to a rise in classical humanistic education and in 
direct contravention to this kind of Realpolitik thinking, the British public and 
administration were privately very sympathetic to the Greek cause79 but suspected – 
on good grounds – that an autonomous Greece would, after Serbia, become yet 
another Russian foothold in the region. As to whether this was a product of a 
Russophobic British foreign policy tradition80 or whether this was indeed the 
reflection of a real existing requirement to maintain the balance of power in the 
region will be dealt with in the following section.  
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 This attitude was channelled into a movement called the ‘Philhellenes’ which flourished across 
Europe with Charles X of France and Ludwig I of Bavaria being the most prominent, if by no 
means sole supporters amongst the European dynasts. Notably, the Russian Tsars were less 
enthusiastic about it, as any such ambition was likely to be seen as an attempt to install an 
Orthodox satellite regime under the ‘Greek’ label.   
80
 While ‘Russophobia is distinct from ‘Slavophobia’, these two are often used interchangeably. 
British foreign policy developed a tradition of eying Russia suspiciously, especially with regard to 
Russian ambitions in the Middle East, which were thought to affect Britain’s most vital interest, 
India. See Gleason (1951: 58); see chapter 6.  
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5.4 The International Making of Modern Greece  
Whether by British Grand Design or genuine consensus, this anti-independence and 
pro-Ottoman policy started to be compromised when Lord Canning followed 
Castelreagh as Prime Minister. Castelreagh was allegedly more willing to listen to the 
philhellenic British public. Amongst those in favour of Greek independence were 
influential figures from the City of London to whom many Greek merchants had 
excellent relations. As a result, the entire Greek struggle was effectively sustained 
through British finance alone. The need to recover those loans naturally increased the 
desirability of a Greek success.81 More importantly, however, as the war wore on, a 
heightened Russian involvement became more likely as more atrocities and massacres 
were committed against the Orthodox subjects. British fears were further fuelled by 
the death of the troubled, yet calm, Alexander I, who was already hard pressed to 
contain his hawkish administration. An escalation seemed to be on the cards when 
Alexander died of an alleged suicide and his more proactive and more conservative 
brother Nicholas I took power in 1826 (Jelavich and Jelavich 1977). Faced with a 
potentially much more assertive Russia, growing public concern and a large debt 
owed by the revolutionaries, Britain as well as Austria could not afford to stand by 
idly. The potential Russian exploitation of the Greek situation generated a 
geopolitical imperative in the Balkans as the Greek struggle provided Russia with 
plenty of leverage for taking a militarily more assertive position. When war did break 
out in 1828 between Russia and the Porte, this was, admittedly, triggered by the 
Ottoman’s closure of the Straits to Russia’s mercantile fleet rather than Russian 
hostility. However, it left little space for manoeuvre to Lord Canning’s 
administration. Contrary to popular perception, his rationale for intervention was less 
grounded in the Philhellenism so popular with large parts of the European but also the 
American public (cf. Saint-Claire 1972: 59-60), than in a geopolitical quagmire 
(Konstantinou 1998). “[Canning] simply feared that Russia might take unilateral 
action against the Ottoman Empire”… whilst at the same time Russia saw herself 
similarly under pressure to compete with British influence: “Russia could not afford 
to let England, already its great rival in the Near East, win the popularity and hence 
the influence which it had traditionally exercised among the Greeks“ (Petropulos 
1968: 45). Inter-state competition, in a proto-realist manner, had generated a swift 
                                                 
81
 As the City had funded the Greek operations since 1824, the need to pay the loan back was a 
decisive impediment to post-independence development and land distribution.  
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policy change from reactionary status quo policies to a heightened competition for 
Greek favour.  
 
Finding the lowest common denominator between Russia and Britain (and to 
a lesser degree France and Austria) was not, however, necessarily as confrontational 
as might have been expected. Once the struggle had gained a dynamic, the Great 
Power’s preoccupation was not so much to favour either of the two conflicting sides 
in the Greek War of Independence, but simply to stabilize the region so important to 
both of them – the Straits for Russia and the routes to India for Britain. This objective 
had always been best achieved by preserving Ottoman territorial integrity. Now, 
however, “Greco-Turkish naval hostilities disrupted trade in the eastern 
Mediterranean and thereby affected the British, French, Austrians and Russians” 
(Petropulos 1968: 44) alike. More specifically, “Russian Black Sea grain trade and 
British and French commercial interests in the Levant had suffered considerably on 
account of the hostilities” (Clogg 1979: 62) and the prevailing common desire was to 
re-instate stability in the region in general. In light of these developments, Greek 
Independence, whilst not initially being a part of British grand territorial design, was, 
once the dynamic of secession appeared inevitable, the only viable route to avoid 
another Russian foothold in the region. This choice was made in light of Walachia 
and Moldavia and later Serbia having already become de-facto Russian protectorates 
by decree of the 1926 Akkerman convention. This time, however, Greek neutrality, 
full independence and joint protection by four powers were to guarantee a cordial 
solution less dependent on Russia alone. “For Wellington, fearing after the Treaty of 
Adrianople82 that a tributary Greek state might, like the Danubian Principalities, fall 
increasingly under Russian influence, was inclined to favour the idea of a fully 
sovereign Greece” (Clogg 1979: 66). ‘Independence’ in this case, thus meant 
independence from Ottoman rule as well as from the exclusive control of any single 
one of the Great Powers. However, it did not mean independence from the joint 
control of Russia, France and Britain (Petropulos 1968: 48). Conversely, the thus far 
mainly British preoccupation with sustaining the Sultan’s reign in the Balkans and the 
Middle East was increasingly shared by the Tsar. Hence, despite the active great 
power competition, there appears to be an equal amount of evidence to support the 
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 Ending the Russo-Turkish War which brought the Ottoman Empire close to a complete 
subjugation to Russian forces, the 1829 Treaty of Adrianople conceded yet more Ottoman 
territories, especially in the Caucasus and Bessarabia to the Tsar. 
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institutionalist thesis given the high level of international, or rather intra-European, 
coordination in the Greek Question.  
Nicholas’s agreement to the “Ottoman model” for a geopolitical order in the 
region was derived from the realization that Britain would not allow Russia to 
establish an (even) tighter control over the Middle East. Initially the cooperation with 
Russia in the Greek Question was therefore carefully coordinated by Lord Canning in 
strict avoidance of the other continental powers. Thus, it was more of a bilateral, 
rather than a truly multilateral form of cooperation. The two parties who had carried 
the heaviest economical burden due to the instability in the region, Russia and 
Britain, agreed in principle that cooperation was inevitable. This also followed a 
defensive rationale, however. For, the matter of the Straits was equally one of 
national defence for the Tsar. He feared that would the control over the Straits pass to 
a different, more formidable or chaotic regime, a military and/or commercial 
penetration of the Black Sea by European Powers was likely. The agreement 
established in 1774 in Küçük Kaynarca increasingly appeared as the more favourable 
solution over the full liberalisation of traffic through the Straits (Anderson 1970).  
 
 
5.5 Küçük Kaynarca and the Greek Question 
Conventionally, however, the Küçük Kaynarca regime is not interpreted as possessing 
any defensive character whatsoever. The treaty had ended one of many Russo-
Turkish encounters in 1774, which, together with the ‘Testament of Peter the Great’,83 
is usually presented as the prime example for the continuing aggression and 
transhistorically expansionist rationale of Russian foreign policy. John H. Gleason 
(Gleason 1951) points out how British foreign policy, rather than pioneering 
Realpolitik, was highly prejudiced in establishing the tradition of Russophobia. 
Whether this argument holds true as an explanation of British behaviour in the Greek 
Question will be seen in the following section. In any case, the ‘Russophobes’ 
certainly had it right when ascertaining a strong Russian interest in the Ottoman 
Empire, which usually led to encounters of a hostile nature.84 On the one hand, Küçük 
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 The so-called ‘Testament of Peter the Great’ sets out the steps for future Russian expansions. It 
is generally considered a forgery, but was utilized up until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to 
justify anti-Russian and anti-Soviet foreign policies; see Resis (1985: 681). Resis compares the 
social function of the testament to the infamous ‘Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion’ to the Nazis 
and sees it as generally discredited, whereas “some of our most respected officials, scholars, and 
journalists [still] give credence to the “Testament”, (Subtelny 1974).  
84
 For a chronology of Russo-Ottoman engagements, please refer to the appendix.  
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Kaynarca intensified a process set in motion by the treaties of Karlowitz (1699) and 
Passarowitz (1718), i.e. the closure, consolidation and regression of the thus far open 
borders of the Ottoman Empire as they sanctioned the loss of territories of an (at that 
time) expansionist empire (Abou-el-Haj 1969; Abou-El-Haj 2005: 62).85 More than 
the mere reality of the loss, however, it was the precise geopolitical location of the 
territories in question which determined the future destiny of the Ottoman Empire. 
The loss of the Black Sea shores and most importantly, the Crimea with its mostly 
Muslim Crimea Tartar population was not only humiliating, but also implied the 
peacetime right of passage through the Straits for commercial shipping to Russia, 
providing, thereby, year-round access to the important Mediterranean markets for 
Russian produce. Together with the end of Ottoman suzerainty over the Crimea and 
the subsequent Russian occupation thereof, this turned the Black Sea from an 
Ottoman into a Russian lake, which would, as a consequence, naturally seek to 
control the one and only naval outlet – the Ottoman capital. This was, however, not 
necessarily a matter of endogenously and socially generated Russian aggression, but 
much more a matter of geopolitical necessity as the Straits provided the unique 
opening to gain warm water access for Russian produce, especially grain.  
 
Beyond establishing the geopolitical prerequisites for an endless Russo-
Ottoman conflict, Küçük Kaynarca also laid the foundations which allowed for the 
rise of Balkan nationalism under Russian supervision in the Ottoman provinces. 
Sidelining the clerical authority of the Ecumenical Patriarchate over the Porte’s 
Orthodox subjects, Küçük Kaynarca established Catherine the Great’s protective 
status over the Ottoman Christian subjects. To be precise, the treaty itself did not 
entail the legitimation of Russian influence in Ottoman affairs. Rather, it allowed the 
Tsar to protect only those Orthodox subjects living in the Principalities and the 
Caucasus. These provisions were not only generously interpreted but even flagrantly 
violated by widening the claim so as to include all Orthodox subjects. Given that the 
protection of the Sultan was sufficient and effectively regulated through the Rum 
Millet, this treaty violation arguably favoured the Tsarina much more than the 
Ottoman Orthodox community. The Sultan countered by making, for the first time, 
explicit use of the institution of the Caliphate, which allowed him to claim spiritual 
leadership over all Muslims, including the ones in Russia and specifically in the 
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 The most hurtful loss to the Porte at Küçük Kaynarca was the primarily Muslim inhabited 
Crimea. 
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Crimea. This is remarkable insofar as the Ottoman Sultans had already formally 
inherited the title of ‘Caliph’ from the Mamluks when Selim I occupied Mecca and 
Medina in the 1520s. It was, however, not until 1774 and again during the late 
Ottoman Islamicist restoration of the Sultanate under Abdülhamid II in the 1870s that 
this title was instrumentalized as a tool of foreign policy, before finally being 
abolished by Kemal Atatürk in 1924. This escalation indicates the Sultan’s 
desperation over the Russian encroachment on Ottoman sovereignty that Küçük 
Kaynarca constituted. In fact, given the disastrous consequences, his fears were by no 
means inflated. 
 It was, thus, partly in reaction to the Sultan deploying the relatively powerful 
ideological ‘tool’ of the Caliphate, partly out of dissatisfaction with the nevertheless 
quite substantial territorial gains of Küçük Kaynarca, but above all out of a desire to 
place the Straits under tight Russian control, possibly through a vassal, that Catherine 
the Great developed her ‘Greek Project’. This plan, second only to Peter the Great’s 
‘Testament’ in its historiographic perception as evidence for Russian imperial 
aggression (Ragsdale 1993: 75, 82)86, anticipated the Megali Idea by projecting the 
deposition of the Sultan and the revival of Byzantine/Orthodox rule at Constantinople 
under Russian suzerainty (Ragsdale 1988: 93). However, this was not just a loose and 
imaginative idea, but was pursued quite thoroughly at least during Catherine’s rule. 
According to Hugh Ragsdale she started out by Hellenizing parts of the Russian court 
as well as her own children’s and grandchildren’s education. Dreaming of 
establishing a Romanov Byzantine dynasty on the shores of the Bosporus, she had her 
grandson baptized ‘Constantine’ so he would take the still imaginary throne at 
Constantinople. Catherine also secured the support of the Austrian Emperor, Joseph 
II, with whom she intended to share the spoils of Ottoman dismemberment.  
The Greek Project was the personal brainchild of Catherine. It was not 
pursued in the same fashion beyond her rule, nor did it establish a ‘tradition’ in 
Russian foreign policy, partly due to a strong Austrian opposition developing against 
it. It is nevertheless highly significant, as it reflected the more tangible practice of a 
strong Russian interest in the Straits. Thus, despite being overambitious, Catherine’s 
Greek Project does hold significance for the Greek Question for it established the 
geopolitical environment so crucial for understanding the social conflict that 
ultimately led to Greek independence. All of this might have been less momentous 
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 Ragsdale concludes that the Greek Project constitutes the only solid evidence for Russian 
expansionism while he relegates the Testament to the realm of historical mythology. 
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had the expanding Russian Empire enjoyed better access for its grain through warm 
water ports. However, the lack thereof almost forced Russia’s growing volumes of 
trade through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles - like through the eye of a needle and 
making the control of the Straits a natural goal of Russian foreign policy – whether 
through aggressive or cooperative tactics (Jelavich 1973). Secondly, Küçük Kaynarca 
also led to a Hellenization within Russia as the Romanovs started recruiting 
Grecophone nobles for the Russian administration and military whilst the opening of 
the Russian Black Sea trade through the Straits led to the Russian encouragement of 
Orthodox Christian merchants from within the Ottoman Empire to settle on the Black 
Sea shores. This led to the establishment of large Greek merchant communities in 
Odessa and Sevastopol. Both of these developments, combined with the relative lack 
of success of both the Greek Project or the grain trade, are highly significant for 
explaining the origins of the Greek national project, as the eventual leaders of the 
Filiki Etaria and the Greek Revolt had their social origins in just these heterochthon 
groups. 
 
Russian Moderation under Alexander I and Nicholas I 
Pointing out Catherine the Great’s imperialist ambitions does not necessarily have to 
contradict Schroeder’s argument, however. He evidently focuses on Russian 
containment only through the Concert system, i.e. after 1815, so pre-Vienna Russian 
imperialism ends up confirming, rather than contradicting his point. This shift from 
Catherine’s outright expansionism to Alexander I and Nicholas I’s is understood as 
the result of a commitment to the post-Napoleonic status quo order. Their pledge was 
not with imperial aggrandizement, but with ‘Enlightened Absolutism’. The new 
Realpolitik implied in this shift severely constrained the former Tsarina’s ambitious 
plans (Jelavich 1991: 32-33). “Virtually all scholars agree that Russia’s foreign 
policies (…) especially in the Near East, were ones of considerable moderation…” 
(Hass 2005: 77). In particular, most of Russian historiography establishes 
Alexander’s pacific attitude, and portrays him as a much loved liberal reformer. 
“[N]othing could have been more contrary [to his mood] than this outbreak of a 
revolution in the Balkans” (Lobanov-Rostovsky 1968: 427; Palmer 1974). Despite 
being ‘liberal’ at heart, Alexander was not only committed to the Vienna status quo – 
a policy that was arguably motivated by a deep understanding of great power 
balancing. He was also averse to the revolutionary social change the Greek revolt 
appeared to represent, as any official recognition of the ‘national’ principle would 
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have severe consequences for other elements of the Russian imperial policy at the 
time, most notably the Ottoman’s most reliable European ally, Poland. Thus, 
Alexander is alleged to have wasted no time in reassuring the Sultan of his lack of 
involvement in the Greek affair (Lobanov-Rostovsky 1968: 408). The increased 
violence of the conflict and especially the assassination of the Patriarch of 
Constantinople, nevertheless posed a dilemma between adhering to conservative 
principles and rushing to the aid of Orthodox Christians still formally under 
Alexander’s personal protection. The Russian establishment, already not necessarily 
impressed with his moderate foreign policy, expected Alexander to take a more 
proactive stance in favour of the Greek struggle, since he was expected to be leading 
the entire Orthodox world. What remained, therefore, despite Alexander’s general 
moderation, was the subtle threat of Russian involvement.  
 
 
5.6 The Straits Question: The Structural determination of Russian Foreign 
Agency 
However, more than the issue of Orthodoxy, this threat was constituted by the 
geopolitics of the region. Even though the general consensus on Alexander’s Greek 
policy appears to be that he shunned the uprising, that he wanted to preserve the 
Empire and that he did not want to be seen as acting outside of the Concert, he had 
nevertheless set the diplomatic foundations for a later intervention when he 
successfully lobbied the other Great Powers to refute Metternich’s proposal to include 
the Sultan in the new international order on the basis of the illegitimacy of the Porte’s 
rule over its European provinces (Seignobos 1917: 9). According to Alexander’s 
rationale, undermining the Porte’s scope of action internationally would make the 
eastern question naturally an internal Russian affair, effectively proclaiming a 
Russian prerogative to intervene in Ottoman affairs whenever deemed necessary on 
behalf of its Christian subjects.  
More importantly, however, as the Greek struggle, which was to a large 
extent carried out by sea, started to have a painful effect on Russia’s grain trade 
through the Straits, this dilemma became much less difficult to solve. Even though 
Alexander explicitly told the Revolutionaries Ypsilanti and Capodistrias (both 
members of his administration), that he “did not intend to leave a free field to the 
enemies of order” and that “at all costs means must be found of avoiding war with 
Turkey” (Anderson 1966: 61), he and his successor Nicholas I still preferred to keep 
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all of their options open by not preventing the Greek operation which was planned by 
men in Russian service and launched from Russian controlled territories. After all, 
Ypsilantis “was not an obscure agitator, he was a Russian General, a friend of the 
Stourdzas and a prominent figure in Viennese Society during the Congress” (Palmer 
1974: 377). Regardless of Alexander’s personal political convictions or hesitations, 
the social order based on an Ancient Regime within Russia made the shift from 
Catherine’s outright expansionism to Alexander’s and Nicolas’s ‘commitment’ to the 
Vienna status quo more of a superficial and temporary, than a revolutionary and long 
lasting one. Despite the supposed “sea change” in the post-Napoleonic international 
system, their inherent support and obvious exploitation of the situation ultimately 
reflected a high degree of continuity in the Russian war aims, the most persistent 
feature of which was the desire to encompass “control over the Straits, national 
statehood for the Balkan Christian peoples, and ascendant political influence 
throughout the region” (Bodger 1984: 43) well into Stalin’s reign. The threat of a 
Greek state under Russian suzerainty was shared by most Great Powers, so open 
support might have been prevented especially by active preventative measures by 
Austria and Britain, rather than a universally accepted normative structure. It was 
merely a coincidence, however, that Alexander resided with Metternich and Emperor 
Francis at Laibach when the news of the revolt reached him, effectively preventing 
any meaningful action in its favour.  
 
The Imperialist Logic of Ottoman Preservation  
Russia’s reluctance to support the Greek cause outright in a more assertive show of 
hegemonic ambition, is not so much owed to either her lack of such an ambition or a 
normative constraint of the Vienna system, but by the acknowledgement of an 
international structure that is best described as a realist balance of power. The 
successor of Capodistrias in the office of the Russian foreign minister understood 
these constraints very well, most evidently laid out in a memorandum on the 1929 
Peace of Adrianople. For Russia, he argued  
“…any order of things which might be substituted there [in the Ottoman 
Empire] would not balance for us the advantage of having for a neighbour a 
weak state, always menaced by the spirit of revolt which agitates its vassals, 
reduced by a successful war to submit to the law of the conqueror”.87 
 
                                                 
87
 Memorandum of Nicholas’ Foreign Minister Count Nesselrode at the occasion of a Meeting of 
the Special committee on the Affairs of Turkey on September 16, 1829 in St Petersburg, quoted in 
Kerner (1938: 281). 
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Here, Russian foreign policy appears to have undergone a major shift from grand 
Byzantine designs to territorial saturation, even lending support to the Sultan. Indeed, 
Russo-Turkish relations experienced a form of détente after the signing of the 
Akkerman Convention on 6 October 1826 which comprised concessions regarding 
Russian influence in the Principalities and Serbia and seemingly satisfied all interests 
involved. When war broke out in 1828, this was still mainly due to Mehmed’s 
insistence on closing the Straits after the Battle of Navarino, which left Russia little 
choice but to re-open her maritime umbilical cord by force. Even though the Russian 
victory over the Ottoman forces at Adrianople (Edirne) in 1829 was unambiguous and 
brought Russian artillery within the range of the Topkapi Palace, Nicholas 
deliberately stopped the advance of his far superior troops, pursuing what Schroeder 
called an ‘inactive hegemony’ (Schroeder, P. 1994: 663). While Britain was uneasy 
about the impressive display of Russian military superiority and her territorial gains, 
this still did not generate pro-active, anti-Russian and pro-Ottoman involvement. 
 
What changed this attitude was not Russia itself, however, but, paradoxically, 
Mohammad Ali’s forceful and almost successful challenge to the Sultan. Disgruntled 
over the lack of spoils from the war against the Greeks and fully aware of the 
Egyptian military superiority, Ali set out on a campaign against his overlord that 
brought him, or rather his son Ibrahim, within sight of the Bosporus twice. During the 
Battle of Konya on December 21 1832, Ibrahim virtually destroyed the main Ottoman 
army after a long and successful campaign through Syria. Complacent about the 
balance of power in the region with Russia apparently appeased and saturated, the 
Ottoman plea for help fell on deaf ears in London and Paris. Not so in St Petersburg, 
however. In what appeared to be a major reshuffling of alliances, Russia rushed to 
preserve the Sultan’s rule over the Straits against his rebellious vassal. The Russian 
navy moored almost its entire Black Sea fleet in the Bosporus in February 1833 in 
exchange for full Russian navigation rights through the Straits. This also obliged the 
Porte to deny access to any potential enemy of the Tsar, effectively forming a very 
exceptional bilateral defensive alliance which was signed on July 8 1833 in the Treaty 
of Hünkâr İskelesi. This treaty, proverbially speaking, put the fox in charge of the 
henhouse, by turning the Ottoman Empire, in Lord Palmerston’s words, effectively 
into a Russian protectorate (Adanir 2005: 406).  
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As opposed to bringing the Ottoman Empire into the Russian imperialist 
orbit, this potentially life-threatening situation turned out to widen the Porte’s scope 
of action far beyond the expulsion of the Egypto-Albanian challenge. The Tsar’s 
unexpected and cunning support sent shockwaves through the European capitals. 
Russian domination of the Ottoman Empire, if not by direct military occupation, but 
through quasi-hegemonic indirect control, was nothing short of a nightmare scenario 
for France, but more-so for Britain. Prior to Hünkâr İskelesi, Palmerstone had all but 
given up on the Sultan’s ability to provide the sort of order Britain had in mind when 
supporting the Pax Ottomanica. In other words, the continuous military defeats and 
internal challenges to the Porte’s rule prior to the exceptional Ottoman-Russian 
rapprochement meant that Britain had started considering alternative solutions to the 
eastern question. Not even the Egyptian challenge to the Sultan’s sovereignty, which 
jeopardized Britain’s vital India trading routes more than the Greek War of 
Independence, changed this laissez-fair approach. This, however, changed rapidly 
once it became clear that the alternative to idleness would be Russian vigour. It was, 
therefore, the spectre of Russian hegemony in southeastern Europe as well as the 
Middle East that revived the pre-eminent policy of Ottoman preservation. Even 
though Muhammad Ali’s campaign had comprehensively crippled the Porte 
militarily, financially as well as psychologically, the Tsar’s ostensible opportunism 
had forced the British back to preserving Ottoman territorial integrity. In concrete 
terms, the British awakening to Russia’s real ambitions had two effects. First, it 
caused a shift from supporting Greek ‘suzerainty’ (copying the Serb model of a 
tributary relation to the Sultan with Russian guarantees as was previously agreed 
between the Great Powers), to the full scale independence eventually granted in the 
London Protocol. Secondly, it made Britain more committed to the Porte, so that 
when Egyptian forces closed in on Istanbul for the second time in 1839, an Austro-
British naval intervention restored Ottoman rule. 
 
These events appear to contradict Schroeder’s and other arguments about 
Russian territorial saturation when her ambitions, especially in the Near East, were in 
full swing, albeit with more sophistication than previously (Kerner 1938: 282-286). 
This can be explained by the continuous lack of access to warm water ports, which 
continued to compromise Russia’s participation in the growing world economy. This 
is what premeditated Russia’s actions regardless of the personalities in the leadership. 
This does not mean that outright occupation of the Straits and the Balkans was seen 
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as the only option, however. While Orthodox client states emerged in southeastern 
Europe, gaining control over the Straits could equally be achieved by manipulating a 
weak Sultan. Conspiracy theories describing Mohammed Ali as a Russian agent could 
probably win a wide audience. So in principle, Nicholas was ready to settle 
differences with the Porte peacefully if possible. However, Robert Kerner provides 
ample evidence that this was not owed to a Russian adherence to the norms of the 
Concert, but due to pure pragmatism. In case the opportunity rose, however, partition 
and distribution plans were readily available and shared, at times, with Austria and 
France.88 The outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854,89 under the same supposedly 
restrained Nicholas I finally put an end to the idea of a détente and confirmed the 
unaltered, but also unalterable Russian position based on free passage through the 
Straits. This argument is also not diminished by the Tsar’s temporary 
acknowledgment of European balance of power realities. Russian geopolitical designs 
were almost immutable since they originated in a specific strategy of socio-economic 
reproduction dependent on profits from Black Sea trade and Ukrainian corn 
production. This could not be altered without incurring significant material, military 
and social costs on the Tsar. Thus, as much as Russophobic arguments suggest an 
innate Russian propensity towards aggression and war mongering, the Straits 
question, while social in origin, nevertheless constitutes a tight frame of action to 
almost any Russian leader. 
As a consequence, the Straits remain a contentious issue in Russo-Turkish 
relations to this day. Access is regulated in the 1936 Montreux Convention, but 
generally the Straits are under exclusive Turkish control. This was evidenced in the 
recent conflict between Russia and Georgia. Russia protested over Turkey’s 
admission of two large US Coast Guard vessels through the Straits (Anonymous 
2008).90 The terms of the Convention restrict the number and weight of non-Turkish 
War ships as well as limiting their stay in the Black Sea to 21 days. As a reaction to 
Russian protests and trade blockades, the Turkish navy blocked the entry to further 
                                                 
88
 Prior to the realization of Greek internal instability, the British as well as Russian post-Ottoman 
designs had rested on a Greek ‘revival’ in the Eastern Mediterranean as a cornerstone. The ultra-
conservative French Foreign Minister Jules de Polignac, on the other hand, proposed the outright 
territorial division of the Ottoman Empire between Russia and France at British expense before 
being deposed by the 1830 July Revolution (Stavrianos 2000 [1958]: 290).  
89
 Arguably, Nicholas’ grievance should have been with Napoleon III rather than the Porte. 
Instead, he punished the Sultan for his inability to negotiate the guardianship over the Holy Land 
after Napoleon had effective forced Abdülmecid’s hand at the expense of Russia. 
90
 Anonymous (2008): Russia warns Turkey on U.S. ships in Black Sea, Hurriyet English. 
Istanbul; available at http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=9766567, (accessed 28 
August 2008) 
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US vessels on their way to Georgia that were considered to exceed the maximum 
number and/or size (Hallinan 2008; İdiz 2008),91 thus upholding Russia’s 
prerogatives towards their ally. Despite Stalin’s post-war plea to revise the control of 
the straits, the Montreux regime always equally worked in Russia’s and the Soviet 
Union’s favour - preserving the Black Sea as a Russian lake.  
 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
In summary it can be argued that despite ample evidence for a post 1815 general 
détente and an increase in cooperation, the institutionalist account does not consider 
how the European interest in the Greek uprising was dependent on the potential 
emergence of Russian hegemony in the region. Cooperation was not based on a 
normative consensus but on the collective management of potential threats in a 
strictly realist fashion. Hence, it is owed to the spectre of the Russian dominance of 
the Balkans that Britain and France demanded a fully independent and powerful 
Greek state. Russia, on the other hand, being alerted by her own success, but also by 
Mohammed Ali’s rise as a formidable internal challenger to the Sultan’s authority, 
gradually abandoned Catherine the Great’s overt schemes of domination and replaced 
them with more sophisticated strategies. However, this was not motivated by 
normative concerns but by plain pragmatism. More importantly, the underlying social 
conditions determining Russian expansionism had not changed.  
Schroeder’s tribute to the Vienna System as the most sophisticated 
international order in international history overlooks the degree to which Russia’s 
continued territorial ambitions continued to constitute a formidable challenge to the 
Pax Britannica and how much of the eastern question was determined by just this 
Anglo-Russian geopolitical competition over influence in the Middle East. 
Emphasizing this conflict, which was also pursued in the Far East, provides for a 
better understanding of the international dynamic that led to the acceptance and 
endorsement of what was initially perceived as a disturbance, the Greek uprising. 
This makes a national secession, such as the Greek one, in the midst of a supposedly 
reactionary international order much more intelligible than the normative appeal of an 
all pervasive system of “mutual consensus on norms and rules, respect for law (…) 
rights, security, status, claims, duties, and satisfactions rather than power…” 
(Schroeder 1992: 694f).  
                                                 
91
 For a historic discussion see: Hurewitz (1962), DeLuca (1981), Váli (1972: 34f) 
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In other words, what led to the success of the Greek revolt was a Great Power 
contestation fuelled by fears of Russian dominance, rather than a wilful support of a 
nationalist struggle. It was, thus, the menace of Russian expansionism and a 
proactive, mainly British, balance of power policy, rather than her cooperation as an 
equal member within an international regime guided by rules, norms and procedures, 
which first led to the compromising of the previously sacred principle of Ottoman 
territorial preservation, before reviving it again.  
Russian designs continued to be derived from a historically pre-determined 
geostrategic reasoning based on gaining unimpeded access to the Mediterranean and 
beyond. That this was not of Alexander’s or Nicholas’s personal making but set in 
motion by their indirect predecessor, Catherine, at Küçük Kaynarca, does not change 
the fact that they found themselves in a position where the pursuit of similar goals, 
which in principle created a competitive situation between the Ottoman Empire, 
Austria and Britain, was the only option. This raises the question as to whether in fact 
a realist analysis is not best suited for explaining this crucial historical juncture, 
which ultimately determined the eastern question in large measure. Having 
reconsidered the role of Russian expansionism here, it could be easily argued that the 
geopolitical dynamic portrayed in this chapter and described by Realism dictates the 
international response to the Greek struggle much more than any potentially 
moderating normative or societal effects of the Vienna Concert.  
However, contrary to such a strict realist or Weberian outside-in 
historicisation of these developments, the combined picture drawn in chapters 4 and 5 
goes to show that this process is not abstracted from individual, localized social as 
well as dynastic agents and the social struggles they engage in. The outcomes of these 
struggles cannot be reduced to the passive enactment of geopolitical necessities. In 
other words, the transformation towards nation-formation cannot be captured by a 
deterministic, functionalist or positivist reference to the ‘logics’ of interstate 
competition alone. The local dynamics of secession are conversely equally not 
comprehensible without a theorization through the prism of this geopolitical 
momentum which was propelled by the unaltered expansionist drive of the Romanov 
Empire – itself a result of the historically specific juncture at Küçük Kaynarca and 
Russia’s intensifying competition with British imperial ambitions. The international 
response to the Greek Question has to be understood as the unintended outcome of 
these dialectical social and geopolitical struggles between the Ottoman Empire, 
Russian and British balance of power policy within an emerging system of European 
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states. Struggles between situated agents have specific outcomes that cannot be 
reduced to an overarching modernist rationale imposing itself in an all-determining 
fashion, neither in 1683, nor in 1815.  
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6 The Incarnation of the Antichrist or Strategic Linchpin?  
Orientalism and the Ambiguous Ottoman-European Relations 
 
“Modern history of Europe begins under stress of the Ottoman conquest.” 
Lord Acton 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The view that the Vienna Concert was not a normative inter-national European order, 
based on old dynasts carefully configuring the balance of power is not an unusual 
one. In fact, it is said to stand in stark contrast to the contemporary project of 
European integration, which is said to epitomize a truly normative universal order 
transcending previously divided ‘nations’. This brings us back to the initial problem 
about the mismatch between a universalizing ‘moderntiy’ and the territorially 
fractured international system it coincides with. It could be argued that the process of 
European integration eventually resolves the contradiction by creating a capitalist 
super-state, at least within the confines of the ‘Old World’. While this argument faces 
various historical challenges due the origins of the unification process in the 
geopolitical context of the cold war, the most obvious objection would be the 
continuously limited geographical scope within which European integration takes 
place. In other words, rather than overcoming fragmentation in favour of 
universalism, fragmentation persists, arguably more forcefully in form of the 
‘Fortress Europe’ (eg. Ireland 1991). This is best illustrated by the continuing refusal 
of full membership to the secular, free market, NATO member, Turkey.92 After all, 
the first Turkish application was made on 14 April 1987, more than twenty years ago. 
Accession negotiations, formally launched in 2005 still have not produced tangible 
results, even though Turkey is a formidable and reliable cornerstone of the West’s 
geostrategic design in the region since 1952. It seems, therefore, that the European 
Union, far from being the epitome of a capitalist superstate, still has borders that are 
constituted by ‘logics’ that do not lend themselves easily to either a geopolitical or 
capitalist reasoning. In other words, the contradiction between the universal and the 
particular, epitomized in the eastern question, persists.  
 
                                                 
92
 This was reconfirmed in April 2009 when US President Obama’s bid to grant Turkey EU 
membership was swiftly rejected by the French President Sarkozy and the German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel. 
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The following chapter will locate the origins of this continuing paradoxical 
division within what Edward Said has famously identified as ‘Orientalist’ practice. 
The way this concept is adapted here is, however, not so much in relation to the 
colonial experience of Britain and France and their attempt to establish hierarchical 
relationships between ‘East’ and ‘West’ as a means of economic exploitation. Even 
though it is true that “the ‘ideology’ of Orientalism was inextricably tied to Western 
hegemony,” (Kabbani 1986: 138), the study of this practice reveals, as Bryan Turner 
pointed out, more “about the origins of the West, not the origins of the East” (Turner 
1994: 100). In other words, Orientalism will not be looked at as the ideological 
superstructure of a materially determined imperial expansion, but as a strategy of 
maintaining internal European social relations. Orientalism is, therefore, understood 
here as a specifically European practice, which, above all “helped to define Europe 
(or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience” (Said 2003 
[1978]). This practice has many applications, amongst them literary reflections, 
policy making and academic research. This chapter will focus on the conception of 
Orientalism as a discursive means, i.e. “a style of thought based upon ontological and 
epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and (most of the time) ‘the 
Occident’,” (Said 2003 [1978]) which produces an external ‘mirror image’.  
Taking the long view of Orientalist practice will reveal, however, that there 
was no necessity for ‘the Orient’ to become Europe’s mirror image (Yapp 1992) at a 
time when the discoveries provided a much more radical example of difference 
(Cocker 1998; cf. Jahn 2000). In other words, it will be argued that Orientalism’s 
origin does not lie in a demarcation of “the boundary between the ancient regime and 
the modern” (Aijaz 1994: 166). Instead, it will be argued here, that this historical 
practice developed out of the various geopolitical encounters with ‘Orientals’ in 
general and the Ottoman Empire in particular from the 16th century onwards. While it 
is conducive to various ‘modern’ political projects, notably imperialism, this is not 
the underlying socio-historical origin, not least since the ‘European’ identity, Said 
and others emphasize, is itself fractured into various national forms.  
The argument is substantiated in five steps. First, the relationship between the 
European enlightened political subject and Orientalism will be problematized. This 
will reveal that Orientalist depictions of the Ottoman Empire or ‘the Turk’ are not 
unique products of the Enlightenment or modernity in Europe, but emerged within 
specific social and geopolitical contexts and found different expressions. Secondly, it 
will be shown that far away from coinciding with the formation of a pan-European 
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identity, Orientalism was first established as a response of the Catholic establishment 
to the Reformation more than to the Ottoman menace. Thirdly, it will be argued that 
rather than having its origin in the formation of European progress, it was specific 
competitive encounters between different European and Ottoman precapitalist 
polities, engaging in geopolitical accumulation, that eventually produced this divide. 
Fourth, a brief reconstruction of Ottoman-European relations in general and European 
Philhellenism in particular will demonstrate how Orientalism shaped the further 
European and Ottoman trajectories alike. Within this territorial and national 
reformulation of Orientalism, the Greek War of Independence is a crucial juncture. 
From 1821 to 1923 the ‘East’ and ‘West’ dividing line was physically manifested 
along the Greco-Ottoman territorial border. This will explain, finally, that even 
though the further spread of capitalism in the 20th century brought a general decrease 
in the geopolitical nature of the East/West divide, this still did not lead to the 
diminishing of its discursive substance, which is so solid that it survived into the 21st 
century North Atlantic zone of liberal peace.  
 
It is important to mention at this point that this reflection on the 
problematique of Orientalism does not imply the commitment to a postcolonial 
theoretical perspective in the entire thesis. For as Bryan Turner and Simon Bromley, 
amongst others, have duly pointed out “the conceptual basis on which that critique is 
founded, [...] does not lend itself unambiguously to the task of reformulating 
perspectives” (Turner 1994: 31) and “does little to provide us with the tools with 
which to build an alternative understanding of the region itself” (Bromley 1994: 12). 
Re-interpreting the origins of Orientalism does help, however, to understand the 
social underpinnings of the dynastic European international system within which 
Ottoman disintegration took place as well as the aforementioned practices of 
methodological nationalism. It explains, for example, forms of interactions with the 
Ottoman Empire that appear irreconcilable with Realpolitik and, most importantly, it 
de-naturalizes Ottoman decline and, in doing so, provides the epistemological and 
ontological openings that allow for the non-deterministic, non-teleological and non-
Orientalist reading of the process of late and post-Ottoman national state formation 
this thesis aims at providing. 
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6.2 The European Political Subject and Orientalist Practice  
According to the Oxford English Dictionary (1989 ), the word ‘Orientalism’ was in 
the 18th and 19th centuries used to refer to the work of the orientalist, a scholar versed 
in the languages and literatures of the East; and in the world of the arts to identify a 
character, style or quality commonly associated with the Eastern nations. However, 
these studies are not necessarily value-free but always based on the assumption that 
“the Orient and everything in it was, if not patently inferior to, then in need of 
corrective study by the West” (Said 2003 [1978]: 41) This was motivated by the 
West’s or Europe’s both desire and need to set “itself off against the Orient as a sort 
of surrogate and even underground ‘self’ (Said 2003 [1978]: 3). 
Out of all the critiques launched against this practice, it was Edward Said’s 
that was the most influential one. Whether it can be considered, as is frequently 
argued, “by far the most effective” (Macfie 2002: 8), will be established in what 
follows. In any case, Said’s ‘Orientalism’ provides the entry point for many, if not 
most reflections on this subject. The detection of Orientalist representations as early 
as in Aeschylus's play on The Persians (Said 2003 [1978]: 21) raises the question 
whether this form of ‘underground self’ is a transhistorical ‘necessity’, intricate in the 
European ‘self’. Contrary to such an essentialised assumption, Said continuously 
emphasizes the requirements of imperial and colonial subjugation of the ‘orientals’ as 
the background of most Orientalist representations and practices, particularly in 
British and French literature. However, colonialism only constitutes one part of the 
explanation. Said equally locates the origins of Orientalism in the specific social 
conditions of ‘modern’ Europe itself. To him, Orientalism is bound up with the 
formation of modern states, whose rulers require a substitute for the divine 
legitimation that was compromised by the secular ideology of the Enlightenment. 
While this argument may overestimate how swiftly Europe’s societies were 
‘secularised’ beyond the expropriation of clerical possessions, it is the transformation 
to capitalism and the intrinsic de-personalization of social relations that is more 
crucial in this regard. The freeing of the individual has generated a ‘form of 
paranoia’, as Said put it, that led to Western projections of the oriental other as an 
aggressive outward expression of this ‘ego-anxiety’ (Said 2003 [1978]: 72). The aim 
behind this critique is to illustrate that there is no transhistorically inimical 
relationship between the ‘Orient’ and the ‘Occident’ (Yeğenoğlu 2006: 248), but that 
this oppositional difference was socially created specifically within European 
modernity. Thus, rather than a continuity of inter-faith hostilities fuelled by mutually 
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exclusive messianic drives of Christianity and Islam respectively (cf. Huntington 
1996), this antagonism does not persist despite European ‘progress’, but because of it. 
In other words, the social condition of enlightened modernity, the breakdown of 
moral spiritual authority of the Church and divine legitimacy necessitates the Orient 
as a constitutive element to discursively manifest novel forms of sovereignty. The 
social transformations unique to Europe towards capitalist modernity, which alienate 
the individual from its traditional social structures, produce new forms of political 
subjectivity that generate an aggressive outward motion. This is unique to capitalism, 
and must therefore also be unique to Western Europe, where it first emerged. 
 
Indeed, it is here that Orientalism meets the Nietzschean explanation of 
nationalism. European sovereignty transforms subjects into citizens, i.e. personal 
relations of domination are replaced by depersonal forms of formally or legally equal 
political subjects. These individuals organize themselves within nation-states 
according to the conventional liberal internationalist narrative, rather than ‘Europe’. 
Nation-states, thus, coincide with the "new order in freedom, based upon the 
autonomy of the individual" (Kohn 1967: 237). In other words, collective identities 
are containerized within national states as the prima facie political institution through 
which this new free political agency is expressed. However, nationalism not only 
constitutes a form of political emancipation, it equally embodies the notion of a crisis 
of the political subject. Alienated by the ‘the coldest of all cold monsters’ as 
Nietzsche put it (Nietzsche 2005), the modern abstract and de-personal state requires 
a form of social identification previously supplied by spiritual forms of identity, 
mostly in the form of the Abrahamic religions. This moment of crisis that evolves out 
of the process of alienation can, therefore, equally generate a momentum for social 
change. The controlled introduction of collective social identities can be interpreted, 
therefore, as a form of  maintaining established forms of political power by the old 
regime (Mayer 1981; Halperin 1997). However, this strategy relied not only on the 
projection and imagination of one’s own community, but, equally, on establishing its 
‘outside’ realm’ as an intrinsic part of its ‘self’. Orientalism’s central purpose is 
understood as legitimating secular/Enlightened Western European statecraft and 
developmental agency. Thus, as Simon Bromley observes, “the sharp, theoretical 
dichotomy between 'West' and 'East' was only formulated in the modern political 
theory of the Renaissance (…) the origins of 'Orientalism' were thus intimately 
related to the process of self-definition that accompanied the transition to capitalism 
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in Europe and the ensuing European conquest of the globe” (Bromley 1994: 14f). 
Besides this political function of Orientalism, there is also a persistent sociological 
function, whereby the Orient serves to answer, according to Turner, “one of the 
formative questions of classical sociology – why did industrial capitalism first emerge 
in the West? [Orientalism] is consequently an essential feature of an intellectual 
accounting system which [foundationally] hinges upon a basic East/West contrast” 
(Turner 1994: 18). Thus, there appear to be various ways to associate capitalist 
development, nationalism and Orientalism, whereby new forms of collective 
identities, themselves an outcome of social conditions specific to capitalist modernity, 
operate through the creation of alterity, and the demarcation of an inimical or inferior 
‘outside’.  
 
Indeed, it is here that the contradiction arises: If multiple nationalisms within 
Europe are defined in opposition to each other, yet at the same time they all belong to 
a European macro-identity defined by its opposition to the Orient, the unity provided 
by ‘the anti-Oriental’ European identity should supersede the contradictions within 
Europe. Historically this is difficult to substantiate if looked at the 19th and the first 
half of the 20th century. Theoretically, however, nationalism and Orientalism, instead 
of providing complementary explanations for the same social phenomenon – 
difference – are in fact competing explanations, both based on the depersonalisation 
of socio-political relations. Since the societal and socio-psychological differentiations 
typical of modernity logically preclude a unifying identity such as Europe, or rather, 
if modern conditions dictate the ‘invention’ of mutually exclusive and reciprocally 
defined nationalisms, it appears difficult to argue for the need of a European meta-
identity that precisely supersedes the fragmentations logically implied, according to 
the Nietzschean theory of nationalism, in European capitalist ‘modernity’. 
 
This contradiction also conjures a wider problem with Said’s account: the 
notion of ‘Europe’. If anything, the 19th and 20th century history of capitalist 
expansion in Europe has demonstrated that its development was uneven and 
refractured by a multiplicity of pre-existing European territorial states while its spread 
was mediated through geopolitical struggles. Thus, the initial phase of capitalist 
development was characterized by the intensification of difference, rather than the 
emergence of universality in the form of Europe. This trajectory has been 
convincingly explained by the theory of uneven and combined development 
 198
(Rosenberg 1996). In short, engaging the notion of a cohesive European projection of 
an inferior Orient cannot accommodate Europe’s internal fragmentations.  
 
This reveals yet again the problem of linking all crucial historical 
conjunctures of the 19th century to the emergence of this one universal notion of 
modernity. This problem is also not overcome by identifying the Renaissance rather 
than capitalism as the historical point from which, “European political thinkers in the 
age of Absolutism repeatedly sought to define the character of their own world by 
opposition with that of the Turkish order” (Anderson 1974: 397), since it assumes a 
social transformation that had by and large not taken place until the late 19th century. 
However, even if the necessity of a mirror image is accepted, this still does not 
explain why the Orient in general and the ‘the Turk’ in particular gained the 
referential position in Europe’s self-imagination. Why is it the ‘Orient’ serves this 
oppositional function over ‘the Russian Ivan’, ‘the Slavs’, ‘the Bolsheviki’, or for that 
matter the natives in the Americas? While the concept of Orientalism understood in 
Said’s terms accurately captures social practices prevalent from the Renaissance, to 
the Enlightenment, to modern capitalism, the choice of the ‘Orient’ over any other 
potential ‘constitutive outside’ or ‘other’ requires an explanation.  
  
To sum this up, Said’s Orientalism leaves at least four questions. First, there 
remains a question about chronology. Orientalist discourse emerged long before the 
social transformation that generated a state of ‘ego anxiety’ in Europe. Second, the 
idea of a pan-European identity beyond individual nationalisms during the 19th 
century clashes with the simultaneous emergence of various, reciprocally defined, 
nationalisms. Third, the geographical focus on the ‘Orient’ is left unexplained. This 
becomes evident in the light of various alternative readily available ‘others’. Fourth, 
Said’s critique reifies Orientalism by making an ‘Occidentialist’ argument about the 
generic character of ‘Western’ societies, their uniform need for discursive ‘alterity’ 
and their unvarying focus on the Orient. Regardless of all of these problems, Said 
provides an extensive and cogent portrayal of the concrete historical as well as 
contemporary reality of a European tradition of Orientalism. The establishment of this 
tradition, it will be shown, has severe consequences for the application of Realpolitik.  
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6.3 Luther and Süleyman 
One prominent way in which this Orientalist tradition is expressed is in culturalist and 
essentialist assumptions of a religiously motivated expansionist drive of Islam.93 
However, this ‘Myth of Confrontation’ (Halliday 1995) is not necessarily a product of 
a 19th century transformation, but followed a long tradition already expressed in 
notions of ‘the Turk’, to speak with Luther, as the ‘Servant of the Antichrist’.94 This 
‘Turk’ has shaped European political discourse at the very latest from the conquest of 
Constantinople 1453 onwards. Hence, the depiction of the Ottomans as the epitome of 
evil did not necessarily spring from a modern or early modern European social 
condition, but had been institutionalized prior to the transformations associated with 
‘modernity’. Initially, this ‘tradition’ was given a decisive boost, not by Luther 
himself as the quote above suggests, but by the threat his 95 theses posed to Catholic 
unity. The Catholic Roman heritage, while by no means rock solid, had nevertheless 
been spared any major challenge ever since the Eastern Schism in the 11th century. 
Rather, Christian unity had just been reinforced by the success of the Spanish 
Reconquista in the 15th century. This period of unanimity changed, however, with the 
Reformation, itself the result of socio-economic more than theological issues, which 
saw “Christian unity … severely impaired,”…as a result of which “the old antithesis 
of Christian versus Muslim was replaced by the new polarity of ‘civilised Europeans’ 
versus ‘uncivilised barbarians’” (Delanty and Campling 1995: 67) with the latter 
applying to Protestants just as much as to the coincidentally expanding ‘Turks’.  
24 years after Luther’s theses were published and Protestantism gained 
momentum in Germany, the Ottoman onslaught hit at the Catholic Church’s heart 
with the occupation of Buda by Suleiman the Magnificent in 1541. This meant that 
the Holy Roman Emperor found himself under pressure from two ends. To the South 
he had lost vast territories to Suleyman’s advancing troops, whereas Protestantism 
had emerged in the Northern part of the Empire and started to pose a just as 
                                                 
93
 The author does not take issue with the empirical observation of expansionism of various 
‘Islamic’ Empires as such. What is problematized here instead is the explanation of various vastly 
different forms of expansionism with reference to a single religion (cf. Karsh 2007). While 
Europe’s expansion equally requires different explanations at different times (e.g. Spanish colonial 
vs. British capitalist expansion; ‘informal’ vs. ‘formal’ Imperialism, etc.; cf. chapter 3, p 85), so 
does ‘Islamic expansionism’ require historically specific explanations at different times reflecting 
peculiar reproductive strategies of various notionally ‘Islamic’ social formations (e.g. Ottoman, 
Mamluk, Seljuk, etc.). Culturalist or religious a priori assumptions about the expansionary 
dynamic of ‘Islam’ itself are therefore highly problematic. 
94
 'The Pope is the spirit of Antichrist and the Turk the body of Antichrist', original: '[P]apa est 
spiritus Antichristi, et Turca est caro Antichristi. Helffen beyde einander wurgen, hic corpore et 
gladio, ille doctrina et spiritu.' (Luther 1967: 135, 330) 
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formidable threat, ideological for the time being, as the Ottomans posed a geopolitical 
one. The coincidental arrival of the combined threat, however, posed a double 
challenge to the Habsburg Charles V, not least since the continuous defeats of 
Catholic powers at the hands of infidels or even agents of the incarnation of the 
‘Antichrist’, were said to have assisted the success of Protestantism significantly at a 
time when political power was derived from divine legitimacy (Iyigun 2008). Even 
though Habsburg weakness frequently translated into the success of Protestantism, 
this was arguably owed much more to the relief from indulgence payments 
Protestantism offered, than a lack of theological justification of Austrian rule caused 
by military defeat at the hands of the infidel. Popular perception of an Ottoman threat 
was not great outside of the South-eastern European border regions. Fischer-Galati 
observes that during the 1520s nothing seemed to indicate in any way “that the 
peasants considered the Turks either as enemies or as liberators, or as having directly 
or indirectly contributed to their sufferings; the Turk did not seem to concern them 
one way or the other” (Fischer-Galati 1954: 49). If it didn’t concern the peasantry, it 
certainly concerned the Catholic establishment, who, nevertheless, treated 
Protestantism as the more serious threat and rushed to deal with this problem with 
much more resolve. As soon as Protestant princes entered into alliances with the 
Ottoman Empire in their struggles for legitimacy with Catholic Powers, Charles V 
swiftly reversed his priorities. However, Charles was unable to engage both the 
Ottoman as well as the Protestant front simultaneously. Despite Luther’s ‘Orientalist’ 
perception of the Ottomans, it was their advance that gave Protestantism some 
breathing space. The much more serious ‘infidel’ in form of the ‘Turk’ thus at least 
deferred the Catholic backlash against the Protestant infidel, arguably until the 
outbreak of the Thirty Years’ War in 1618. As opposed to Charles V’s earlier 
reluctance to commit to the anti-Ottoman struggle, he increasingly realized his 
militarily precarious situation which at the same time opened up the opportunity to 
gather Protestant support in the effort against a perceivably common Islamic threat.  
The Ottoman advance, thus, had two slightly contradictory effects. On the one 
hand, it led to a temporary intermission of the sectarian conflict the Reformation had 
generated. On the other hand, it put ample pressure on the Catholic establishment to 
allow Protestant sectarianism to be strengthened. This delay of the ensuing struggle 
was eventually codified in the 1532 Peace of Nuremberg. German Protestantism, it is 
sometimes argued, thus, owes nothing short of its survival to the Ottoman campaigns 
into Europe (Fischer-Galati 1959). This is because the Catholic Habsburg dynasty 
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found itself in no position to restore “Christian unity within a new Holy Roman 
Empire with Charles as its emperor” (Fischer-Galati 1954: 47) when hard pressed at 
the same time to defend the Empire’s southeastern borders. In a different way, 
however, the Ottoman threat could, at least temporarily, help overcome the division it 
had allowed to mature by posing a constant geopolitical threat. By identifying the 
common enemy as Islam, sectarianism, if not subdued, could at least be guarded more 
easily. This episode of the coincidental arrival of the Protestant and Ottoman 
challenges to Catholic power in Europe goes to show that the Ottoman infringement 
on the European borders was far from marginal or external to European relations, but 
that it shaped not only Europe’s relations to the rest of the world but also influenced 
intra-European relations in a meaningful way.   
 
 
6.4 The Ottoman Origin of Orientalism  
This pre-empted the process of ‘otherization’ in Said’s account. However, it was not 
based on Islam or a more generic notion of ‘the East’ or ‘Orient’ but, the much more 
tangible menace of Ottoman conquest specifically (Neumann and Welsh 1991: 329). 
Pointing at the concrete historical background of the Ottoman encounter can reveal 
how the imagining of the Orient is derived from geopolitical conflicts in southeastern 
Europe, rather than the necessities of the colonial enterprise. Not colonialism or 
imperialism, but geopolitical accumulation, which was the principle mode of social 
reproduction of all participating parties, caused the emergence of ‘the Turk as 
Antichrist’ as a predecessor to Orientalism.  
From within the great European powers it was Britain which had pioneered 
diplomatic, non-violent and peaceful relations with the Ottoman Empire and which 
advocated Ottoman preservation from the 17th century up until the outbreak of the 
First World War – a position that could be explained with reference by Britain’s 
territorial secluded position vis-à-vis the Ottoman expansion. This shows that various 
Orientalisms evolved within various European societies, dependent on the specific 
social constitution and position and encounters with the ‘Orient’ and the ‘Turk’. 
Equally, the Orientalist perception of Ottoman rule was neither uniform nor static, but 
evolved in accordance with the uneven, fractured and multiple European 
developmental paths 
This is also reflected in a considerable amount of Western political thought, 
which engages the image of ‘the Turk’ or, more commonly, Oriental Despotism, a 
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concept the origins of which far exceed Wittfogel’s relatively recent, if important, 
analysis (Wittfogel 1957). Amongst the most prominent analyses of ‘Eastern 
Despotism’ – or more precisely – ‘Turkic Despotism’ (i.e. Ottoman rule) are Jean 
Bodin (Les six livres de la République), Nicolló Machiavelli (Il Principe) and 
Montesquieu (De l'esprit des lois). Il Principe, for example, develops a binary 
typology of government, “either by a prince to whom everyone is subservient and 
whose ministers, with his favour and permission, help govern, or by a prince and by 
nobles whose rank is established not by favour of the prince but by their ancient 
lineage.” While the latter describes European feudalism, the former applies to French 
Absolutism and the Ottoman Sultan. Non-feudal rule might bring defensive 
advantages, according to Machiavelli, but he is also clear that it implies less 
‘freedom’ and a way out of the ‘abasement of the people’ (Springborg 1992: 280-81). 
However, as Lucette Valensi shows, relying on the earliest reflections of Ottoman 
sovereignty from Venice, what is usually implied by this ‘Prince’ is the Aristotelian 
concept of ‘Tyranny’, rather than the notorious concept of ‘Oriental Despotism’ 
which came to dominate the initial European accounts of Ottoman rule, notably the 
Venetian ambassador’s to the Porte, Peitro Foscarini (Valensi 1987: 2f).  
The distinction between ‘despotism’ and ‘tyranny’ is crucial, however, as 
these two concepts, while closely related, actually denote different forms of rule. The 
Aristotelian concept of ‘tyranny’ could have positive connotations as it merely 
referred to the absence of nobility. “Turkish ‘tyranny’ implied not only a terrifying 
experience, an oppressive regime, and an exotic ensemble of political and social 
relations, but also the legitimacy and success of the empire”(Cirakman 2001: 55-56). 
Whilst ‘tyranny’ simply indicated a strong and centralised form of rule, such as the 
Ottoman, this does not necessarily imply unjust or illegitimate rule. ‘Despotism’ on 
the other hand connotes “abusive, excessive, and degenerate governmental form(s)” 
(Valensi 1987: 76), i.e. a illegitimate rule. Jean Bodin, using the concept of ‘tyranny’, 
considered the Ottoman tolerance towards all Abrahamic faiths to be a model for 
emulation for Europe. “The King of the Turks, who rules over a great part of Europe, 
safeguards the rites of religion as well as any prince in this world. Yet he constrains 
no one, but on the contrary permits everyone to live according as his conscience 
dictates” (1962). Bodin, writing from a background of religious wars in France, is not 
alone in describing the Sultan’s rule in such positive terms. The relatively positive 
depiction of ‘Tyranny’ was originally based on the observation of the Şeriat, the 
Islamic just order, notably preventing the accumulation of landed property. In strictly 
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legalistic terms, there was no private property until the introduction of the 1856 Land 
Code (Arazi Kanunnamesi) which allowed the transfer of state lands to individuals. It 
is indeed these absolute property rights of the Sultan that underlie many Renaissance 
and Enlightenment analyses of Ottoman rule, such as Montesquieu’s: “There is no 
despotism so injurious as that whose prince declares himself proprietor of all landed 
estates and heir of all subjects: the consequence is always the abandonment of 
cultivation, and if the ruler interferes in trade, the ruin of every industry” 
(Montesquieu and Goldschmidt 1979: 67-66). However, despite this legalistic 
interpretation, in practical terms, the ‘Oriental Tyrant’ could not rule so arbitrarily 
outside of the ‘good, God-given’ order, i.e. the same Şeriat that in theory entitled the 
Sultan to all land more profoundly established God as the ultimate proprietor and the 
Sultan’s control over it was contingent upon him maintaining a just order as a trustee 
of God’s land. The just order of Islam, and with it the powerful clergy (ulema), rather 
than granting the right to arbitrary rule, established caps on surplus-extraction, 
protected the direct producers and preached religious tolerance, while curtailing the 
ruling class, especially in the periphery. Thus, even though there might not have 
necessarily been a powerful ‘moderating class’ like the nobility in Europe, the Şeriat 
also constrained the Sultan’s agency. Apart from this normative religious frame by 
which the exercise of Sultanic powers was restricted, there were a variety of classes 
and class alliances comprising landed aristocrats, governors, as well as bureaucrats 
within Istanbul that effectively limited the Sultan’s powers.  
In the 17th century a conceptual shift occurred. “After that date subjects of the 
sultan were increasingly said to suffer under the ‘tyrannical yoke’ of their ‘despotic’ 
ruler, since they were obliged to blindly obey him…” (Kaiser 2000: 9). Hence, the 
transition from the term "tyranny" to that of "despotism" indicates a radical change in 
the European images of the Ottoman Empire (Koebner 1951). Asli Cirakman 
describes a similar shift, but points out that it is only with the beginning 
Enlightenment in the 18th century that Ottoman rule is much more frequently 
described as ‘Oriental Despotism’. He elaborates on the conceptual difference 
between ‘Tyranny’ as a personal, permeable, i.e. non-structural condition of 
exploitative and arbitrary rule, and ‘Despotism’ which refers to an underlying 
cultural-social condition of regionally specific forms of government – invented only 
in the 18th century and applicable specifically to the Ottoman Empire (Cirakman 
2001). It is the emergence of the concept of ‘Despotism’ which is so specific to early 
modern European political philosophy that requires an explanation. As such it is 
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pertinent to consider Lucette Valensi’s questions: “by what metamorphosis did the 
mighty body of the Ottoman colossus change into an ailing monster? What could turn 
an emperor who aspired to universal monarchy and seemed capable of attaining it 
into an unworthy ruler” (Valensi 1987: 79)? 
 
Most of the explanations for the shift from ‘Tyranny’ to ‘Despotism’ focus on 
an emerging Ottoman weakness or, to use the common teleological reading of 
Ottoman history, ‘the beginning of the End’ discussed in chapter 3. On the European 
side, Ottoman defeat is said to have instilled a growing sense of superiority which 
meant that European observers went from admiration and fear to subordination, thus, 
setting the ground for the Orientalist depiction of Ottoman rule. These changing 
fortunes are, however, not as historically clear cut as they might appear at first sight. 
The Empire’s territorial stagnation was already discussed at some length and need not 
be disputed here. Equally, however, neither can 1683 be read as the establishment of 
an almighty European superiority.  
A more revealing aspect that arguably contributed to this paradigm shift is the 
already discussed damage to the traditional Ottoman social structure from the late 16th 
century onwards that these geopolitical encounters had caused. This means that the 
crucial difference was not with a European military superiority, or an increase in 
Ottoman arbitrary rule (at least in case of the Sultan), but with the emergence of much 
more exploitative social relations in the periphery which were caused by the 
breakdown of Ottoman order. This social transformation and the rise of the âyâns, led 
to a decline of the Şeriat. The arrival of ‘Despotism’ is, thus, substantiated by the 
already discussed social transformations within the Empire and was consequently 
reflected in the European accounts as the shift from ‘tyranny’ to ‘despotism’.  
While this is a crucial historical development underlying the paradigm shift, 
locating the source of social change exclusively within the Ottoman Empire equally 
overlooks a central aspect of European transformation. As Bryan Turner argues,  
“the debate about oriental despotism took place in the context of 
uncertainty about enlightened despotism and monarchy in Europe. The 
Orientalist discourse on the absence of civil society in Islam was a reflection of 
basic political anxieties about the state of political freedom in the West. In this 
sense, the problem of Orientalism was not the Orient but the Occident. These 
problems and anxieties were consequently transferred onto the Orient which 
became, not a representation of the East, but a caricature of the West” (Turner 
1994: 34).  
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In a similar fashion, Thomas Kaiser has argued that ‘Despotism’, much more 
than actually representing an Orientalist treatment of ‘the East’ or Ottoman society 
more particularly, was what he calls a “standard model” used to depict the ‘despot 
within’, i.e. the outgoing Ancient Regime (Kaiser 2000). In other words, the 
transformation towards ‘Despotism’ was not simply something empirically 
observable or a mere reflection on Ottoman internal instability. The shift from 
‘tyranny’ to ‘despotism’ also reflected the European transformation towards 
absolutism.  
It can be observed, therefore, that the European concepts through which the 
Ottoman Empire was (mis)understood changed due to the specific social 
transformations and various shifts in the internal and external positions of European 
dynastic states more than due to a change within the Ottoman Empire. ‘Oriental 
Despotism’, as Kaiser observes, is better understood as a term to describe the 
establishment of absolutist rule in Europe, rather than the ‘backward’ and ‘despotic’ 
mirror-image of the Ottomans. Thus, instead of reflecting a social transformation 
within European societies, Orientalism was initially an inter-dynastic practice, “…a 
club of (western) Christian monarchs [which] produced its first forms of organisation 
against the Muslim, i.e. infidel, Turk” (Halliday 1992: 440).  
 
 
6.5 The Denial of Ottoman Agency-A Brief Survey of European-Ottoman 
Relations 
Within literature on this ‘international society’, which also deals with the Ottoman 
Empire, this kind of longe-durée view on European-Ottoman relations is fairly 
uncommon. Instead, a narrative of European universalization explains these relations 
in form of a teleology, whereby the formerly alien Ottoman polity matures until it 
finally enters the world of civilized European states in the mid 19th century. The first 
officially recognized form of cooperation as an active subject of international 
relations akin to any of the other Great Powers is said to have taken place in July 
1840 with the drawing up of the Convention for the Pacification of the Levant. The 
1856 Peace of Paris ending the Crimean War is conventionally understood to mark 
the beginning of ‘full membership’ of the Ottoman Empire in the post-Napoleonic 
Concert of European Powers, or the international society (Naff 1984: 143; Göl 2003). 
This argument will be referred to here as the incorporation thesis. Here, Ottoman 
international agency is only fully recognizable once it has been ‘incorporated’ into the 
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European society of states, implying a prior inability to adhere to the legally and 
institutionally regulated societal nature of European international relations. This 
argument could be supported also from a historical materialist perspective, since 
British imperialist expansion has made the Ottoman bulwark function towards Russia 
indispensable, whereas it was previously only regarded as a – temporary – anomaly in 
Europe. Thus, European modernization in Grotian terms inferred a foreign policy 
shift, which was increasingly dominated by raison d’état thinking allowing for 
alliances with the Ottomans, whose own modernization program had made them 
amenable to entering the European club. This involved a re-formulation of the “law 
between Christian nations” to the “law between civilized nations”, seemingly 
constituting a recognizable shift in the dealings with the former ‘Despot’.  
However, as opposed to the incorporation thesis’ major premise, this formal 
introduction of the Ottoman Empire into the European inter-state system did not 
catapult the Ottoman-European relationship into a new and different age. The change 
this act of recognition at Paris instigated was not as dramatic as is suggested. Ottoman 
rule was not, as a result, considered a part of the European ‘international society’ as is 
evidenced by the swift relegation of the Porte from a welcome new member to the 
‘Sick Man of Europe’. Conversely, 1856 was also not the beginning of formalized 
foreign exchanges, but Ottoman diplomatic activity burgeoned already from 
Karlowitz 1698 onwards as a result of territorial stagnation. Given the Empire’s 
proximity to the European theatre, it had always played a part in European politics.  
Hence, the Ottoman presence is either understood as an anomaly temporarily 
setting camp in Europe and treating the Porte as an element of disturbance or as an 
active and important participant in European politics which was not illegitimate or 
unusual in principle. This was the case for some early Protestant princes, who had 
formed anti-Catholic alliances, thus leading to more pragmatic forms of interaction 
with the Porte. These two perspectives do not occur in a sequence, however, but 
appear in less systematic, random and sometimes simultaneous instances. It is 
problematic, therefore, to think of Ottoman-European relations in strictly 
chronological terms, for identifying watersheds like 1840 or 1856 fails to account for 
the degree to which multiple European states reacted in different ways in specific 
situations to the Ottoman Empire. However, this is not to say, that there is not a 
special quality attached to the Ottoman as opposed to any of the other Powers of the 
Concert. After all, the process of ‘incorporation’ was never really complete, neither in 
1856 nor in 2009. In this sense, process should not be confused with linearity.  
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A more useful way to understand this, to some extent schizophrenic 
relationship between the Ottoman Empire and Europe, is in terms of a dialectical 
negotiation between two extremes. On the one hand, Ottoman agency can be seen as 
autonomous, i.e. the Ottoman state/unit functioning as the southeastern branch of the 
European inter-state system. Territorial decline generated, paradoxically, the 
establishment of such an Ottoman international agency. On the other hand, the 
geopolitically and financially weakened state of the Porte made it easy to perceive the 
Ottoman Empire, in good Orientalist fashion, as an object, rather than subject of 
European Politics. This ‘objectification’ of the Ottoman realm was duly exercised by 
the Great Powers who distributed its territories amongst themselves, if in need for 
territorial compensation as a means of mediating conflicts distant from Ottoman lands 
(Reinowski 2006). Ottoman preservation was therefore also necessary “simply 
because its demise would raise problems so dangerous that general European war and 
upheaval could not be avoided. European cabinets thus relied upon concert diplomacy 
(…) to avoid as long as possible the inevitable scramble over the spoils, and to insure 
that no one power acquired exclusive preponderance in an area affecting the interests 
of all” (Elrod 1976: 166). This position as a political football of European Great 
Power politics was comparable to Poland’s position in the 18th century (Bideleux and 
Jeffries 1998: 156), which even led to a little known Polish-Ottoman defensive 
Alliance in 1790 (Adanir 2005: 401f). The Porte’s position differed, nevertheless, 
from Poland’s in two important aspects. Firstly, apart from peripheral territorial 
tradeoffs, mostly to Russia’s advantage, the Empire – in stark contrast to Poland – 
managed to avoid outright dissection, or partition, until the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, 
which was met by a highly successful Turkish war of resistance.95 Secondly, and 
more importantly, Poland never served as a definitional referent for the idea of 
‘European-ness’ in the same way the Ottoman Empire did.96  
While the usage of the Turkish mirror was mostly sporadic, it became more 
systematic during the post-Napoleonic conservative ‘restoration’ – a project that was 
in dire need for a unifying projection. Consequently, the Holy Alliance treaty 
explicitly referred to ‘members of one and the same Christian nation’ (Adanir 2005: 
                                                 
95
 The Turkish War of Independence brought a revision to the territorial designs aimed at curbing 
Turkish power, at the expense of the original territorial promises to Greece, Armenia and a still to 
be agreed form of Kurdish autonomy. These provisions were internationally codified in the 1923 
Treaty of Lausanne. This also included the controversial exchange of Turkish/Muslim with 
Greek/Christian populations.  
96
 While Poland specifically never came to constitute Europe’s ‘other’, it was nevertheless part of 
the Slavic and Communist worlds, which did acquire this kind of function.  
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402). Thus, the inter-dynastic ‘concert’ was not only based on the inclusive notion of 
a unified Christian/European ‘self’, but inevitably equally involved the exclusion of 
Islam. In other words, the ‘Turkish menace’ had a consolidating effect on the post-
war European consciousness. At the same time, however, it was especially the British 
understanding of the balance of power that included a fortification of the Pax 
Ottomanica and, in consequence, extensive cooperation with the Ottomans. This 
developed, as we have seen, into a main British policy of strict territorial 
preservation, which served the requirements of the newly formed international order 
better than outright confrontation. A most likely rapturous partition, as envisaged by 
France and Russia at various stages would have opened Pandora’s Box in the region.  
In and of itself the ‘incorporation’ thesis of the International Society approach 
sheds light only on the formalistic diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire 
in European Great Power politics, while failing to identify the real rationale behind 
Ottoman preservation. To be sure, this and the historically observable increase in 
volumes of diplomatic, commercial and cultural exchange are undeniably very 
significant developments. However, the English School approach fails to illuminate 
the geostrategic centrality of the Ottoman lands for the British Empire and, therefore 
fails to explain the crucial determination of the political developments it describes 
accurately. Equally, it cannot accommodate the contradicting, but important function 
of the Ottoman polity as a passive object of European self-identification. The 
Ottoman polity fulfilled these two functions simultaneously, depending on specific 
circumstances, rather than as two separate sequences within a long-term assimilating 
trajectory.  
 
 
6.6 The Orientalist Logic of Philhellenism  
Given that a balance of power rationale, if anything, had originally dictated the 
maintenance of Ottoman rule in the region, the European intervention in the Greek 
War of Independence defied both this rationale as well as the conservative spirit of 
the post-Napoleonic “restoration”. Apart from the need of Russian containment, this 
seeming contradiction becomes more understandable when considering the 
significance of the Philhellenic movement in Europe. As opposed to its own self-
definition as a Hellenic model for a ‘modern’ geopolitical order in the Balkans or the 
Middle East, the Philhellenic movement was supported by enlightened absolutists like 
Charles X of France or Ludwig I of Bavaria.  
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However, the result of the Greek secession was significant to understanding 
Orientalism insofar as it allowed for a much more succinct demarcation of the realm 
of ‘otherness’ territorially. Extracting the perceivably European, Byzantine, Roman 
and Christian elements from the Islamic Ottoman realm, which had previously been 
an intricate part of that polity, allowed for a much more purified version of the 
‘Oriental Despot’ in the form of an Ottoman administration which, by then, 
increasingly employed Muslim civil servants in the foreign ministry. Thus, what Said 
has called the ‘imaginative geography’ of Orientalism could now be elevated to a 
concrete physical geography along the Greco-Ottoman border. A ‘spatial fix’ of the 
divide, which could now be reproduced cartographically, thereby strengthening its 
social effectiveness, whereas previously, “Europe's uncertain boundaries increase the 
importance of historical, racial, ethnic, and cultural factors in constructing a Self vs. 
Other identity” (Müftüler-Bac 2000: 25). However, this instrumentalization is not 
accidental or simply a matter of convenience. The support of the Greek cause 
provided Europe’s enlightened absolutist rulers with a discursive opening capable of 
fostering their crumbling legitimacy as the saviours of Occidental culture, values and 
of Christianity in southeastern Europe in opposition to an Empire that had stopped 
constituting an existential or even geopolitical threat a long time ago. Crucially, this 
did not necessarily imply the conscious creation of a pan-European identity, but was 
limited to an anti-Ottoman discourse. Paradoxically, however, this was marred with a 
diplomatic opening towards the Porte as dictated by balance of power politics.  
The social structures generating these uneven and sometimes contradictory 
relations with the Ottoman Empire were highly differentiated throughout Europe, thus 
making it appear problematic to speak of a single European Orientalist practice, not 
least since Edward Said, in his original work makes a differentiation between French 
and British Orientalisms while attracting criticism for not having discussed a German 
variant (Said 1984: 14f). Various Orientalisms, thus differed, broadly speaking, 
between liberal early capitalist societies and absolutist continental European societies. 
Britain, for example, had less ‘encounters with the Turk’ but perceived Russia as a 
much more serious threat, whereas the economic dependency and geostrategic 
centrality for the maintenance of the British Empire made some form of interaction 
with the Ottoman Empire indispensable. The German states, Venice and, to a lesser 
extent, France tended to make heavier use of the ‘oriental despot’ because of the 
geographical proximity and the actual encounters with the perceived threat. At the 
specific conjuncture of the Greek revolt then, embracing the Greek ‘liberation 
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paradigm’ helped maintaining the crisis ridden European ruling dynasties, ever 
fearful of uprisings after the Napoleonic interlude had instilled the seeds for upheaval 
all over Europe. Initially this challenge was contained by restoring legitimacy, in part 
by saving Europe’s lost Greek heritage from the Oriental yoke. In this regard it did 
not even matter that the neo-absolutist Kingdom of Greece established after 
independence was run by a German Catholic Prince whose reactionary regime had 
little in common with ‘Hellenic’ political traditions.  
Thus, the substantial lack of any real implementation of an Athenian Republic 
on the Peloponnesus did not contradict the projections and imagination of European 
Philhellenism. This reorientation to the pan-European Hellenic heritage, suggesting a 
vision of political progress by concentrating on a common past, which was not 
matched by any genuine social transformation, was an adequate means to channel 
liberal spirits already unleashed. In other words, Philhellenism appeared to offer a 
unique opportunity to demonstrate the Enlightenment credentials of Absolutism. 
European Philhellenism was much more than just a spontaneous expression of 
sympathy with a ‘Greek’ people trying to overthrow the ‘Asiatic Despot’. Cultivating 
Hellenism both at home and abroad was central to generating an “idealized vision of a 
reunified and reintegrated European civilization that would include its Greek 
progenitor” (Kasaba 2003: 2), better understood as absolutist crisis management, than 
an early form of internationalism.  
Some postcolonial writers, most famously Martin Bernal, in his Black Athena 
(Bernal 1987; Lefkowitz and Rogers 1996; Hobson 2004: 2), already pointed at the 
Orientalist character of the Hellenic movement. The idealized version of a resurrected 
Hellenic civilization is pitched against Ottoman exploitation. However, as both Reşat 
Kasaba and Maria Koundoura have pointed out, once encountered first hand, the 
Philhellene’s realizations were comparable to “a homecoming in which he [the 
Philhellene] figures as the modern day Odysseus returning to Ithaca only to find crass 
suitors surrounding his Penelope and occupying his home” (Kasaba 2003; Koundoura 
2007). Greek society remained initially, at core, the Oriental society in opposition to 
which the European Enlightenment was supposed to define itself. The close relation 
between Orientalist practice and Philhellenism, or rather the Orientalist practice that 
Philhellenism was an intrinsic part of, had to deny ‘Greek’ social reality.  
 
From Orientalism to Slavophobia and Back  
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However, the philhellenic imagination of Greece in place of the social reality on the 
ground was not only constructed in opposition to its former Ottoman overlord, but 
also in opposition to its predominantly Slavic geopolitical environment to the North. 
Europe has multiple mirrors and one of them was the Slavic world. These 
Slavophobic tendencies can be traced in the highly inflated liberal spirit of the Greek 
struggle. More precisely, the Greek ‘revolution’ gained much more international 
attention and support than the Serb ‘uprising’. This ‘uprising’, however, in fact 
preceded the Greek struggle. Observe the terminology: While Serbia’s struggle is 
described as a primitive ‘uprising’, the Greek ‘revolution’ appears to embody liberal 
values. This is not a discussion about semantic details. Rather, it is significant insofar 
as Greece could attract widespread support, literary and historiographic reflection in 
Europe, whereas Serbia’s ‘awakening’ was considered to be of a more backward 
variety. So was the Serb ‘uprising’ a more or less primitive peasant revolt while the 
Greek ‘revolution’ was firmly located within a liberal Enlightenment tradition which 
has its origins in a bourgeois merchant community? The conventional wisdom seems 
to confirm this and is best captured by Jevalich and Jevalich: “The Serbian revolt was 
carried on by a peasant people, fighting what was essentially a guerrilla war under 
local military leaders. Serbian society was not sophisticated or highly differentiated” 
(Jelavich and Jelavich 1977: 38) whereas Greeks were perceived to be just that. This 
was despite the fact that none of the initiators of the Etaria had lived under Ottoman 
rule themselves and that the core of the fighting force, the Klefts, were equally of 
peasant origin. This demonstrates, that ‘Orientalism’, if understood more generically 
as a practice of misrepresenting non-European societies for the purpose of self-
reflection, is not in fact limited to the ‘Orient’ but can and does lead to reflections on 
the inferiority of many societies, which are reflected upon differently according to 
specific spatial and social circumstances.  
 
 
6.7 The Enlargement of Europe and the Turkish Mirror 
This chapter started out by stating that European integration, at least in part, solved 
the contradiction between the universal and the particular. This is contradicted by the 
European fortification against its ‘outside’ which reproduces the contradiction in the 
form of Orientalist practices. Regardless of the fact that there are many European 
mirrors that prove this point, the successor state of the Ottoman Empire still occupies 
a unique position among them (Yapp 1992). Significant was the shift of the ‘Turkish 
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Mirror’ in the European self-perception after the end of the Cold War. Turkey’s 1987 
bid for EU membership had its chances of success severely diminished when the 
classical post-World War ‘outside’ of the Warsaw Pact disappeared overnight. With 
the Eastern enlargement of the European Union spelling the definitive end of the Cold 
War as a catalyst for European integration, a fall back on to Orientalist practices 
appeared a readily available surrogate. In 1991 Jan Nederveen Pieterse went so far as 
to say that “Europe’s historic frontier of confrontation with the world of Islam is 
being reactivated” (Pieterse 1991: 6). Thus, paradoxically, the breakdown of the 
Soviet Block, in which the NATO member Turkey played a significant role, has made 
it more difficult to join a Europe where definitional “boundaries had shifted from 
congruence with the line tracing the ‘iron curtain’ to one of civilizational divide – 
defined as religious difference” (Keyder 2006: 73). So when Western Europe rushed 
to embrace its long-estranged Eastern half after the iron curtain had fallen, the borders 
of Europe could now be redrawn according to presumed cultural affinity, rather than 
geopolitical expediency. Or as Müftüler-Bac put it, “the disappearance of the Soviet 
enemy eroded Turkey's position in the Europe. It no longer served a clear function, 
and thus was shunted to the back of the line of candidates for EU membership in the 
1990s” (Müftüler-Bac 2000: 29). The fall of the Berlin Wall did, therefore, not lead, 
as J.G.A. Pocock argued in 1991 (1991), to an opening of European borders but 
simply to shifting them back from Europe’s centre to where they had been prior to the 
Cold War, i.e. along the Greco-Turkish frontier. As Perry Anderson has recently 
observed, this shift of the demarcation between ‘progress’ and ‘retardation’ led to the 
revival of the “successor danger in Islamism”, which, to many “arrière pensées” 
(Anderson 2008),97 translated into a policy of rejecting the Turkish EU membership. 
In the meantime, as with the Orientalist practices of the 19th century, this is at odds 
with the requirements of Realpolitik as the Turkish disenchantment with the European 
project shows signs of producing a geopolitical reorientation of Turkey from Europe 
towards a more assertive, possibly hegemonic role in the region. This includes the 
rapprochement with Armenia and the Kurdish leadership in Northern Iraq, peace 
building in Lebanon, the mediation between Syria and Israel, the US and Iran, Russia 
and Georgia and the active involvement with Hamas. This could be seen as the 
                                                 
97
 Anderson’s claim about a wide-spread European consensus about Turkish EU accession is 
problematic as was re-affirmed by the Franco-German rejection of President Obama’s 
endorsement of Turkish EU accession; see Barysch (2009). This position is in contradiction to the 
UK’s and that of the European Commission.  
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logical foreign policy extension of a pan-Islamic AKP government,98 aiming at a 
disassociation from the West (Oğuzlu 2008). While Turkey’s pacifying role in the 
region is arguably better understood as preparing the ground for a more aggressive 
expansion of Turkish capital, rather than outright geopolitical power into the former 
Ottoman world, it has yet to be seen whether this 21st century re-invention of the Pax 
Ottomanica will be at the expense of Turkey’s traditionally transatlantic and 
European orientation. 
Given this delicate danger of ‘losing Turkey’, the continental European 
opposition to the Turkish EU accession appears to contradict both economic rationale, 
but more importantly the geopolitical order of the day. This contradiction, it is argued 
here, can be explained by Orientalism. The reservations against Turkish membership 
are particularly strong in France, Germany and, in an apparent spirit of 1683, Austria. 
The UK and the US, along with the European Commission meanwhile, endorse 
membership. These different positions can be traced historically in the development 
of different Orientalist traditions. These are not only determined by previous 
geopolitical encounters with Ottoman invaders, but are, coming back to Said, owed to 
the specific fabric of individual mature capitalist societies. Anglo-Saxon liberal states 
build on notions of citizenship and nationalism distinct from race and ethnicity, 
embracing the original French republican model. British encounters with the Ottoman 
Empire, with the exception of the First World War, stand in the tradition of the Pax 
Ottomanica as an institution conducive to British interests, whereas the projection of 
inferiority focussed on the wider colonial world and Britain’s long-standing 
geopolitical rival Russia. The continental notion of citizenship, on the other hand, is 
grounded in the idea of nationalism as ethno-linguistic, biologist and cultural 
divisions reflected in Herder, whereas the collective memory of 1683 appears to more 
alive the closer one gets to the Southeast. Thus, while the former group of states, 
along with the rational European bureaucracy, endorses Turkish membership, the 
latter, more inward looking societies, oppose the incorporation of its long-standing 
‘definitional other’, especially at a time of internal crisis.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
98
 For an insight into the intellectual basis of this new political movement in Turkey see Knaus 
(2007); Özdalga (2000) 
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6.8 Conclusion 
According to Said’s famous treatise, Orientalism produces the Orient discursively and 
authoritatively. What this view tends to undervalue, however, is the concrete 
geopolitical encounter with the Ottoman Empire, which was not an invention of the 
Renaissance or the Enlightenment, but has its roots in the Ottoman advance on 
Europe.99 Ottoman rule and the metaphorical ‘Turk’ served as the definitional 
European ‘counter-image’ from the late 16th century at the latest. This chapter has 
shown, that just as nation-state formation itself is not necessarily a result of a 
capitalist modernity universalizing itself, or intelligible exclusively in those terms, so 
is the practice of Orientalism not reducible to the ‘requirements’ of ‘modern’ 
European identity formation or colonial subordination. Rather, it is a historically 
grown practice. While this practice prevails as an ideational structure, it requires more 
spatio-temporally specific sociological explanations instead of the Orientalist meta-
narrative suggested by Said.  
This also means that ‘Orientalism’ is in fact not restricted to the Orient but 
produces many ‘mirror images’, such as the Slavic world. More concretely, 
Orientalist practice was intensified as a result of absolutist restoration at a time when 
diplomatic exchanges with the Ottoman Empire were on the rise. The European 
dynasts’ preoccupation with the Hellenic struggle was not only born out of sympathy 
with a fellow Christian population rising against a Muslim exploitative regime, but 
was more owed to the crisis of European absolutism at the time. Many European 
enlightened autocrats were faced with the challenge of rebuilding their respective 
realms after Napoleonic rule when, coincidentally, liberal philosophy had shaken 
their very foundations. Their resurrection as legitimate rulers could not merely be 
grounded in restoring former divinely ordained glory, but required some form of 
modernist outlook which had to be meticulously separated from the anti-dynastic 
odour of the French Revolution so as to avoid any chances of real social change. 
Instead, it was their objective to foster a form of post-Napoleonic legitimacy which 
was capable of accommodating Enlightenment political philosophy with the social 
and political reality of maintaining absolutist power. This did not involve the creation 
of a pan-European identity, however, beyond the inter-dynastic bonds manifested in 
the Concert.  
                                                 
99
 Said does in fact mention the European encounter with the Ottomans, as a “lasting trauma” 
contributing to Orientalism, but does not provide a central space for this trauma in his analysis 
(2003 [1978]: 59). 
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Thus, the Ottoman Empire fulfilled two contradicting functions in the 
building of modern Europe, one internal and one external. Internally, ‘the Turk’ 
provided the prime mirror-image that helped in maintaining legitimacy. Externally, 
however, British overseas expansion and Blue Water policies increasingly dictated 
the ‘incorporation’ of the Porte into European affairs. Later, as a result of the – 
uneven – spread of capitalist modernity, representations of the ‘Orient’ changed 
again, always reflecting the ‘West’s’ developmental differences.  
Thus, understanding Orientalism as a long-standing historical tradition, rather 
than a uniquely ‘modern’ practice, implies that it is not restricted to the Renaissance 
or the Enlightenment, but continues to (re)produce forms of religious and cultural 
antagonisms as epitomized in the dominant contemporary “civilisational” discourse 
(Huntington 1996; Müftüler-Bac 2000). These practices frequently clash with the 
pursuit of ‘rational’ foreign policy. 
This Orientalist dialectic between cooperation and conflict with the Ottoman 
Empire goes to show, finally, that the international cannot be understood in terms of a 
Neo-Weberian notion of geopolitics as imposing purely ‘rational choices’ onto 
various actors. Rather, it is necessary to historicise various unique, but inter-related 
social dynamics within their specific contexts.  
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7 Conclusion  
Explaining the Emergence of the ‘Modern’ Post-Ottoman States System  
Towards an Inter-National Historical Materialism  
 
“The destiny of man is accomplished, and his freedom realized by absorption 
within the state, because only through the state does he attain coherence and 
acquire reality. It might, then, seem logical to conclude that such a state should 
embrace the whole of humanity. But this would be, nonetheless, erroneous, for it 
would conflict with another, essential feature of this metaphysic, namely, that 
self-realization and absorption into the whole is not a smooth, uneventful process, 
but the outcome of strife and struggle.”  
Kedourie (1993: 43)  
 
 
7.1 Introduction: The Making of the ‘International’ in the Balkans  
On the highest level of abstraction, this thesis has attempted to reconcile the universal 
with the particular, the international with the social and the material with the 
ideational. This historical reconstruction of Ottoman ‘decline’ has revealed that there 
are no clear cut formulae capable of explaining the historically and socially specific 
resolutions of these contradictions and that, as a result, the eastern question remains 
wide open. This problem appears to be particularly relevant to the discipline of 
International Relations. Whereas they can be contained within the domestic sphere 
through legal and physical coercion, the contradiction between the universal and the 
particular remains, as RBJ Walker aptly put it, “between states, irresolvable” and that 
further “contradiction is guaranteed” (Walker 1990a: 175, quoted in Kratochwil 1996: 
217). The territorial delimitations of political jurisdictions, not only in the Balkans, 
are thus not best understood as uniform and generic ‘outcomes of modernity’, but as 
historically specific products of socio-economic conflicts over power and property 
relations between situated social actors. The constitution and position of these actors 
are continuously shifting as a result of the dialectical interplay of various 
contradictions and social pressures.  
 The following chapter will provide a concise re-statement of the historical 
reconstruction in relation to a series of historiographic, theoretical and conceptual 
issues that the Ottoman case has generated. These results will then be confronted with 
the various attempts within IR theory to conceptualize large-scale change, territorial 
fragmentation and state-formation. This will reveal that a theorisation that avoids 
structural (international or domestic) determinisms and grand theorizations as well as 
causal indeterminacy can be based on the foundations of Political Marxism. Namely, 
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what is suggested here in lieu of these grand abstractions is a radical historicism of 
both categories and practices. However, far away from denying the possibility of 
theory on the whole, this emphasis on the universal need for historicisation within 
historical materialism is itself presented as a general reflection and constitutes, 
therefore, a distinct, independent theoretical position. With regards to the specific 
historical period in question, this also means that a clearer incorporation of ideational 
elements capable of explaining the emergence of national collective consciousness 
into the materialist analysis is required as it helps to clarify assumptions about 
societal multiplicity, coexistence and, as a result, the emergence of various 
nationalisms in the 19th century. As will be argued, such an elaboration of collective 
identity could be accommodated within Political Marxism, without fundamentally 
invalidating any of its major theoretical tenets.  
 
 
7.2 Social Struggles and Ottoman Decline  
This study has shown that the “cracks and fissures” occurring within the Ottoman 
Empire were not the result of modernization (in the sense of an encompassing 
rationalisation process), capitalist imperialism or the permeation of the political 
thought of the Enlightenment, but a long-term consequence of the Ottoman 
geopolitical predicament in its articulation with intra-Ottoman socio-political forces, 
leading to the collapse of the traditional centralised Ottoman land-regime and its 
internally pacifying effects. The territorial fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire does 
not, therefore, coincide with the modernization of political rule, but has to be 
understood as a reactionary response from within the Empire to the restoration of 
Sultanic rule that was trying to superimpose a project of state-modernization on a pre-
capitalist social landscape. Secessionist national state-building projects emerged only 
in response to the Porte’s attempts to restore central power. The re-appropriation of 
surpluses through tighter fiscal control and the attempt to establish a monopoly over 
the means of violence led to a series of reactions in the periphery that culminated in a 
military confrontation in the early 19th century. In the pursuit of this conflict between 
empire-consolidating and empire-fragmenting forces, Muslim and Christian 
populations started recognizing each other as ‘foreigners’. Amongst other things, this 
ultimately led to the unprecedented creation of a territorially defined ‘Greek’ identity.  
The analysis of Greek ‘peripheral nationalism’ (Hechter 2000: 74), therefore, 
confirms parallels to Sandra Halperin’s argument about the “19th century European 
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nation-states [which] inaugurated the rule of the traditional nobility”. For her, 
nationalism was neither a ‘liberal’ mass movement, nor the project of a rising 
bourgeoisie, or a professional bureaucratic state-class, but one of the old semi-feudal 
landed nobility as a reaction “to a growing autonomy of absolutist states and to 
monarchical attempts to rationalize and liberalize state structures” (Halperin 1997: 
53) as a result of geopolitically and socially generated pressures to reform. Equally 
these findings can be associated with what Charles Tilly called a “statist analysis”, 
locating social transformations in semi-autonomous political changes “that produce 
governability crises and threats to political power for the ruling elite” (Tilly 1994a: 
3). The Ottoman reform movements from Selim III in 1789 via the Tanzimat to the 
constitutional period and beyond constitute telling examples of this kind of dynamic.  
 
However, the origins of the intensification of this intra-Ottoman socio-political 
conflict which gained a prominent place in Ottoman/Turkish historiography as a 
centre-periphery conflict (Mardin 1973a; Heper 1980) are to be found within the 
wider geopolitical environment of the Ottoman Empire, namely the intensified 
competition between the Sultan and his Absolutist neighbours. This calls for an 
approach that is capable of integrating geopolitical conflicts with local social relations 
without reducing one of them to an outcome of the other. An exclusive emphasis on 
the modernizing dynamic that is mediated by these geopolitical pressures cannot 
accommodate the specificities and relatively autonomous dynamics of local, regional 
and, only in the last instance, ‘national’ developments. Nor does it explain the social 
origin of the intensified geopolitical competition itself. Rather than being the result of 
an almost mechanical process of homogenizing rule into national forms through 
capitalist, commercial, ideological or military penetration, the new regional interstate 
system in the Balkans replacing the Sultan’s rule over his domains was determined in 
strong measure by a complex succession and diversity of Ottoman class conflicts and 
social struggles over the control of the sources of revenue. As Benno Teschke points 
out: 
While the initial impetus towards state modernization and capitalist transformation 
was [indeed] geopolitical, state [or pre-state, local] responses to this pressure were 
refracted through respective class relations in ‘national’ contexts, including class 
resistance. (2003: 266) 
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This statement, however, has to be extended and re-formulated in so far as the 
management of these pressures, in terms of an imperial response, precipitated 
‘national’ fragmentation.  
 
 
7.3 ‘Backwardness’ and Nationalism 
Assigning causality only to geopolitical processes also overlooks the role of the 
Sultanate as a center of ‘enlightened Absolutism’ and bureaucratic reform. Thus, a 
clear association of national fragmentation with modern IR denies “…the many 
opportunities available (…) for first theorizing and then evaluating the potential 
experiments in multiethnic and multireligious coexistence in the social organization 
of early modern times as alternated models of social and political organisation” 
(Abou-El-Haj 2005: 63). Chapter 6 has traced the origins of this historiographical 
distortion in a geopolitically generated persistent discursive practice of Orientalism. 
Ottoman ‘backwardness’ is, thus, not explicable in these culturalist terms, for it was 
precisely the intention to modernize, rather than Orientalist assumptions about social 
stationariness, that explains the ultimate demise of the last ‘Islamic’ polity. 
Representing this Orientalist distortion, Abou-El-Haj rightly criticises Perry 
Anderson’s famous explanation for the decline of the Ottoman Empire in ‘The House 
of Islam’ (Anderson 1974 : 361–97) on the grounds that “he reduces Ottoman state 
and society to a kind of backdrop to the unfolding drama of world history, which in 
his view is equated with the history of the principal European states” (Abou-El-Haj 
2005: 4).  
Territorial fragmentation equally neither expresses nor reflects a pre-political 
existence of primordial ‘internal’ ethno-linguistic diversity. Diversity has to be 
understood as an outcome, not a cause, defying the common misperception in IR that, 
as Ernest Gellner put it, nationalism “determines the norm for the legitimacy of 
political units” (Gellner 1983: 49). ‘Difference’ was, as modernist theories of 
nationalism rightly point out, ‘imagined’ and politically willed. While this represents 
an advance over primordialism, social engineering per se can equally not explain 
diversification without identifying the social background and political motivation for 
these nation-building projects. One such project was the attempt to engineer a unified 
Ottoman social identity in the mid 19th century, dubbed ‘Ottomanism’. This did not 
fail because of a lack of ‘cohesive power’ and ideological appeal of this concept (as 
opposed to Turkism, Greek nationalism, Arabism, etc.), but because of its 
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combination with a social struggle. The central government from where it originated 
had started re-appropriating surpluses and political power to a degree it had not 
before, thereby antagonizing the peripheral ruling strata, which decided to opt out of 
the social contract with the Sultanate once the costs outweighed the benefits. Thus, 
nationalism cannot be understood as a liberal ideology consolidating a revolutionary 
‘collective agency’ of disenfranchised or bourgeois classes rising against the ancient 
Turkish exploitative regime. The social origins of nationalism, its material 
foundation, the means of its perpetuation and the conflicts that ensued are all 
locatable within the Ottoman ruling strata themselves, rather than reflecting political 
emancipation ‘from below’ or an emerging ‘civil society’ (cf. Mardin 1969). This 
lack of developmental agents also explains why the post-Ottoman national regimes 
were initially unsuccessful in precipitating a large-scale transformation of the existing 
social order after gaining full independence from Ottoman rule. 
 
 
7.4 International Relations, Historical Sociology and the Case of Ottoman 
Decline 
This brief summary of the key analytical findings of this thesis demonstrates that 
secessions and processes of disintegration pose a challenge not only to static realist 
IR theory, but also to theories more conscious of the need to explain change in 
general and the emergence of nationalism in particular. The modernist contradiction 
inherent in the eastern question still needs to be resolved. Both capitalism and 
nationalism entail claims to universality. However, the process of universalization, 
paradoxically, does not result in what is suggested by their internal ‘logics’, i.e. a 
homogenous universal form. Rather, what has come to be accepted as the global 
‘norm’ is functionally similar yet culturally, ethnically and socio-politically 
heterogeneous nation-states. Globalisation, in turn, is meant to transcend this illogical 
process of particularization into divided and divisive national polities and economies. 
However, as both political and economic developments have shown, this process does 
not produce a world-historical convergence towards a ‘borderless’ liberal flatland, but 
continues to generate contradictions, which in turn result in the rearticulation and 
sometimes further particularization of rule, rather than following the proposed 
universalising trajectory. This means that the challenge persists and is also relevant in 
light of more recent examples of secessions which continue to have, through 
processes of ethnic homogenization, a detrimental impact on human rights as well as 
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a destabilizing effect on the international order. This is well illustrated by cases such 
as Kosovo, Ossetia, Abchasia, and East Timor, to name but a few. In short, explaining 
the transformations in 19th century southeastern Europe also has contemporary 
resonance. The following section will elaborate how the re-interpretation of the 
eastern question presented here can contribute to rendering the contradiction between 
the universalizing tendency of modernity and the fragmentation of political rule more 
intelligible. This question will be dealt with by revisiting the various approaches 
within historical IR theory introduced in the introduction.  
 
7.4.1 Constructivism  
Having explored the Ottoman trajectory, the constructivist research programme 
appears to offer great explanatory potential. By focussing on processes of identity 
formation, while at the same time relating these to wider structural transformations 
within international relations, constructivism provides promising inroads for 
understanding Ottoman disintegration. More specifically, chapter 6 has shown that 
constructivism’s emphasis on the relational aspects of national identity formation and 
the inter-subjective creation of meanings helps comprehending the dynamics not only 
of the disintegration process, but also of the shifting geopolitical relations of the 
Ottoman Empire with its European environment. Constructivism is crucial for 
understanding the dialectical process of Greek and Turkish national identity 
formation out of a previously unified Ottoman formation. Once established as a 
dominant discourse, Greek nationalism can be understood as an ‘expansive’ 
nationalism, which triggered a Turkish ‘reactive’ nationalism. These two forms of 
identity were consequently defined in relation to each other, and gradually received 
clear territorial expressions that fuel conflicts in the Aegean and Cyprus to this day. 
But these identities also established further systemic dynamics. Turkism’s exclusivist 
claims, in turn, fuelled emerging conflicts between the Ottoman center and the Arab 
periphery, which initiated the formation of a coherent form of Pan-Arab nationalism. 
Greek claims to the regional dominance expressed in the Megali Idea fuelled Slavic 
and especially the Bulgarian (counter) nationalist movements. Secondly, emphasising 
the possibility of non-bounded forms of territoriality or social epistemes (Ruggie 
1993: 149) is helpful for illuminating other pre-modern forms of collectivities which 
have played a role in these transformations. In the Ottoman case, many multi-layered 
forms of social differentiation existed within as well as beyond the Empire, which a 
realist state-centric analysis cannot accommodate. These sub- and supra-state forms 
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of collectivities include the community of believers and non-believers, Umma and 
Dawla, as well as the state-sanctioned faith-based form of social differentiation within 
the Empire, the Millet system.  
 
However, there are various problems with the constructivist project in light of the 
Ottoman example. In particular, the history of post-Ottoman Greek state-formation 
reveals some problems with Ruggie’s emphasis on territoriality. The ‘package’ 
understanding of modernity, comprising territorial rule, modern political subjectivity 
and the institution of private property has to be dissected into distinct phases of 
emergence and subsequent articulation, rather than being understood as three 
interacting, yet ‘autonomous spheres’ of modern sovereignty that co-emerge 
simultaneously (Ruggie 1993: 157). The history of Greek state formation shows that 
the shift from personal domain to private property relations did not coincide with the 
establishment of national sovereignty and exclusive territoriality. Equally, this 
national polity was not territorially consolidated until the end of the Turkish War of 
Independence in 1923. Thus, territorial secession, the creation of new social 
epistemes and new forms of political subjectivity predate other forms of 
modernization. They are historically disjointed phenomena. It appears difficult, 
therefore, to look for the key to understanding change by ‘unbundling territoriality’ 
when territorial transformations neither necessarily represent nor induce social 
change.  
A much more fundamental problem with constructivism is, however, the missing 
account of the social origin of these inter-subjective meanings and collective identity 
formations. More to the point, rather than collective identities causing change, they 
are an outcome of deeper processes of social change. Thus, even if these identities 
and the differentiation of cultures, ethnicities and races, once constituted and 
consolidated into coherent national societies, transform the nature of the international 
system as a whole, as Hall argues (Hall 1999), they cannot explain the 
transformations that generated them in the first place. Thus, on a conceptual level, 
constructivism fails to identify the source, or the social engine of the disintegration 
process that engendered the construction of social meanings, but was not triggered by 
the differentiation of national identities per se. In other words, nationalism-formation 
is not an autonomous process, but a regionally-refracted derivation of wider 
geopolitical and social conflicts. 
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More specifically, in light of the current example, two important material 
dimensions are absent from the constructivist analysis. Firstly, an emphasis on the 
role of political violence and its inherent capacity to generate and to mould identities 
unintentionally is missing. The onslaught of the formidable combined 
Ottoman/Egyptian forces initiated an unintended process of ‘inter-subjective’ identity 
formation, which finally resulted in the galvanization of the Greek and other post-
Ottoman national communities as they have been naturalized by realist and other 
mainstream IR approaches.  
This raises a second, more crucial point about the limits of constructivism and the 
absence of social dynamics. In this historical reconstruction, the social change that 
occurred during the 18th century was identified as the crucial element in 
understanding the process of disintegration and secession. This ‘feudalisation’ of the 
Ottoman land structure produced a complex and politically unstable class 
constellation. Out of this constellation developed conflicts both between the periphery 
and the center, within the Ottoman Empire and, geopolitically, with the Romanov 
Empire and the European inter-state system in the run-up to the secession of 1821. 
The origins of Greek identity formation can only be understood within this complex 
and multi-layered configuration of social geopolitical forces, which are constituted 
materially and not ideationally.  
 
 On the systemic level, constructivism claims that inter-subjectively 
constituted, shared meanings of anarchy constrain all actors’ behaviour. This could be 
equated to an institutionalist understanding of the 19th century international system. 
Ideational and formalised structures were reflected in the post-Napoleonic Vienna 
Concert, which established rules and norms. On a less formalized level, the balance of 
power system can be understood as an agent-constituted and constraining structure 
which generates a form of order. However, far from establishing the era of peace and 
stability Paul Schroeder celebrates (Schroeder 1983), Russian designs on the Balkans 
and towards the Ottoman Empire were not fundamentally altered, but merely upheld 
as the outbreak of the Crimean War demonstrates. If ideational structures had been 
successful in constraining aggression, the very material British interventions in the 
Greek War of Independence, motivated first and foremost by the desire to balance 
Russian influence, would have been unnecessary. The balance of power in the 19th 
century, to the degree that it was operational, was physically enforced and not merely 
immaterially and normatively maintained.  
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To sum this up: From the historical analysis presented here, it is not clear where 
ideational factors enter the material analysis in a constitutive way. This is not to say 
that ideational factors do not play a role in the transformation. In terms of a causal 
hierarchy, however, they are clearly subordinated to the material factors that led to 
the break-up of the Ottoman Empire. Inter-subjectively constructed identities and 
structures have to be understood as an outcome of materially conditioned social 
struggles within a wider context of geopolitical encounters.  
 
7.4.2 Neo-Weberian Historical Sociology  
If looked at superficially, the findings of this research project could suggest that the 
relevance of geopolitical competition for analysing the social transformations that led 
to Ottoman decline could hardly be overstated. On the systemic level, a constant and 
almost uninterrupted geopolitical rivalry can be discerned historically. Realists could 
read this as a form of structural determination of social transformations. Military 
competition, therefore, appears to be an immutable, constant and essentialized part of 
the nature of Ottoman foreign relations, generated by the mere fact of coexistence 
with the Romanov Empire within an unchanging and unchangeable physical 
environment constituted first and foremost by the Straits Question. Sultan and Tsar 
stand in natural competition towards one another in their pursuit for resources and 
survival guaranteed by the control of physical space, in this case around the shores of 
the Black Sea. While these conflicts became more regulated with the consolidation of 
these societies into modern national territorial states, competition remains, in this 
paradigm, a timeless reality, continued by the Republican and Soviet successor states 
independently of the radically altered internal constitutions. Thus, geopolitical 
competition was omnipresent and forced the previously stable social structures of the 
Ottoman Empire to change in the 17th and 18th centuries. With increased military 
pressure, exercised mostly by the equally pre-modern ‘Empires’ of Austria and 
Russia (Venice earlier), from the 17th century onwards, the Ottoman Empire shifts 
from a position of territorial stagnation to recession after the failed siege of Vienna 
1683, when the first territorial losses in the Balkans were internationally sanctioned 
by the Peace Treaties of Karlowitz 1699 and Passarovitz 1718. Thus, the result of 
increased geopolitical pressure was indeed — as neo-Weberian historical sociology 
predicts — an attempt to consolidate political power in the center through the creation 
of a salaried, modern standing army, an impersonal bureaucracy and a sound fiscal 
basis necessary to fund it. Furthermore, it was by means of emulation of Europe that 
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the Ottoman state started introducing a new army, or Nizam-i-Cedid, under Selim III. 
The previously patrimonial bureaucracy approximated the Weberian, rational ideal 
type and became one of the central agents of modernization (Findley 1980a). Indeed, 
it is precisely these institutional innovations that were started in the late 18th century 
that can explain why the successor state of the Ottoman Empire emerged as arguably 
the geopolitically most successful and formidable ‘unit’ from the selection process in 
the Balkans and the Middle East. Most post-Ottoman nation-states, from Bosnia-
Herzegovina down to the Emirate of Kuwait, have suffered many external and 
internal, sometimes life-threatening challenges. The Republic of Turkey (i.e. the 
original locus of modernization and institutional innovation in the region), on the 
other hand, has retained territorial integrity and enjoyed relative political stability and 
prosperity ever since its foundation in 1923.  
  
However, despite these various convincing aspects, there are, as with 
Constructivism, conceptual problems. On the social level, Neo-Weberians assume 
passive and identical institutional responses to geopolitical pressures from national 
bureaucracies everywhere. Here, the modernizing agents did not emerge from 
aspiring national states, but evolved from within the imperial administration itself. 
Like the Ottoman Empire, the newly founded national states remained coercion-
intensive as they did not radically alter the mode of revenue extraction, but continued 
the long and protracted period of transition started under Ottoman rule towards 
‘modern’ sovereignty. The feudal mode was above all entrenched in the social forces 
that opposed imperial, ‘rational’ consolidation. And yet, with international help, the 
theoretically weaker (in Tilly’s sense), feudal regime of the Greek primates persisted 
geopolitically. It was the Ottoman imperial modernizing agency that created an 
escalating conflict with the peripheral/feudal ‘lords’. This conflict was not ‘won’ 
outright by the ‘rational modernizers’, whose efforts culminated in the Tanzimat, the 
Young Turk revolution and Kemalist state formation. Thus, it is the social struggle 
over the sources of revenue, i.e. a social process rather than one or many 
modernization agendas alone, that explain the emergence of a multitude of states in 
southeastern Europe.  
Theoretically, the neo-Weberian approach cannot account for these 
transformations. This is because it discounts ‘non-rational’ outcomes of social 
struggles as ‘setbacks’ instead of stepping stones in a non-linear process. 
Modernization did not lead to the consolidation of rule, but to the opposite, i.e. to a 
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process of disintegration. Institutional innovations undertaken by the Sublime Porte 
prior to Kemalism did not create ‘competitiveness’ but social contradictions, which 
eventually led to secessions. Geopolitically, on the other hand, the Ottoman Empire 
remained uncompetitive despite various wide-ranging military reforms. While it 
could be argued that the process of decline from 1683 to 1923 should be understood 
as a protracted form of ‘outselection’, leaving a formidable national state, the 
Republic of Turkey as the survivor, it would be highly problematic to force 240 years 
of non-linear social developments into such a unidirectional narrative of decline.  
Secondly, there appears to be a problem with the Neo-Weberian explanation 
of national, ethnic and linguistic differentiation. Internal national homogenization 
and, by extension, external differentiation, are explained as necessities of ‘rational’ 
state-building. Even though this is never made explicit, Neo-Weberian historical 
sociology appears to rely on an implicit primordial understanding of ethnic 
differentiation which becomes politicised only in the modern nation-state. Applying 
an essentialized notion of differentiation implies an unawareness of the various 
attempts to de-essentialize race, ethnicity and nation-formation which reveal the 
political and social origin and cognitive nature (Malik 1996; Brubaker, Loveman et 
al. 2002), rather than natural and biological essence of these concepts (Smith 1992). 
However, if differentiation of territorial rule does not reflect an underlying biological 
or a priori difference, then an explanation for the rational ‘logic’ of differentiation 
itself is missing. Secondly, given this socially constructed nature of ethnicity, the 
process of ethnic homogenization is never finite but circular, which prevents the 
establishment of a stable political order. The history of homogenization is not only 
one of internal ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity committed by 
secessionist and centralizing forces alike. It is also a history of international 
instability and breakdown of ‘order’, as the ‘Powder Keg’ characterization of the 
Balkans illustrates.100  
Furthermore, the nature of military competition needs to be historicised and 
contextualized. Despite the fact that Ottoman/Russian coexistence was highly 
conflictual in nature, this was not owed to a transhistorical law of human coexistence, 
                                                 
100
 The atrocities committed during the Greek War of Independence and the Armenian Genocide 
confirm the relevance of these findings for the Ottoman case (Bloxham 2005; Mann 2005: Ch 5 
and 6) More recently, atrocities committed against the Serb Civilian population by the supposed 
liberators, the Kosovan Liberation Army, in 1999 further illustrate this point. The extent of war 
crimes committed against Serbs, including organ theft, was recently documented by the former 
chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Carla 
Del Ponte, see: Del Ponte and Sudetic (2008).  
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but to historically specific underlying social conditions, namely the necessity of 
‘political accumulation’ confined by the limits of production performance of pre-
capitalist social property relations. In other words, a mere reference to competition 
does not explain the origins of Romanov expansion which originated in the unique 
Russian reproductive strategies developed by Catherine the Great. It appears, 
nevertheless, unjustified to label the geopolitical conflicts that contributed to the 
break-up of the Ottoman land regime as a structural condition of international 
relations when its origins are socially specific. The particular origins of Russian 
expansionism combined with the unique physical geography of the Black Sea and the 
Straits cannot be generalized. There was no natural or inherent drive of Russian elites 
trying to project their ‘will to power’ as classical Realism would have it. Equally, it 
was not the anarchical structure of modern IR that forced them to seek expansion. 
Rather, it was their colonization of the Ukrainian steppe driven by geopolitical 
accumulation that led to a situation whereby the Russian geo-strategic location made 
access to the Mediterranean indispensable for further social reproduction, in this case 
based on an imperative to export newly cultivated crops. Hence, the prospect of 
realizing profits on the world market directed Russian practices. However, this in turn 
was driven by Russia’s own social crisis and the Romanov’s need to raise levels of 
revenue – something that sprang out of their own geopolitical predicaments. Thus, the 
only ‘structural determination’ that continues to dominate geopolitical relations in the 
region was its physical geography. At the core of these geographic structures were the 
Straits as the sole access route to warm water ports. It is this aspect of the geography 
and topography of the region, rather than Russian ‘Orthodox’ sympathies, Pan-
Slavism or outright imperialism which made the Straits, and with it their Ottoman 
gatekeepers, the contested area that it was up until the end of the Soviet Union. The 
Ottoman/Russian competition was, therefore, not generated by a natural drive for 
power-projection, but by the geopolitical configuration around the Black Sea. Yet, 
even this expansionism was neither static nor perennial as instances of Russo-
Ottoman cooperation such as the 1833 Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi illustrate. Russian 
motivations also differed in origin and nature from the competing expansions of the 
Venetians and Habsburgs, which equally contributed to the Ottoman Empire’s 
weakness. However, none of the competitors involved were, in Neo-Weberian 
parlance, national ‘efficient’ or ‘capital-intensive’ states, but largely remained 
‘inefficient Empires’. The most advanced state, Britain, was concerned with the 
preservation of Ottoman rule, and, save the Greek War of Independence, had no 
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designs for outright Ottoman dismemberment until the Sultan’s fateful decision to 
join the Central Powers (Kent 1996: 166, 176). 
 
7.4.3 World Systems Theory  
As with geopolitical competition, it is difficult to deny the impact of the global 
economic transformations inherent in World Systems Theory on the Ottoman society. 
This is also reflected in the wide reception the World Systems approach has received 
in Turkish historiography and sociology. In fact, various changes in the world market 
put the Ottoman economy at a comparative disadvantage and thereby contributed to 
the fiscal crisis that changed the Ottoman land regime and that, in turn, harmed the 
Sultan’s military prowess. Namely, the exposure to competition from the New World 
and the influx of American silver caused inflation and triggered the economic, fiscal 
and social crisis (Barkan and McCarthy 1975; Cizakca 1980; Pamuk 2001). Equally, 
the Ottoman textile industry was negatively affected by the import of British 
production into a previously enclosed Ottoman market. Apart from these wider world 
economic factors that contributed to Ottoman economic weakness and, by extension, 
political instability, there are two more specific ways in which the expansion of the 
world economy induced the process of disintegration. The most obvious one is the 
emergence of a trans-national Christian merchant class. Members of this class 
conspired with ‘Greek’ notables in Russian service to launch the Filiki Etaria which 
coincided with a decline in grain prices in the early 19th century after the end of the 
Napoleonic disruptions had revived pre-war levels of production in Europe. This in 
turn contributed to the socio-economic malaise on the Peloponnesus where the 
agricultural economy had previously benefited from easy access to the war-torn and 
unproductive European markets. This decline in income impacted on a society where 
the struggle over surpluses was already fierce. Combined with the Etarist’s nationalist 
agenda, discontent peasants, military men and notables gradually converged into an 
anti-Ottoman coalition. 
However, this latter example is equally well suited to illustrate a problem with 
the World Systems argument. While it is beyond doubt that these economic factors 
contributed to Ottoman decline, it is difficult to see how they could enter the analysis 
independent of the specific class configurations they ultimately claim to alter. In other 
words, the impact of market inequalities is dependent on the social formations they 
are impacting on. More to the point, national secession did not alter these 
fundamental inequalities and the new Greek state was dependent on loaned money 
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from the City of London, the repayment of which restricted Greek agency just as 
much as financial dependency restricted Ottoman agency. The Ottoman fiscal-
financial crisis only developed into a major factor once the global economic recession 
was thoroughly felt throughout the region in the 1870s.  
Another problem regarding the World Systems analysis concerns the agency 
of transnational merchants. Rather than Greekness being the outcome of bourgeois 
identity formation, it is probably fair to say that the kind of Greek nationalism that 
involved a territorial dimension had no clear social origin and ‘Greekness’ only 
gradually developed into a territorial concept through inimical, violent encounters 
with recognizable enemies (Triandafyllidou and Paraskevopoulou 2002; 
Triandafyllidou 2005). Moreover, the territorial project generated by the discontent of 
a second tier of the Greek merchant community based in Odessa threatened the 
livelihoods of the wealthiest parts of the transnational Greek merchant community as 
it would (and eventually did) destroy the previously unified Ottoman market. In 
particular, the Greek elites of Istanbul were either indifferent or in strong opposition 
to the conflict evolving in the Morea.  
As for the establishment of the rule of law and secure property titles, these 
were not introduced until the late 19th century in either modern Greece or the Ottoman 
Empire. Greek as well as Turkish state formation resembled each other in that 
territorial secession and consolidation did not imply a radical social transformation as 
seen in the Iranian or Chinese cases. As was the case with the formation of republican 
Turkey, “the structure of society, the rules of property, the pattern of class relations, 
remained unaltered” during the Greek secession (Anderson 2008). It should be added 
at this point, that this lack of social transformation is more widely acknowledged for 
the Turkish Kemalist state than it is for the Greek state.  
It is highly problematic, therefore, to argue that secession was institutionally 
necessary for world-market mediated capitalist development, or conducive to the 
incorporation of the Ottoman lands into the pre-configured political superstructures of 
the world economy. Understanding social change as determined by the incorporation 
of the Ottoman Empire into an emerging world economy, i.e. as the result of 
externally imposed capitalist development which spreads in the form of bourgeois 
revolutions cannot account for the complexity of the social struggles underlying the 
transformation (cf. Teschke 2005). Furthermore, this argument cannot account for the 
pre-capitalist nature of the Greek struggle.  
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7.4.4 Uneven and Combined Development  
The social transformations in the Ottoman Empire between the 17th and 19th centuries 
are only intelligible when considered within their geopolitical and world-economic 
contexts. Thus, both geopolitical as well as global economic transformations are 
important causal factors for explaining this transformation. However, it appears that 
the two most pertinent approaches in the Historical Sociology of International 
Relations, the Neo-Weberian competition model and World Systems Theory operate 
with limited and reified ontologies of ‘the international’. On the one hand, this 
exclusive emphasis on the geopolitical and the world economic respectively 
constitutes a problematic limitation preventing a fruitful theoretical synthesis. On the 
other hand, this problem derives from an a priori, rather than sociological derivation 
of the respective concepts of ‘the international’.  
In developing this concept sociologically, the theory of uneven and combined 
development (U&CD) claims to overcome these shortcomings. Applied to the 
Ottoman case, U&CD argues that the historical transformation that led to the 
emergence of a new international system in southeastern Europe commenced with the 
uneven development of the Ottoman Empire as compared to its Austrian and Russian 
neighbours. Inter-action with these – relatively speaking – more advanced societies 
led to the changes in the Ottoman land regime and the institutional innovations 
described in chapter 3. The struggle between a feudalising land regime and an 
Ottoman centralizing bureaucracy, which started to emulate institutions from its 
external environment, can be understood as a process of ‘combination’. Finally, the 
social contradictions this process of ‘combination’ produced, led to further social 
struggles eventually culminating in societal differentiation and the territorialization of 
this conflict during the Greek secession of 1821. This set in motion a new inter-
national dynamic, the preliminary, but by no means final, outcome of which was the 
formation of modern Turkey in opposition to the new Greek expansionism (Özkirimli 
and Sofos 2008). The cycle of uneven and combined development is complete. 
Societal differentiation, reflecting uneven development, has, through interaction, 
generated further international dynamics that combine with existing social structures, 
propelling social change elsewhere. In light of the Ottoman example some problems 
with the theory of uneven and combined development nevertheless arise. This 
concerns the historical concretisation of its two central analytical categories, ‘society’ 
and the ‘inter-societal’ as well as the inscribed notions of ‘inter-action’ and 
‘combination’.  
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Problematizing the Social  
As the concept of the ‘inter-societal’ relies on an ontological clarity about the 
delineations of the ‘social’, this should be problematized first. The process of 
Ottoman disintegration constitutes but one example illustrating that this is far from 
clear in the pre-modern world, if it is in the modern world. The constitution of 
‘unevenness’ and the definition of pre-territorial ‘boundaries’ of ‘the social’ remain 
unclear even within the established inter-nation-state system of contemporary 
southeastern Europe. In the case of the late Ottoman world, the much debated 
conceptual distinction between ‘state’, ‘nation’ and ‘society’ is reflected in a complex 
web of identities, which, like in the case of the Greek exile merchants or the Umma 
and Dawla concepts of a dualistic worldview are entirely non-territorial in nature. 
This is not to argue that it suffices to replace territorial societal forms with 
transnational ones. ‘Greekness’ itself was a contested concept, which was only partly 
reflected in the contradictory visions of the Greek Enlightenment (Veremis 1990; 
Carras 2004). The various pre-territorial attempts to craft collective identities, from 
‘Greekness’ over Pan-Slavism to Turkism did not necessarily create uniform forms of 
consciousness. Examples like the role of the ‘Greek’ nobles in Russian service, the 
Orthodox clergy on the Sultan’s payroll and the Albanian ‘Muslim Bonaparte’, Ali 
Pasha, who took up arms against ‘his’ Caliph, are all indicative of the fact that the 
definition of the social as ‘society’, and by extension the ‘inter-societal’ as a distinct 
realm of ‘inter’-action are problematic if applied to the current example.  
In general, relations of personal dependence were not necessarily the rule. 
The allegiance of freely roaming peasants and bandits within the Morea shifted 
constantly according to casual opportunities to generate income in various ways. At 
the beginning of the struggle some joined the Ottoman army, some joined Ali Pasha’s 
forces while others preferred to organize themselves. Other forms of income 
generation were found in pastoral reproduction in remote geographical, mountainous 
areas, plundering Christian and Muslim villages alike. At sea, piracy became a 
common mode of subsistence on many Aegean islands. Warlords, including the 
Sultan himself, and merchants offered many pre-capitalist forms of employment. This 
non-territorial and de-personal and yet pre-capitalist form of subsistence calls into 
question the idea of identifiable stable pre-capitalist social relations or even whole 
societies. Yet it was, above all, these freely roaming, un-socialized peasants who 
constituted the backbone of the Revolt as ‘brigands without a cause’. This goes to 
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show that identities were always overlapping and changing and are not sufficiently 
explained by relations of personal dependence and kinship in the pre-capitalist era.  
 In more abstract terms, this shows that U&CD builds on sociological 
categories derived from 19th century Western Europe without taking into account the 
historically specific constitution of these categories. This recognition is not least 
important since the institutionalisation of the study of bounded societies within 19th 
century academia served a specific national socio-political purpose. Equally, national, 
homogenised societies are themselves the result of violent (geo)political processes 
specific to the 19th century, rather than a passive structure within which these 
processes occur.  
 
Problematizing the ‘Inter-National’ 
To these problematic sociological categories, U&CD now ads, as a derivative, the 
‘inter-national’. In the specific setting of the 19th century Balkans, one concrete 
appearance of ‘the international’ would be the Vienna inter-state system, which 
chapter 4 has shown to have had a significant role for the transformations in question. 
However, there are various significant social actors and, by extension, historical 
developments that sociologically constitute ‘the international’, the concept of 
‘unevenness’ cannot capture because they escape a clear inside/outside bifurcation, 
even if understood in non-territorial terms. Specifically, the centrality of provincial 
relations in the history of Ottoman decline does not fit this clear dichotomy. 
However, pointing out these complexities does not imply that it suffices to simply add 
another layer of ‘the provincial’ and to replace a binary ontology with a triad model 
of interaction as all social relations are historically conditioned and therefore 
constantly shifting. The central Ottoman administration had relations with Europe and 
Russia as well as with the various provincial magnates and power-holders. The 
transnational appeal of Pan-Slavism and the variable role of Orthodox Christianity 
‘combine’ with each other on various levels and not just via an inside/outside 
dialectic. This process of ‘combination’, moreover, does not necessarily further 
‘development’, but sometimes produces more backward formations, or indeed does 
not lead to meaningful social change at all.  
Another question pertains to the impact of a new inter-national post-Ottoman 
order in the region. Did the further differentiation change the rules of the game in the 
sense that, what used to be ‘social relations’, had now become ‘inter-societal 
relations’? In fact, the aftermath of the Greek secession did have long-term effects on 
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the whole region from the Bulgarian to Turkish state formations with some questions, 
such as the Macedonian, unsettled to this day. Hence, even the new inter-national 
order in the Balkans begs the question as to whether new kinds of interactions can be 
logically derived from the fact of ‘co-existence’. As a matter of fact, the emergence of 
an inter-state system created new dynamics. Even though old social conflicts residual 
already within the Ottoman Empire were re-formulated within the new spatial layout 
of the region, the emergence of inter-nation-state relations did change the rules of the 
game. The significance of this reformulation into various nation-states lies in the 
geopolitical situation that followed which has been aptly described as a ‘Powder 
Keg’. This juncture, thus, gave rise to a quasi-realist geopolitical dynamic which 
continues to be fuelled by reciprocally reinforcing state-forming wars. This means, 
however, that a clearly identifiable notion of the international and a realist ontology 
become applicable only once inter-societal relations are containerized within modern, 
territorially bounded nation-states. Specific forms of inter-action, such as ‘society’ 
and ‘the international’, therefore form historically specific categories that cannot be 
derived from the presumed ‘facts’ of ‘multiplicity’ and ‘co-existence’.  
 
Social Change as Moments of Combination  
What the historical reconstruction has demonstrated is the importance of the process 
of differentiation, as opposed to an a priori assumption about difference. The 
challenge this thesis tried to meet was an explanation for the concrete historical 
processes of societal division that occurred between 1821 and 1923. It was shown 
how a political, violent and competitive process created mutually exclusive as well as 
constitutive narratives of ‘self’ and ‘other’ out of the Ottoman social whole. This is 
not to say that uneven development does not constitute a form of differentiation, but 
simply that it does not constitute the only form. Here the role of social and political 
struggles is crucial. Indeed, one major channel of these struggles was violence and 
war. Only with the arrival of a modernizing Ottoman and an effectively modernized 
Egyptian army, does the conflict generate two clearly delineated, ethnically 
homogenous and territorially bounded ‘societies’. Thus, while uneven development 
has contributed to producing the contradictions that ultimately led to the outbreak of 
the conflict, it is not unevenness per se, but the process of ‘combination’ that 
generates further differentiation. This crucial moment of ‘combination’ escapes 
abstraction and can only be revealed through concrete historical enquiries. In the 
Ottoman case, ‘combination’ is violent since the introduction of modern warfare by 
 234
the French-trained Egyptian army is a crucial factor that explains the emergence of 
unprecedented radicalized identities and ethnic divisions. This goes to show that 
social delimitations and, by extension, the international, are politically constituted 
categories, which are not only a reflection of ‘unevenness’ but which are politically 
willed and socially engineered processes of differentiation.  
 
By way of conclusion, it can be argued that the theory of U&CD does shed 
light on one certain, important aspect of inter-action between ‘backward’ elites and, 
broadly speaking, the ‘whip of external necessity’. While important, this cannot 
replace the need for a holistic explanation of Ottoman decline, such as the one 
presented here. U&CD helps comprehending the emergence of an Ottoman 
modernization movement, while neglecting at least one other central aspect of the 
transformation, notably national secessions and nation-formation. Moreover, as 
U&CD relies heavily on ‘the inter-national’ as a master-category explaining 
transformations everywhere, it seems that the very processes constituting these 
ontologies historically would need to be formulated on the level of theory, rather than 
left to concrete historicisations. In other words, nation-formation needs to be built 
into the abstraction, not least since U&CD in fact “lacks any tools for specifying the 
causal properties of those processes of social life to whose multiplicity and interaction 
it draws attention” (Callinicos and Rosenberg 2008: 86). It can be argued therefore 
that U&CD, at the level of abstraction where it is articulated as a ‘theory’, holds little 
explanatory guidance for any concrete investigation like the one presented here while 
ascribing a transhistoricity to its central categories they arguably do not possess (cf. 
Davidson 2009: 17f).  
 
In relation to the present study, this means that the use of certain generic 
terms, such as ‘the geopolitical’ or ‘the social’, has to be seen as a shorthand for a 
historically specific semantics that refuses to operate with these categories as 
‘modernist real-abstractions’. Thus, geopolitics is understood here as the variable 
politics of organising space by historically situated actors which cannot be reduced to 
a perennial ‘inter-societal/communal’, while it also stresses the agential politics of 
these geo-processes that cannot be mechanically derived from the structural 
imperatives or constraints of a transhistorical notion of the ‘inter-national’. Defined in 
such terms, it has been shown in the present case that geopolitics is shaped by the 
actions and practices of individual, personalized ruling dynasties more than 
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‘societies’ or ‘states’ in a modernist, collective sense.101 In this way, a historicised 
notion of the geopolitical is upheld, while avoiding its limitation to a realm of ‘inter-
action’ between ‘Russia’, ‘Austria’ and an Ottoman ‘society’. In other words, the 
Ottoman experience suggests that it is much more useful to unlock these 
methodological constraints and to start from an assumption about all social actors as 
multidimensional and complex. This, then, equally applies to the other categories in 
which the theory of uneven and combined development operates, i.e. ‘society’, ‘inter-
action’, ‘unevenness’, ‘backwardness’, ‘development’, and ‘combination’, all of 
which require careful historicization before being employed as analytical tools.  
 
7.4.5 Political Marxism 
One re-emerging criticism of uneven and combined development is, therefore, that its 
underlying ontology is in fact based on the history of European capitalist modernity, 
which rules out its universal or transhistorical application (Ashman 2009; Davidson 
2009). One answer to this can be found in Political Marxism’s emphasis on the 
historical specificity of socio-economic conflicts. The intelligible, yet unpredictable 
and unintended outcomes of these conflicts generate historically and regionally 
specific – politically constituted – appearances of ‘the social’ and geopolitics. This 
should not be understood, however, as leaving the explanation to historical 
contingency. Political Marxism simply builds on the notion of specific, materially 
conditioned social struggles and privileges, thereby privileging agency over structure. 
As stated earlier, this turn towards historical specificity suggested here should equally 
not be read as a flight into historiography, but as a theoretical position that stresses 
the historicity of the very theoretical categories deployed to analyse specific 
instances of historical concretion and a corresponding aversion against the 
temptations of grand theorizing.  
What is proposed here is a more simplified dialectical understanding of social 
change (Heine and Teschke 1996). This still allows for an understanding of local 
struggles within specific geopolitical settings, which are, however, themselves 
constituted by specific social relations and struggles. This is illustrated by the post-
Napoleonic Vienna system of states and the various ways in which it moulded the 
specific center-periphery conflict within the Ottoman Empire. This emphasis on the 
                                                 
101
 This should not be read as a replacement of the ‘inter-national’ by the ‘inter-dynastic’, but as a 
reminder that geopolitics is constituted by a variety of historically and regionally specific social 
actors engaging in a variety of practices. Defining this realm merely in terms of ‘inter-societal’ 
‘inter-actions’ obscures precisely those specificities that can account for the variation in outcomes.  
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dialectical and historical nature of social change and geopolitics offers an escape 
route from various forms of geopolitical or economistic international determinisms.  
 
This also means that the relationship between nationalism, territorial sovereignty 
and capitalist development cannot be subsumed under one totalizing meta-narrative of 
‘modernity’. Post-Ottoman state formation demonstrates that the identification of a 
plurality of states with effective capitalist or other forms of modernization cannot be 
sustained. Capitalism, as a way of determining social relations, does not require or 
presuppose the ‘national’ organization of individual societies or the interstate system, 
even though it might be intrinsically compatible with it (cf. Rosenberg 1994). 
Contrary to the view of a ‘structural’ or ‘logical’ link between capitalism and the 
nation-state, Hannes Lacher and Benno Teschke argue that ‘the inter-stateness of 
capitalist political space cannot be explained by reference to the nature of capitalism 
or the “laws” or “logic” of capital’ (eg Lacher 2002: 148; Teschke and Lacher 2007). 
While this argument is in principle supported by the findings of the preceding 
historical enquiry, it does not explain the origins of the distinctive national form of 
territorial rule.  
However if the disintegration of a so-called multinational Empire is not owed to 
the appearance of a specifically capitalist or modern way of ordering political rule 
along ‘national’ lines, this also means that the Ottoman Empire was not the big 
anomaly or the ‘Islamic Alien’ setting camp in southeastern Europe, as the Orientalist 
tradition would have it. While the Ottoman’s historical nomadic origins do lie in a 
tradition of geopolitical accumulation (Teschke 2003: 95f ), the same is true for most 
European dynastic states. For both, the Ottoman, as well as the European states, this 
nevertheless remained a historically specific strategy of reproduction which did not 
survive into ‘modern’ territorial interstate relations. The Ottoman Empire entered a 
process of territorial consolidation which was codified in the 1699 Treaty of 
Karlowitz. This set in motion a process of far-reaching socio-economic as well as 
institutional adaptations so that at the time of the secessions, Sultanic power was 
comparable to the enlightened Absolutist contemporary dynasts in Europe.  
 
Conversely, neither does the emergence of ‘national’ sovereignty indicate the de-
personalization of political rule. Exploitation was still carried out through extra-
economic means and political relations remained highly personalized through 
patronage and clientelism within the new national polity. This is not to say, however, 
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that theories of nationalism are inadequately portraying the historical uniqueness of 
nationalism as a distinctive form of political and social organization. Nationalism 
eventually constitutes distinct, mutually exclusive, social formations and, by 
extension, creates the anarchical and geopolitical conditions of modern international 
relations. Neither modernity nor capitalism, however, can serve as an explanation for 
the initial emergence of a multiplicity of nationalisms (Lacher 2005; Teschke 2005; 
Teschke and Lacher 2007). It is thus the premodern social origins of the post-
Ottoman nationalisms that are capable of illustrating that the prevailing modernist-
Marxist ‘capitalist reductionism’ as an explanation for the specifically national 
character of state-formation needs to be reconsidered. The historical specificity and 
social complexity of the emergence of these national movements, which were deeply 
entrenched in the various premodern and pre-capitalist social constellations and 
conflicts, do not lend themselves to notions of an automatized universalization of 
Western models of popular or national sovereignty. Equally, this process did not 
occur in isolation and according to strictly ‘internal’ dynamics. However, it is to say 
that national insurrection is not intelligible without developing an understanding of 
“the determinate long-term consequence of centuries of social conflicts over rights of 
domination and appropriation over land and people amongst pre-capitalist classes” 
within the Ottoman lands (Teschke and Lacher 2007: 570). It is important at the same 
time to avoid a replacement of an unreflected modernist functionalism with a 
primordial essentialism (Smith 1991). As Ray Kiely put it: 
“Recognizing difference here should not be confused with an uncritical 
celebration of cultural particularism, or what often amounts to the universal 
indifference of difference. Rather, it is based on the recognition — denied above 
all by Hardt and Negri [2000] — that capitalism has not ‘created a world after its 
own image” (Kiely 2005: 48). 
 
As this historical reconstruction of Ottoman decline has shown, fragmentation of 
rule is best understood as a specific, but materially driven process. This material 
element is constituted by locally situated class conflicts over sources of revenue. 
Within this dynamic there are two important aspects that need to be added to a 
historical materialist analysis in order to understand the process of national 
fragmentation in the Ottoman case. On the one hand, these conflicts, once they enter 
into a stage of mass violence, create collective identities that are reflected by the 
respective political subjects themselves as well as by their international environment. 
In turn, these emerging structures establish both material and ideational structures. 
These understandings of nationalism(s) are present in realist and constructivist 
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analysis respectively. Once constituted as an outcome of social struggles, nations are 
to this day reified and, in this sense, do amount to a socially generated normative 
structure through which inter-state relations are usually channelled.  
Without taking into consideration the socio-economic and geopolitical origins of 
these structures that Political Marxism emphasises, they cannot be made intelligible. 
Ideational ‘forces’ in and of themselves, can neither explain the Ottoman center-
periphery conflict, nor the military campaigns, both within the Ottoman Empire as 
well as between the Sultan, the Tsar and the European Great Powers. In other words, 
it was not just a simple ‘transplant’ of modernity, but complex and multi-layered 
social conflicts that led to the very gradual and interrupted transfer of European 
models of sovereignty to southeastern Europe. This is not only of historiographical or 
conceptual relevance. It also helps emphasizing that political violence does not 
necessarily create order (cf. Kalyvas, Masoud et al. 2008). Rather, ‘nations’ and the 
contemporary inter-national geopolitical layout do not represent a ‘natural’ or finite 
order of things, but are subject to change by the very social forces that created them 
in the first place.  
 
 
7.5 Towards an Identity Agenda in Historical Materialism  
While due care needs to be taken to avoid an essentialization or overdetermination of 
the concept of geopolitics, as the current research has confirmed, this does not deny 
its importance for a meaningful historical sociological analysis However, it has also 
shown the historicity of the concept of society itself, which means that any 
formulation of ‘the inter-societal’ as a generic ontology is problematic for it is a 
derivation of a transhistorical understanding of the social as (national) society. 
Instead, geopolitics is a historically contingent category, the definition of which 
always depends on changes in the social make-up and practices of its ‘constitutive’ 
parts, be they classes, religious groups or, indeed, national states.  
 
Furthermore, the historical reconstruction of Ottoman decline presented here 
has shown that a strict delimitation of the ideational from the material as practiced by 
mainstream International Relations Theory is problematic. The biggest challenge 
continues to be the development of an explanation that avoids two recurring 
problems. One is the subordination of a variety of social forms, such as the nation or 
territoriality to a grand totalizing narrative of the expansion of European capitalist 
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modernity. On the other hand, an epistemological arbitrariness, which enters a variety 
of factors into the analysis without clarifying any form of causal hierarchy, such as 
Michael Mann’s IMEP model, appears just as difficult to implement historically. 
Material and ideational factors are both relevant, but are not simply ‘co-constitutive’, 
or inter-related. Rather than making generic statements about either the relevance of a 
variety of factors, or the exclusive preference of one factor over another, this 
historical reconstruction constitutes an attempt to reconcile the material with the 
ideational by emphasizing specific material class configurations as the origin of 
struggles. These eventually determine the nature of ideational, and ultimately, inter-
national, structures, through which further struggles are geopolitically mediated. This 
is not only important for explaining the emergence of multiple nationalisms or 
‘difference’ more generically. Introducing the ideational as a materially determined, 
yet nevertheless socially relevant category, can also contribute to developing 
historically more sensitive notions of geopolitics that escape the trap of operating a 
static inside/outside ontology (cf. Walker 1993).  
 
The ideational element underlying the study of international relations is ‘the 
national’ as the contemporary, fragmented, form of ‘the social’. While Political 
Marxism provides the most promising opening towards understanding the various 
dialectical social struggles that led to the specific territorial configuration of the post-
Ottoman world, it is not without shortcomings with regards to explaining the social 
origin and role of the national character of territorial sovereignty. Considering the 
process of collective identity formation in pre-capitalist societies within a broad 
historical materialist understanding of social transformation is essential for explaining 
multiplicity. Frederick Dufour’s work represents a major step forward in this 
direction (Dufour 2007). While his recent intervention did provide some valuable 
theoretical and historical advances on how to reconcile the study of nationalism with 
Political Marxism, it was demonstrated that the relationship between nationalism and 
modern sovereignty needs to be understood even beyond the context of social 
property relations and uneven capitalist development. In contrast, it was argued here, 
that the origin of collective identities that came to be reflected historiographically as 
‘nations’ have various and specific origins which cannot be attributed to a single 
‘modern’ or ‘capitalist’ homogenizing force. Thus, a reconciliation of historical 
materialism with a non-statist, non-static and de-essentialized, but historical 
understanding of the social that acknowledges the malleability both of the abstract 
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nature as well as the specific historical content of collectivities, should constitute the 
natural building block of a theory of the inter-national.  
 
Proposed here, instead of a futile quest for a new grand narrative of nation-
formation, is a historicisation of the specific social struggles that led to different 
manifestations of ‘the national’. Within these historically specific processes of 
identity formation, the effects of mass violence and total war can play a central role. 
Without falling back into a Neo-Weberian trap of geopolitical (over)determinism, this 
concerns the constitutive role of war and geopolitics. Adding the social effects of 
mass violence to the study of the material origins of social transformations can 
improve the understanding of the post-Ottoman trajectories which continue to leave 
their mark on contemporary international politics. Social differentiation is understood 
here as a specific rather than a natural outcome. However, succinctly pointing to the 
origin of a social dynamic in the material world does not prohibit a reflection on the 
ideational outcomes of this transformation or prevent claims about the future social 
relevance of these structures. Indeed, because they constitute the central categories of 
IR, the ideational outcomes in the form of multiple collective identities are crucial 
beyond the post-Ottoman context. Theories of nationalism have, usefully, pointed out 
that this ‘inside’ was ‘nationalized’ only relatively recently. However, as Miroslav 
Hroch’s apt critique of modernist theories of nationalism has revealed, it was equally 
not a path-dependent process in tune with a large-scale project of teleological 
modernization, but the result of specific social struggles.  
 
 
7.6 Conclusion: The Infinity of the Eastern Question 
In a similar vein, it is argued here that the emergence of the geopolitical system in 
southeastern Europe is best understood as the outcome of dialectical social struggles. 
However, as the establishment of the inter-national ‘order’ has not resolved the 
material/ideational, international/social and particular/universal contradictions, the 
eastern question(s) – historiographically, (geo)politically and conceptually – remain 
unanswered and continue to pose “the double challenge - to produce a sociology at 
once historical and international” (Halliday 2002: 245). The historical reconstruction 
of the process of Ottoman decline presented here confirms that these historical and 
social specificities are reconcilable with a historical materialist approach that 
incorporates historicised concepts of geopolitics. It has also shown, furthermore, that 
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nation-formation is best understood as an open-ended historical process. The 
continuing intra-Ottoman social struggles after the Greek secession led to more 
‘tormented births’ (Al-Khafaji 2004) of national states in the Balkans, the emergence 
of a variety of Arab nation-states, imperialist penetration and the Armenian genocide. 
However, this is a continuous process as was confirmed by the 2008 creation of an 
independent Kosovo, the continuing prevalence of the Kurdish question in Turkey, 
Iran, Iraq and Syria, the persistent division, despite some progress, of Cyprus, the 
unclear future of the ‘FYROM’ and multiple other post-Ottoman conflicts. 
 
In other words, this study has shown, that not even the historical complexities 
that ultimately produced the ‘Balkanization’ metaphor (i.e. an association of 
inexplicable chaos, unpredictability and exceptionalism), require a submission to the 
epistemological and ontological indeterminacy of poststructuralist thought, the realist 
structuralist-positivist stasis, or the denial of social theory altogether. While ideational 
structures are important and relevant, they are politically composed outcomes of 
material social struggles. It is these persistent social changes that produce new 
eastern, western and other world political questions that lie at the heart of the 
discipline of International Relations.  
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Appendix  
 
i Maps 
 
Map 1: Dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire since 1683 
 
Source: Shepherd (1923: 164) 
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Map 2: Greek territorial gains 1832-1947 
 
Source: Cagé (2006 ) 
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Map 3: The Growth of Russia in Europe 1300 – 1796  
 
 
Source: Shepherd (1923: 164) 
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ii Chronology of events 
 
1451 
 
Mehmet II ‘The Conqueror’ 
 
1453 Conquest of Constantinople 
 
1481-1512 Bayezid II 
 
ca. 1520 Selim I defeats the Mamluks in Arabia and Egypt 
The conquest of the Holy Sites of Mecca and Medina means that Selim I 
becomes the first of the Ottoman Sultans to assume the highest spiritual office 
is Sunni Islam, the Caliphate.  
 
The title remains attached to the Ottoman Sultan until Kemal Atatürk 
renounces the Caliphate in 1924, one year after the foundation of the Republic 
of Turkey. Wahabi separatists in Saudi-Arabia started challenging the 
legitimacy of the title in the light of the perceived heresies committed by the 
Young Turks since the early 20th century. 
 
1541 
 
Occupation of Buda by Suleyman the Magnificent  
1654 
 
Establishment of the ‘Sublime Porte’ 
The bureaucracy organized under the Grand Vezir’s office is separated from 
the Sultan’s household 
 
1656 Mehmet IV hands over his executive powers to Grand Vizier Köprülü 
Mehmet Pasha 
 
1683 The second Siege of Vienna fails  
The Ottoman Empire reaches the peak of its territorial expansion  
 
1687-1691 Suleyman III 
 
1691 Ahmed II 
 
1695 Mustafa II 
 
1699 Treaty of Karlowitz 
The loss of Hungary; for the first time the Sultan is forced to cede territories 
 
1718 Treaty of Passarowitz 
Ceding Serbia to Austrian rule  
 
1718–30 Tulip Period  
Attempt to consolidate Sultanic power within Istanbul through a program of 
decadent mass consumption for rivalling Istanbul elites  
 
1725– 1789 Abdulhamid I  
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1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (also spelled Kuchuk Kainarji) 
The Ottoman Empire cedes most of the Black Sea shores to Russia;  
Russia expands and distorts Article VII of the treaty into a right to protect all 
Orthodox Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire. The Sultan reacts with a 
similar claim to protect all Muslims in Russia (specifically the Crimean Tartar 
Muslims) by re-invoking the title of the Caliph.  
 
Article XI opens the Straits to Russian commercial vessels  
 
1783 Russian occupation of the Crimea  
In a clear violation of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, Catherine the Great 
forces the Tartar question in the Crimea which had been left open by the 
previous treaty negotiations.  
 
1787 The Ottoman Empire declares war on Russia over the Crimea  
Austria later joins the Russian war effort hoping for spoils in the Balkans  
 
1789 Selim III  
Most historical accounts see this as the beginning of modernisation  
 
1791 Separate peace with Austria at Sistova 
 
1792 Treaty of Jassy  
Ending the Russo-Turkish war, another humiliating defeat for the Ottoman 
Empire cements the Russian annexation of Crimea, whilst Russia withdraws 
from the Balkans. The Dniestr demarcates the Ottoman/Russian frontier. 
 
1793 
 
Introduction of the New Order (Nizam-i-cedid) 
New Model Army and a new treasury for funding the new army corps ‘Irad-i 
Cedid’ are created. However, it does not survive due to strong resistance from 
the landed nobility and Janissaries whose surpluses the new fiscal regime had 
threatened. 
 
1797 Rigas Velestinlis’ Greek Revolutionary Proclamation 
 
1798 Napoleonic invasion of Egypt  
This leads to the creation of a modern standing Egyptian army.  
 
24 June 1798 
 
Execution of Rigas Velestinlis in Belgrade 
1804 Outbreak of the first Serb revolt  
Misrule and overexploitation by Janissary corps lead to a peasant uprising, 
initially in alliance with the central Ottoman administration.  
 
1804 Russian invasion of the Principalities 
Ottoman-Turkish war over dominance in Romania, Walachia and Bessarabia 
(lasts until 1817). 
 
1805 Edirne Event 
A coalition of notables from the Balkans marches towards Istanbul threatening 
to attack the Nizam-I-Cedid troops. Selim III gives in and re-locates the new 
corps to Anatolia.  
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1807 Deposition of Selim III 
Rise of Janissaries and stop of Selim III’s centralising reforms; Selim is de-
throned as a result of growing pressure from the nobility and still powerful 
Janissaries; the Nizam-I-Cedid troops are dispersed; followed by a brief 
interregnum by his cousin Mustafa IV. 
 
1808  Mahmud II 
 
 Deed of Alliance (Sened-i Ittifak) 
Agreement between the ayans and the Grand Vizirate 
Compromise between central administration and local (military) power base 
Formal acknowledgment of hereditary land rights 
 
1812 Treaty of Bucharest 
End of Russo-Turkish War with Bessarabia and parts of the Caucasus ceded to 
Russia; from this point onwards Russia is willing to let the Serb cause slide in 
favour of a stable Balkans – in the light of the Napoleonic invasion of Russia; 
River Proth as new Ottoman/Russian border 
 
Sept 1815 Foundation of the Filik Etaria in Odessa 
beginning 
of 1815 
 
Start of successful challenge of the ayan’s power by Mehmed II 
Followed by the successful establishment of modern, centrally controlled army 
1817 Establishment of the tributary fiefdom of Serbia  
semi-autonomy under Russian guardianship  
 
1820 Ensuing conflict between the Ottoman centre and Ali Pasha of Janina  
March 1821 Outbreak of a Revolt in the Principalities by Alexander Ypsilantis 
Due to the lack of local support this attempt is quickly aborted 
 
April 6 1821 Rising in the Peloponnesus  
Declaration of the Revolution by Bishop Germanos;  
This revolt this is less centrally planned and organized if compared to the rising 
in the Principalities, however much more successful.  
 
Easter Monday 
1821 
Assassination of the Ecumenical Patriarch Gregory V  
The patriarch and other high ranking Orthodox clerics are assassinated in 
Istanbul by Janissaries in response to the Greek uprising.  
 
11 September 
1821 
Massacre of Tripolis  
30000 Muslim inhabitants killed by Greek insurrection 
 
January 1822 Constitution of Epidaurus proposed by notables and Phanariots  
22 February 
1822 
Ali of Janina (Tepedeleni Ali Pasha) is beheaded by Ottoman forces 
March 1822 Chios Massacre 
82,000 Greeks were killed, ca. 50000 enslaved and 23,000 expelled in an 
Ottoman/Egyptian onslaught on the Island  
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Mid 1823 End of neutrality of European powers  
Sparked by the reprisals of the Ottoman/Egyptian forces against the Greek 
civilian population. Lord Canning accepts Greeks as official belligerent party. 
 
1824 First loan to the Greek uprising from the City of London 
On 14 January 1824, the Greek deputies Andreas Louriotis and Ioannes 
Orlandos reached London and on 9 February they signed the loan agreement 
with the bankers Loughman and O'Brien. The amount was 800000 pounds but 
only 280000 were actually given to Greeks. The total interest was 520000 
pounds plus the 8.5% on the nominal value 
 
1826 Annihilation of the Janissaries in Istanbul by Mahmud II 
The New Order Troops now constitute the core of the Ottoman military. 
 
4 April 1826 Protocol of St Petersburg:  
Proposal to establish a third Principality by Russia and Britain (and France), 
Russia was the assigned mediator between the OE and the Greek insurgency: 
This agreement came about as the result of an Anglo-Russian détente carefully 
conceived by Lord Canning to establish British hegemony in the region in 
cooperation with Russia, circumventing the continental contenders. 
 
7 October 1826 Akkerman Convention 
Establishing the Principalities and Serbia as de-facto Russian protectorates. 
Regulating the status of the Principalities: Ottoman forces are evicted and the 
relation to the Porte is relegated to a merely tributary one.  
 
6 July 1827 Treaty of London 
Plan to establish an autonomous but not entirely independent Greece (By 
Britain, Russia and France; in the Spirit of St Petersburg).  
 
20 October 
1827 
Battle of Navarino  
Destruction of the Ottoman Fleet by the Great Powers during the Greek War of 
Independence. 
 
February 1828 Capodistrias to become first Greek President 
The supposed new president Count Capodistrias is released from Russian 
service and arrives in Greece via Switzerland. 
 
April 1828 Internationalisation of the Greek War of Independence  
Russia, Britain and France formally declare war on the Ottoman Empire; 
Russian forces cross into Moldavia; preparing the ground for a further 
‘liberation’ of other Balkan (client) states. 
 
September 1829 Polignac Project 
The French foreign minister Polignac proposes to Russia to divide the Ottoman 
Empire between them. 
 
 
September 1829 Treaty of Adrianople  
Ending the Russo-Ottoman War: Bessarabia, the Danube Delta and parts of the 
Caucasus (Georgia) are lost to Russia, wake-up call for the British and French 
to consider Russian occupation of the Straits a serious option.  
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Nov 1829 – Feb 
1830 
London Conference 
Discussion over the future status of Greece 
 
Feb 1830 London Protocol 
In the absence of a stable Greek indigenous government the decision was taken 
to establish a Greek Monarchy headed by a European Prince, but not from the 
dynasties ruling any of the Great Powers.  
 
12 December 
1830 
Milos Obremovic declared Prince of Serbia  
Consolidation of Serbia as a hereditary autonomous principality with Russian 
guarantees but with a continuing tributary relation to the Ottoman Empire. 
 
October 9, 1831 
 
Assassination of the first Greek president Capodistrias  
This was caused by clan rivalries and shed doubts on the prospects of a 
functioning central Greek state.  
 
1831 Mahmud II officially abolishes the timar 
 
18 May 1832 Establishment of a fully independent Kingdom of Greece  
 
21 July 1832 Treaty of Constantinople 
Fixing of Ottoman/Greek borders and Convention between Britain, Russia, 
France and Bavaria as guarantor powers: Installation of the Bavarian Prince 
Otto of Wittelsbach as the King of Greece 
 
21 December 
1832 
Battle of Konya 
Mohammed Ali occupies Syria out of dissatisfaction with the lost Greek War 
where he had been promised major spoils for his participation in the war effort.  
Mohamad Ali’s Son Ibrahim virtually destroyed the main Ottoman Army and 
set forth a credible threat to take over the Empire altogether.  
 
May 1833 Convention of Kutahya 
Greater Syria comes under Muhammad Ali’s control for his lifetime whilst he 
retains an inheritable reign over Egypt.  
(While Syria is handed back promptly under Great Power pressure, only 
Nasser’s coup d’état in 1952 ends the ‘Albanian’ rule over Egypt).  
 
8 July 1833 Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi  
Defensive pact between Russia and the OE in the face of Muhammad Ali’s 
threat and after the refusal of France and Britain to help; included a clause 
whereby (despite the promised mutual assistance) the Porte was exempted from 
sending military forces; but was obliged to close the Straits to all non-Russian 
vessels. 
 
1833 Installation of the Translation Bureau (Terciime Odasi)  
Foreign Relations are increasingly conducted by Muslim, professional salaried 
officials instead of Greek Dragoman interpreters suspected of sympathies with 
the Greek revolt. This translation bureau constituted the social foundation of 
the ‘Young’ movements 
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1833 Establishment of the Autocephalous Church of Greece, 
This includes the renouncing of relations with the Ecumenical Patriarchate (an 
Ottoman institution), which were restored only in 1850. 
 
1835 End of the Regency in Greece 
Direct monarchical rule by King Otho begins 
 
1838 Anglo-Turkish Trade Convention (Baltalimani Convention) 
Abolishment of trade monopolies and introduction of low uniform tariffs.  
Effective implementation of Free Trade policies in the OE. 
 
21 April 1839 Mohammed Ali’s son Ibrahim crosses the Euphrates  
Mohammed Ali launches a second military attempt to seize power in Istanbul. 
 
23 June 1839 Battle of Nezib 
Ibrahim Ali deals a fatal blow to the Ottoman army leaving an open route to 
Istanbul  
 
1 July 1839 Abdulmecit I 
 
November 1839  
 
Tanzimat decree (Hatt I Sherif of Gülhane) 
(also: Gülhane Rescript)  
Beginning of full-scale modernization  
 
1839 Establishment of distinct Ottoman ministries 
Most importantly this included Foreign Affairs, Interior and Finance as well as 
the renaming of the Grand Vizier to ‘Prime Minister’. 
  
1840 Introduction of the commercial code 
Establishment of dedicated trade courts.  
 
1840 Establishment of the Ottoman central Bank 
 
July 1840 Convention for the Pacification of the Levant 
Muhammad Ali is expelled from Syria after an international coalition saves the 
Sultan’s rule for the second time. Ali remains constrained to Egypt after his 
repeated attempts to challenge the Sultan. For the first time, the Ottoman 
Empire participates in an international conference as a party with full rights 
and duties.  
 
July 1841 Straits Convention 
Russia, Britain, Prussia, Austria and France agree to close the straits to any 
warships, safe the Sultan’s allies. 
This is mainly a defensive act against Russian ambitions and constitutes a 
significant step in the development of international maritime law. 
 
 
3 September 
1843  
First coup d’état against King Otto  
 
 
March 1844 First Greek constitution 
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1847 Start of consolidated land registration in the Ottoman Empire 
New land deeds recorded in new defterhane (land registry) 
 
March 1854–
February 1856 
 
Crimean War 
As a result of the conflict between Orthodox Russia, Catholic France and the 
Porte over the guardianship over the Holy Sites in Palestine, Russia blames the 
Sultan. 
 
1854-57 Blockage of Piraeus by the British Navy  
Britain aims to contain Greek territorial ambitions. 
 
1856 Islahat Fermani 
State within the state for the Armenian community.   
 
30 March 1856 Treaty of Paris  
Ending the Crimean War, the Ottoman Empire formally becomes a legitimate 
member of the Concert of Europe: Article VIII: admission to “the public law 
and concert of Europe” 
 
February 1856 Introduction of a citizenship law (Hatt-i Humayun Rescript)  
Equality of all members of all millets before the law; ‘equality’ of all Ottoman 
subjects; law of citizenship 
 
1858 
 
Introduction of a liberal Land Code (Arazi Kanunnamesi) 
The liberalization of transfer of state lands to individuals establishes de-facto 
private property rights. 
Corresponds to French concept of public domain (droit foncière de l’état; 
Türk.: âmme) 
 
October 1862 Revolution against the Othonian regime in Greece 
1864 New Greek constitution and enthroning of King George, Prince of 
Denmark  
The King from the House of Schleswig-Hostein-Sonderburg-Glücksburg grants 
the new prime minister Venizelos considerably more scope of action. 
The Land Reform permits expropriations on behalf of landless peasants.  
Venizelos’ power base is a rising bourgeoisie, in opposition to established 
landholders.  
 
1869 Ottoman Law of Nationality 
 
1861 Abdülaziz 
Continuity of Modernisation; however Abdülaziz puts more emphasis on the 
title of Caliph. 
 
1871 Distribution of National Lands in Modern Greece 
 
1873 World Economic Crisis 
Turmoil in the financial markets affect both the young Greek state as well as 
the Ottoman Empire. Austrian banks operating within the Ottoman Empire 
collapse; European capital starts retreating. 
The already highly indebted Ottoman finances suffer a loss of capital. 
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1874 Crop failure followed by great famine 
 
1875 Bosnian uprising  
strategic dimension with Austria Hungary at its doorstep  
 
October 1875 Ottoman State Bankruptcy  
declaration of suspension of payments 
 
1876 Establishment of the Dette Ottomaine  
Tax collection under Franco-British authority 
 
1876-7 
 
Ottoman Constitutional Experiment 
The Young Ottoman reform effort culminates in the short-lived introduction of 
an Ottoman constitution and parliament  
 
1876 Bulgarian ‘April’ uprising 
 
1876  Abdülhamid II   
The reactionary ‘Neo-Absolutist’ restoration on the basis of ‘Islamic values’ 
puts an end of the constitutional experiment. 
 
1877 Russo-Turkish War 
The Russian attempt to recover territories lost during the Crimean War is 
coordinated with the declaration of principalities of Romania, Serbia and 
Montenegro, which had already enjoyed semi-independence under Russian 
guardianship. 
 
1878 Treaty of San Stefano 
Establishment of a Greater Bulgaria; creation of a foothold for Russia in 
Europe.  
 
1878 Treaty of Berlin 
Dismantling of Russian ambitions in the Balkans by creating a smaller, fully 
independent Bulgaria at Ottoman territorial expense.  
(Alexander Joseph of Battenberg as first ‘Prince of Bulgaria’) 
 
22 May 1878 Romanian independence under King Carlo I 
(Karl I of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen) 
 
1880 Abolition of the Tithe in Greece 
 
1908 Young Turk Revolution (also: ‘Rose Revolution’ )  
Empowerment of the ‘Committee of Union and Progress’ 
Second constitutional attempt  
 
1912-15 Armenian genocide 
 
29 May 1912  Outbreak of the Balkan Wars 
Greece, Serbia and Montenegro, with Russian support, declare war on the 
Ottoman Empire. The coalition splits, however, over the Macedonian question 
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May 1913 Treaty of London 
Establishment of the territorial inter-state order in the Balkans that is to last 
until the outbreak of the First World War.  
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iii Glossary  
 
âyân Local notables (communal leaders); tax-
collectors by government appointment; 
replaced the timariot 
 
Bey provincial administrator (lord) 
beytu mali-lmuslimin the treasury of the Muslims: describing the 
work ethic of the early Ottoman bureaucracy 
  
çiftliks 
 
Large landholdings (tax farms) 18th and 19th 
centuries in the Balkans and Anatolia (quasi-
hereditary) 
 
dar-al-ahrb House of War  
dar-al-islam House of Islam 
dawla Realm of non-believers  
(modern Arabic: state) 
 
defterhane Land registry (Tanzimat period) 
derebeys Old notables; lords of the valley 
devşirme Child levy  
Exercised in the Christian areas of the 
Balkans, this tax was the main source of 
recruitment for slave soldiers and 
bureaucrats until the 18th century 
 
eşraef Form of Local Notables (ayanlik): 
recognition by communities by social 
stratification;  
bureaucratic-military elements associated with 
the government; not necessarily the same as the 
17th century rising ayan  
 
evkaf  Directorate of vakfs 
 
iltizam (Egypt) New government tax farms  
Here, the tax is arbitrarily fixed by the 
government which enables short-term increases 
in surplus-extraction possible 
 
istiglal Land right (right to usufruct) 
 
kanun Sultan’s law 
 
malikane  Life time lease on land 
 
meşvere 
 
Consultation 
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millet; (pl.: millel) 
 
Community of people (modern translation in 
Turkish and Arabic: ‘nation’) 
This could apply to any group or formation, 
not only communities of faith or language. 
The four biggest millets reflected religious 
communities: Muslims, Byzantine/Greek 
Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox and Jews 
 
millet-i hâkime Ruling class (millet) 
millet-i- islamiye Umma (see below) 
millet-i mahkûme 
 
Ruled class (non-Muslim communities; most 
commonly used meaning) 
mülk 
 
Private land, mulk: right of full ownership and 
alienation, as well as right to the usufruct of the 
land. 
 
miri State-owned land, individually rentable right to 
usufruct  
 
nizam-I-Cedid New Order, launched by Selim III 
nizam-I-Cedid Ordusu Ottoman New Model Army 
örf-I sultani Sultanic verdicts; sovereign prerogatives  
 
rakabe Land title  
reaya (hereditary status) 
(also: raiyyet) 
Peasantry 
sancak  Administrative region 
sened-i htifak 
 
Deed of Alliance 
serasker Commander in Chief, Minister of War, and 
garrison commander and police chief in the 
capital. 
 
şeriat The good, pious (Islamic) order 
 
siphai Landlord/knight Tax farm (timar) holder 
 
Şura Council 
 
tanizmat reorganization, referring to the large-scale 
reform of Ottoman in the 19th century (1828) 
under Abdulmecit I 
 
terciime odasi Translation office  
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timar traditional Ottoman fief in return for military 
service as siphai (tax fixed on the basis of 
actual revenue) 
 
üsür Tithe 
 
ulema Clergy 
umma (arab), ümmet (turkish) Community of believers 
 
vakf state owned, religiously legitimated land for 
communal use 
 
vali Local governor 
 
vilayet Province 
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